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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Arthur W. J. Lewis, M.P.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

by Arthur W. J. Lewis, M.P.

ONE of the most basic of all Human Rights is the right to know the truth.

'The truth shall set you free' (and by secrecy ye shall be enslaved). In Britain today, subject as we are to Official Secrecy, it is legally wrong for people to know unless officially permitted to know.

With hindsight, we view with uncomprehending horror the evils of slavery as depicted in *Roots*. We do not see so clearly the manifestations of slavery in contemporary society. It has been stated so often that knowledge will forever govern ignorance and yet we fail to notice the control exerted upon us by those who have access to information from which we are debarred. We work and toil in submission to the domination of fiscal manipulation. The quality of our lives is determined by those who control world finance.

The control of money monitors the direction of scientific research and also monitors the release of information acquired from research. The complexity of high finance coupled with the use of secrecy places our economic fortunes and the scope of our existence into the hands of those who lust for power.

The Official Secrets Act, now on the Statute Book, is essentially the 1911 Act which was nodded through Parliament at a time of spy hysteria. Barely 35 minutes of debate and the citizen lost his right to know.

The Attorney-General, Sir Richard Webster, in a speech of sixty-seven words, persuaded Parliament to introduce a law which, as one MP remarked at the time, 'Upset Magna Carta altogether.'

In an atmosphere of casual unawareness, the very basis of democracy was thrown away. The 1911 Act destroyed the free flow of information between the Government and its people and today we suffer Government of the people by the Government and for the Government.

Democracy, translated from the Greek, means literally 'the rule of the people'. In ancient Greece, Athens became the most influential democracy. Its leading ideas were law, freedom and equality.

The sovereign authority of democracy was the Assembly which decided by majority. In the Assembly and popular courts almost the whole people

participated, and as the counsel and magistracies were continually changing their personnel, the people became the actual rulers. Every citizen had full liberty of speech, and of course was able to be appraised of all the facts pertaining to matters of state in which he had an interest.

The democratic ideal, or the ideal of 'open government', is the basis for our own parliamentary democracy which over the years has proven to be a successful and much copied form of government. Over the years, however, a degree of ossification has occurred, and it is probably true to say that the majority of the public in the United Kingdom feel somewhat divorced from their government and machinery of administration.

Democracy in Britain is deteriorating into a totalitarian type bureaucracy or, to use the phrase of Lord Hailsham, Britain is becoming an elective dictatorship.

Excessive and officious secrecy has been recognised by all political parties as a matter in urgent need of reform.

The Labour Party is committed to replace the Official Secrets Act with a measure to put the burden on the public authorities to justify withholding information. That committment can only be achieved by repeal of the Official Secrets Act and its replacement with Freedom of Information Legislation. Such legislation must concentrate secrecy where it belongs and where it can be enforced and yet give the widest possible access to information that is compatible with state security and individual privacy.

Here are the cardinal requirements of a democracy in relation to Freedom of Information:

1. The Right to Know. This is the concept of true open government and must not be confused with the exposure of Parliamentary Debate on Television. The right of Parliamentarians to know must be established before a peep show can have any significance.
2. The Right of Privacy. The first major exemption from free disclosure of information is that of privacy. Personal information shall not be freely divulged or distributed if it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
3. The Right to Inspect. Each individual would have the right to inspect records concerning him personally and check the veracity of them. (Special limitations being made for categories of police information where this would be manifestly undesirable as a blanket provision.)
4. The Right to Correct. Each individual would have the right to correct information about himself that was demonstrably incorrect. Under the existing laws errors occur which cause defamation by mistake or malicious intent and the individual is condemned without trial.
5. The Right that only Valid Information may be Disseminated and Used by the Administration. This is probably the most vital point affecting administration and administrative law. Each organ of public administration would be required to ensure that their information is as accurate and valid as possible before relying on it. It means in effect

that not only must administration be done but that it must be 'seen to be done'.

6. A Right of Rapid Action before the Courts to enforce the above rights, in which the burden of proving the necessity of withholding or not correcting information lies on the government, and where costs are borne by the Government if the plaintiff substantially prevails. This is an essential practical aspect of such legislation. The spirit of the original American Freedom of Information Act was frustrated by the agencies' ability to create excessive unrecoverable costs for individuals seeking access to information, through delays and side issues. Further, the plaintiff had the burden to convince the court that the withheld information, which he did not have, should be released over the objections of the agencies, who said it should not. The substance of the amendment passed in 1974 was that the agencies should prove why information should not be released; provision was made for in-camera inspection by the Court; and plaintiffs do not need to be exclusively members of higher income brackets.

Freedom of Information legislation established upon these fundamental criteria will achieve a true openness in government, and fulfil the Manifesto promise upon which the present Government was elected.

Although the principle of freedom of information asserts that all information shall be potentially available to the public, exceptions to the principle must be made for both reasons of principle and practice.

Once the principle of freedom of information is accepted, it is the exceptions to it that will cause the greatest debate.

An obvious exception will be sensitive information pertaining to national security. Police information, in the main, must remain confidential in order that criminal investigation may succeed. Similarly, matters concerning certain foreign affairs must needs be non-disclosable. Cabinet meetings should also remain secret.

However, there is a lot to be said for a degree of liberalisation of even these aspects of governmental information, where this is possible without causing unwarranted disruption or danger to the national or public interest. Indeed, the Government have already proposed to liberalise the laws regarding official secrets. If the principle of freedom of information is accepted as a desirable and needed reality in our political life, then exceptions to that principle must be carefully and constantly scrutinised lest the purpose of such an Act be defeated by the exceptions. The degree to which such exceptions would be allowed to take effect would, of course, be the subject of parliamentary debate at the legislative stage. In later practice it would depend upon firstly the willingness of the various government departments to follow the spirit of the law, and secondly on the courts' vigilance in balancing the interests in cases of dispute. Such weighing of interests is a rightful function of the courts and it is proposed that where information is withheld under one of the grounds of exemption the courts would be enabled to inspect in camera the information withheld, and rule upon its

disclosability. If such a provision were enacted, it would be a logical proposition that the burden of proof should lie with the withholding entity to show what public interests would override the claimant's interest in obtaining the withheld information. In this respect the American model would be worth following.

An objection that has been raised to putting such matters in the hands of the courts is that judges would not necessarily be well qualified to balance the delicate interests involved in withholding information. Judges are mortal men. However, there are few men who have more experience in weighing and balancing interests. If our judges, who constitute some of the finest minds in the land, cannot be trusted to decide wisely, who is more fit?

Where exceptions and limitations of the freedom of information principle arise, who draws the lines once Parliament has set out the principles of exemption from disclosure?

The answer is in the first instance that the lines between what information is given and what is withheld should be drawn by the official responsible for releasing the information. Where his judgement is challenged the courts might be called upon to intervene.

Where line-drawing is concerned, the Common Law of this country, reinforced by the principles of equity where necessary, is quite equal to the task. Common Law principles can only be baulked by badly-worded statute law, where the draftsman has become so involved in catering for every future possibility that he can think of, that the principles become confused.

The answer is perhaps to leave as much of the line-drawing to the courts as is feasible. Provided that the principles and the interests to be considered are clearly set out in establishing the exceptions to freely available information, and if the recourse available again follows the line of the American model by giving freedom of information actions the highest priority in the courts' calendar, then the courts, having sufficient room to manoeuvre, would rapidly establish a body of case law to guide both the public and the administration. These precedents would be based on actual problems that have arisen, rather than imaginary or direly prognosticated difficulties of delineation. This approach has worked well in all other aspects of law where the legislative intent has been clear.

The Government is committed to abolish the Official Secrets Act and to introduce an open form of government. But once in power a government tends to forget the promises on which it was elected. The Home Secretary has told the House of Commons that he will introduce reform of the Official Secrets Act in the next session of Parliament. He has changed the promise from a commitment to replace, to an offer of reform. Although his proposed reform has not been published, Merlyn Rees has stated that it will be in line with the recommendations of the Franks Committee. The infamous Section Two will be renamed and called an Official Information Act.

The recommendations of the Franks Committee have no relevance to open government, the terms of reference of that committee were directed towards tidying up the Official Secrets Act.

By talking in terms of a liberal reform, Mr. Rees has misled the TUC and the Labour Party into believing that he intends to carry out their wishes.

It is important for all concerned to realise that changing the name of the Official Secrets Act and giving it more teeth is diametrically opposed to the reform promised in the Manifesto, repeated in the Queen's Speech in November 1975 and restated as a priority in the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee's publication of July 1976. This priority was unanimously endorsed by the TUC Congress and the Labour Party Conference in the early autumn of 1976.

Thoughtful people of all political persuasions throughout the country share with me the view that one of the most important reforms which could be achieved in this Jubilee Year is the restoration of Magna Carta by restoring to the people of Britain their Right to Know the Truth.

Never before in our history has it been so important for the individual to know the truth. Decisions are being made in the field of nuclear energy which will commit the future human race to act as caretakers of our radioactive refuse into eternity. A new priesthood of dedicated men and women must come into existence to stand guard over radioactive waste, through war, pestilence and famine, for millions of years to come. The technology needed to guard and contain that waste must be preserved as securely as the waste itself. Even though our civilisation dies and is lost, thousands of tons of plutonium must be guarded by scrupulous husbandry for millenia to come. Decisions of this magnitude involve every one of us in the responsibility we all possess for the future of the human race. There are no soft options in this field which will permit us to leave such decisions to the so-called experts. These are decisions in which each and every one of us bears the burden of responsibility. 'The extermination of future generations diminishes me because I am involved in mankind. And therefore never ask whose responsibility it is, the responsibility is thine,' as John Donne might well remind us.

If we are to bear this burden we cannot do so in ignorance. We have a right to know all the facts. Bland assurances that radioactive waste is the biggest non-problem of the century should give us dire warning that the experts accept no responsibility for the future of mankind. They skulk behind the Official Secrets Act and imagine that decent men and women do not care.

Another field in which secrecy today is blighting every life is money. We are all victims of a mysterious malady which pervades the world economic scene. Despite the longest peace in history and unimagined advances in technology, we all find ourselves getting poorer. We hear dim rumours of secret meetings of the top world financiers. The media keep silent and our economic future is decided for us behind closed doors in a Devonshire hotel. Knowledge is power and those who can use that power to manipulate the management of money on a world-wide basis have us all enslaved. It is secrecy which places into the hands of a tiny minority the power to control us all.

The concept of open government is not always easy to grasp when one has lived in a country which has not had an open form of government. It should be borne in mind that freedom of information is not a party political issue. Rather, it is politic that we should have such legislation in this country at the earliest opportunity, as lack of a more open government system is currently damaging our ability to survive as a democratic society.

It should be considered how a Freedom of Information and Privacy Act would influence the various sectors of our society. It could indeed produce a radical change in our way of life.

For the press, there would be an opportunity to present its readership with accurate and complete information on any topic. The press would be able to give a coverage of governmental and political matters such as is almost impossible currently.

Today, the press all too often have to rely on published conclusions or figures, which are often based on raw data which is not available to be inspected or challenged. This would be a great incentive to maintain the highest standards of competence and integrity within official administrative bodies.

For the medical profession there would be an opportunity to find out what exactly the Department of Health and Social Security are doing with the information that they receive, and upon what information the DHSS recommendations concerning medicines or treatments and other related matters is based. For the patient there would be the opportunity to establish the validity of his medical records, and to ensure that only his medical records were maintained by Government departments, and not other irrelevant information as may very well exist presently.

For industry, there would be greater opportunities to establish what governmental policy is in relation to industrial matters, and the reasons for those policies. As there is no reason to suspect that the same information is available to the Trades Unions either, the possibilities for improved industrial relations, through both labour and management being apprised of the current facts, it is not unduly fanciful to suppose that there may be new ways opened by which an amelioration of the present conditions in industry could be brought about.

For the individual there would exist the opportunity of being well informed as to the current progress of any particular political or administrative event, whether nationally or locally, and the possibilities of effective participation therein. Additionally, the citizen would find his rights to privacy protected and would be secure in the knowledge that even if false information were to find its way into government files for one reason or another, there would always be the possibility of correcting this information and that no great harm should result from it, and if it does, then adequate remedies would be available.

For the politician in Parliament, there would be many advantages of a Freedom of Information Act. Firstly, many of the inquiries and constituents' problems that a Member of Parliament receives are due to the constituent's

inability to get the information he requires to solve his problems from the government department concerned. When the individual constituent is able to handle matters of this sort directly or through his own lawyer, this would free the Member of Parliament's time for the more pressing matters of state and more major problems. Secondly, important issues for debate would be enhanced if Members of Parliament were enabled to be fully informed of all the relevant data concerning the subject under discussion. At present, access to data is strictly limited to what individual departments feel inclined to give their Minister, or leak discreetly to the press.

For the administration, there would be a greater exchange of valid data with the public, industry, the press, the unions and other bodies and this should have an enhancing effect upon the validity of the data used for governmental studies and decision-making. There would also be an increased self-respect and mutual trust between the administration and the citizen. Where mutual confidence exists that information in the possession of the government will be well treated, and where this can be seen to be the case, then trust can indeed become a 'two-way street'.

In summary, it may be said that an effective Freedom of Information and Privacy Act could bring about radical improvements in our way of life in this country, and it is probably true to say that whatever one's political aims and aspirations, or whatever one's particular hobby-horse is, it would be enhanced by a Freedom of Information Act.

Freedom of Information, privacy and the rights to know, to inspect and to correct are simple issues to grasp. They fit our Anglo-Saxon traditions and mores like a hand into an empty glove. We have been missing them for a long time from our political life.

Once we have such legislation, we will wonder how we managed without it. And the question will remain—did we?

Let us celebrate the Queen's Jubilee Year by restoring true democracy to the people.

[Arthur W. J. Lewis, Labour Member of Parliament for Newham, North West, is Chairman of the Parliamentary All-Party Committee for Freedom of Information.]

JUBILEE THOUGHTS ON POLITICS

by Paul Rose, M.P.

IT is a curious coincidence that at the age of sixteen I joined the Labour Party officially in the same year that H.M. Queen Elizabeth II was crowned. In a very different way, therefore, this is a jubilee year in politics for me. Even more coincidental is the fact that my political baptism was as a 'number snatcher' at the 1945 General Election. The results were still coming in when I had my first glimpse of royalty in the shape of the popular King George VI on a tour of North Wales.

It was there, on the annual one week's family holiday in a 'bring your own food' private house at Llandudno, that I learned that something remarkable and hopeful had happened. It made my father, a veteran of the hunger marches, who rarely took a drink, declare his intention of going out to paint the town red. At that age it seemed a strange idea and anyway I couldn't understand where he would get all the paint.

Our landlady, to my utter ten-year-old incomprehension, declared undying loyalty to Lloyd George whom I vaguely associated with the First World War and a now irrelevant Liberal Party. This seemed to be the dawning of a fixed two-party system representing workers and capitalists dominated by the quiet, firm and compassionate major Attlee and the imposing figure of Winston Churchill, whose inspiring oratory would now seem curiously out of place in a more pedestrian House of Commons.

By the time of the Coronation, Labour's post-war Government, with considerable achievements to its credit, had apparently run out of steam. Its task of post-war reconstruction and the foundation of the welfare state was completed but the socialism of the visionaries whom I had digested in formative years of reading while at grammar school seemed as far away as ever. It seemed wrong that Labour could collect more votes than their Conservative opponents and yet lose—a factor which has never been lost upon me when proportional representation is still despised as a Liberal heresy by many members of the Labour Party.

A long barren period in Opposition followed, in which opposition became almost a habit—a way of life which one enjoyed in a perverse sort of way. It was natural that within the context of the Labour League of Youth and Student Politics the majority of us rebelled against the Bevin-Deakin brand of social democracy dominated by right wing block votes and flirted with factions of the revolutionary left which were as irrelevant as they appeared exciting.

Unfortunately, the habit of opposition and the tradition of protest rather than positive and realistic action is difficult for some members of the Party to unlearn. Labour still has to be the party of protest as well as power if it is to retain the idealism which brought in a whole new generation of red-brick graduates into Westminster in the wake of the Education Act two decades earlier. But only as a party of power is it anything more than an

emotional luxury for those with outsize consciences.

The period up to the climactic year of 1956 was the most formative for me and I suspect nationally in shaping our current political spectrum and developing our attitudes. That period still reflected the divisions of the thirties.

The political education stemming from the Left Book Club and the ferment of ideas in a citizens' army fighting fascism had borne fruit in 1945. Complacency and material affluence in the 'never had it so good' age later personified by Mac the Knife or Supermac was being challenged in strange books about class and symbolised by John Osborne's play *Look Back in Anger*. Meanwhile, the tendency towards 'private wealth and public squalor' analysed by Professor Galbraith was affecting the consciousness of the new generation of Socialists and was to be an important theme in the 1964 General Election.

The year 1956 stands out above all as the most formative. Communists tore up Party cards in public and liberal-minded Tories joined in protest over the Suez fiasco. A glance at today's Parliament will reveal the remarkable influence of the political ferment which followed in the wake of Suez and Budapest. It was also the year in which Britain's real power in the world was dramatically demonstrated. It was our relegation into the second division. Just as Attlee saw the reality of the Indian sub-continent and Queen Elizabeth did not inherit one title from Queen Victoria, so Macmillan and Macleod recognised and accepted the wind of change in Africa.

However, a candyfloss bonanza was enjoyed by all as our basic industries declined. Germany, Japan and the U.S.A. were busy developing their industrial base and China was to flex its nuclear muscles as four dominant trading blocks began to emerge. Only too late did Britain realise that going it alone with rosy visions in the twilight of Empire was placing us in a position analogous to post-Imperial Spain.

The spectre of nuclear war and confrontation in Europe had been replaced by a pattern of war by proxy and internal subversion as the Third World asserted its voting strength in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Even communism became multi-centred in Moscow, Peking and Belgrade and now a new Euro-communism poses a fourth possibility. Slowly and imperceptibly, the Empire on which the sun never set was turning towards the continent from which it emerged. All this was hidden as the car and telly, the holiday abroad and a free health service were the glittering prizes of the post-Coronation era. Working people had never known such prosperity and party political activity declined steadily.

Sporadic radical protests, C.N.D., Sharpeville, and above all Suez, punctuated this decline. Community politics and conservation were to become the 'in thing', reflecting the fragmentation of an anonymous community. The result of this alienation is now seen in a virtual multi-party system at Westminster, widespread acceptance of direct elections by P.R. to Europe and a lack of automatic traditional political commitment to the major parties among the new generations.

The political map had changed substantially but its context had changed even more. The interdependence of economics has challenged the primacy of political power and called into question just how far any British government, whatever its political complexion, has room to manoeuvre other than within strictly defined limits.

However, other changes of mores which were independent of economics characterised the second period of Labour rule after thirteen years in the wilderness. Divorce law, homosexual law reform, abortion, the abolition of capital punishment, easing of censorship were no more than a legislative recognition of the changing values prevalent among the growing ranks of the new products of higher education.

But within this more tolerant or permissive society were backlashes and signs of unrest far removed from the protests of the radical young. Racial discrimination and violence became a feature of inner city life where urban decay mirrored the American pattern. Industrial strife became a British disease as old machinery, lack of investment and old-fashioned craft unions contrasted starkly with the German economic miracle. Crimes of violence increased as expectations became greater. The balance of terror had given way to the frustration of young men and women with no cause or war to fight and some created their own.

The Festival of Light is one manifestation of a puritanical yearning for old-established values in the face of frightening changes. It is the atmosphere in which authoritarian attitudes could well flourish and private armies motivated by fear show the insecurity that afflicts the middle class for whom the world has become a confusing and menacing place. Bob Dylan put it in the most famous of protest songs, 'Your Old World Is Rapidly Changing'.

Che Guavera became a symbol for one radical section of a generation benefitting from the welfare state and the Education Act with no Hitler to fight. Other youngsters are beginning to fall for the ugly scapegoat mentality of the Nazi-minded National Front. But the majority are still part of the commercialised cults of the pop star Manchester United or some esoteric, pseudo-religious money spinner. Dropping out has been the answer of a small minority to a society which caters increasingly for material needs but which has largely lost the sense of community that still existed to a great extent at the time of the Coronation. Only a tiny fringe in the Angry Brigade took their hostility to the point of destructive violence.

Nevertheless, Scots and Welsh nationalism are symbols of this alienation while voting has become almost a form of protest against the inability of all governments to grapple with increasingly complex problems. It is less frequently a commitment to positive ideals represented by ideologically orientated political parties. Ideology gave way to pragmatism in the Wilson era in the wake of the mighty battle between Gaitskell and Bevan and the theological ardour provoked by the Clause IV controversy.

In the Wilson era compromise was erected into a principle and comfortable mediocrity and sycophancy surrounded a man who found verbal formulas easier than statesmanlike decisions. In the long run, however, the

circuitous Wilsonian route was towards a Labour Party firmly wedded to co-operation with the unions after the abandonment of In Place of Strife, firmly secured in Europe after voting against in Opposition and tied to Treasury orthodoxy in the midst of recession.

The old conjuror could depart with honour and bestow many honours on others. Mr. Heath made the fatal mistake of stubborn refusal to move from an untenable position when facing the miners after the provocative and untenable Industrial Relations Act. He suffered an internal coup which shifted the centre of gravity of the Tory Party further to the right than at any time in the post-Coronation era. Meanwhile, Mr. Thorpe was to suffer the fate that occurs to public figures whose private lives are not seen to be more than humanly blameless. The departed leaders still lurk in the shadows while a new line-up has emerged which may well foreshadow the future of a British political system cast more in the mould of Federal Germany. Even a change in the electoral system to reflect this new situation has become a possibility.

'Steady as she goes' is an apt motto for the Callaghan administration. The radicalism of Roy Jenkins has been despatched to Europe and his supporters sucked into government or scattered to the winds. The traditional Tribunites have been trapped within the embrace of a government that exists by permission of the Liberal Party. Thus the Party which seemed all but eclipsed even twenty-five years ago not only refused to lie down but could assume the role of king-maker, imitating the German Free Democrats.

However, the stage has shifted increasingly from Westminster to the opposite poles of Cardiff and Edinburgh on one side and Strasbourg and Brussels on the other. The growth of European institutions since the Coronation reflects the development of the multi-national corporation. This is perhaps the greatest single change in rendering national boundaries almost irrelevant and the nation state frequently has less power than a large corporate entity.

The reverse pull is in a sense a reaction to this growth of size and increasing anonymity. Thus, in Quebec and Brittany, the Basque Country and Bangladesh, in Scotland and the Sudan, there are revolts of different types against central authority. The assertion of ancient individuality in the face of the one-dimensional image of the multi-national is mirrored by ethnic nationalism asserting itself in Africa and Asia.

At home, class differences are by the same token more blurred and complicated by affluence, technical advance and the falling numbers of manual production workers as services and bureaucrats grow correspondingly. Consequently, the fragmentation of political parties and new alignments is matched by the new image of communism in France and Italy cast in the traditional model of parties working within the constitution and slowly freeing themselves from the rigid domination of the Soviet Union.

The events that followed the 20th Congress, Budapest and the rape of Czechoslovakia followed by the ill-treatment of minorities and dissidents in the Soviet Union have started the process of creating a fourth centre in the

communist world. This Euro-communism within the framework of a European Assembly may act as an important factor in the reshaping of a liberal capitalist EEC.

Meanwhile, although there have been shifts to the right in Scandinavia and British Conservative Parties, there has been a general rebirth of democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece. These are a few glimmers of light in a world where three-quarters of the United Nations has opted for one or other form of dictatorship and an estimated two million people rot as political prisoners and torture has become the normal weapon of state oppression.

In Jubilee year the final gusts of the wind of change are hitting Southern Africa where oppression has taken the peculiarly obnoxious form of racialism and apartheid. Imperialism has left many problems in its wake that are not yet resolved. The partition of the Indian sub-continent has been repeated. The partition of Palestine has been the flashpoint which could trigger off a third world war. The partition of Cyprus has resulted from the Turkish invasion. In our own backyard the Irish explosion has been detonated yet again nearly half a century after partition.

The impotence of Britain in the wake of the Turkish invasion, its inability to solve the problem of Ulster, its susceptibility to oil blackmail, are only part of a general vulnerability of advanced Western economies to the muscle of the primary producers, particularly of energy. Urban guerillas can cause havoc in the modern interdependent city.

At the time of the Coronation, we still saw ourselves at the centre of power. Twenty-five years later we are at the periphery and even the argument about the independent deterrent seems irrelevant in this context. It has taken that time to try to adjust to a new role in which at least we can claim the temporary Presidency of a much haggling but united Europe. It needs vision and perspective if it is to be a substitute for the Empire that inspired the Victorians or the internationalism that once inspired the Socialist Movement. I fear, however, that a large proportion of our people cannot make that adjustment and prefer to look back to a non-existent golden age.

Perhaps the overriding impression that I have at the end of this impressionistic tour is the rate at which the world of politics has shrunk. Television brought the napalm of Vietnam into the living room. The Assassination of President Kennedy or thousands of starving Ibo children happened a few feet away. But as an active politician in those years, I ran out documents for the Greek underground, walked through minefields in the Golan Heights, met Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, tangled with B.O.S.S. in London and with the Mafia in the Caribbean. Even as a backbench Labour M.P. one can actually participate in some major events at first hand so fast is the speed and facility of travel in the post-Coronation jet age. But the average man on the production line is still firmly set into a rut which may narrow his horizon and blunt his emotional responses as too many stimuli are thrown at him from glossy magazines, radio announcers and television ads. The drive to apathy in affluence was a feature of the post-Coronation era.

Saturday Night and Sunday Morning was a warning closer to reality than Orwell's *1984*.

The drive to action by what Franz Fannon called 'the wretched of the earth' contrasts starkly with the political cynicism that afflicts Britain. One does not have to be a monarchist to see the Royal tour of Australia as a reassurance of national identity and continuity. The interest in such dramas as 'Edward VII' is significant in a nation looking into its past, but the unhealthy invocation of the Dunkirk spirit and epics of the last War show a reluctance to face the realities of our position.

Taking stock in Jubilee year ought to involve a process of looking 25 years ahead. In the midst of economic turmoil we seem unable to look beyond the oil bonanza with no concept of any new role for Britain. But the step into Europe is just the first towards a new era in a much changed world, where the uncertainties are the only constant factor. Détente seems to be as elusive as ever but the most curious feature is the identity of military interest between China and Europe in a new balance of power.

The Sino-Soviet dispute which threatens world war more than the traditional East-West confrontation is a far cry from the nail-biting night over Cuban missiles.

In this world where Japan has the most rapidly expanding economy and Kuwait is the world's eldorado Europe, with the legacy of the Judao-Christian ethic and Greek political philosophy, may yet be the beacon to the Third World and the dictatorships. European nations must overcome the legacy of national divisions and create a democratic advanced industrial bloc committed to values of tolerance, individual freedom and economic equality.

It will have the moral and political and industrial base to close the North-South gap and spread its philosophy and values. In this context Britain, with its multi-racial Commonwealth and its traditional values and vast experience can play a key role. If Europe can succeed in this task then I will have been right in voting 'Yes' with my grandchildren in mind at the referendum.

An inward-looking conservative Europe based on outmoded military concepts will defeat this possibility. As we look back on twenty-five difficult years perhaps we can look forward to a new role. That role will be as part of the European continent to whose geography and history we belong. I believe the message of Jubilee year is that we can and must make a unique contribution towards peace; the elimination of poverty and a combination of democracy with the socialist ideals for which I entered politics twenty-five years ago.

THE ENGLISH PEOPLE AND DEVOLUTION

by J. A. Boyle

THE setback to the Government's devolution bill has been accounted for in various ways. The bill was hastily prepared and ill thought out; it was lukewarmly supported by some of its sponsors; it was seen to be a measure of expediency rather than a genuine attempt to accord some degree of self-rule to Scotland and Wales. All of these explanations are certainly valid, but no one seems to have mentioned an obstacle that may well prevent the passage of this and any future devolution bill as it prevented the passage of Gladstone's Home Rule bills in the nineteenth century: the Englishman's own deep-rooted nationalism.

The English, as was recognised by Hans Kohn in the *Idea of Nationalism*, are an intensely nationalistic people: their nationalism is so deeply ingrained as to be instinctive rather than consciously felt. One manifestation of this is their tendency, especially in moments of stress and excitement, to ignore the Act of Union and to refer to 'England' when they mean the whole island of Great Britain. Leaving aside the famous utterances of Pitt and Nelson and the consistent practice of nineteenth-century historians and publicists, we may remember how at the beginning of the Second World War a Conservative backbencher called upon the Deputy Leader of the Labour Opposition to 'speak for England'. The Scots and Welsh must be thankful that we do not refer to the 'Battle of *England*'. The English do in fact, because of the blinkers of their own nationalism, display a certain insensitivity towards the national feelings of their two sister nations.

A case in point is Her Majesty's title. In references to Elizabeth I in documents laid before the English and Scottish Parliaments of James I, such expressions as 'of famous memorie' were tactfully omitted from the Scottish version. By contrast, at the accession of our present Queen she was proclaimed in Scotland as Elizabeth II despite the protests of many Scots and in disregard of the historical fact that her predecessor and namesake, far from being the Queen of Scotland, had been responsible for a Queen of Scotland's death or even, according to some, her judicial murder. And yet, when one considers what liberties are taken today with royal titles, liberties to which only the Editor of Debrett seems to take exception, what possible objection could there have been to placating Scottish feelings by having Her Majesty proclaimed as Elizabeth the Second of England and First of Scotland?

The question of her title as Queen of Wales does not arise. The purpose of the Act of Union under Henry VIII was 'to bring about the unity of England and Wales by placing the Welsh on exactly the same footing as the English and to convert them ultimately into Englishmen'. In other words, there was to be an end to the Welsh as a nation, and to achieve this objective the use of their language was officially discouraged in the hope that it would die out and 'the whole Island might speak English'. This policy

of discouragement has continued into our own days. Indeed, in recent years the official attitude to the language has actually engendered violence. The perfectly reasonable request that place-names on signposts should appear in the Welsh as well as the English form was at first adamantly rejected by the authorities, which led to the intervention of the Welsh Language Society, whose innocuous title reminds us that Sinn Féin too began as a language society. And yet what possible objection could there be to the suggested signposting in *both* languages? This is surely infinitely to be preferred to the practice in Belgium, where one finds only the Flemish forms in the North and only the French ones in the South and a motorist arriving from Britain and not knowing that Luik is the Flemish for Liège may well be seriously misdirected.

Implying that Elizabeth I was Queen of Scotland or forbidding Holyhead to be called Caergybi can be dismissed as mere pinpricks to national pride, but they do illustrate a kind of insensitivity, due partly to intense nationalism and partly to pure ignorance, which might well, in the delicate situation in which we may soon find ourselves, do irreparable harm to the Union. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, one appreciates how, by making concessions on matters which were not really of primary importance, it might have been possible to retain what is now the Republic of Ireland in some kind of federal arrangement.

What is needed then, if the English are to adopt a helpful attitude to the process of devolution, is for them to be much better informed about the history and culture of Scotland and Wales. A first step in this direction could be the giving of lectures, broadcasts, etc., perhaps as the English counterpart to the holding of referendums in Scotland and Wales. There is no shortage of material for this purpose, material as interesting and entertaining as it is instructive: it is remarkable how little even the well-educated Englishman knows about many aspects of the past history of this island.

As a long-term project to maintain the interest in our neighbours the study of Scottish and Welsh culture should be included in the curricula of English schools and Departments of Scottish and Welsh Studies established in some at least of the English Universities. Departments of Celtic Studies, where they exist, should be encouraged to expand and, in so doing, to lay more stress on history and literature than on philology. Such expansion might attract more English people into a field in which they have played a not undistinguished part: one thinks of Lady Charlotte Guest, George Borrow and Matthew Arnold in the nineteenth century and Nora Chadwick and Kenneth Jackson in our own time; and one hopes that they may have worthy successors. I am thinking here mainly of Welsh language and literature. Gaelic will have its place in the larger Departments, but the problem of the Gaels and their language is an internal Scottish matter.

It is perhaps unrealistic to speak of such developments in these present difficult times; but something could be done along general lines even within the existing framework of our schools and universities. There is, however, one simple step that could be taken by all who are sincerely in favour of

devolution. That is to cease referring, as politicians of all parties are fond of doing, to 'the British people' or 'the British nation'. There is no such people or nation. The object of the Welsh Act of Union was indeed to turn the Welsh into English; the Scottish Act of Union contrived to turn some Scots for a while into North Britons; but neither Act achieved its purpose and today, as before 1535 and 1707, the Welsh remain Welsh and the Scots Scots. Let us then speak henceforth of 'the British peoples' or 'the British nations': to use the singular form is to reject the whole idea of devolution. On the whole I would recommend the adoption of the phrase 'the peoples of the United Kingdom', which expresses on the one hand the existence of separate nations on this island and on the other hand their common allegiance to the Crown. The use of the plural, whichever phrase one chooses to adopt, has another advantage: while recognising the nationhood of the Scots and Welsh it can at the same time be understood as including such remnants of ancient peoples as the Gaels, the Manx and the Cornish.

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POLICE RULES, O.K.

by Robert Reiner

SHOULD the police have a proper trade union, with the right to strike and to affiliate with the T.U.C.? Until very recently such a question would have seemed quite fanciful and merely academic, certainly not within the bounds of practical politics. Since the Police Act of 1919, enacted after the strikes by policemen in 1918 and 1919, such actions have been explicitly prohibited, punishable by fines and imprisonment. Instead of an independent trade union with powers of industrial action, the police have had a tame official substitute, the Police Federation, (nicknamed the 'goose club' by its detractors in 1919). From the 1950s onwards there has been machinery for collective bargaining, in the form of the Police Council. This is an institution on the lines of the Whitley Council, in which a staff side, including Federation representatives, can negotiate pay and other conditions of service with an official side constituted by representatives of the various police authorities.

Last July the Federation representatives for England and Wales walked out of this body, declaring that they had lost confidence in it. They argued that the official side had no independent power to reach agreement but was tightly constrained by government pay policy. Meaningful negotiations had to be directly with the government itself. 'If the monkey's lost its teeth, talk to the organ grinder', an article in the Federation's journal *Police* declared. The Federation urged a comprehensive review of the negotiating machinery and representative structure of the police force. In the ensuing months events have moved rapidly. Meetings have been held up and down the country in which rank-and-file support for union powers was voiced with increasing vehemence. Motions were laid down for the Federation Annual Conference which took place in May seeking an independent union, strike powers and T.U.C. affiliation. In the last few weeks at least seven forces have voted overwhelmingly for the right to strike. Forthcoming referenda in other forces are likely to echo these results. It now seems certain that the Federation leadership will be forced to abandon its opposition to militancy and seek to remove the legal restrictions on police union activity.

This change in police opinion is remarkable. The Federation leadership would not, until recently, have contemplated such action, and the majority of the rank-and-file undoubtedly accepted this. In 1973 I interviewed policemen about their attitudes to unionism. Most were against having a union. Only 18% of constables then supported the right to strike, although 45% wanted the right to work-to-rule and 38% the right to affiliate with the T.U.C. (Among supervisory ranks, support for these powers was much smaller.) The policemen claimed that they had unique responsibilities to the public, so that they had to forego rights of industrial action enjoyed by other workers. These principles were buttressed by the belief that the police force would not need such powers. The crucial importance of the police to society would give them sufficient bargaining strength. Police experience in

the early 1970s supported this view. A succession of pay rises, awarded by the Tories, went beyond policemen's expectations. The police believed that increasing industrial unrest made the Heath government wish to maintain police morale by treating them favourably. Most policemen believed that the Tories were more likely than Labour to make their pay demands a special case. But it was felt that any government would have to make the police a top priority. Changing economic circumstances have weakened police bargaining power. A decline in industrial conflict, and public expenditure cuts, have lowered the 'demand' for policemen. At the same time, growing unemployment has increased the 'supply' of potential recruits, despite the falling real value of police pay relative to other workers.

Frustration with the government's treatment of their current pay claim is the immediate cause of police unrest. The precise interpretation of the award given the police in September 1975, soon after the start of the first phase of the government pay policy with its £6 limit, is disputed. The Federation argue that the award, which was far above the £6 norm, was due to the effects of both the restructuring of pay scales following the Report of the Working Party on Police Pay (March 1975), and the need to restore the real level of pay to that of 1974. Thus they have not had a chance to negotiate within the £6 limit of Phase One. The official side argue that the 1975 award included the £6, and therefore the 1976 police pay review falls within the tighter limits of Phase Two. (It may be asked why the police should be bound by a supposedly 'voluntary' policy, agreed to with the T.U.C., when they are forbidden from belonging to it, and hence are not a party to the agreement.) To give the police more than 4½% would be to make them a special case, claims the government. The Federation rejects this view. For strategic reasons, they have in recent months demanded a package award combining fringe benefits and a straight pay rise of 4½%, on the lines of the seamen's agreement. Mr. Rees' rejection of this solution leaves the Federation leadership with no alternative but to back down or seek the right to industrial action. The militant mood of the rank-and-file makes a movement towards unionisation almost inevitable.

Politicians and the Press have reacted with alarm, if not hysteria. The Tories in particular have criticised the government for not treating the police as a special case. They claim the police have been goaded into forsaking their traditional 'responsibility'. The Daily Telegraph, for example, argued in an editorial on March 2nd that

> of all the many dangers which confront the country today none is plainer or more immediate than that presented by the growing demand of the police for the right to strike. . . . It is not only because the police have it in their power to plunge the country into instant anarchy by the withdrawal of their labour . . . it is also because . . . a police force with the right to participate in trade union activity automatically loses its political impartiality.

In a speech in Bristol on February 25th, William Whitelaw, the Shadow Home Secretary, argued that the police ought to be an example to other workers, and would lose their special standing in society if they took industrial action. The government has been condemned for not settling the pay dispute on favourable terms. On the 23rd February an early-day motion

was drafted by Conservative backbenchers urging 'the Prime Minister to procure a speedy solution to the police pay dispute on the principles applied in the case of the seamen's pay agreement'. The Tories believe that the government should give the police special treatment, to prevent unionisation. The government is also opposed to police unionism, but wishes to avoid breaking the pay policy.

Is the case against police unionism convincing? It rests on three arguments: that a police strike would result in 'anarchy' and the complete breakdown of law and order; that the police ought to set an example to society as a model of discipline; and that union affiliation would threaten police impartiality.

The view that a police strike would result in 'anarchy' or as The Times put it, a 'jungle', rests on a conception of society as precariously balanced between order and chaos, with only 'the thin blue line' to tip the scales. This view is simplistic, and ignores the complex sources of social cohesion and stability. It is, of course, undeniable that the police force perform a valuable function. But the claim that a police strike would fundamentally threaten civilisation is far too alarmist. It is true that some British and American police strikes in the past—Liverpool and Boston in 1919, Montreal in 1969—have been accompanied by outbreaks of looting and rioting. Order was eventually restored by other forces—for example, the non-striking police and troops in Liverpool. Industrial action often threatens public safety, but other employees are not denied the right to strike by law. Lawlessness is not an inevitable accompaniment of police strikes. The London strikes of 1918-19, and many cases of industrial action in the United States, passed off peacefully. Whether or not a police strike endangers public safety depends partly on the character of the community, and partly on how prepared the authorities are with other policing arrangements.

Arguments about the possible consequences of police strikes are in any case of doubtful relevance to the question whether the police should have the right to strike. No doubt these issues would be thoroughly debated within the police prior to any actual strike. To deny the police the right to such action is to suggest that they alone of all workers do not have sufficient integrity and intelligence to weigh up the pros and cons of striking under specific circumstances. If this dim view is taken of policemen's capacity for taking responsible decisions it seems odd that they should be trusted at all. The everyday tasks of the policeman demand that he makes complex and weighty decisions rapidly and effectively. The individual constable has a considerable degree of discretion which he exercises in his ordinary work, subject to, at most, the possibility of ex post facto review. People who are routinely entrusted with responsibility to make decisions affecting the safety and liberty of others surely do not have to be restrained from striking by special legislation. They would be likely to strike only if their morale had already sunk so low that their performance in the job was of most doubtful efficiency.

The argument that the police ought to set an example of discipline to

society, and that this precludes unionisation, is contrary to the more general claims often made about the British police tradition. The Royal Commission of 1929 commented in a famous passage (repeated by the 1962 Royal Commission):

> The police of this country have never been recognised, either in law or by tradition, as a force distinct from the general body of citizens. Despite the imposition of many extraneous duties on the police by legislation or administrative action, the principle remains that a policeman, in the view of the common law, is only 'a person paid to perform, as a matter of duty, acts which if he were so minded he might have done voluntarily'.

The singling out of the police force as the only occupation (apart from the Army) statutorily prohibited from having a union, contradicts this principle of the civilian rather than military character of the police.

The related argument that the police would lose public respect if they had the right to strike is quite illogical. How can one be respected for not striking if this is prohibited by legislation rather than an exercise of choice? In any case, why is never striking necessarily something that deserves respect? Surely it depends on the particular situation. The view that an occupation which eschews the right to strike automatically deserves respect, or favourable treatment, is one which the labour movement at any rate ought to question.

The final argument against police unionisation, that it would threaten police impartiality, is most dubious. It implies that policemen could not enforce the law in a just or impartial way if they had any personal views about the people against whom they are enforcing it. But it is quite unrealistic to suggest that policemen do not have personal opinions about social and political issues such as the causes and character of offenders of various kinds, or the legitimacy of demonstrations or strikes. If these personal opinions threaten their impartiality then they do so now.

Trade unionists themselves have traditionally regarded the police as on the other side of the fence, tools of the bosses. Any claim that the police are impartial at present must concede that they can dissociate personal opinion from their law enforcement activity. If this is possible, then it should still be the case if they were themselves affiliated to the T.U.C. Indeed, it is likely to increase impartiality by counteracting policemen's present lack of understanding and sympathy with the trade union movement.

Socialists might object to police unionisation for a quite different reason. There is no doubt that the present discontent in the police force derives from far deeper and longer standing grievances than the pay dispute. For many years now policemen have felt a sense of frustration and anger at what they see as the dominant trend in society. They believe that their job has been made far more difficult by a series of social and legal changes of a liberalising kind. The 'permissive society', abolition of capital punishment, other liberal aspects of penal policy, the efforts of organisations concerned about civil liberties to strengthen civilian control of the police—all these are blamed for making life much harder for the policeman. The Federation initiated a 'law and order' campaign in November, 1975, to propagate police views among the public, and to reverse 'the drifting into a

lawless society'. Policemen's diagnoses of, and solutions for, social problems are not ones that would be congenial to socialists. Radicals might oppose police unionisation in order to prevent policemen using their potential power to influence legislation in a reactionary direction. In the United States in the last decade, police associations have often used industrial action to support political campaigns of a conservative or even 'radical right' character.

It should be noted that American police associations are not linked with the ordinary labour movement. In Scandinavia, West Germany and France, where police unions are affiliated to the central trade union organisations, and also linked to Social-Democratic political parties, they have acted as liberalising influences. One example is over the use of physical force in police work.

It seems unlikely that police forces can encourage the development of democratic and liberal attitudes among policemen as long as they are structured in a way that denies policemen the autonomy and rights of other workers. Rigid rules can only produce an attitude of unthinking conformity and regimentation, which will affect the way policemen treat the public.

Authoritarianism in internal police organisation and in attitudes to the public are interdependent. As Michael Banton has argued: 'Greater justice for the policeman has also brought greater justice by policemen'. Giving policemen the right to choose how they are to be represented will not only benefit them but make for a fairer and more democratic society.

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QUEBEC 1977

by Kevin McCourt Cross

IN the midst of Québec's current political chaos, few things are crystal-clear. The populace awakens to its morning papers to find new governmental pronouncements on practically every major issue of daily life. One thing is certain, however; Adam Smith and his *laissez-faire*-hands are not the prime movers behind *La Nouvelle Québec*. The province's traditional 'leave alone . . . let to do' policy has been dramatically cast aside; its replacement has shaken the mind of each and every citizen of the Dominion of Canada.

At this point in time, economic analysts throughout the world would shudder were they faced with dealing with the province's internal workings. The unemployment rate has topped 10%; inflation hums along merrily, right in step with the rest of Canada. Foreign investment, which is the Rosetta Stone to any growth in Québec, is going through an exceedingly arid period. And what has triggered more than a fair share of this were the results of the provincial polls on November 15th, 1976.

Last autumn's election of the separatist *Parti Québeçois* government cannot be rooted to a unique factor. Naturally, the quarter of the province's population which has been polled to favour independence fell behind their chairman, the now-premier Réne Lévesque. But Lévesque did receive over 40% of the vote, and his candidates did capture the majority of seats in the provincial parliament (newly termed the National Assembly), thus bringing the PQ party to power. From whence came the deciding voices?

Though operating under the same tag 'Liberal', the provincial and federal parties are not allied. Québec has been traditionally Liberal in its Ottawa representation; one might say, quite accurately, that the very existence of Pierre Trudeau at the top has been the doing of the Québec electorate. The National Assembly, however, had only recently been Liberal—the Union Nationale party having held power for decades. But Premier Robert Bourassa's Liberal government was not a stellar one. Labour became a thorn, as strikes mushroomed in practically every area of enterprise. Graft, a word not alien to the ears of Québeckers, resumed its place in the *avant-garde*. And the middle-of-the-road language policy adopted by Bourassa incensed franco- and anglophones alike. Even federalist Claude Ryan, editor of the intellectual and influential *Le Devoir*, came out in favour of a vote for the PQ government, in an attempt to purge the province of so many negatives and to put an end to the staggering debt-accumulation of Québec's exchequer. Thus, Lévesque won handily.

The accomplishments of his government to date have not been warmly applauded by the majority of Canadians. Shortly after his election, Lévesque and his *entourage* flew to New York to address the prestigious Economic Club, the membership of which determines the province's ability to borrow. In an hour-long speech, Lévesque completely skirted the very issues which these men came to hear. There was no documentation of Québec's economic

condition; rather, the milieu created by the speaker was an attempt to evoke sympathy from Americans to the plight of Québeckers within Canada. An unfortunate analogy was even made to America's 'adieu' to the U.K. in 1776. Laughter swept the audience; and the Canadian dollar has plummeted since, as national and international fears mount over the very viability of Canada's future.

In December, Lévesque announced that banks in Québec (even those federally chartered) would come under provincial supervision. 'Some key industries', albeit unnamed, were threatened with nationalisation. Speculation turned immediately to the vast asbestos mines in the province; and the value of the shares of Johns Manville, an industry leader, dipped handsomely on the New York market. Many key industrial segments quietly crossed the border into Ontario, and economic vitality in Québec ceased to exist.

Yet, Lévesque has made it clear that the economy of Québec does not represent his top priority. No, Bill No. One, recently tabled in the National Assembly, is one of language. French is to become the one and only official tongue in the province. Within a period of five years, all business in Québec is to be conducted exclusively in French. The right of English-language education is to be granted only to those children with one parent schooled in English somewhere in Canada. Even this basic restriction seems too moderate to the majority of the *Parti Québeçois'* élitist Montréal membership . . . one which has demanded the complete extinction of English-language schooling in the province. Yes, Bill No. One is a powerful package. Yet, even *it* skirts the fundamental plan of Lévesque—to remove the province completely from the Canadian Federation, a plan which the premier has promised to put to referendum in due course.

The historical implications in all of these developments cannot be ignored. The decisive defeat of the French on the Plains of Abraham still produced the Quebec Act of 1774, an act which guaranteed the conquered full religious and language rights. For well over a hundred years French Canada wallowed in an industrial purgatory whilst the English reaped the fruits of the seeds planted by Watt and Newton. Montréal, the metropolitan hub of the 80%-plus francophonic province, pulsated with the beats of the Protestant Ethic, whilst the French remained on their bucolic plots, in complete obeisance to the village pastor who was the mentor for every situation. This is not to say that Québec lacked an intellectual band of French-speaking individuals. The descendants of the French nobility had *salons* in their splendid *seigneuries*. But higher education was deemed a requisite only for those destined for the clergy, medicine, and law. Exceptions existed, of course; but there developed no tradition of channeling the French populace into commerce which, after all, supplies the dollars which buy the plums of industrialised civilisation.

The exceptions to the above have to be noted, for these people keenly realised that the economic world of North America is an English one. For Québec is surrounded by anglophonic Canada and that massive neighbour to the south. French-speaking Québeckers who perceived the necessity of English became masters of it, thus providing for their own industrial and

social mobility.

Opportunities always existed for the French in Québec for the top rôles in the English economic community. The French, in effect, were decades too late in allowing for their own commercial melding with the rest of the world. And, in recent years, after a vast improvement in the French sector of the province's state-supported educational system and with a decided lessening of clerical authority, the new francophonic intellectual élite have become incensed with the English domination of the economy, indeed with *everything* English, for that very reason. The right and wrong of this situation is so complex that it defies analysis even by those who appear to be eminently qualified. It must be stressed here that, in all fairness, 'les anglais' have not always behaved within the moral and civil frameworks as they would like to believe. Throughout the decades, there was little or no attempt, on the part of the English, to elevate the status of the labouring French Canadian. Were he destined for upward mobility, it was to be individually accomplished. The unbecoming labels of 'frog' and 'Pepsi' (owing to French Canada's remarkable consumption of that cola) were handy ones to bolster English inadequacies.

But things did improve. The recognition of French as an official language of the country brought about obvious benefits, even down to the bi-lingual labelling of tinned goods sold in Trois Rivières, Québec, and in 'veddy' British Victoria, B.C. Federal government aid became massive, in an attempt to boost dramatically the status of French Canada, its language and its people. The confirmed policy of Trudeau's present government is of bi-lingualism and bi-culturalism, not only within the ranks of Ottawa's top echelon but even through the rank and file of the country's civil service.

All this has not appeased French Canada. Very possibly it was a case of too much too late. The burgeoning nationalistic movement of the 1960s received the blessings of Charles de Gaulle, whose ungentlemanly lips uttered the catch-all '*Vive le Québec Libre*' whilst a guest in Montréal's City Hall. To exclude the rôle of France in Québec's turn towards separation would be folly. The fear of France for the authority of its language can be witnessed by the tedious attempts of the *Academie Française* to delete such words as 'jeans' from the Frenchman's vocabulary, not to mention the bulwarks placed before Great Britain in its attempt to join the Common Market. The contemporary imprints of France are very strong in Québec, but they are totally cultural and political. Economic investment is but a pittance compared with that of the U.S. and Germany. Even Air France did its diplomatic best to reduce the unprofitable Montréal-Paris service and to gain landing rights into that bastion of English Canada, Toronto. Yes, France has very much to gain—socially—from its attempts to include Québec as another francophonic nation. But the benefits accruing to Québec are, at best, moot.

Were the separatist backlash to be genuinely motivated by revenge over past handling by anglophones, no one could truthfully regard them as being instilled by other than a pervasive chidishness and reprehensibility. Yet, it cannot be denied that revenge is the motive of some. To add renewed

vigour to the thought that French is *the* mother tongue, that Québec is its own land, is a beautifully idealistic thought, not harmful in itself perhaps. And very possibly this is the motive of the majority of clear-thinking separatists. They refute Adam Smith all right, and they might be quite correct in their belief that a *laissez-faire* policy would ultimately spell demise for their language and culture. For the birth-rate of French Canada, once amongst the highest in the Western world, has dropped dramatically. And a decidedly significant proportion of recent immigration has opted for inclusion into the English part of the dichotomy. But what is the final price to be paid for all of this? Québec, through the centuries, has also been the home of not a few English, many of whom now feel psychologically insecure and forced to consider relocation elsewhere. And what about the country Canada? A split away by Québec, it is felt by many, would hasten similar action by the Western provinces which have long been dissatisfied with Ottawa's provision for the East 'at their expense'. Were Canada to have been modelled more along the lines of the United States, where the individual states have abundantly less power than the Canadian provinces, then Québec's separation would not be a problem today. Québec even has its own department of immigration. This would be akin to the county Devon or the state of Virginia having the same—a wild idea, at best. No, Canada is not the great melting pot. And, to a large extent, this has allowed for the tremendous *élan* which exists in Québec particularly. Montréal is one of the most exciting and cosmopolitan cities in the world. The excitement is made possible by the offshoots of business; but Canada's 'head office' city is soon to be Toronto, not Montréal. Québec probably has the natural resources to exist alone, but it would be mad to think that the rest of Canada and the U.S. would kindly enter into favourable economic agreements with the new country. It would remain to be seen how French Canada would fare 'existing' instead of 'prospering'. Its people have adjusted very nicely to the habits of the bourgeoisie. The exclusion of those extras such as a winter's fortnight in Miami would not be taken with grace.

It is more than curious to reflect on the provisions of the Quebec Act of 1774 and on the state of the province today. But man, of course, has a singularly poor track record in handling the element of power. The 'wait-and-see' situation of 1977 is not a comfortable one, for uncertainty breeds a plethora of problems. The 'Quiet Revolution', so termed by the separatists, is one of North America's most significant events. Lévesque is brilliant and moderate, but can he keep his party in tow? It cannot be forgotten that in 1970 British Trade Commissioner James Cross was kidnapped in Montréal and that the Québec official Pierre Laporte was brutally murdered—by those dedicated to Québec's separation from Canada. Their disciples, too, belong to the Parti Québeçois.

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EXIT CZARINA INDIRA

by A. S. Raman

ONCE *The Economist* of London referred to Indira Gandhi as the 'Empress of India'. Because of her style of functioning, rooted in her Russophilism, she would probably have been happier if described as *Czarina*. Anyway, she has gone out of the political scene very unimperially —thoroughly disgraced and totally disenchanted. The chances of her re-emergence are remote. The rout of her 90-year-old Congress Party at the parliamentary poll was not so humiliating as her personal defeat at the hands of an old, inveterate electoral opponent, Raj Narain, by a majority of over 55,000 votes, and the equally crushing blow inflicted on her hated son, Sanjay Gandhi, by a politcal nonentity who won by a majority of over 70,000 votes.

The outcome of the sixth General Election held recently in the world's largest democracy did not come as a surprise to the people themselves. When Indira Gandhi dramatically announced the elections in January, a year ahead of schedule, the whole nation heaved a long-suppressed sigh of relief. But the Prime Minister thought that, handicapped by disunity, lack of resources, organisation and manpower at the grassroots level, the opposition would put up a miserable performance. She exaggerated the prospects of her Party because of her own commanding position. Giving the political parties barely two months' notice, she fancied that they would be unable to contest the elections with a common programme. Moreover, many of their leaders had just been released from prison and had yet to sit down together and discuss their common interests and strategies. So, she calculated, her Party would have a landslide victory in every constituency and rejoiced in her uncanny sense of timing.

What Indira Gandhi did not care to realise was that her own self-destructive policies, implemented during her 20-month long reign of terror since the declaration of the emergency on June 26, 1975, had made the opposition's task much easier. So when the General Election was actually announced, India's 300 million voters, most of whom are illiterate, politically naïve and live below the poverty line, decided what to do. They suddenly realised where their loyalties lay and on polling day were wildly jubilant, as if they were about to participate in a national carnival. By then the leaders of the opposition parties, under the inspiration and guidance of their fellow-detainee, Jayaprakash Narayan, had met behind prison bars and decided to unite for a common cause. They had finalised their common programme, their common election symbol and the name for their common party: *Janata* which means just *People*. A senior member of Mrs. Gandhi's Cabinet, Jagjiwan Ram, with a large following among the socially weaker sections throughout the country, resigned from the government and the ruling party on February 2, protesting against the Prime Minister's refusal to revoke the emergency. He hurriedly formed his own party, the Congress for Democracy, which he declared would fight the elections on the side of the

Janata party. Jawaharlal Nehru's famous sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, no admirer of her ambitious, unscrupulous niece's style of functioning, actively worked for the success of the opposition. Also among the campaigners for the opposition were such stalwarts as Jayaprakash Narayan, Morarji Desai, Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Imam of Juma Masjid, Delhi, who were not only persuasive speakers and skilled debaters but had a firm rapport with the masses. Prisoner George Fernandes, against whom a case of conspiracy was registered (he is now a member of the Janata cabinet) was unable to join them because Mrs. Gandhi would not release him on bail. By contrast, the ruling party could depend only on the Prime Minister for drawing crowds because, like her father, she never allowed anyone to grow taller than she! Having exhausted her limited stock of slogans, clichés and gimmicks all too soon, she made no impression at all on the people who had been hired to listen to her.

The issues involved in the election were many and the Prime Minister, by harping on her 20-Point Programme and her son's 5-Point Programme, only added to the confusion. Indeed, the challenges facing the nation were complex. But the ruling party oversimplified them by asking the people to choose between stability and chaos, while the opposing parties, summing up their goals and methods neatly, approached the electorate with a telling poser: 'Do you want the stability of the grave? This is your last chance to choose between dictatorship and democracy. Do you want bread at the cost of freedom? Would you be happy to see the emergency continue for ever? Or would you like to have your fundamental rights restored? The quality of your future life depends on the decision you take now.' And the people decided to vote for democracy and reject dictatorship. The result? The Janata and its allies have captured over 300 seats in a House of 542. The Congress, which ruled India for nearly 30 years, has 153 seats and sits uncomfortably on the Opposition benches.

The Congress has one minor consolation. Its performance in the four southern States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala and in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, was impressive. There were reasons for this. The excesses of the emergency had only a peripheral impact on the people of these States. Eligible couples had been spared the agony and humiliation of compulsory sterilisation. It had been very easy for the affluent Congress candidates to buy over the voters who had no awareness of the fundamental issues involved in the election; also, people in the south believed that the leadership of the opposition was strongly pro-Hindi and anti-English. Another good reason: in Tamil Nadu, the opposition tactlessly teamed up with the dismissed chief minister's thoroughly discredited Dravida Munnetra Kazhagham (DMK) whose brief career of hooliganism and sectarian politics must be familiar to the voter. The opposition did not have time to streamline its election machinery in the south. An intriguing feature of the elections in the Tamil-speaking areas was the spectacular success of the candidates nominated by a party led by a matinee idol: 18 seats won out of the 19 contested by the nominee of M. G. Ramachandran, the chief of the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagham

formed by the breakaway group from the DMK.

So the expected has happened—the democratic rejection of the 90-year-old Congress by the people themselves. Everybody knew what the outcome of the General Election would be, because of the widespread resentment of the people against the excesses of the emergency. Mrs. Gandhi's government no doubt had some plus points on the socio-economic front, but her achievements had been negatived by the misdeeds of the small coterie surrounding her under the sinister leadership of her son, Sanjay Gandhi. He had never been prepared for the sort of exposure from which a leader in a democratic society cannot escape. Now, his own immaturity and arrogance have destroyed his political career once and for all. He has publicly confessed that he reads only *Horror Comics*, and another, shocking admission by him: 'My grandfather has not influenced me in any special way'.

At the right time her friends, the pro-Moscow communists, drew Indira Gandhi's attention to her son's political irrelevance and intellectual bankruptcy, but she would not heed them.

Sanjay Gandhi was the leader of the hated *Gang of Four*. The other three were: Defence minister Bansilal, in charge of the armed forces; Om Mehta, the Home minister in charge of the police and intelligence wings; and V. C. Shukla, the minister controlling the powerful news media. Of these, three have been rejected by the voters, while Om Mehta, being a member of the Upper House, now sits on the Opposition bench where he can do no harm.

Morarji Desai, the new Prime Minister, heads what Jayaprakash Narayan has hopefully described as the people's government. At 82, he walks erect, talks firmly and thinks clearly and fearlessly. He is known to be a dry puritan: austere, aloof, arrogant. His 19 months' detention in Mrs. Gandhi's prison has, by all accounts, mellowed him. A fiercely uncompromising prohibitionist, vegetarian and champion of time-honoured Indian traditions, values and norms of public conduct, he is a convinced follower of Mahatma Gandhi's directives in letter and spirit; but he has assured the nation that he will not impose his fads and aversions on an unwilling people. He has serious challenges ahead: but with the cooperation of a very able and cohesive team of colleagues, both in the cabinet and outside, he is confident that he will serve the country with success in a true democratic spirit.

[A. S. Raman is a former Editor of the Illustrated Weekly of India.]

POPULATION PATTERNS IN THE EEC

by John A. Loraine

IN March 1976 global population reached the 4,000 million mark. Five years previously it had been 3,700 million, in 1950 2,500 million, in 1900 just over 1,500 million. The Washington-based Population Reference Bureau, quoting UN sources, has projected a population of 5,000 million for the late Eighties. It has also stated that if the current world growth rate of 1.8 per cent per annum is permitted to continue, 2014 AD could see a doubling of present numbers.

Of the world's 4,000 million inhabitants in 1976, approximately 260 million—6.5 per cent of the total—live in the nine countries of the EEC. The overall population of the Community is greater than that of North America, about the same as that of the Soviet Union, less than half that of India, less than one third that of China, about double that of Indonesia.

Throughout the EEC, with the exception of the Republic of Ireland, fertility rates are falling. The decline has been in full swing since the mid-Sixties; it is continuing even more rapidly in the Seventies. In 1974 the lowest birth rate in the world (10 per 1,000 population) was in Federal Germany; in Luxembourg it was only 11.0 per 1,000, in Belgium 13 per 1,000. During 1975 the birth rate in England and Wales fell to an unprecedented low of 12.2 per 1,000; the previous peacetime nadir of 14.4 per 1,000 had been in 1933 during the throes of the Great Economic Depression. In the twelve months ending September 1976 births in England and Wales fell by some 4 per cent; deaths rose slightly during the period with the result that there was a small natural decrease of population amounting to some 7,000.

Low death rates have been a characteristic feature of the EEC in the Seventies. Figures in 1976 range from 8 per 1,000 population in the Netherlands to 12 per 1,000 in Belgium, Federal Germany and Luxembourg. The death rate for the Community as a whole is well below the world average, for example, it is about half that of Africa, and less than half that of the Indian subcontinent. Infantile mortality rates (expressed as deaths under 1 year per 1,000 live births) are also low in the EEC. Figures range from 11 for the Netherlands to 23 for Italy; the average for the Community is 16. This is about a sixth of the global average, one eighth that of Asia, one tenth that of Africa.

The EEC boasts a high life expectancy at birth. The mean figure is 72 years compared with the global average of 59 years. *Pari passu* with falling birth rates and increased longevity, a rise in the numbers of elderly people in the Community is taking place. The UK provides a good example of this trend. In the early Thirties the percentage of people in Britain over the normal retirement age (65 for men and 60 for women) was only 9.4; by the mid-Seventies the figure had increased to 16.8. Regarded in global terms, denizens of the EEC are 'old'. Only in the Republic of Ireland are more than 30 per cent of the population under the age of 15; in Luxembourg the

percentage is only 21, in Denmark, Belgium and Federal Germany 23, in the UK, France and Italy 24, in the Netherlands 27. These figures compare with 44 per cent in Africa, 38 in Asia and 42 in Latin America.

The EEC is highly urbanised. In Federal Germany 88 per cent of people live in towns, in Belgium 87 per cent, in Denmark 80, in the Netherlands 77, in the UK 76. France and Luxembourg have a slightly smaller proportion of city dwellers; however, the lowest rate of urbanisation in the Community (52 per cent) is in the Republic of Ireland. At present the EEC is much more heavily urbanised than most areas of the Third World, and this is in spite of the fact that during the Sixties and Seventies in many of the poor countries there has been a veritable stampede of people from rural areas to cities. The figure for the 'percentage urban' population of Africa is 23 and for Asia, 25; these are much lower than in the EEC. Latin America is urbanising more rapidly than any other area on earth but even there in 1976 about half of the population were still rural dwellers.

At 62 million people, Federal Germany is the most populous nation in the Community. Its population density (250 persons per square kilometre) is exceeded within the EEC only by those of the Netherlands and Belgium and outside the Community—excluding small islands and city states—by Bangladesh, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and the Lebanon. By the mid-Seventies, deaths in West Germany were outnumbering births; however, immigration, albeit on a small scale, was still sufficient to maintain population growth above zero. Federal Germany has lagged behind many other countries in the realm of population policy. There is not even a governmentally backed family planning programme and the oral contraceptive Pill remains rigidly on medical prescription. The abortion situation in Germany is in a state of flux. In 1974 a new and more liberal law was passed. But the anti-abortionist lobby, traditionally strong in the Federal Republic, reacted violently. It used all the political *gravitas* at its disposal to alter the law in the direction of restrictionism; its efforts met with success and as a result the law was declared unconstitutional. Since the recent general election in Germany the abortion issue has not featured prominently in the press.

Italy with just over 56 million people is the second most populous country of the EEC. Her growth rate (0.8 per cent per annum) is lower than during the Sixties, and this is due almost entirely to a fall in birth rates. Marked regional variations in Italian fertility exist. The less economically developed Southern area of the country traditionally shows greater procreative activity than the industrial North. South-North migration and emigration overseas have been rubrics of the Italian demographic scenario throughout much of the second half of the twentieth century. Rural-urban migration is also a prominent feature; for example, Rome is believed to be gaining about 30,000 people annually and between 1961 and 1971 Turin and Milan each gained 26,000 people every year.

In the Twenties and Thirties, governmental policies in Italy were staunchly pro-natalist. Benito Mussolini desperately wanted to stimulate reproduction. He moulded fiscal policies with this end in view; he discouraged emigration. Since the end of the Second World War, successive Italian

Governments have played the population issue in much lower key. However, the situation *a propos* abortion has recently flared into activity. In 1975, Italy's Constitutional Court, in the teeth of opposition from the Vatican, ruled that abortion was not illegal provided that it was performed to avoid danger to the woman's physical and psychological health. In the spring of 1976 some 50,000 women demonstrated in Rome in favour of a more liberal abortion law. Quite soon the issue was again in the news when the highly toxic substance dioxin—used by the Americans in Vietnam and well known to give rise to birth defects—leaked from a chemical factory at Seveso in Northern Italy. Pregnant women in the surrounding area wished to be aborted. The Vatican objected strongly, but eventually a few of the subjects were permitted to have their pregnancies terminated. At the time of writing, a Bill is before the Italian Parliament to provide 'abortion on demand' during the first three months of pregnancy.

Britain had her last population census in 1971 before she joined the EEC. Then, numbers stood at just over 55 million and the growth rate was 0.45 per cent per annum. The population density (228 persons per square kilometre) made the UK the eighth most crowded country in the world, while the population density of England and Wales (323 persons per square kilometre) was exceeded in global terms only by that of Taiwan.

By 1976 the UK, now in the Community, had about one million more people. But remarkable changes in the pattern of reproduction had become apparent. Parents were opting for fewer children; births were tending to be postponed; large families were becoming a rarity; the average family size had plummeted from 2.4 children in 1972 to 1.8 by 1976. The abortion scene in Britain remained disturbed during the Seventies. The anti-abortionists had never accepted the 1967 Act. They rallied their cohorts; and in 1975 they found their Trojan horse in the person of James White, Labour MP for a strongly Catholic Glasgow constituency. White, with the aid of another Labour MP, Leo Abse, and a Catholic lawyer, proceeded to draft a wrecking bill. But the pro-abortionists, faced with this challenge, did not remain passive. At the Parliamentary level they agreed to resign *en masse* from a Select Committee established by the Government to examine the working of the Abortion Act and heavily infiltrated with anti-abortionists. At the medical level some 350 doctors in a letter to the *Lancet* in August 1976 criticised the recommendations of the anti-abortionist 'rump' of the Select Committee and demanded that abortion services throughout the country became considerably more homogeneous than at present. Early in 1977 anti-abortionists again became active in Parliament, and in February another restrictive Bill, sponsored this time by William Benyon, Conservative Member for Buckingham, received a second reading in the House of Commons.

The oral contraceptive Pill had a reasonably good year in Britain in 1976. The Pill has now manifestly been woven into the warp and the woof of the country's population policy. About 3 million women are currently receiving it, and in October a Select Committee, established to study alternative schemes for the distribution of the Pill, recommended that in addition to

doctors, suitably trained people, among them nurses, midwives, health visitors and chemists, should be given the authority to prescribe it.

France had a population estimated at 53.1 million in mid-1976; as such she is the fourth most populous country of the EEC. France's population density (96 person per square kilometre) is relatively low as compared with other EEC countries, notably Benelux, Federal Germany, Italy and the UK. Regarded in global terms, the French population density is comparable with that of nations such as Austria, Portugal, Romania and Hungary. Currently the population in France is growing at about 0.8 per cent per annum. The birth rate has dropped from 18 per 1,000 in 1965 to 15 per 1,000 in 1976; death rates and infantile mortality rates have also decreased over the same period.

During most of the twentieth century, social policy in France has had strongly pro-natalist overtones. By the early Seventies approximately 5 per cent of the French national income was being spent on family allowances. There were measures to alleviate the costs of rearing children; there were social welfare benefits and liberal leave for pregnant women working before and after delivery. Meanwhile, French politicians have indulged in a stream of pro-natalist rhetoric. Charles de Gaulle wanted the country's population to rise to 100 million. Georges Pompidou echoed this view. Giscard d'Estaing—if press reports are to be believed, hardly a pariah amongst the ladies—has bemoaned France's 'demographic decline' and early in the year proclaimed that 1976 would be dedicated to the 'politics of the family'.

Yet *pari passu* with an official policy geared to pro-natalism, France has liberalised her abortion law. In November, 1974, after a stormy debate, in the course of which the Government was accused by Michael Debré of making more coffins than cradles, the Assembly carried a liberal bill. It authorised abortion on request during the first 10 weeks of pregnancy. But it stipulated that pregnancy terminations must be carried out in hospitals and that counselling should be an essential part of the service.

Of the smaller countries of the Community—Benelux, Denmark, Ireland —the last-mentioned has the most interesting population pattern. Eire, along with Norway, is the only Western European country to maintain her fertility in recent years. Between 1965 and 1975 the trend towards a declining Irish population, which had lasted for over a century, was reversed; instead, numbers increased by 233,000 (about 8 per cent) during the ten-year period. Currently the Irish population exceeds 3 million and is growing at a rate of 0.7 per cent per annum. The birth rate (22 per 1,000) is much the highest in the Community; so also, at 31 per cent, is the proportion of people under 15 years of age. The marriage rate in Ireland is still amongst the lowest on earth; but it has increased dramatically during the Sixties and Seventies, and there is every reason to believe that this trend will continue. As emphasised previously, Ireland is less urbanised than the rest of the EEC, only about 50 per cent of its population residing in cities.

Abortion is still totally proscribed in Ireland, mainly due to the pervasive influence of the Roman Catholic Church. But there is evidence that since the passage of the 1967 Act in Britain, an increasing number of Irish women

are travelling to the UK to have their pregnancies terminated. The Pill became available on medical prescription for 'regulation of the menstrual cycle' in the late Sixties. In 1973, following disturbances at the border with Ulster, the Irish Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to prevent the importation of contraceptives.

Belgium and the Netherlands are two of the most densely populated countries in the world. Yet neither of them espouses a realistic population policy. Belgium, like France, pays very generous family allowances. Family planning, although condoned, is not enthusiastically supported. Abortion remains completely proscribed; illegal abortion is rampant; an attempt to liberalise the Belgian abortion law in the early Seventies failed on the rock of Governmental intransigence. The Netherlands have moved somewhat further into the Twentieth century. Overcrowding is perceived as an important political issue. Attempts are being made to redistribute population, to increase national territory by reclaiming land from the sea, and to subsidise emigration. Contraceptive practice has been liberalised; most devices are freely available, although a doctor's prescription for the Pill is still required. *Vis-à-vis* abortion, a considerable dichotomy exists between the *de jure* and *de facto* situations. The law prohibits the operation except to save the woman's life. Yet many medical clinics throughout the Netherlands will perform it on request during the first three months of pregnancy.

Overpopulated countries of the EEC, particularly Belgium, the Netherlands, Federal Germany and the UK, have everything to gain from a continuing fall in birth rates. In a finite planet with diminishing resources the movement towards increasing national self-sufficiency will eventually become more dominant; a reduction in numbers is likely to speed this trend. The signposts for the future point increasingly in the direction of global sustainability; and a *sine qua non* for the sustainable society of tomorrow is that birth rates and death rates should be equal and that they should be kept at the lowest possible level. If one agrees with this view then realistic population policies within the countries of the EEC would undoubtedly be in tune with the tides of contemporary history.

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THE INFLUENCE OF CARAVAGGIO

by Ernle Money

AN important exhibition on the followers of Caravaggio, *In the Light of Caravaggio*, was held in the summer of 1976 at the Trafalgar Galleries, 35 Bury Street, London, S.W.1.

When Michelangelo da Caravaggio burst like a meteor across the Roman scene in the last decade of the sixteenth century he was to change European painting almost beyond recognition. His career was an extremely short and turbulent one. He arrived in Rome, at the age of about twenty, either in the autumn of 1592 or early in the following year. His secular pieces, genre paintings and the like, were crowded into the seven years before 1600, after which he was to concentrate on a number of subjects with religious themes. The revolutionary importance of these pictures has only comparatively recently come to be re-appreciated. By 1610 he was dead.

Throughout most of this brief life he was in and out of trouble continuously. Although his genius could attract for him important contemporary patronage, like Cardinal del Monte and representatives of leading families such as the Banberini, Ginstanini, Borghese and Mattei, as well at a later date as the Knights of Malta, he threw away his opportunities by reason of his violent disposition. In 1606 he had to flee from Rome after stabbing an opponent in a game of tennis. In Malta, which he reached in 1608, he was at first feted but subsequently imprisoned and expelled by the Order of St. John for assaulting a justiciary. In Naples the following year he was seriously wounded in a tavern brawl and given out for dead. He in fact died the year after at a Spanish enclave on the Tuscan coast called Porto d'Ercole where ironically he had been arrested and imprisoned by mistake. He was released in time only to see the felucca on which he was hoping to travel sailing out of the port, taking with it, as he thought, his belongings. This brought him to such a pitch of rage that he suffered an attack of fever which killed him a few days later. After his death the Spanish Viceroy sent to Porto d'Ercole for his effects and it was found that these had never left the little town but were sitting in the customs house there.

How did such a strange, maverick and complex figure come to have so great an influence on the course of European art, greater in fact than his more successful contemporaries such as Rubens and the Caraccis? Certainly both his romantic personality and his genius made an immediate impression on the artists of his time, particularly in Rome which was the effective centre of the western artistic world. But more important than this he was able to throw open a window which led in a flood of new realism into a world which had been previously dominated first by the almost artificial sweetness of the High Renaissance and then by the erratic affectations of Mannerisms. As Professor Spear and other Caravaggio scholars have pointed out, the Cinquecento *maniera* was already under significant attack by the time he reached Rome but it was the impact of Caravaggism and the

speed with which the Caravaggisti spread its influence over a wide area of Western Europe, that was to bring about what to all intents and purposes was a new dimension of vision.

Within a few years of his death, Caravaggio's work was being sought by the leading collectors. Waager, for instance, when he published his *Galleries and Cabinets of Art in Great Britain* in 1857, noted how many pictures by him had apparently reached England in the first half of the seventeenth century. Apart from a number of works which are still *in situ* at the places for which they were painted, in Rome for example and at Valetta, Palermo and Naples, his major paintings are to be found now in the galleries of Rome, London, Paris, Madrid, Berlin and Leningrad, as well of course as in America. The twentieth century, which has been largely responsible for the 're-discovery' of Caravaggio, has also, fortunately, seen a general increase of responsibility about the movement of works of art. As a result a retrospective exhibition of his work has become largely impossible and the light has shifted, for exhibition purposes, largely on to the Caravaggisti.

There have been a number of exhibitions dealing with the Caravaggisti since the end of the war. Among these were the *Mostra del Caravaggio e dei Caravaggeschi at Milan in* 1951, *Caravaggio en de Nederlanden* at Utrecht and Antwerp in 1952, *Caravaggio and the Tenebrosi* at the Seattle Art Museum in 1954, and two in Paris, in 1955 *Caravage et les peintres Français du XVIIe Siècle* at the Heim Gallery and *Le Caravage et la peinture italienne du XVIIe Siècle* at the Louvre in 1965. The most important single exhibition on the subject during the period, however, has undoubtedly been *Caravaggio and his Followers* at the Cleveland Museum in 1971-72. This was of particular significance for two reasons. First it dealt with the spread of Caravaggism over a wide basis on a more balanced scale than any previous study. Secondly it produced the extremely measured and scholarly catalogue of Professor Spear which has now been re-published as a paperback book on its own account by Icon Editions. This, together with Mr. Benedict Nicolson's *Hendrick Terbrugghen* first published in 1958 is the leading existing authority written in English on the subject of the Caravaggisti now available.

The Trafalgar Galleries exhibition, to the catalogue of which a number of prominent scholars including Mr. Nicolson have contributed their advice, did not purport to be on this scale. At Cleveland there were no less than six paintings directly attributed to Caravaggio himself included and seventy-five from other hands. Not unnaturally the London exhibition contained no work attributable to the master himself but it had pictures amongst others by Bartolomeo Manfredi, Moïse Valentin (de Boulogne), Terbrugghen, Abraham Janssers, Ribera, Zurbaran, Matrias Stom(er), Antiveduto Grammatica, Giacomo Gali and Baldassare Franchescini, known as *Il Volterrano*. When one considers that this particular showing made no allowance for Georges de la Tour (the subject himself of a major exhibition in Paris in 1972), Honthorst, the Gentileschi, Mattia Preti, Sanacenior Simon Vovet, one begins to realise the scale and size of Caravaggio's influence. One also

realises the remarkable achievement of the Trafalgar Galleries in bringing interesting examples of so many of the leading Caravaggisti together at the same time.

Not only the works of Caravaggio himself but that of many of his leading followers has been the subject of a process of re-assessment during the present century. As Mr. Sherman E. Lee, the director of the Cleveland Museum of Art, put it in his introduction to the 1972 exhibition catalogue: 'The lack of attention given him in the nineteenth and early twentieth century has been replaced since World War II with a flood of articles, monographs and attributions. The present re-evaluation and deification of Caravaggio inevitably leads to excess. All dark genre pictures become either Caravaggio or Caravaggesque. His influence has been extended to include artists who could never have seen his works, except in remote reflections. Exhibitions on the continent, in Milan and Paris, did much in providing occasions to see his work and that of his followers, but also obscured the true meaning and extent of the master's impact on European painting of the seventeenth century.'

In an interesting recently-published study called *What is Art History?* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1976) Professor Mark Roskill dedicates a chapter to the case of Georges de la Tour and his rediscovery. De la Tour, who is now regarded as individually one of the most important of the Caravaggisti, was by no means altogether unknown in his own day, when his work was bought both by Louis XIII and the local rulers in Lorraine. As a result of having chosen to live at Lunéville rather than in Paris, however, he had by the end of the century become largely forgotten. In 1810, when the Museum at Nantes in Britanny had to deal with the question of the attribution of two of his works, including the archetypal *Denial of St. Peter*, they attributed these, although both were signed and one was dated, to the eighteenth century pastellist Maurice Quentin de Latour (1704-88). A more bizarre mistake it would be hard to imagine but so the attribution remained for over the next hundred years. Although today even a first year student would be unlikely to mix up two such totally disparate artists, it has proved a difficult task in establishing the twenty-five to fifty pictures which make up the definitive corpus of La Tour's work and examples of his work have been attributed in error variously, for example, to painters of the Spanish School, to Honthorst and the Utrecht tenebrists and to the Le Nains. This kind of misunderstanding can only be accounted for by an affinity among very different schools based on their realisation of the works of Caravaggio. The link becomes even more marked when one compares La Tour's *St. Joseph in the Carpenter's Shop* (Louvre) with *Caravaggio's Conversion of St. Paul* in S. Maria del Popolo at Rome or his *Ecstasy of St. Francis* (Musée du Mans) with Caravaggio's picture of the same name in the Wadsworth Atheneum at Hartford, from which, according to Hermann Voss, it was derived.

The qualities in common to all these Caravaggisti, wholly different as they might be in other ways, was a realistic naturalism, a concentration on

the properties of light and an avoidance of perspective depth. This had its effect on the way in which even such artists as the Le Nains, whom I suspect that Mr. Lee and Professor Spear would not accept as strict Caravaggisti, handled the way in which figures stood out in a scene. Nothing could ever be the same after Caravaggio. Théophile Bigot, an artist whose personality has largely been revitalised as a result of the researches of Mr. Nicolson and M. Jean Boyer, is another example in point.

When it comes to Honthorst and the Utrecht tenebrists the affinity is too obvious almost to require particular mention though the relationship concerned is interesting in a number of ways. A number of Dutch artists besides Terbrugghen and Honthorst were clearly strongly influenced by the works of Caravaggio. These include Pieter Lastmann, Dirck van Baburen, Jan van Biglert and Abraham Blomaert. Interestingly enough, this influence was frequently at second-hand. Not only did Caravaggio formulate no direct school, as for example did Rubens with his countless pupils, but to take the example of van Baburen one of the most strongly influenced of the Dutchmen, he did not even get to Rome until the year after the Italian's death. As Messrs. Rosenberg and Slive have pointed out, the Dutch artists must have assimilated Carravagism either through their knowledge of his works in the churches and private collections of Rome or by contact with such Caravaggisti as Manfredi, Gentileschi and Saraceni as continued to work there during the first few decades of the seventeenth century. It was through these means that the strong chiaroscuro, the vivid colour harmonies and the particular aspects of motifs and compositions were passed on. Even Elsheimer, who was in Rome from 1600 until the time of his death in 1610, learned part of his facility for handling light, which in turn was to influence Rembrandt from a familiarity with the achievement of Caravaggio in this field.

As Mr. Lee says it is dangerous to obscure Caravaggio's real impact on seventeenth century art by exaggerating the immediate scope of his influence. Equally, it is also possible to underemphasise the broader aspects of his influence by over-concentrating on the particular. Rubens, for instance, who was a particularly strong artistic personality in his own right, shows a conscious awareness of Caravaggio, with whose work he became familiar during his Roman sojourns at the beginning of the century at various stages in his career. This is evidenced not only directly by the careful copy which he took of Caravaggio's *Entombment* but the effect which this had on such works of Rubens as the *Descent from the Cross* in Antwerp Cathedral. He was one of the group of local artists who took the unprecendented step of subscribing to buy Caravaggio's *Madonna del Rosario* for the Dominicans of St. Paul's in Antwerp. Not only Rubens was clearly and continuously conscious of Caravaggio, but so equally was Rembrandt and, in the light of recent assessments of that master, was Vermeer, the man who, according to Dr. Peter Murray, 'turned Caravaggismo upside down.'

It is the universality, therefore, of Caravaggio's impact that he should have influenced artists as widely diverse as, say, Vermeer and Velazquez.

So far as the Spanish masters are concerned the Trafalgar Galleries exhibition underlined the importance of Caravaggio to both Ribera and Zurbaran. His visit to Naples in 1606-7, at that time a Spanish possession, was to have considerable impact not only on painting in that city, but in Spain. Included in the exhibition were a fine pair of Riberas, *The Martyrdom of St. Lawrence* and the *Martyrdom of St. Bartholomew*. Not only do these show the fluid but controlled handling of the Caravaggesque influence but they also demonstrate, as I suggested in an article on the Burlington House Spanish Exhibition earlier this year, what a fine painter Ribera could be when he worked in the major European tradition of the Caravaggesque *metier* rather than going off on macabre frolics of his own. Zurbaran's *Veilez S. Veronica* and two brodega pictures, a school painting of Zurbaran and a still life by Juan Fernandez ('El Labrador') further indicate the strength and breadth which the impact of Caravaggism brought, both through the direct import of his pictures into Spain and through the Neapolitan link, onto the Spanish artist' treatment of naturalism as a whole and the use of light in particular.

The August issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The Canadian Condition* by L. F. S. Upton, *The First Spanish Republic* by Lionel King, *The Case Against Fluoridation* by Andrew Bowden, M.B.E., M.P. and *The Theatre During the Reign* by J. C. Trewin.

EDUCATION AND PARTICIPATION

by R. G. Cave

> Indeed, the permanent participation of all in everything has led to the permanent frustration of all.—Ralf Dahrendorf.

THE imminent publication of the Taylor Committee's Report will almost certainly lead to a great deal of public debate on the subject of Education and Participation. My own views and opinions on participation in educational decision making are inevitably coloured by fairly long service in Cambridgeshire, an Authority which is generally acknowledged as a pioneer in community provision and involvement. Newsom said: 'The experience of the Cambridgeshire Village Colleges has shown that suitable provision for schools, youth clubs and adults on the same premises is practicable.' Plowden described Village Colleges as 'famous throughout the world and spread far beyond the County's boundaries,' and the Russell Report describes how community involvement was first pioneered in Cambridgeshire. My main intention in detailing these acknowledgements should not be interpreted as a mere display of chauvinism, in fact I do so to emphasise that community participation in educational decision-making has a history in this country which is curiously ignored by many writers on the subject.

This is not the place to examine why the concept of community provision and involvement has taken nearly fifty years to mushroom in the present fashion, however, it can justifiably be described as 'an idea whose time has come', and during the last quarter century in particular. Community colleges and schools, whether primary, secondary or further are, of course, only part of the picture of recent growth in grassroots participation. Few concerned teachers now believe that the school should, or indeed can, perform its function efficiently without taking non-professional opinion into account. However, as with all innovations in education there are groups both within and outside the system who have some serious reservations. For example, Stuart Maclure, editor of *The Times Educational Supplement*, told this year's Headmasters' Association Conference that the authority of head teachers was under attack. Traditionally, he said, heads had enjoyed great power in English education—much more than most other systems had allowed. 'This has been one of the driving forces of English education, but it is now more seriously challenged than ever before, its legitimacy challenged by radical younger teachers, by alienated students who challenge authority in general, and now, maybe, by the Taylor Committee in search of more power and participation for parents.' At the same conference, however, Arnold Jennings, the new president of the Association, called for greater participation by parents, commerce and industry in the work of schools. In his view teachers should not be the sole arbiters of what was taught in schools, 'Others should be involved in the devising of the curricu-

lum and syllabus, either directly or through their opinions, interests and wishes being taken into account. . . . The teacher will remain in control of the curriculum, but the process of deciding on the curriculum will be a continuous dialogue in which he will seek to hear and talk to others outside the profession.'

The above statements are typical of those which are being expressed at the moment, with many, who are to some extent free of the day-to-day pressures of headship, viewing with concern an apparent decline in the authority of the head and the heads themselves, conscious of their management problems, treading a delicate path between consultation and participation. Their position in the maintained section of education is a very difficult one in that so far as the law stands at the moment they are accountable to the Governors and the Local Education Authority for the running of a school. Maclure believes that their authority is under attack and it would be foolish to underestimate what appears to be a growing gulf in opinion between heads and teaching staff about the real power of the head and the claimed advantages of participation even within the profession itself. Musgrove has discussed the power of the head in a number of books and articles and writers such as Esland have expressed the view that the teacher is largely dependent on the sponsorship of his head. Bernstein has suggested that there is a lessening of the authority of the head in his paper about the changing power relationship in cognitive communities; a change which he has described as a move from a mechanical to an organic solidarity. Anne Corbett in a *New Society* article entitled 'The School Bosses', discusses indications of a lessening of their authority, but David Hargreaves, writing nearly twelve months later in the same journal, says:

> The majority of heads have changed their image according to the times. The contemporary head is more likely to foster an image of himself as more of an equal. . . . But a change of image is not necessarily associated with a shift in power, and in my view there is little evidence of such a power shift.

My own experience is in line with that of Hargreaves, especially as recent Burnham awards, with their discretionary elements, do much to reinforce the authority of the head. It may also be the case if, following Taylor, the LEAs relinquish more control to governing bodies, that this also will be a factor in increasing the head's power. Even financial virement, with the increased possibilities for granting or withholding resources, can be a useful asset to power if used as a sanction.

At present there seems to be little evidence of group consensus even about teachers' participation in educational decision making on the part of the professional associations. Most N.U.T. members are likely to have a very different view of professional authority and participation to that held by their colleagues in the Joint Four. One Union has its historical origins in the elementary school, the other in grammar school traditions. Certainly the N.A.S. expresses views about teacher participation which would not be shared by most members of the N.A.H.T. let alone members of H.M.A. Most members of the teaching profession appear to believe that there should be some form of participatory decision making in schools but opinion is very much divided on how much and how it should be achieved.

It is perhaps worth asking, in view of recent events in the I.L.E.A. and elsewhere, from where does the head get the values which underline his authority? The head's inter- and intra-professional communications are important sources of legitimacy in his taken for granted reality as a leader in one form or another. It may be as well to remind ourselves again that at this point in our educational history, with the growing emphasis on participation and accountability, the average head is likely to be bemused and somewhat insecure about his role while there are such strongly competing definitions of his task. The point I wish to make is that while it is probable that the concepts of leadership and the achievement of school objectives are embodied in the perspectives of the individuals who propound and promote them, in everyday terms heads are faced with accountability and participatory bandwagons which can produce a state of oscillating uncertainty. This may well result in an outward appearance of enthusiasm for democratic influence strategies while maintaining an inner belief in the effectiveness of control strategies, a situation not unknown in local government with regard to corporate management. Heads and their staffs are jointly engaged in the achievement of very difficult, even where clearly defined, aims and objectives; uncertain ideational structures and vague models of democratic partnership may in some cases prove to be anomic. Consensus and participation as guides to action are only of value if based on rationality not a vague belief in participation as a basic ground of the same order as rationality. In fact, participation as a means of educational decision making only makes sense as that manner of setting about the process least hindering rational action. In other words, democratic participation itself needs to be grounded in the presupposition of the necessary value of rationality.

Halpin has described two styles of headship in his book *Theory and Research in Administration*. He describes a head in what he calls a school with an 'open' climate and then goes on to describe another in a 'controlled' climate; making a valuable point when he warns of the difficulties in describing leadership styles in terms of an authoritarian/democratic dimension. Leadership is *uni*dimensional, any single head is likely to demonstrate examples of several dimensions. The democratic style still reflects the hierarchical position of the head; in this county he is still undoubtedly in control. In the sense of the ability to get things done, there is no inherent or *prima facie* difference between control and influence styles of leadership. It is the way this power is achieved which differentiates the two styles. Control does not necessarily depend on fear and sanctions alone. Halpin in fact found that in schools with controlled climates, staff morale was usually high, the staff appeared in general contented and working well, and they appeared to obtain considerable job satisfaction. It might have been an interesting exercise to ask these staffs if they considered themselves to be in a 'control' or 'influence' situation; the heads' responses may also have proved interesting. In the present climate of opinion there are likely to be very strong pressures for appearing to approve influence rather than control styles. Other things being equal, most members of the profession would claim to prefer educational decisions to be based on assent, rather than compliance.

However, as a former Chief Inspector of Schools, I recognise that other things rarely are equal. For example, if time permitted, it might be interesting to speculate about participation and control strategies in an innovative growth situation as opposed to the cut-back and redundancy situation towards which we appear to be inexorably moving. By now it will be obvious that I do not intend here to take any strong position on the question of participation or control. This article is not meant to be a polemic, the arguments are as old as democracy itself and my purpose is purely to sketch an outline of some of the present concerns in education.

There is, of course, an interesting comparison to be made about relationships and the concept of participation in schools as compared with establishments of Further Education. Following the advice offered in the post-Weaver Circular 7/70, David Parkes, Head of the Resources Group in the Further Education Staff College, stated: 'It is certain, in my view, that the forces involved in changing the form of government in educational institutions have been largely political and social rather than primarily educational and have been to do with pressures within a democratic society rather than with making decision-making processes more efficient or effective.' In August 1972 the Headmasters' Association issued a document, *The Government of Schools,* from which it might be useful to quote one or two views. For example, after stating that they know of no secondary school where there is not already opportunity for staff opinion to be expressed, they go on:

> We are not willing, however, to agree that participation, in the sense in which the N.U.T. uses the term, is desirable in our schools at the present time. We consider that the establishment of academic boards or staff councils with powers to overrule headmasters by majority vote would entail dangers far greater than arise in the present situation in which headmasters are solely responsible to Governors.

Objecting to determination of school policy in educational matters by majority vote of the staff, the document states:

> A crucial choice at the bedside of a sick man is not made through a ballot of junior doctors: the experience, knowledge, skill and judgment of the consultant is recognised and the responsibility of deciding how best to treat the patient is placed firmly upon his shoulders; and continue: In present circumstances a headmaster can be an innovator, whereas new ideas might sometimes meet effective resistance if their adoption required the support of a majority of the staff.

Those outside education would do well to recognise the fact that even so far as their professional colleagues in the staff room are concerned, most heads, certainly those in secondary schools, apparently prefer to affect the behaviour of others by the mutual acceptance of conclusions derived from shared value positions but fear that they may not be able to fulfil their headship role effectively, without resource, if only occasionally, to control.

If we now briefly consider the position of parents in educational decision making it is undeniable that the looking outward on the part of the schools is complemented by the fact that in an increasing number of homes interest in the purposes of education has never been greater. As Lady Plowden has emphasised, the people in this country are not divided into the middle class

and the deprived: in between there is the great mass of the population, in Registrar-General's terms just over half, who have high hopes for the education of their children, and who themselves have talents which have often been denied. Although such technical jargon would rarely be used, discussion both about the 'instrumental' and 'expressive' aspects of schools and schooling is no longer confined to a relatively small section of our society. One of the problems about parent participation is that much of it is fluid and there is the obvious difficulty of reconciling a number of widely differing demands. Also, of course, threatened redundancies have made the teaching profession more conscious than ever about professional boundary maintenance. In considering participation their phenomenological world is taken into consideration. It might be possible to draw an analogy from studies of teachers and extrapolate from models of restricted and extended professionality to working- and middle-class perceptions of the purposes of education. One could then ask the same question as Hoyle asks of teachers, i.e. 'How would you expect the two types to respond to the opportunity of participating in decision making in the school?', remembering always, of course, that for this purpose the terms 'working' and 'middle' class are 'ideal types' which deliberately over-simplify and over-dichotomise. A study of the 'politics of professionalism' is more likely to be attempted by the middle-class parent even though the stereotype of the unconcerned and feckless lower-working-class parent has been shown by Halsey, Midwinter and others to be largely a myth. A widely recognised difficulty in attempting to encourage parental involvement in decision making at any significant level is the obvious fact that manual workers and their wives, although every bit as concerned, are unlikely to be well represented. The reverse side of this situation for the innovating head is that increased participation on the part of middle-class parents will inevitably affect both organisation and curriculum. It may be that there are some advantages for all in this situation and it is true that articulate and concerned middle-class pressure groups have already improved conditions in some areas of local authority and state provision. Recent television programmes have also shown the power of these pressure groups. There is, however, the possibility that a school introducing parental participation and drawing its pupils from a variety of social conditions may be 'captured' by sophisticated and ambitious middle-class parents to the detriment of the children of less knowledgeable, more diffident and self-effacing parents of traditional working-class backgrounds. Certainly such a head should be aware that the middle-classes are adept at building and maintaining pressure groups, whose aims may be very narrow and partisan when taken in the context of the whole of our educational provision.

It may be that the partial solution to the above problem lies in the recognition of Rensis Likent's thesis that 'the giving or sharing of information is an essential step in the process of participation and one of the first in moving toward more complete participation.' Certainly, few working-class parents have been encouraged in the past to regard participation as 'legitimate', a necessary condition for effectiveness. We should remember

that in education, as in other areas of life, people will very often accept what they are used to only so long as they are left unaware that something better is possible. One might speculate why the disadvantaged section of this country accepted so readily their conditions in the period between the Wars.

What seems probable is that it is not so much actual deprivation which produces discontent but relative deprivation, the degree to which those at the bottom of the pyramid feel that they are being treated unequally and that their treatment is undeserved. Whilst those who were educationally disadvantaged felt themselves the victims of misfortune rather than injustice, little change occurred in their conditions. However, research workers such as Floud, Halsey, Bernstein and Douglas have conclusively shown that in this country society distributes its rewards, including education, disproportionately between the children of various social classes. So far in this century two World Wars have been the catalysts in heightening the sense of relative deprivation and making and strengthening the demands for educational reform. Perhaps in the near future this will be achieved by a greater degree of community participation in educational decision making. Although I share the view of those who believe that the educational system alone is incapable of changing society, certainly it is a most influential agent in social change. As Donald Schon pointed out in his Reith Lectures, 'We have to find ways of inventing or modifying institutions so that they are capable of transforming themselves without flying apart at the seams.' It may be that the introduction of a participation model of decision making in education at all levels is one way of ensuring that the seams of our democracy do not give way under strain.

I began this article with a pessimistic although very understandable expression of concern by Ralf Dahrendorf. Participation *is* the thief of time and much concern has been expressed about the multiplicity of mere 'talking shops.' However, Henry Morris, founder of the Cambridgeshire Village Colleges, writing nearly fifty years ago was more optimistic. In his view 'the welfare of communities and the vigour and prosperity of their social life depend on the extent to which centres of unfettered initiative can be developed within them. The great task of education is to convert society into a series of cultural communities . . . where every local community would become an education society, and education would not merely be a consequence of good government, but good government a consequence of education.'

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Sunrise. Dominic Cooper. Chatto and Windus. £3.95. *Bear*. Marian Engels. Routledge and Kegan Paul. £3.50. *Marry Me*. John Updyke. Andre Deutsch. £3.50. *One Man's Poison*. Colin Watson. Eyre Methuen. £3.50. *Caves of Alienation*. Stuart Evans. Hutchinson. £4.95. *Love's Gravity*. Per Wästberg. Souvenir Press. £4.95. *Roots*. Alex Haley. Hutchinson. £5.50.

There has been a welcome emphasis on strong descriptive writing among the early summer fiction publications. One of the most outstanding is *Sunrise*, Dominic Cooper's second novel. Dominic Cooper is a young writer with a built-in capacity for conveying the grandeur of lonely, rugged places where a man can be absorbed into an unspoiled landscape without fear of urban intrusion. The setting of *Sunrise* is a rocky island territory off the West coast of Scotland, stark and terrifying in its varying moods and climates, yet capable, by its very isolation, of inducing spiritual tranquillity. Unfortunately, Murdo Munro, the chief, in fact the only life-size character in the novel, is foiled in his attempt to find peace of mind among the massive bastions.

This stocky, ageing and frustrated man has for too long bottled up resentment against his nagging, frigid wife and the travesty of married life to which she has condemned him. During his daughter's wedding ceremony he decides to avenge himself by setting their home on fire. The house is Council property and he soon realises that he faces prosecution—even prison. He takes to the hills as much to evade capture as to revitalise his broken spirit. Either way, the plan soon goes sour on him. The scenically beautiful environs are as unwelcoming as his familiar village background. Unscaleable heights, treacherous bogs, bitter cold or enervating heat soon drive him to seek out some human habitation, which proves to be only slightly less squalid than an impromptu shelter in the open.

Finally, after unintentionally causing another fire, this time in the flimsy dwelling of a benefactor, he staggers back to his native village, badly injured, there to die unnoticed and unmourned before either the law or his revengeful wife catch up with him.

Impressive writing also clothes a simple tale of life on a remote island in Marian Engels' novel, *Bear*, this time in Northern Ontario. It revolves around Lou, a repressed and depressed research worker in a city Institute whose few emotional forays have ended in disillusionment. She enjoys life in the metropolis, although yearning for the freedom of the countryside; and so, when an opportunity occurs to spend the summer cataloguing and sorting the contents of a mansion bequeathed to the Institute, she accepts the assignment eagerly. The atmosphere of the place pulsates with the overwhelming mastery of the elements. From the moment of her arrival Lou is inspired by the untamed beauty which surrounds the island. Once inside the neglected Residence, however, primitive conditions denude the scene of romance—temporarily at any rate. Resourcefully, she hammers out a routine for living and working and has all but adjusted herself to a new way of life when she becomes aware of her

'stable companion', a huge, bedraggled-looking bear chained up in an outhouse. At first she is afraid of the creature, but by degrees pity prompts her to attempt its rehabilitation. It is not long before she finds herself deeply involved with the individual bear, as well as with the history and mythology of the species, examples of which proliferate among the records and papers she has been employed to index. All too soon, her concern is transformed into 'love'. The bear returns her devotion yet retains his own authority. Once, when she affronts his dignity by her lewd advances, he rips the skin off her back with his formidable, non-retractable claws. Lou is chastened but not alienated. She continues to woo her strange bedfellow within a cocoon of isolation which does not, fortunately, impede her work on the documents.

Lou still retains the enterprise to enjoy a brief sexual affair with the local handyman and so, despite her solitary existence on the island, she is more involved and interested than in the urban way of life for which she now has an aversion. When the seemingly endless summer merges at last into autumn, she staves off the moment when she must abandon the island, until she can delay her return to the Institute no longer.

Strangely, Lou has benefited from her strange deviation. The bear is going to be well cared for; the handyman returns to his wife and nothing more remains to be told. Within the restricted space of the novella form, Marian Engels has neither explored nor assessed the psychology of a woman who enjoys mating with an animal, or touched upon the physiological possibilities of such a union. Instead, she invests the strange romance with a strong measure of fantasy, drawing upon her inexhaustible store of brilliant images and evocations.

The value of this kind of lyrical and intensive approach is at once noted by its absence. The quartet who work out their problems in John Updyke's new novel do so not against a backcloth of changing sea and sky, not on a romantic island, but in a very ordinary Connecticut suburb. In Part One of *Marry Me*, Jerry Conant and Sally Mathias are presented in a centuries' old situation. They are passionately in love, but both are already married. And so there exists for them only a contrived routine of subterfuge and evasion. Both genuinely adore their children yet are compelled to give them rather less single-minded attention than they deserve. The conflict and edgy tension within their own thoughts and loyalties are effectively conveyed. But *Marry Me* is not only concerned with the problems of Sally and Jerry, the wider intention being to examine their domestic tangle from several angles. Unfortunately, the disclosure that Ruth, Jerry's wife, is already aware of her husband's liaison with Sally serves to diminish the tension. Ruth is fond of Jerry and hopes he will remain with her, and her natural jealousy for her supplanter is a lukewarm emotion. And then Sally's husband, Richard, takes the centre of the stage and he too seems to have few downright convictions about either the preservation or collapse of his marriage.

Jerry is described as a writer of TV commercials, but never for a moment seems to possess the necessary enterprise for such a demanding career. The two women are *au fond* conventional suburbanites and only Richard, aided by a few exaggerated quirks and mannerisms, emerges as a positive character. John Updyke can be witty and quite profound about the marriage state. His problem has been to write a compulsive and stimulating novel on a theme worked over so many times before.

In *One Man's Poison*, Colin Watson certainly eschews the familiar by presenting a plot which is as bizarre as it is bewildering. Colin Watson has enjoyed a phenomenal success with his 'Flexborough' novels, several of which

have been adapted as a TV series. A feature of the Flexborough stories is the unravelling of a crime by a fashionably 'trendy' detective and any other bystanders who may be disposed to assist the cause of justice.

One Man's Poison is about a young motorbike enthusiast who is hurled to his death from a spaceship contraption at a local funfair. Coincidentally, an attractive young matron intent upon obtaining adequate alimony from her obnoxious husband is unwittingly involved in the cover-up. It would be unfair to reveal the ingenious manner in which the mystery is resolved, or the identity of the murderer, who does not at any point reveal the callous disposition required to carry out a particularly brutal crime. Brisk narration and witty dialogue combine to carry this 'black' comedy to its unlikely conclusion; but it must be admitted that enjoyment of the 'Flexborough' novels is an acquired taste.

No one could accuse Stuart Evans of undue levity. His overall intention in *Caves of Alienation* is too serious for farce and, by the very nature of his chosen form, swift or lively narration is difficult, if not impossible. Michael Craddock, the central character, was a famous writer of the 'sixties, not merely 'popular' but accepted by the 'intellectuals' as well. To prove this point, imaginary extracts from his novels are reproduced, bodied out by copious extracts from a fictitious 'Life', comments from friends and enemies and a complete working TV script. Through these, Craddock is seen at school and University as a lonely, frustrated person, deserving of sympathy rather than analysis. After a period of disillusionment with 'literary London' he returns to his native Wales, there to die a violent and mysterious death, survived only by varying opinions as to his true worth.

The working out of Craddock's complex personality through a kaleidoscope of memories has presented Stuart Evans with a Herculean task. If he fails, it is probably because the intangible quality of the creative writer resists transmutation to the printed page. With a character in almost any other profession—doctor, politician, company director—the method might have been successful.

Fortunately, there are times when by its sheer brilliance and originality a novel stimulates the reader into a new kind of enlightenment. *Love's Gravity*, by an accomplished Swedish writer, Per Wästberg, is an example. Basically, it has a simple plot. Jack Backman, an air traffic control engineer, is married to Gertrude, who later turns out to be his half-sister. But he loves Jenny Jeggers, a convincingly professional social and environmental worker, who returns his passion ecstatically.

Gertrude is several months' pregnant by a man not her husband; and a refreshingly 'liberated' attitude towards such complicated issues as fidelity and incest enables the three of them to unravel the marital tangle. Gertrude takes off for Botswana to work out her problems, teaching and doing social work in the Bush. Jack follows her; whereupon the delectable Jenny gives way to ordinary human pique and leaves for London, ostensibly to attend a conference about the environment. Finally, Gertrude and Jack return to Sweden; the child is born without any emotional fuss, with Jack expressing avuncular affection for the infant. Gertrude suffers most, but has a son to console her. And Jack and Jenny come together again, bound for all time by ties of physical and spiritual passion which override the 'civilised' approach.

It is not easy to consider the mammoth best-seller novel, *Roots*, objectively, coinciding as it does with the TV serial, nationwide acclaim and a charge of inaccurate research. Alex Haley, a successful American journalist, conceived

the bold plan of tracing the origins of his forbears in Africa before, in the mid-seventeen hundreds, one of his ancestors was captured and sold as a slave. The publishers claim that Alex Haley discovered both the man's identity and the village where he was born: a remarkable achievement. From that point onwards, a considerable volume of data must have been available for bodying out the true story; although insufficient, presumably, for a straight biography, hence Alex Haley's decision to present the facts in fiction form.

This has enabled him to devote a very large proportion of the novel to a study in which African tribal customs form the preponderant interest. So smoothly does all this flow along that the horrifying details of the transportation to America come almost as an intrusion rather than the novel's *raison d'être*. From then on it must be admitted that page after page of phonetically reported conversation among the captives becomes increasingly monotonous. Away from the spur of the sheer need for survival in the jungle, the Africans lack stimulus and direction and readily accept their role of subservience—which largely robs them of their interest. Nevertheless, a good, though inordinately long 'read', and one which is most memorable for its first two hundred pages.

Also received

The Turbulent Heart. Margaret Butler. Macmillan. £3.95. The third novel in Margaret Butler's trilogy covers the period of Henry II's reign, during which Thomas Becket was murdered. It is a dignified and factual account of events already well known to most readers: laced with sufficient imagination to breathe life into the familiar characters and completes a valuable, scholarly record.

Cast A Long Shadow. Mary E. Pearce. Macdonald and Jane. £3.95. It is not easy to isolate the charm of Mary Pearce's 'country' novels set a century ago on the Herefordshire borders. *Cast A Long Shadow* is the story of a cruel, bullying husband who drives his wife and son out of the house after a quarrel, and of her subsequent love for the village blacksmith. It seems a simple enough tale, but the sincerity of the wronged wife and her first-born son lifts it on to an altogether higher plane. This is the final novel in the series and, with the first two, will shortly be issued in one volume as *The Apple Tree Saga*.

Ghost In Green Velvet. Elizabeth Peters. Cassell. £3.95. The Highlands of Scotland are lovingly portrayed through the eyes of an exuberant young American archaeologist, not averse to mingling romance with research. She dispenses historical data in the most unlikely circumstances, which is pleasantly informative, but the general effect is marred by the author's 'cloak and dagger' approach.

A Shadow Of Gulls. Patricia Finney. Collins. £4.25. With her first novel, written at the age of seventeen, Patricia Finney has attempted the almost impossible task of weaving from misty, half legendary Irish characters, a coherent story about men and women credible to our contemporary minds—Queen Maeve of Connaught, Deirdre of the Sorrows, Con (or Conchobor) of Ulster and an invented narrator, Lugh the harper, whose sagas serve as the novel's framework. It is a bold attempt, yet not entirely satisfying, providing insufficient scope for Patricia Finney's remarkable powers of invention and description.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

BLACK MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA

Red, Black And Green: Black Nationalism In The United States. Alphonso Pinkney. Cambridge University Press. £7.50.

The colours of red, black and green were those of Marcus Garvey's flag—the flag of the Universal Negro Improvement Association of the 1920s, with its Back-to-Africa schemes and its many (in the end usually bankrupt) enterprises, from the Black Star shipping line to factories, hotels and publications. Marcus Garvey's enterprises are only one of the many movements that have marked the story of Black America, and Dr. Pinkney of Hunter College in C.U.N.Y. renders a service in providing what is in essence a handbook to them. If he concentrates on what he calls 'the peak years' of nationalism in 1963-73, nevertheless he reminds us not only of Garvey but of the Massachusetts black sea captain Paul Cuffee, whose African Institution and whose voyages to Sierra Leone and Liberia in 1811 and 1815 were pioneering and important. He passes lightly over the liberal-intentioned and white foundation of both these states in Africa; and, in retelling the nineteenth-century story of Back-to-Africa, he assumes, like Alex Haley in *Roots*, a Utopian and idyllic Africa from which wicked white capitalists dragged slaves mercilessly, rather than the diseased, corrupt and primitive society, itself as much involved in the slave trade and in slavery as were the white profiteers. Significantly, few American blacks now share these illusions of the tortured lands from which they came.

There are, of course, other illusions, and some of them mar this book. It carries the dedication: 'For the liberation of Afro-Americans and all the oppressed peoples of the world'. In the People's Republic of China, he declares, 'National minorities do not represent an oppressed category of citizens, as is the case in the United States . . . capitalism gives rise to and supports various forms of oppression, including racism' (p. xi). Or again ' . . . repression is rampant in the United States and in order for Afro-Americans to survive they must rely on the strength which comes through unity which in turn requires some degree of autonomy'.

Professor Pinkney, however, makes his point of view clear, and much of his study is commendably objective. He sees Malcolm X as an heroic figure, whose assassination was a major blow. He does not hide the twists and turns that marked and marred both Garvey's and Malcolm X's careers, and admits the state of disunity that now prevails among Afro-Americans. The iron may be deep in the soul, but the fire does not seem to burn very bright these days. He does not mention—presumably his book was already in the press?—the *volte-face* in the career of the former Black Panther leader, Eldridge Cleaver. He does note the likely weakening of the Black Moslems after the death of Elijah Muhammad—clearly he does not see Wallace Muhammad as being a chip off the old block. He is frank to admit the difficulties of Black Studies programmes and is expressly so on the quality and social pretensions of Howard University, marred in his view by being a feeble copy of a 'white school'.

Perhaps at the end, as at the beginning, he pays too little attention to the cross the white man carries. Although he mentions the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of 1954 which held that segregated education was itself unequal education and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he pays less credit than ought to be paid to those white and



black judges who, ten years before the great demonstration in 1963, were working to end legally-enforced segregation.

Yet he honestly faces up to the problem: how to pay for past injustices? It seems doubtful if segregation, whether as advocated by the Black Muslims or by any other group, is the answer in so varied and integrated a society. It has not helped the Indian. And how different is it, in fact, from the hated White man's world? He admits that the black nationalist movement is now 'in a state of flux and apparent decline', and is not rich in constructive solutions. It no longer sees any ray of light in Africa. Except in the career of W. E. du Bois (on whom he writes well) it has never shown much interest in Communism or Communist Pan Africanism. It faces the problem of a divided and confused leadership; the minority—not primarily because of its own failings—has too high a proportion of America's criminals and drop-outs, drug addicts and unemployed. There is, in fact, no obvious solution except time and tolerance, and Professor Pinkney is honest enough to admit it. He might have added that both Jefferson and Lincoln wanted the blacks just to go away, as an historical legacy for whom there was no future, and for which problem they saw no solution. But what is clear now is that the Blacks' future—by their choice—lies in North America, not Africa—and that there is, in fact, given its size, resources and free political system (whatever Professor Pinkney's *caveats* on it) ample opportunity for them in it. Most of their blood-brothers in the Congo and in Uganda would, one assumes, willingly trade places with them.

ESMOND WRIGHT

OPERA IN A NUTSHELL

Opera From A to Z. Elizabeth Forbes. Kaye and Ward. £3.50.

Elizabeth Forbes' knowledge of opera is encyclopaedic, and here she has combined her knowledge with a remarkable ability to compress and extract the vital statistics of opera in a readable and useful form. The format of the book, common to the series, is divided into three sections, the first and last being textual and containing a study of the subject, and the central section—usefully printed on contrasting buff paper—is arranged alphabetically for instant reference. That the author is thus able to survey a musical form in its entirety in just over 150 pages is remarkable, and more remarkable still is her opening chapter which, in some 20 pages, recounts the full history of opera from Peri and Monteverdi at the start of the 17th century, to Gershwin's *Porgy and Bess* in 1935. This is a masterly survey, packed with information, and yet far more than a mere catalogue, so elegantly and stylishly is it written. 'The gale of creative vitality that flows through (Verdi's) music makes Bellini's elegance seem languid and Donizetti's invention look contrived by comparison" epitomises her capacity for succinct appreciation.

After this admirable initial survey, the final section—just ten pages—on opera since the end of the last war is perhaps slightly less helpful reading for the newcomer to the form, though once again it presents an informative and useful survey of the past 30 years. One feels perhaps that Miss Forbes might better have been allowed to continue her survey in Part I right up to the present day, and to have used her final section to discuss something rather different: a survey of the major opera houses perhaps, or even possibly a chapter on operetta as a

distinct form. For the central alphabetical section one has nothing but admiration: it is uncanny how the author manages in so short a space to show such unerring judgment of what information is essential. The system is that over 600 entries are divided into composers, operas, singers, conductors and producers (past and present). Furthermore, under the operas themselves she helpfully selects, and gives details of recommended recordings of the work in question. There is useful cross-referencing by means of asterisks, and the biographical information about living singers is most helpful, though I suspect that some may be less than happy at the author's readiness to supply their birth dates! She is perforce selective in her list of performers and one detects, perhaps understandably, a certain patriotic bias towards British and Commonwealth singers—Rita Hunter and John Brecknock are both in, Ramon Vinay and Alfredo Kraus, for example, are not. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, it is remarkable just how much she has managed to include.

This book, attractively produced, with some beautiful engravings from old editions of *Illustrated London News*, will be of considerable interest to the opera-lover who wishes to discover more about the art, as well as, in its central section, being a most useful work of instant reference for the enthusiast who is already well acquainted with it. At its modest price it also represents remarkably good value.

DAVID FINGLETON

A STUDY OF DISSENT

So Down To Prayers. Studies In English Nonconformity, 1780–1920. Clyde Binfield. Dent. £8.50.

Dr. Clyde Binfield, Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of Sheffield, and himself a keen and active member of the United Reformed Church, has written what is both an immensely enjoyable book and a thorough piece of scholarship. His first book was on George Williams and the Y.M.C.A.

Dr. Binfield's approach is novel and attractive. He clearly states that his aim was not to write of denominations nor to write a chronological study of events: such a task would have been impossible within the confines of 248 pages of text. Dr. Binfield's approach, rather, is designed to 'do justice to a section of English life without parallel for influence or variety, still taken too easily for granted by all save the professionally curious'. His approach is to study the whole of English Dissent through a careful examination of specified parts.

After a general introduction, he begins creating a sort of dissenting web by studying the relationship between the famous Nonconformist man of letters, Crabb Robinson, in London with the Pattisson family in Norfolk, a leading dissenting family. Into this study is woven the history of chapel affairs and dissenting attitudes as reflected by the Pattissons' and Crabb Robinson's correspondence and doings. From late eighteenth and early nineteenth Norfolk and London, the book turns to the newspaper magnates: the Baines of Leeds. Here one is taken into the world of 'political' Dissent of mid-Victorian England, secure in its Radical creed. From the nexus of the Baines family, the author turns to the 'political parson' *per se*, Edward Miall, one-time Congregationalist minister and later editor of *The Nonconformist*, a chief agitator for disestablishment and twice a Liberal M.P.

From Miall, Dr. Binfield turns to a fascinating study of the 1885 general election in a rural constituency in Norfolk in which Nonconformists played a predominant role: as candidates, workers and local magnates. From Norfolk the study turns to discussions on Nonconformist church-building (for the assets of which a good case is put) of the late Victorian period, on Nonconformist craftsmen similar in approach to William Morris, to foreign missions, to the advocates of 'social gospel' like Baldwin Brown and C. S. Horne, both of whom were famous Congregationalist ministers in the last thirty years before the outbreak of war in 1914.

There are some criticisms which can be made: the study is not so much of Nonconformity but of middle-class English Congregationalism; the subjects chosen in most cases were not 'representative' of the rank and file of Dissent; and, sometimes, there seems to be just a hint of zealous commitment in fairly strident terms. But these faults, if they are faults, do not detract from the fact that the study remains a fascinating one. Dr. Binfield did not set out to produce a study of 'representative' Nonconformists but to shed light on certain aspects of Dissent too often ignored or simply not known. His aim was to show that Dissent was far more varied than is often assumed and that its various connections by blood and by marriage rival that of other great middle-class families attached to the English Church such as the Wilberforces and Gladstones. Dr. Binfield has helped to show the oft-forgotten truth that Dissent was primarily a question of religion which contained positive goodness unique to itself. Politics were important, perhaps too important to some Nonconformists at certain times; but, politics were not the lifeblood of Dissent. Dr. Binfield has made all students of English religion indebted to his meticulous work and challenging presentation.

J. E. B. MUNSON

A VICTORIAN SCANDAL

The Cleveland Street Affair. Lewis Chester, David Leitch and Colin Simpson. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £5.95.

When, in the early 1970s, it became possible to see in the Public Records Office the Director of Public Prosecutions' papers relating to one of the most notorious late nineteenth century scandals, known as the Cleveland Street Affair, there were those who hastened to open the Victorian closet with great expectations of finding a royal skeleton therein.

Eighty-eight years ago, Number 19 Cleveland Street, in the West End of London, now absorbed into respectability as a part of the Middlesex Hospital, was the eye of a moral hurricane. In a London replete with houses of dubious repute, it suddenly erupted as *the* house of ill-fame—the capital's most infamous male brothel. The exposure came about in a very queer way when a 15-year-old telegraph boy, Charles Swinscow, suspected of petty thefts at the General Post Office Building in St. Martin's-le-Grand, was questioned regarding the unexpectedly large sum of eighteen shillings which he was found to have in his possession, and admitted that he had obtained it by behaving indecently with 'fine gentlemen' at the house in Cleveland Street.

First to rummage in the cupboard was Mr. Montgomery Hyde. His book, *The Cleveland Street Scandal*, was published in 1976. Now, following close on its traces, comes the fossicking report of Messrs. Chester, Leitch and Simpson. Their book, less stringently academic than Mr. Montgomery Hyde's, is written

in a more sensational style, but does not add anything of consequence to the solution of the riddle as to whether or not Prince Albert Victor, the Duke of Clarence, was a visitor participant to Cleveland Street. What it does, is to reinforce the impression that high powers were brought to play to divert the normal course of criminal justice: that there was a summit conspiracy, involving the Prince of Wales and the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, to make sure that His Royal Highness' friend, Lord Arthur Somerset, an undoubted habitué of the brothel, should escape the legal consequences of his folly. Lord Arthur, 'Podge' to his intimates, was permitted to escape to Dieppe. Charles Hammond, the 'Monsieur' of the brothel, was also allowed to show a dirty pair of heels, fleet-footing it to Paris . . . and thence to America. Two luckless degenerates, George Daniel Veck, a former post office employee now posing as a clergyman, and Henry Horace Newlove, an 18-year-old post office clerk who acted as procurer for Hammond, received suspiciously light sentences of a few months. And there, despite the agitations of Labouchere, the affair ended. Not, however, without claiming two further, as it were, ancillary victims. Ernest Parke, the editor of the left-wing *North London Press*, was whisked away to serve twelve months for a criminal libel uttered against Lord Euston, and a solicitor, Arthur Newton, alleged to have suborned witnesses, received a six weeks' prison sentence for conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice.

Neither the law nor the law officers emerge very creditably from this somewhat seedy episode, and not only is the distinction between law and justice pointed up, but both are plainly seen sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Or, as it was alternatively expressed, His Royal Highness and Lord Salisbury were determined to avoid public scandal in the name of a higher good.

A disturbing book for idealists—but a sociologically fascinating document on juris prudence.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

PSYCHOLOGISTS ANALYSED

Psychologists on Psychology. David Cohen. Routledge & Kegan Paul. £6.95.

David Cohen has hit upon an enterprise that was well worth pursuing: he has gone to, and interviewed *in situ*, a selection of eminent psychologists, which term is widely interpreted, in that he includes Harald Leupold-Löwenthal (the chairman of the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society), and R. D. Laing, as well as David McClelland, Donald Broadbent, Noam Chomsky, H. J. Eysenck, Leon Festinger, Liam Hudson, Michel Jouvet, Neal Miller, Burrhus Skinner, Henri Tajfel and Niko Tinbergen.

Apparently there has been remarkably little study of psychologists themselves, who may be suspected of having resisted any such approaches. In 1953, Anne Roe published a series of monographs on the personalities of notable scientists, including psychologists. She found that while biologists and physicists tended to be isolated during their childhood and not to be dependent on family ties, psychologists were still reacting with guilt and anger to childhood difficulties with parents even twenty years later. Many also admitted to feelings of superiority from an early age. While psychologists value human relationships very highly, they may not be particularly good at them. David McClelland argued (1973) that psychologists have an extremely strong need for power.

David Cohen does not attempt a clinical type of interview with his subjects, but, after an introductory short history of their careers, goes directly to asking them about the emergence of their interest in psychology, and then to an analysis of their viewpoint and their work in progress. His questions are of a very high order, and the eminent psychologists appear to respond with enthusiasm to his invitation to expand. Particularly, those who feel that their 'controversial' work has not been fully understood—Skinner, Laing and Eysenck—welcome the opportunity for another attempt at explanation.

Further use will, no doubt, be made of David Cohen's specific findings, such as the way in which accidental factors led most of his sample to their careers; the apparent paradox that the more successful a psychologist may be, the less he needs actually to see, observe or collect data on people himself; the way in which psychologists seem to release much of their need for power in fighting over what psychology should be about.

However, the secondary theme of David Cohen's book, which perhaps has parity with the 'psychology' of these psychologists, is probably its most useful immediate contribution; that is, since all these extremely individualistic psychologists were interviewed almost contemporaneously around 1976/77, this must be a valuable conspectus of the state and progress of this discipline, along a continuum from the severity of experimental psychology to the lush exhortations of Abraham Maslow's humanistic psychology of 'self-actualisation'.

In a way, this is a discouraging study because, with the best will in the world, it shows so clearly that there is no agreement even as to what psychology should really be about. Only Dr. Leupold Löwenthal, who, incidentally, is subjected to the most rigorous questioning, radiates calm certainty—as one would expect. Faced with this hotchpotch of theories, one almost has difficulty in accepting that there is any such discipline as psychology. Furthermore, it is quite striking how little stress these psychologists place on 'helping' people.

MOLLY TIBBS

THE POETRY OF DANNIE ABSE

Collected Poems 1948–1976. Dannie Abse. Hutchinson. £4.95.

What might the casual reader of Dannie Abse's poems learn from quickly flicking through them? From *Letter to Alex Comfort* that he has had a scientific training; from *Pathology of Colours* and *The Stethoscope* that he is a doctor; from the early *Song for Dov Shamir* and the later *Tales of Shatz* that he is Jewish; from *The Silence of Tudor Evans* that he comes from Wales. So many obvious factual points which leave questions of spirit and technique unanswered.

Wonder is a feeling vouchsafed to young poets. To preserve it (and tincture it at times with terror) is something not frequently accorded to the poet in his middle age. And when you have a sense of humour not to be stilled in the muse's very sanctum—as *Not Adlestrop* and *The Poetry Reading* (*Funland*) indicate—to sense and express this wonder may be harder. In Dannie Abse's earlier poems, this feeling is expressed lyrically and ornamentally (as in *Epithalmion*). Now, as in *Remembrance Day*, it may receive more naked presentation: 'A vision dies from being too long stared at', '2000 men are taking off their hats'. The pathos, too, may be more colloquially exhibited:

By nightfall, smoke lurks down pub-lit streets
and cheers! cheers! mademoiselle from 'Armentiers';
and did you die of cancer, Lily Marlene?

Both as to style and spirit, Dr. Abse has described his intention in an Introductory Note to this volume: 'For some time new', he tells us, 'my ambition has been to write poems which appear translucent but are in fact deceptions. I would have a reader enter them, be deceived he could see through them like sea-water, and be puzzled when he cannot quite touch bottom'. He also states that he wishes us 'to look upon the world with the eyes of a perpetual convalescent'—and that look, of course, is the look of wonder.

DEREK STANFORD

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES

In Search Of The Constitution (Pergamon Press. £6.50. USA $12.00). These 'Reflections on State and Society in Britain' by Nevill Johnson of Nuffield College, Oxford are at once stimulating, penetrating and provocative. He is concerned with the economic, social and political malaise that, he claims, has overshadowed Britain since the war, and is steadily dragging her down. He attacks Keynesian economic management, egalitarianism, the distribution of wealth and many aspects of the welfare state and the discouragement of productivity in favour of distribution as some of the factors in the British decline. Mr. Johnson argues that 'the root of the trouble is now political: we have a tired and old political order under which it has proved increasingly difficult to solve serious economic and social problems'. Constitutional institutions are either atrophied in their proper function or grown to overriding power, as the Executive, 'the Leviathan at the centre'. There are, therefore, needed great changes to ensure the proper balance between Parliament and the executive, to render the Courts an effective check on the abuse of authority and to provide the citizen with built-in constitutional rights incapable of simple erosion by either Parliament or the government. He favours a Bill of Rights. He supports some form of proportional representation which provides a balanced spectrum of political outlooks in the House of Commons and will lead particularly to consensus administration through inevitable coalitions. He has no objections to the latter. Indeed, he encourages it. He contends that the two party 'adversary mode of politics encourages a condition of ungovernability because it steadily destroys that belief in the existence of common interests and values without which a political community cannot survive . . . equally the adversary mode erodes and weakens the instruments for the control of government which were so carefully developed in the course of the evolution of parliamentary procedure'. He wants to see a more stable life of a Parliament and would restrict the power of the Prime Minister to dissolve it. He would like to see the development of House of Commons Committees to provide direct checks on the administration. The American Congress has, of course, a very elaborate method of Committee control. At the same time he wants Parliament as a whole to concentrate more on the control of legislation independently of the Cab-

inet. Mr. Johnson appreciates that his wide ranging changes could not in practice be carried out at a stroke. He advocates a permanent body to recommend constitutional reforms. It is certainly a lively study which should no doubt attract wide attention and comment.

Shakespeare the Man and His Achievement (Dent. £6.50). Robert Speaight's attractive book is the fruit of many years spent not only in acting but in the close study of Shakespeare's plays. He looks at Shakespeare's art in the light of the few known facts of his life and of the history and social conventions of his time. The plays are studied in relation to the conditions of their original performance and a convincing picture is built up of the kind of man their author was as well as of his social assumptions and literary tastes. Robert Speaight gives his views too on the perennially controversial question of the date of the *Sonnets* and Shakespeare's relationships with the Earl of Southampton and the Dark Lady. The testament of so distinguished an interpreter of Shakespeare's works will be of the greatest interest to readers and playgoers alike.

Mr. Puntila And His Man Matti (Eyre Methuen. £1.50). It is useful to have published in the paperback Methuen Modern Play series this play of Bertolt Brecht, which is not so well known as some of his other works. It has been translated into English by John Willett who is joint editor of Brecht's Collected Works in English.

Butcher's Broom (Souvenir Press. Hardback £3.95; paperback £2.00). Neil M. Gunn's second historical novel was first published in 1934 and is now reprinted in the same series as a number of his other novels. *Butcher's Broom* is set against the Highland clearances in the nineteenth century and the tragic experiences of the Gaels. Appropriately, the Souvenir Press have republished, in the same format, Fionn Mac Colla's **And The Cock Crew** (hardback £3.00; paperback £1.60). This moving novel was first published in 1945 and is also set amid the ruthless emptying of the Highlands to make way for sheep grazing. Both these reprints will be widely appreciated.

Discover Roman Britain (English Tourist Board. 25p). This excellently produced booklet, edited by Richard Quick, has been designed to present, in the very minimum of space, the sites of Roman occupation in the British Isles. These are sub-divided into regions which include Scottish, Welsh, Yorkshire and Cotswold remains. Detailed maps are provided for each area, together with colour photographs and concise accounts of the building and purpose of the various forts and villas.

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

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THE CASE AGAINST FLUORIDATION

by Andrew Bowden, MBE, MP

AS an individual, as a parent, and as a Member of Parliament I am utterly opposed to the artificial fluoridation of public water supplies. Had circumstances forced me in 1963, when fluoridation first became an issue in this country, to declare my position or vote on fluoridation, I would have been in favour of it. I would have claimed that it significantly reduced tooth decay and that its benefits continued into adult life, and I would also have brushed aside any suggestion that it might be dangerous. I would have said the process was both legal and ethical and would probably have classified, at least to myself, many of those who opposed it as cranks. My views would have been genuine and sincere—based largely upon statements put out by the Ministry of Health (as the department was then called) whose views I had accepted in good faith, without question. I would have been wrong on every point—an opinion which gains support from what has happened with the passing of time; that after years of experiment and following debate in the Swedish Parliament, fluoridation has been stopped; that it has been ended in Holland—mainly because of reports that there have been side effects including an increase in death rate from cancer in fluoridated cities in America as compared with non-fluoridated cities; that out of the four original experimental areas in Britain, the people in three of them—Andover, Kilmarnock and Anglesey—have voted to terminate the experiment, though in Anglesey the Minister has refused to allow the experiment to be stopped despite the fact some people are complaining after 20 years of having to drink artificially fluoridated water that it is affecting them adversely.

In 1963 my views on this subject were in line with what I am sure was the view of the vast majority of people in the country and I very much doubt if I would have gone further into the matter had it not been for the fact that when canvassing in the constituency in which I was a parliamentary candidate I met, for the first time, a number of people who, to all appearances, were far from emotional cranks and who were strongly opposed to the idea of fluoridation on the grounds that they regarded it as a needless and avoidable threat to their health and wellbeing.

Granted that these people were not scientists—neither doctors, dentists

nor chemists—but as they were able to back up their apprehension with the opinion of individuals with impeccable qualifications, I felt unable to disregard them.

Although a layman myself, lacking the qualifications necessary to assess properly the differing opinions of experts on the subject, I had no doubt that, as a parliamentary candidate, I should make it my business to study, as best I could, both sides of the issue. To start with it struck me as a highly complicated technical subject and the deeper I went into it, the more perplexed I became and felt one could be excused if one just bowed out and left it to the 'experts'—but which experts? Those in favour or those against? This was the crux of my problem. If I had any bias it would have been in favour of fluoridation. For one thing, my natural instinct prompted me to support any measure which responsible, well-qualified people said would be good for children—especially if it would relieve them of suffering. From what I could gather the leaders of all the political parties were strongly in favour of fluoridation as were the Establishments of the medical and dental professions, and it might be politically unwise for a young politician whose foot had not yet reached the bottom rung of the ladder to declare himself to be against what his leaders favoured. Yet I had a feeling—perhaps a deep down hunch or apprehension—that I should so declare myself.

In 1964 I attended a public meeting of the London Anti-Fluoridation Campaign (it has since changed its name to the National Anti-Fluoridation Campaign) and heard a talk on the subject by the Campaign's Chairman, P. Clavell Blount, author of the book *Compulsory Mass Medication—A Factual Guide To The Fluoridation Issue.* To put Mr. Blount on his mettle I sent my card up to the platform, telling him I was quite ready to be converted if he could convert me! Following his talk and answers to the questions raised—in particular those raised by a group of young men who were dental students who clearly wanted to make mincemeat of the speaker, I found no difficulty in finally deciding that even if fluoridation could be proved beyond doubt to be wholly effective and absolutely safe for everyone and in all circumstances, I would still be against it because it was contrary to my own political view that people have a fundamental right to maintain and protect their own and their children's health in the ways *they* think best and that, with certain well-defined exceptions such as in the case of an emergency or accident when a person is unconscious and the next of kin cannot be contacted, for example—no one should ever be subjected to medication or bodily treatment without consent.

In addition to being contrary to what I believe to be right politically, I regarded fluoridation as violating a precept which I think is common to most religions and philosophies—the rule, that is, which requires us to do to others and their children only what we would have others do to us and our children. While no one would want others to subject us or our children to a treatment which we believed, rightly or wrongly, might be harmful to us, that is precisely what the proponents of fluoridation are trying to do, thus breaking the rule. The opponents of fluoridation, on the other hand, are not trying to deprive children of fluoride if their parents want them to

have more of it. Fluoride can be obtained from most chemist shops in tablet form and taken in water or milk, or given to children individually, like any other medicine by those who want it without forcing it on those who do not want it, so there is no justification whatsoever for forcing it on one and all.

Having reached the conclusion that fluoridation was morally and ethically wrong, having declared myself to be against it in my 1964 election manifesto, and knowing that the London Anti-Fluoridation Campaign and others were spreading the anti-fluoridation case throughout the whole of Britain, I felt there was little more for me to do and fully expected to be able to forget the matter altogether. The impropriety of the measure and its political dangers seemed to me to be so self-evident that I was sure its proponents would soon drop the considerable pressure then being exerted in its favour. Once again I was quite wrong and I have been amazed by the way that pressure for fluoridation has continued to be exerted during the last 10 years despite the fact that there has been no demand for it apart from a relatively small group of dedicated 'pros'.

I have no wish to suggest that the proponents of fluoridation are not highly intelligent and well-meaning people, yet I am quite unable to understand their inability or unwillingness to grasp what seem to me to be unanswerable moral and ethical objections. What is even more perplexing is that besides appearing to be impervious to the moral and ethical arguments against fluoridation—which in my view make it altogether unacceptable—these proponents seem to be equally impervious to all other views not favourable to the case they are trying to make. Let me list some of the points which have impressed me most.

1. No one disputes that children's teeth in this country are, generally speaking, in a shocking state. The causes of this are very well known, and I don't think any authority really believes that a lack of fluoride causes tooth decay any more than a lack of castor oil causes constipation. While we tend to regard tooth decay as a distinct disease all on its own, I would like to suggest that it might be regarded more as the first visible warning sign of something deeper and far more serious. I view it as just one symptom, and possibly the least serious, of disease caused mainly by a combination of sweet, starchy diet and poor dental hygiene. This largely non-nutritive diet is also a factor in other symptoms of the same disease—obesity, for example. If intelligent steps were taken to deal with the causes of the underlying disease instead of trying to patch or cover up one of its symptoms—tooth decay—not only would there be less tooth decay but overall health would be improved as well. I accept the criticism which has often been made by the National Anti-Fluoridation Campaign that fluoridation is just one more effort to remedy the consequences of wrong-doing and folly without undoing the wrong by behaving sensibly. For this reason it is bound to weaken the fabric of society—people's sense of self-discipline and individual responsibility—even if it does no harm in other directions.

2. The central argument in favour of fluoridation is that it reduces tooth decay in children by at least 50 per cent and that its 'benefits' will continue

throughout adult life, the inference being that given when water is fluoridated most people will always have at least half their natural teeth at the end of their lives. When this claim was first made in Britain it was on the basis of American results. Some of these, mentioned in the book *Compulsory Mass Medication*, suggested that all that had been done by fluoridation was to delay tooth decay by a year or two, after which teeth became decayed just as rapidly after fluoridation as before it had been started.

In 1969, the British Department of Heath published a booklet giving the results of fluoridation experiments carried out in Britain—*The Fluoridation Studies in the United Kingdom and the Results Achieved After Eleven Years*. This report confirmed what had already been proved in the United States—namely, that fluoridation does not prevent tooth decay in children but merely delays its onset for a year or two. Figure 1 is a graph compiled by the National Anti-Fluoridation Campaign some years ago from the information contained in the Department of Health's report. The fact that the non-fluoridated and the fluoridated lines run parallel between the ages of 8 and 10 is proof that decay in both areas proceeded at the same rate. From the figures given it was found that while decayed, missing and filled teeth in the fluoridated areas had averaged 1.2 during the 2 year period from age 8 to age 10, they had only been 1.3 in the comparable non-fluoridated areas. So apart from having postponed the start of decay for about 18 months, the effect of fluoridation had been no more than an average saving of 0.1 DMF teeth per child. According to these official figures the only time in a person's life when fluoridation has even appeared to have reduced tooth decay by 50 per cent or more was at age 3 when the average number of decayed teeth was 1.1 after fluoridation as against 3.5 DMF teeth before fluoridation, a gross saving of 67 per cent; but as there had been a reduction of 16 per cent in the control areas, the nett saving was 51 per cent. After that age the percentage difference gradually got less and after 10 years of fluoridation there was a difference of only 1 tooth amounting to a saving of only 26 per cent nett. A most surprising and somewhat disturbing fact is that no official information about the results achieved in these experiments has been published since 1969—presumably because such results do not support the case the Department of Health is trying to make in favour of fluoridation.

3. The answer given by the proponents of fluoridation to the publication of the graph in Figure 1 which completely undermined their case was to publish a graph themselves, reproduced in Figure 2. Taken at face value, this graph appears to support all that has been claimed in favour of fluoridation, but if one looks below the surface it is found to be misleading to say the least. Here are some considerations which need to be taken into account in relation to both graphs.

(a) The graph in Figure 1 was compiled from official data and compared the rate of dental decay in children living in artificially fluoridated areas with the rate of dental decay in comparable children living in comparable non-fluoridated areas. This comparison showed that while it was about 18

months later in the fluoridated areas, the amount of decay in both areas was the same with, as it was without, the additional fluoride in the water.



FIGURE 1

Age of children in years

The above graph is based on Department of Health figures. The solid line represents the rate of decay in the permanent teeth of children in **non-fluoridated** areas. The broken line represents this rate in **fluoridated** areas, specially selected because of their general similarity to the non-fluoridated areas. Children up to the age of 10 in the fluoridated areas had had the so-called 'benefits of fluoridation' **all** their lives. Those over 10 had had these 'benefits' for the last 10 years of their lives. The graph shows that the **rate of decay** was almost identical in both areas. Fluoridation did not prevent tooth decay but merely delayed it for about 18 months whereafter the amount of

decay in fluoridated areas was practically the same as in non-fluoridated areas. It should be noted that the number of DMF teeth in children who had had fluoridated water all their lives had increased by 1.2 per child between the ages of 8 and 10 as against 1.3 per child in non-fluoridated areas. After the initial prevention of decay in an average of 0.8 of a tooth, the effect of fluoridation in this 2-year period was no more than to save decay in 1 tooth in every 10 children—an average saving of 1/20th of a tooth per child per year!

(b) The graph in figure 2 is copied from one put out by one of the Area Health Authorities whose appointed, non-elected members have been made mainly responsible by the Department of Health for deciding whether or not fluoridation is to be implemented. It is contained in a document clearly intended to persuade readers of the benefits of artificial fluoridation. The comparison shown is between tooth decay in both children and adults living in York, where drinking water is naturally fluoridated at a level of about 0.22 parts per million (ppm) and tooth decay in adults and children living in Hartlepool, where the water is naturally fluoridated at a level of about 1.5 ppm. The graph shows that Hartlepool children had about half as much decay as children of the same age in York and that this benefit carries on into adult life, well past the age of 60. The document states that 'Several studies have shown that the dental benefits of fluoridation are lifelong and not restricted to childhood' and figure 2 is cited as evidence of this—the inference being that if the level of fluoride in York water was raised to that in Hartlepool, the level of tooth decay in York would be reduced to that in Hartlepool. Thus is the suggestion implanted in the reader's mind that if the fluoride content of all water in the country was raised, all tooth decay would be reduced by about half—a most attractive proposition!

What the proponents of fluoridation ignore or play down is that there are many factors besides fluoride in water which, by their presence or absence, affect tooth decay. Of those contained in food and drink, the best known, perhaps, is calcium, which, besides being helpful in tooth development is said to mitigate the harm that might otherwise be done by the fluoride. It is possible that the greater amount of calcium in Hartlepool water, or the presence of a trace of other minerals might account for there being less decay in that town. It is equally possible that some factor not taken into account—such as more sweet eating, for example, may be the reason for the greater amount of tooth decay in York. Only if all relevant factors have been properly taken into account and eliminated can it be said that the addition of fluoride to York water would produce the same results as in Hartlepool—and there are some scientists who say that this could only be guaranteed if the same fluoride compound were used in both places.

As a layman whose concern about fluoridation lies with its moral, ethical and political aspects, I have made it a rule not to get involved in detailed technical aspects. If it seems that in the foregoing I have departed from my rule let me just say that I am not arguing technicalities for or against fluoridation but drawing attention to what appears to me to be anomalies and deviations from lay common sense. Perhaps the most outstanding feature about the case in favour of fluoridation is that it is made up largely of assertions which are not backed up with evidence. The fact that Hartlepool

water has more fluoride than York water and that there is less tooth decay in Hartlepool is not evidence, to my way of thinking, that tooth decay in York would fall to that in Hartlepool if fluoride was added to York water.



FIGURE 2

Total caries experience (deciduous and permanent teeth) in Hartlepool and York.
* The information given in brackets did not appear in the original.

4. The question that seems to have been of most concern to most people is that of the safety of fluoridation—a question which proponents tend to brush aside with the somewhat cavalier and ridiculous statement that one would need to drink at least one-and-a-half bathfuls of fluoridated water at one sitting to be seriously harmed. I don't think that anyone has ever expressed concern as to the immediate perceptible harm that would be caused by drinking fluoridated water. The concern which has been put to me has been about its long-term effects—what the results would be in 40, 50 or 60 years of ingesting more fluoride with every drop of water taken into the body. Many authorities have said that fluoride tends to accumulate in the human body and that its harmful effects can develop so gradually as not to be noticeable until people have reached middle- or old-age when the symptoms may be attributed to 'growing old'—a phrase sometimes used to 'explain' ailments the precise causes of which are unknown. Some authorities have in fact postulated that some of these so-called growing old ailments which have arisen in the past, long before fluoridation had ever been thought of, may, in fact, have been due to the fluoride naturally present in drinking water. Such an explanation seems much more logical than that of advancing years which suggests that time of itself could have a material effect.

While the proponents of fluoridation claim that it will be absolutely safe for people of all ages and in all conditions, circumstances and states of health, no one has ever provided proof. The argument of the proponents of fluoridation is that since people have lived for generations in areas where the water is naturally fluoridated at a level of about 1 ppm—such as Hartlepool, for example—without appearing to have suffered harm other than some mottling of their teeth, this can be taken as proof that it would be safe to raise the level of fluoride in water in other areas by artificial means. The argument is wholly specious. Granted that it may be possible to measure the mental and physical health of people in places like Hartlepool who have been drinking naturally fluoridated water all their lives, but it is quite impossible to say what their health would have been like had their water contained less fluoride or no fluoride at all, with all other factors being the same. Would their overall health have been better, or worse, or just the same? Who can possibly know—for certain?

In view of the many imponderables, and especially in view of the fact that anyone who wants more fluoride for himself or his children can get it from a chemist shop, I feel it would be utterly irresponsible for me to vote in favour of anyone being forced to take a risk of harm as a result of ingesting more fluoride than the inescapable minimum—and so far as I am concerned this would be my attitude even if I did not regard fluoridation as being unethical in principle and an attack upon individual freedom.

So the question is—where do we go from here?

I have two objectives in mind. The first arises from my view that if those who originally launched the fluoridation band wagon in the United States in the late 1930s had told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about fluoridation (which they may not have known at the time), no responsible person would ever have jumped on to that band wagon in that country. If the Ministry of Health had made available all the information known about fluoridation when it was launched in Britain in 1962, it would have gained little support. I believe much could be done to make it more difficult for the authorities to mislead the public and to withhold from people the information they have a right to possess. My first objective, therefore, is to get on to the Statute Book a Freedom of Information Act that will not only help to bring an end to fluoridation in Britain and prevent anything similar in the future, but will be a great step forward in many other directions where the truth is being distorted or suppressed.

My second objective—and in the battle against fluoridation it is of equal importance to the first—is that this whole question of using a public utility (a water supply) as a means of conveying chemical and other additives into people's bodies in order to influence directly their development and functioning should be made the subject of a full debate in Parliament with a view to resolving the matter and lest there should be any lingering doubt in the reader's mind as to what the issue is to which I am referring, let me say it is *not* the question of preventing tooth decay, it is *not* how to make and keep our drinking water as pure as it can be made and kept, it is *not* how to

reduce environmental pollution, it is *not* how to reduce the astronomical costs of our National Health Service. It is not even how to escape risk of injury to health. These are all very important questions, but they are not the issue which concerns me as an individual, as a parent and as a Member of Parliament. The issue which concerns me is whether I and all my fellow citizens are to be regarded and treated as sufficiently intelligent to decide for ourselves, with the advice of our dental and medical practitioners, if necessary, how to maintain and protect our own and our children's health, or whether we are to be denied the right to choose. Freedom of choice—that is the issue and few issues could be of greater importance.

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On April 4th 1977 a House of Commons Select Committee stated that they were 'unable to make any recommendation on the use of fluoride in the general water supply' and recommended 'that there should be more research on the long term effects of fluoride.' When asked on June 10th if he accepted the Select Committee's recommendations, the Minister for Health, the Rt. Hon. David Ennals, said 'No.'—Editor.

THE FIRST SPANISH REPUBLIC

by Lionel King

HISTORIANS are fascinated by short periods in the affairs of nations when government collapses, the vacuum filling with crisis or anarchy. These interregna often represent a watershed in history. There have been many studies of the interlude between Cromwell and the Restoration, and of the 'Glorious Revolution' 1688-89. European history abounds in such episodes. 1917, the *annus mirabilis* of Russian history, with its March and November revolutions, has a substantial literature of its own. The attraction is that authentic records of troubled times are incomplete and often non-existent. A scholar who attempts to raise the shroud of mystery is immediately challenged. Book follows book as new material is discovered and new interpretations made. So the controversy and the fascination are maintained.

The task confronting historians[1] tackling the interregnum of the First Spanish Republic which collapsed in January 1874 after a life of eleven months is daunting indeed. This is a bizarre episode by any standards in contemporary history or even when viewed against the bewildering kaleidoscope of 19th century Spanish history.

After reigning 35 years, the Bourbon Isabella II fled Spain in September 1868 after a coup by leading military figures and a coalition of politicians, united only in their desire to end the charade of parliamentary democracy by which Spain had been governed for a generation. A Constituent Cortes, elected in 1869, produced an advanced liberal constitution. General Prim, the Prime Minister, favoured a constitutional monarchy. The search for an occupant for the vacant throne dragged on for two years. The retention of the monarchy was seen by the Republican minority in the Cortes as a betrayal of the September Revolution. By the time Prim had found a willing candidate for the throne, Amadeus of Savoy, the younger son of the King of Italy, the 1868 coalition had disintegrated. Prim announced his choice to the Cortes on June 23rd, 1870, remarking prophetically: 'It is difficult to make a king . . . it is rather more difficult to make a republic in a country where there are no republicans.' In November the choice of the Italian Prince was ratified by 191 of the 344 deputies, though significantly 63 voted for a republic. Prim, who would have been the pillar of support for the new monarch, was assassinated, probably by Republican extremists, on 2nd January, 1871, the eve of the arrival of Amadeus in Spain.

The internecine strife which had smouldered in Spain for half a century now flared up again. The latest Carlist Pretender gathered support in the North. Regional separatist movements reappeared in Catalonia and elsewhere. Republican activity intensified. Ultra-Republican groups began planning cantons in the South and East. Welcome as the deposition of the Bourbons had been, there was no enthusiasm for the imported Royal Family. Politicians nominally pro-Amadeus jockeyed for the spoils of

office. Parties in the Cortes, never well defined, became more fluid. On 11th February, 1873, Amadeus, studiously observing the constitution as always, addressed his abdication speech to the assembled chambers of the Cortes, pleading with dignity that he could not reign over a nation so tragically divided.

There could be no question of seeking another monarch. The Republicans, the only group who could turn the situation to advantage, now seized the initiative. Pi y Margall[2] proposed that the Assembly should vote upon itself the executive powers of state. Though the proceedings on the momentous day were of doubtful legality, formal declaration of the accidental Spanish Republic was approved by 258 votes to 32. The problem of who should exercise executive power was solved during the day by the appointment of a ministry under the Presidency of Figueras,[3] a choice of the Radicals, hitherto the leading pro-Amadeus party and now reluctant Republicans, and the Republicans proper. No decision would be made on the form of the new Republic until a constitution could be drawn up by an elected Constituent Cortes.

The unexpected delivery of the state into their laps had presented the Republicans with an enormous dilemma. The party had been founded but five years earlier. It had been plagued throughout its short life by bitter personality and policy clashes. Pi y Margall had been president of the party from 1870 until November 1872 after which it had remained without official leadership. The party strongly favoured a Federal Republic as the panacea for the ills of central misgovernment. Now, because of the extraordinary circumstances of the birth of the Republic, they would have to impose a federal structure. The Republic would have to de-centralise itself. Recognition of the fledgling Republic came quickly from the United States. This inspired Castelar, the Secretary of State and greatest orator of the day, to proclaim in the Cortes: 'We must lift up our minds and souls to beg the God of Columbus to bless our labours.'

The first Spanish President, Figueras, a Catalan lawyer and a deputy since 1858, was generally considered to lack strength of character, purpose or genuine Republican convictions. He announced as his immediate programme the restoration of peace, order and justice. His first ministry, a Republican-Radical coalition, fell apart within days and was replaced with a wholly Republican cabinet. In the Cortes, Federal extremists, the Intransigents, clamoured for the immediate enactment of federation. Their colleagues in the provinces, organised in revolutionary juntas, were already assuming control of some localities. This development should have quickened the pace of the Government's programme of federation. On March 12th, the President was goaded into a flying visit to Barcelona to forestall the declaration of an independent Catalan state. The Army, unwilling to fight Carlism on behalf of a weak and disorganised Republic, showed the first signs of insubordination. Pi y Margall at the Ministry of the Interior countered by establishing a Republican militia. The Government's problems were aggravated by banditry and lawlessness in the cities and countryside. A

further dimension was the bankruptcy of the Treasury, loans being obtainable only on exorbitant terms.

On 23rd April a Radical coup completely misfired. Discredited, this group withdrew from the Cortes leaving the Republicans to face opposition from within their own ranks alone. The May elections brought an overwhelming victory for the Federal Republicans, though barely 25% of the electorate voted. In a country traditionally apathetic about politics, no party claimed a mass following. When the Cortes convened on 1st June three identifiable factions had evolved among the Federals: moderates, intransigents and a centre group of orthodox Federals. Still the Government shrank from a premature declaration of federation, though a vote taken in the Cortes on 7th June on a declaration of intent showed 218 of 220 deputies present in favour of a federal structure. Figueras now tendered his resignation. As no successor could be found, he reluctantly stayed on until 10th June when, without warning, he fled to France. Pi y Margall, also a Catalan lawyer, was elected to the vacancy. The second President had established himself as the leading federal theorist with his work Reacción y Revolución written some 20 years earlier. Even his bitterest opponents could never accuse him of inconsistency. An emotionless, ascetic figure, an intellectual with few personal friends, he was a dominant influence in Spanish republicanism for half a century. In his address to the Cortes he outlined unequivocally the problems facing his Government. As the chaos throughout Spain mounted, he took the unpopular step of acquiring extraordinary powers to deal with the situation. His failure was not to initiate on taking office the process of federation. Had he done so the plans of the Intransigents would have been preempted. Now, cantons were proclaimed at Seville and Cádiz. At Alcoy events assumed a different character through the activities of the First Communist International. In the North, the Carlist menace loomed more dangerous. Early in July cantonalists took over Cartegena and set up a 'committee of public safety'. A hastily written draft Federal Constitution, intended by Pi as a reconciliatory measure, was published belatedly on 17th July. The President had already lost the support of the Federal left and right. Further dissension created by the draft constitution forced Pi's resignation.

The election of the third President, Salmerón,[4] from Andalucía, a philosophy lecturer at the University of Madrid, marked a rightward swing within the Federals. By the 22nd, cantons were proclaimed at Valencia, Murcia, Toledo and elsewhere. At Cartagena the cantonalists seized control of the fleet in the naval base. Salmerón acted with speed and energy to re-impose Government authority. General Pavía was despatched to Andalucia and Martínez Campos to Valencia to reduce the cantonalists. Elsewhere the abortive cantons soon withered away through poor leadership, internal dissension or apathy. In few centres was there anything approaching popular support for cantonalism. Significantly, the attitude of the upper classes hardened wherever the cantonalists' programme envisaged social revolution. Salmerón's faith in military leaders coupled with his policy of bringing cantonalists to trial as criminals eroded support in the Cortes. As

Pavía prepared to attack the canton at Málaga, Salmerón was forced into resignation on 6th September, ostensibly on the issue of the re-introduction of the death penalty.

The fourth President of the Republic, Castelar,[5] also from Andalucía, now took office. A former journalist and Professor of History, he was a gifted though somewhat extravagant orator from the right wing of the Federal camp. He announced his priorities of 'order, authority and government'. To widen his freedom of action he obtained, by 124 votes to 68, the suspension of the Cortes. From 18th September he was to rule, in the extraordinary circumstances of the times, by decree. His appointment assuaged the growing fears of conservative sectors of society and commanded the loyalty of the military. Save at Málaga and Cartagena the cantonalist movement was easily overcome by the army.

Castelar's entente with the military was bitterly attacked by the Federal centre and left. The President now entered into secret negotiations with the leaders of an uneasy Radical-Conservative coalition which was planning re-entry into the political arena with a vague commitment to a Unitarian Republic to replace the abortive Federation. Castelar had long been suspected of harbouring doubts about the federal structure. He saw that the only hope for the Republic lay in attracting support for it from conservative and military circles. Castelar now secretly offered the coalition 60 of the seats in the Cortes previously occupied by the now largely outlawed Intransigents, his object being to assure himself of a majority. Shortly before the Cortes reconvened, General Pavía warned Castelar that the army would not accept an extreme Federal administration with its attendant anti-military policies. When the Cortes met on 2nd January, 1874, Castelar was accused of betraying the Republic. A frenzied debate on a motion of confidence in which Castelar summoned all his oratorical powers in vain resulted in defeat by 120 votes to 100. In the early hours of the morning of the 3rd he resigned. Agreement appears to have been reached upon a successor, Eduardo Palanca, a neo-Intransigent from Málaga, when the President of the Chamber stunned the deputies with the news that General Pavía had made a pronunciamiento, a declaration against the government. Moments later, a detachment of troops acting under Pavía's orders as Captain-General of Madrid, forced entry into the chamber and ejected the protesting deputies. Thus ended in ignominy Spain's flirtation with a Federal Republic.

For the moment it seemed that something might be retrieved. Pavía had no dictatorial ambitions. He had declared for a national government. Support was forthcoming, however, from only a remnant of the September coalition which had deposed Isabella II just five years earlier. Pavía ceded his powers to the prestigious General Serrano who formed a makeshift government of Radicals, Conservatives and one Unitarian Republican. But it lacked both direction and purpose. As the situation drifted, the role of the army became the significant factor. Enthusiasm for the restoration of the Bourbons in the person of Isabella's eldest son, Alphonso, then a 16-

year-old cadet at Sandhurst, began to grow among junior officers. Alphonsism was carefully nurtured by Cánovas.[6] On 29th December, 1874 General Martínez Campos declared for Alphonso in the last pronunciamiento of the 19th century. This was immediately echoed by other commanders. The odd twilight 'republic of the generals' collapsed the next day, Cánovas forming the first government of the Restoration.

A comparison between the First Republic of 1873-74 and the similarly ill-fated Second Republic of 1931-39 shows some interesting parallels. Both were born fortuitously and not as the culmination of a mass movement in favour of a change in system along republican lines. In both cases the Republican parties were caught ill-prepared and divided. Both began as political revolutions against corrupt and incompetent constitutional monarchy. Both developed into confused and violent social revolutions which degenerated into lawlessness. In both cases there was in the final agony a heavy groundswell towards the right. Neither Republic legalised itself by ratifying a constitution. Both were ended by military pronunciamiento. More significantly, perhaps, both episodes were abrupt departures from the historic equilibrium of Spanish history and were followed by decades of institutional stabilisation when political development was severely retarded, as in the dismal period of the Restoration, 1875 to 1931, or totally arrested, as in the Franco era, from 1939 to 1975.

NOTES

[1] The most important studies are the comprehensive *Spain 1808–1939* by Raymond Carr (Oxford, 1966) and the definitive *Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement 1868–74* by C. A. M. Hennessy (Oxford, 1962).

[2] Francisco Pi y Margall 1824-1901. After the Restoration he remained active in the republican cause, writing *Las Nacionalidades* in 1876 and founding the newspaper *El Nuevo Régimen* in 1891.

[3] Estanislao Figueras 1819-82. Returned from his self-imposed exile in September 1873 to rejoin the moderate Federals; virtually withdrew from politics after the Restoration.

[4] Nicolas Salmerón y Alonso, 1838-1908. Elected a deputy in 1873, he became President two years later. An uncompromising anti-cleric and federal republican till his death, he developed into an astute politician during the Restoration, working for the fusion of all republican groups.

[5] Emilio Castelar y Ripoll, 1832-99. After the Restoration in which he acquiesced, his anti-federal, anti-socialist brand of republicanism made him an isolated figure.

[6] Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, 1828-97. A *Moderado* (Conservative) minister in the last years of Isabella II who became the leading statesman of the Restoration.

[Lionel King, a graduate in Spanish of Birmingham University, has lived in Spain and Portugal. He is at present Lecturer in Liberal Education at West Bromwich College of Technology.]

LIFE AND DEATH OUT OF AFRICA

by Michael Kelly

A DOCTOR friend of mine, working in a particularly well appointed part of England, told me the other day, modestly, that he felt he was only as good as his equipment. He did not feel that he was creative, that he would be able to improvise in the absence of equipment, in the situations that occur in underdeveloped countries. He explained that he felt a whole new outlook on practising medicine would be called for in situations where fate, the presence or absence of equipment or skill, mingled with fatalism (ah, well, it couldn't be helped; nothing to do; death), to create a totally un-English working environment.

I remember the dignity in suffering, both in spontaneous outburst and in stoicism, which I have met in Africa; the recognisably, to me, human side of the otherwise feckless fatalism which so often seems to refuse even to engage with individual prophylactic or curative effort.

Discouragements with regard to hygiene, nutrition and regular treatment can be so rapid and so complete. It seems the clients expect modern attitudes about such things to be less significant than the magical properties of the things themselves. Hence the rapid switches from modern Western treatments and utensils to complete disregard of them in favour of traditional, herbal, native doctor or quack ones; or complicated compromises and parallel endurances between the two systems. The baby, constipated after bottle feeding, will be handed over to a grandmother for herbal enema treatments and gruel. Which system is responsible if it dies? The unhealing operation of the Western surgeon, treatment impatiently incompleted, will be exposed to potion bandaging and medicines. If gangrene doesn't set in, shock doesn't compound with post-operational debility in collapse for the patient, does that validate native medicine at the expense of Western?

Far be it for me to suggest that all native and herbal doctors are quacks. At both the psychological and the pharmaceutical level it is increasingly obvious that their treatments can be effective. It is well known that the 'natives' knew about quinine for malaria and the 'penicillin' properties of fungus for wounds before Westerners told them. On the other hand it is hard to distinguish the objective validities from the accretions of ambiguous or at least placebo elements and the mumbo-jumbo. As in witchcraft, what sort of element in the effectiveness in balance with the poisons in the potions is the 'belief' of the clients in the spells? The elements in the potions or foods or ointments or physical performances are in what sort of interaction with the social constraints imposing certain reactions in patients or the bewitched? And what is the balance between psyche and soma in disease, in treatment and in personality control?

One would have to be more cross-culturally competent that I am to do more than guess. What I witness, however, from time to time in Africa is, for example, reaction to death. It is one of the commonplaces of recent

sociological observations in this area that lack of agreed rituals in our society when death occurs, combined with inhibitions about expressing grief and about sympathising in a committed or ritualistic way with grief, is a social malaise, having a bad effect on the adaptability of the bereaved. In fact, our society is absurdly shifty and mealy-mouthed and psycho-socially deprived when it comes to facing and considering death.

I observe, participantly and admiringly, the way deaths are met in Africa; extrovert wailing and rolling in the dust, both spontaneously as in the case of a young mother whose baby had died and whom I passed weeping and shouting in the road while her silent mother carried the infant corpse, and with a ritual element. I gave a lift to someone going to a family funeral celebration, cheerful and chatty. 'When I get home I shall weep', she said. 'Do you mean you can turn it on or you will suddenly feel it when you see your family? How can you be so sure?' I asked. She said he didn't know, but she would weep. I submit that it may be, as so often, a case of 'both/and' rather than 'either/or': both social behaviour (turn on) and spontaneous involvement in the situation (feeling). Feelings seem so abrupt and so discreet in Africa. In any case, when we did reach her village not only, almost in mid-sentence, did she break into tears, she also wailed aloud with her sister (the bereaved mother) and rolled with her over and over in the dirt road, having carefully discarded her expensive new shoes to do so, with real tears and increasing abandon to the mood of grief.

And yet, in such spontaneous people, the matter-of-fact stoicism with which infant mortality is faced is, to me, quite shattering. Obviously, it may well be a function of the relative frequency of such mortality. And among the poor, where general health and the pregnant woman's nutrition and blood count usually leave a lot to be desired, such refusal to invest in the emotion and ritual which would be attendant on the death of an already productive and significant member of the family and community is understandable. It strikes me most in the cases of relatively Westernised, highly educated, civil servants, for example. I particularly recall one longed-for pregnancy, the excitement of both parents, the preparations for the birth. Then the child died after eight hours. I still do not know whether the almost instant refusal to behave as if anything had happened on the part of both parents, which showed none of the withdrawal symptoms of numbed shock, was felt (culturally conditioned internally) or acted, (individual interpretation at inter-cultural levels of conditioning). I commiserated with both, separately, just after the event; she accepted politely and offered no relevant comment whatsoever; he said: 'Ah, well. It hardly lived, you know. We can't waste time over that'. Could that formula be genuinely felt? I suspect so.

Death of adults is not only felt, conspicuously, but also celebrated, lavishly. Wailing, head shaving, mourning clothes, mourning clay on the face and body, formal commiserating, communing in mourning over strong drinks, religious services, processing with choirs to the funeral ground, drumming, dancing, firing of guns. Nobody can avoid noticing a death celebration. The importance of life, to intimates and the wider networks of

kin and community, is displayed by the energy and expense with which an individual's death is socially accompanied. No one in the parts of Africa I know dies alone or unmarked. There are no silences and reserves and embarrassment about noticing; no feelings of self-conscious inability to rise to the occasion or revulsion from the facts or self-regarding squeamishness about getting too close to the bereaved. The bereaved are expected to be miserable and are forced into the elaborate endurance tests of ritual, whether weeping or controlled, desolate to the point of breakdown, cursing or lamenting or silent. No one is allowed to mope alone, no one is indulged in morbid reflections: the living must behave in the prescribed, energetic, elaborate ways of the living. The one who has died is honoured by all that; life is dishonoured by anything less or by self-centred indulgence in privacy of grief. Feelings exist, in varying degrees of richness; the forms accompanying death must be put into practice and take so much energy out of all participants that feelings are repeatedly exhausted. Kinship members will see to it that the intimately bereaved will be taken up in endless and absorbing tasks of funeral celebration, in rituals of mourning as well as the day-to-day work of continued living, of continued productivity, until the unbearability of grief has been socially cauterised.

How different from our own self-important insistences on emotional privacy and on pretending as little as possible that anything to make a public display of grief about has happened. The less the privacy, the more extrovert and extravagant the fuss, perhaps the better.

Certainly I am struck, as I go between Africa and England on my tours of duty and my leaves, by the unrealism of the panic insistence that death should be kept at bay which seem to be multiplying in England: safety precautions here, hygienic standards there, insurances, preventive drugs and exercises and pamphlets and newspaper articles. The realisation that life is absolutely unsafe, death absolutely inevitable, is lost in the stridency of relative cures and prophylactics whose ultimate intentional purpose is lost. Why is it so scandalous to admit death as a constant shadow in England as well as Africa or anywhere else in the world? Why not rejoice in present life rather than build dams against reality by nervous, anxious pursuit of more and more trivial, faddish, distracting safety precautions and cures and impossible but pretentious attempts to neutralise all experience into a sort of angleless, draughtless, bacterialess, stressless, tasteless psychosocial blancmange? We are going to die. Before we die, do we know how to live? We should snatch and embrace moments, not dream and grouse and wait passively for impossible panaceas of release from mortality and imperfection.

Death is recognisedly easy come by in Africa. Perhaps that is why Africans of my acquaintance enjoy life so immediately: every taste, every mood, every relationship is enjoyed in the present. It would be wrong (anti-life) as well as imprudent to put anything off to a tomorrow which may never come or in jealous dream that something better may turn up or be invented or be organised by Them (the planners, the experts, the authorities). Live now, and accept the constraints of reality, imperfection, regret,

misjudgement. Never commit the blasphemy of putting off life until you're sure or safe, leaving the manipulation of your own experience to others, denying in yourself an active recklessness in response to the reckless vagaries of life. I am sure that it is not my imagination that sees Africans living lives directly and fully, for all the poverty and defects of themselves and their environment, and English people reserving their commitment to life on grounds of unsureness about safety or health (psychological or physical) or respectability (not in the old bourgeois sense, but in that of collective cultural ethos, shown in matters of food and semiotics most conspicuously) or the value of Now compared with When Progress Has Improved Things And Made It All Clearer.

Feelings in Africa may be easy in the sense that they are admitted, exercised and erupt quickly, change quickly, are expressed unreservedly, and at the same time contain high charges of ambivalence. But the residual puritan ethos that equates emotional ease with callowness or superficiality, or, even worse, erects casualness into an antidote for feeling as much as for reserve or old-fashioned inhibitions, is sick. The English have been puritan for too long: prissy about foreigners' expressions of feelings; supercilious about direct emotional expression; hectic in their crude and violent explosions against social and personal inhibition (vandalism, football hysterias, ragnights, trendy wife-swopping and group sex, diffident perversions and fetishisms, sadism, upper class promiscuity, proletariat indiscriminate grossness). Even the English only have one life each to lead: why put if off in lack of commitment, punctuated by hysterical uncreative outbursts of orgiastic defiance of cultural ethos? Cross-cultural illuminations, if popularised and allowed to work their illumination, may help to persuade us out of some of our diffidence about living with feeling.

I do not see much hope from the vapid incoherences of hairy misinterpretations of Eastern religious and meditational systems. Tribal Africa has much to offer, out of real poverty;—the best basis for all elemental learning, for all its obvious limitations and irrelevances, where it most matters: the life of the feelings, ritually supported. We still have kin, friendship networks, communities; we have no need to import exotic externals of dress or behaviour in order to activate our lives to deliberate extroversion and more comprehensive formal and organic involvement with each other (tribalistic). We can make our own ways, historically and personally authentic. It is in the inner spirit of present living, of open feeling, of insistence on social belonging and absolute personal interdependence, which Africa can teach.

And not least by focussing attention on death, admitted, celebrated. Perhaps they could do with less fatalism, more self-help individualism of effort; we could certainly do with more fatalism, less distraction of individualism into useless efforts at perfect health, immortality, security, risk- and danger-free zones for putting off living. Consciousness of death helps awareness of life. Celebration of death helps the living. It is not selfless to deny life, selfish to embrace it and exult in it, in the present; it is felt realism. Philosophy is less relevant than the feelings. Africans have much to teach us.

THE CANADIAN CONDITION

by L. F. S. Upton

SHORTLY after *The Times* came under Canadian ownership, the position of permanent correspondent in Ottawa was abolished. Canadians take a perverse pride in the fact that their nation arouses little interest beyond its own borders: how happy the country that has no news! Yet ignorance of the Canadian situation today would deprive the world of a most interesting spectacle: a nation debating, in a remarkably uninhibited manner, whether or not to destroy itself.

15th November 1976 is the base date for understanding the present situation, for it was on that day that the Parti Québecois came to power in a provincial election in Quebec. Their 39 per cent share of the vote was enough to give them a landslide victory over the three other contending parties. As the official opposition in the previous administration, the PQ had become the beneficiary of many discontents, unemployment, inflation, the oppressive costs of the Olympic Games. But the PQ platform called for the independence of the province. In fact, independence was the *raison d'être* of the party. A provincial government had come to rule over one quarter of Canada's population with the avowed aim of taking those people out of Confederation.

The provinces of Canada are strong institutions, far more influential than American states whose place was defined for them in a bloody civil war over one hundred years ago. Secession was tried then, and failed. While that war was unrolling, British colonials north of the border talked themselves into the political organisation that is Canada today. The British North America Act of 1867 was presented as all things to all men. English unionists saw it as a guarantee of strong central government while French provincialists were assured that it would safeguard local, cultural, rights. The act created a 'federal union' without explaining such a contradiction in terms, and left it for future generations to decide what that paradox meant. With powerful assistance from British law lords on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the 'federal' aspect got the better of the 'union'. 15th November saw the ultimate arrogation of provincial power, the adoption of the right to secede.

Quebec Premier René Lévesque proposes to hold a referendum on the question of independence. No one has denied his right to hold such a vote, and yet there is no mechanism whereby a province can leave Confederation if its electorate so desires. Supposing the vote was for independence? There is no legal way to secede, and Prime Minister Trudeau has pointedly renounced the use of force. French Canadian units in the armed forces in Quebec voted heavily for the PQ, a fact that has been noted by the General Staff. It is simply coincidence that in the process of re-equipping its forces, Canada has recently ordered several hundred armoured cars of the type used by the British in Belfast.

The present day movement for independence takes place within the global context of decolonisation. In the past few years, a sovereign Quebec has become a thinkable possibility. Nationalist enthusiasms have been something that educated Quebeckers have had to grow out of for over one hundred and fifty years. But no longer is that necessary. The vast majority of independent states in the world today have less rationale for being nations than does Quebec. To many, what is happening within the province is simply part of the breakup of the old empires. If Mali can be independent, why not Quebec?

There can be no doubt that Quebec has sufficient historical justification to become independent. Nationhood would involve no sudden change but rather a predictable working out of events that have long been in train, an evolution, not a revolution. The province has sufficient points of identification to be recognised as a nation. It has its own history, taught to generations of Quebeckers with a sense of purpose notably lacking elsewhere in Canada. The French language has served to insulate it from the rest of North America to a degree and has prevented assimilation. The province has a sufficiently different set of values today to sustain it in independence. Geographically it has the size, resources and population to be one of the wealthier nations of the world.

Canada is a federation that has never jelled into a nation, not just because of the French presence but because there are so few people spread out so thinly over such a large territory that it requires an almost impossible effort of will to focus on one common centre. Sheer distance is the enemy that has produced sectional grievance, rivalry and incomprehension throughout Canada's history. The country flies in the face of the classic preconditions for nationalism. It does not have a common language or law or history or religion, and its indefensible border is a defiance of geography. English Canadians have not developed unifying myths for themselves as have French Canadians or United States Americans. If English Canada were to celebrate its beginnings it would be with James Wolfe defeating the French at Quebec—not the most tactful theme.

The leading argument against independence for Quebec acknowledges the fragility of Canada. Without Quebec, it is said, the remaining portions of the country would be ruined and fall, presumably, into the United States. If not annexation, then confusion awaits: East and West Pakistan are frequently cited, with Atlantic Canada cast in the role of Bangladesh. A sovereign state controlling the St. Lawrence would have the power to strangle the economy of Canada at will, leaving only the ice-blocked Hudson Bay and distant Pacific as Canada's exits to the world. Again, a new sovereign state in North America would open all sorts of room for international manoeuvring by the superpowers and might provoke the United States to pre-emptive action. That is, if the U.S. would tolerate the emergence of an independent Quebec in the first place.

Premier Lévesque counters these fears by asserting that a sovereign Quebec would live in association with Canada, and things would continue

much as they do today. Independence would be a psychological and cultural condition, not an economic one. But would Quebec be so modest? One of the first initiatives after independence would be to try to take over Labrador, part of the province of Newfoundland. The Privy Council awarded this vast stretch of the continent to Newfoundland in a 1928 decision that Quebec has never recognised and has said it will challenge before the International Court at The Hague. There is a Quebec irredenta already waiting as a focus for post-independence enthusiasms. How far would a weakened Canada be able to defend isolated Newfoundland? An expansionist State of Quebec might also look along the north shore of New Brunswick, which is inhabited by French-speaking descendants of Acadian settlers. Historically, the connection between these two groups is tenuous, but their common French background would lead to calls for a gather-in of the French folk. Could Canada, or New Brunswick, resist such a move, when the Atlantic provinces were completely cut off from the others?

An independent Quebec might well be tempted into external adventures to offset troubles at home. There is little doubt that independence would mean a lower standard of living, with the possibility of an acute depression were investor confidence shaken. Could Quebec, economically, go it alone? Could any state today? Arguments of economic self-interest make little impression on devoted nationalists, who may in fact be inspired by a whiff of austerity around the corner. Canada as a whole has traditionally tolerated a lower standard of life than the United States as the price of her independence from the republic: Quebeckers might feel a similar difference worthwhile for freedom from Canada.

The associated statehood idea proposed by Premier Lévesque could become a workable arrangement much as that which exists today between Eire and Great Britain. The union of those two countries was broken after immense anguish, an ordeal so well known that Canada may be spared a repetition of it. If no Ulster were left behind, Canada and Quebec could co-exist more equably than ever before.

Supposing Quebec achieved her independence and retained her prosperity; supposing that Canada did not break up. Even so, the withdrawal of Quebec would have some profound effects on the Canadian scene. The first would be the destruction of the federal liberal party that has ruled Canada for seventy of the last ninety years on the basis of its bloc vote in Quebec. If general elections had been decided by the English speaking provinces, the federal Conservatives would have enjoyed a dominance every bit as great as the Liberals'. A Canada without Quebec would be governed by the Conservative party. Secondly, without Quebec, the province of Ontario would be the solitary industrialised province, and would find its members in a minority in the House of Commons. For the first time ever, Ontario could be outvoted by those provinces east and west which it refers to as the 'regions' of Canada. This political development might not be unwelcome outside Ontario. Thirdly, without Quebec, Canada would be

much less tender to minorities, much less proud of maintaining a 'mosaic' of different cultures and much more prone to an Anglo-Saxon melting pot. Once Canada was independent of Quebec it might emerge stronger emotionally and take on some of the classic attributes of nationalism, good and bad alike.

These and other considerations might be raised in the present debate but, by and large, they are not. Such as it is, the argument at both federal and provincial levels is being carried on by French Canadians. Rarely is an English Canadian voice raised to speak for Canada: the accents are those of Trudeau, Chretien, Ouellet versus Lévesque, Pariszeau, Morin. English spokesmen are continually warned not to say anything that would further antagonise Quebec and help drive it out of Canada. The English are expected to display benevolence towards Quebec, be seen, but not heard.

If the English have to date acquiesced in the role of spectators at the demise of Canada, it is a direct result of the fact that the English have found no compelling reason for their Canada being anything more than a non-United States. This inarticulateness is shared by the federal Conservative party, which can find nothing inspirational to say about Canada in its present situation. The occasional provincial premier will show a willingness to tilt with Quebec, but such a man speaks only for his province, or at most his region. English input to the great debate is limited to the invention of ephemeral associations with pompous titles and platitudinous sentiments about unity.

What after all is the point of a debate if it cannot take place? Prime Minister Trudeau has said there will be no negotiation, so why have some federal Liberals been dropping hints as to what might be negotiated? The Quebec that entered Confederation in 1867 was much smaller than the province that exists today, which has doubled in size through the addition of northern territories. All that an independent Quebec could hope to claim would be that comparatively narrow strip along the St. Lawrence once called Canada East. Again, it is argued, if Quebec has the power to secede, could it deny portions of its own territory the right to decide through referenda whether they wished to go along with independence? Would Canada insist on creating enclaves where English-speaking Quebeckers could maintain their accustomed ties and loyalties?

The independence of Quebec is a political possibility that needs to be explored, discussed and clarified. The current range of debate over this vital issue is extremely limited. The PQ government has a comprehensive and deeply thought out programme and a determination to carry it through: if one referendum fails to approve separation, then another, and another will be called. Those who would probe and question that policy do so only at the risk of offending Quebeckers and forcing them out of Canada in an upsurge of disgust at English bigotry. Any call to the barricades to defend the integrity of Canada as it exists is unthinkable, while at the same time any attempt at a preview of post-independence Quebec is unpatriotic. Someone will have to break this debate wide open. But there is no rush for that honour.

Postscriptum. On July 5 and 6 the House of Commons in Ottawa debated, for the first time, the issue of national unity. Prime Minister Trudeau announced the appointment of a 'task force' to tour the country seeking the views of the public on the issues that contribute to disunity. The group will then counsel the federal government on how best to increase national harmony. The co-chairmen of the task force come from Quebec and Ontario and there are five regional members, one each from Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie provinces and British Columbia. They have one year in which to report.

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THE THEATRE DURING THE REIGN

by J. C. Trewin

IT can be difficult sometimes to write of the theatre during an arbitrarily-chosen period: a single decade, for example. Often there is no real pattern. Thus when, not long ago, I was describing the Edwardian stage, it was more logical to open at the beginning of the century and continue until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

But now, when one considers the twenty-five years of the present reign, any problem fades. Indeed, it is not easy to think of any short span of time comparable in sheer theatrical excitement. During the mid-fifties, not long after the reign began, the English stage was rent by the 'revolution' of 1956, and today, in the mid-seventies, we celebrate the most important event in theatre history since the end of the confining 'monopoly' in 1843: I mean the opening of the National on the South Bank with its three auditoria, the open-stage Olivier, the proscenium-type Lyttelton, and the Cottesloe as a test-tube for the Other Drama.

The South Bank was at the core of the English theatre nearly four hundred years ago. Now it is National once more, and only half-a-dozen bowshots from Southwark and the Globe site downstream.

Still, we have to begin at the beginning. When Queen Elizabeth II came to the throne there was nothing but a foundation stone in the wrong place, though those who were present on the morning of 13 July, 1951 when the present Queen Mother (then the Queen) performed the unveiling, have never forgotten Dame Sybil Thorndike's voice in the Masefield ode:

> Pray, therefore, brothers, as we put the stone,
> That glory from the never-dying mind
> May triumph here with vision for the blind,
> Making joy daily bread, and beauty known.

That was in 1951. The theatre scene had not greatly changed a year later, if it had changed at all. The principal dramatists were Noel Coward, J. B. Priestley, Emlyn Williams, Terence Rattigan; the Dubliner, Sean O'Casey, who had been living for a long time in the West of England, an exile from Erin; and, extremely important, T. S. Eliot and Christopher Fry, poets who were bringing back the verse play to a theatre that had been sturdily rejecting it. Someone wrote of *The Cocktail Party*, comedy or allegory with a sustained metronomic beat to discipline the dialogue: 'It is virtually certain that any considerable poet for many years will be a follower of Eliot'.

That said, people in general were happier about Christopher Fry, the century's most considerable verse dramatist, and a man whose true worth will be realised in years ahead. He had called his *Lady's Not For Burning*, staged at the end of the Forties, a comedy of 'human intelligences in a dance together'; and that has always seemed to me to speak for his work: he is the dramatist of human intelligences in a dance, and the last word is vital. No plodding: no massively slow progress. It was once said of Frank Benson,

the Shakespearian actor, that he had the spirit of four o'clock on a May morning; that his work had the freshness of daybreak. So it was with Christopher Fry; and so it is.

Here, for a moment, I must move forward. It is a quarter of a century since Fry's theatrical meridian. He has continued to write, and such plays as *The Dark Is Light Enough* (1954), *Curtmantle*, and *A Yard Of Sun*, in their different ways, can glow and shine from the page. If he is temporarily out of favour, it is purely transient: for once let me be a prophet, most dangerous of trades. The simple fact is that, in what followed the theatre revolution of that year of troubles, 1956, the verse play was lost, and much else with it: even the most expected and traditional theatre-craft became monstrously impossible.

I have often wondered what Shaw, who died in 1950, alert to the last, and his Scottish counterpart, James Bridie (O. H. Mavor) would have made of the sudden change in theatrical temperature. Each was primarily a dramatist of language, a guardian of the spoken word. It was dramatic language that would be in danger: a writer's pleasure in texture and lustre and rhythm, in the sway and life of a sentence, the honing of a phrase to a razor's edge.

A book published in 1953 named, recklessly, half-a-dozen dramatists for the future. In a second book, a decade later, only one of those names had stayed in the running. This was John Whiting, whose *Saint's Day*, which won a Festival of Britain prize at the Arts in 1951, had had almost (though not quite) a consistently bad Press. Of course, it had appeared just too early: the theatre was not ready for it. Now, flawed though it is, it has been recognised as something of a classic. Fry, one of the judges who awarded the prize, said that it 'conveyed most memorably the apocalyptic atmosphere which is never far distant from our times'. No truer word had been spoken in the theatre: 1956 was only half-a-decade ahead.

One passage in *Saint's Day*, I have always thought, is analogous to the revolt in the English theatre. Somebody says:

> Careful! We are approaching the point of deviation. At one moment there is laughter and conversation and a progression: people move and speak smoothly and casually, their breathing is controlled, and they know what they do. Then there occurs a call from another room, the realisation that a member of the assembly is missing, the sudden shout into the dream, and the waking to find the body with the failing heart lying in the corridor—with the twisted limbs at the foot of the stairs—the man hanging from the beam, or the child floating drowned in the garden pool. Careful! Be careful! We are approaching that point. The moment of the call from another room.

There, in a few words, is the change from the smooth, controlled progression to the anarchic mid-fifties, the call from another room. Whiting was a fine and sensitive dramatist. His plays, much applauded critically, never found the audiences they should have done and will find, no doubt, in the future. *Marching Song*, certainly; *The Devils*, perhaps. Here, like Fry, is a man for the future.

What exactly happened in those mid-fifties? When I recall it I cannot

help remembering (unfairly, no doubt) the rush of the maddened Roman crowd upon the harmless poet Cinna. It will be said truthfully that the 'point of deviation' came during the early weeks of the new English Stage Company's experimental tenure of the Royal Court Theatre in Sloane Square (a house that, in and out of the decades, had stood for experiment, in spite of some very curious intervals indeed). At the Court, George Devine propounded his philosophy of The Right to Fail (a phrase that inevitably reminds me of an unluckily forgotten play, Ernest Hutchinson's *The Right To Strike*, from long ago). There was no question of *Look Back In Anger* failing. In spite of some awkward notices, this domestic narrative—perfectly old-fashioned in structure—by a young actor named John Osborne, soon discovered its audiences and its imitators. Its title has gone permanently into the records of the theatre. I never thought it was a good play; but it did speak for many young people of its time not entirely conscious of what they were rebelling against, but certainly rebels. Osborne's central figure, a self-pitying young man with a rancid eloquence, could undeniably talk, and talk dramatically: 'I suppose people of our generation aren't able to die for good causes any longer. We had all that done for us in the thirties and forties, when we were kids.'

No one knows just how these things happen, but *Look Back In Anger* became the fashionable play. It was undoubtedly the spark in the gunpowder barrel. The English stage went up in a flare. New dramatists (as tough as that rioting Roman crowd) proliferated; the old ones fell into silence. Within twelve years or so the Censorship had been abolished and, for better or worse, the stage was left untrammeled.

The first 'wave'—as everyone called it—of the younger dramatists was by no means lasting. Several were sucked back on the ebb, or shall we say that the shooting-stars have fallen from the sky, just as Stephen Phillips (not exactly a Royal Court man) fell in a period that is now primeval. A few of the Devine-sponsored men continue. New dramatists, who may be more sustained, have come to take the places of the fallen. And it may be that, with the National triumphant now on the South Bank—the confirmation of a dream that was a century and a quarter old—the theatre is again recapturing some of the dignity it had scorned. Dignity is not a bad thing.

Though playwriting throughout the reign has been up and down in a curious sierra, the standard of English acting has rarely, if ever, been better: in every department the stage is richly and amply peopled. Though we have mourned the loss of such great players as Sybil Thorndike and Edith Evans (as I write, we look forward to Bryan Forbes's book on Dame Edith), we have Peggy Ashcroft, Wendy Hiller, Dorothy Tutin and Judi Dench to lead our actresses, and such actors as Sir Laurence (Lord) Olivier, who inspired the National during its first decade at the Old Vic, and acted there his unexampled Othello; Sir John Gielgud, Sir Ralph Richardson, Sir Alec Guinness, Paul Scofield; and many, many others.

But let me return to our dramatists; and especially those who are working today. I have said that Fry's hour will return; and his versions of *Peer Gynt*

and *Cyrano de Bergerac* for the Chichester Festival have shown what a fine verbal technician he is. Of the class of '56, as it might be called, John Osborne is, I suppose, the principal survivor: desperately uneven, but always determined and in certain plays, such as *The Hotel In Amsterdam*, an impressively sure writer. His work can be tiresome when it is overheated, as in *Watch It Come Down*, and he is not a man to take criticism calmly. Never mind; he knows he has written himself into theatre record, and possibly there will be another thrust. The only other notable survivors are John Arden, though he has never repeated the success of his cuttingly-edged anti-war piece, *Serjeant Musgrave's Dance*; and Arnold Wesker, a deeply concerned man who has been unlucky, but who wrote in the rather dully entitled *Roots*, that stays in mind from 1959, and from various revivals, something extremely (and reasonably) durable. This shows how a Norfolk country girl, a farm labourer's daughter turned London waitress, realises that at last she is thinking for herself. She owes it to the influence of the man she has quoted for so long, and who has just thrown her over. Suddenly she ceases to quote. 'It does work,' she cries; 'I'm beginning on my own two feet. I'm beginning . . . ' It might almost have been the cry of many of the new dramatists.

One man, who appeared a little later than the Court group, is Harold Pinter. I saw him first when he was an actor, under the name of David Baron, in repertory at the Alexandra Theatre, Birmingham. Later, in London, his first full-length play, *The Birthday Party*, appeared to me to be a merely promising enigma. Several of my colleagues felt similarly; I have seen no cause to vary my original feelings. It was after this that Pinter began to be the most-discussed dramatist of his period. He is unquestionably among the leaders: highly literate, and with an astonishingly alert ear for the elusive rhythms of everyday speech. A popular classification finds for him a pigeonhole labelled 'Comedy of Menace': his plays are oblique, elegant, and at times violent. I said, years ago, that some passages of stichomythia, swift and sinister, might be compared with table-tennis rallies with a scorpion as ball. Still only forty-seven, he has plenty of time before him. We can rely on the dramatist who wrote *The Caretaker*, an examination of loneliness, and *No Man's Land*, which exists in the area between fact and imagination, to continue on his haunted course among the most individual of practising writers.

The other men I would put with him at the head of the dramatists' theatre are completely different, though each, in his way, cares for the language as much as Pinter (in his clipped method) certainly does. It is reassuring to observe that there are dramatists who can work without what, since 1968, has been an almost obligatory coarseness, a resolve to force into a script the kind of exchanges that (a critic said) are familiar on a building-site but need not be reproduced in the theatre. It is, in effect, a brand of demotic frenzy—a frenzy that has gravely harmed many young writers on the Fringe or, as they like to speak of it, the Other Theatre or the Alternative Theatre. These are the people of the studio stages, the upper rooms of pubs, the attics and basements. They are all immensely eager. The Fringe bristles with ideas (not necessarily good ones), but the trouble, very simply, is that few of the plays

have much chance of appealing to a wide audience. The English playgoer, at heart, is conservative in taste. The more he finds himself embarrassed in the theatre, the less he wishes to go.

This has taken me away from the other two dramatists I would place with Harold Pinter in our senior class. One is Tom Stoppard, a former journalist, who sealed his reputation with a fantasy entitled *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead*. Its main figures are the two attendant lords, the college friends enlisted for surveillance and espionage who, in the play of *Hamlet*, are near-ciphers. We get to know Stoppard's pair very well as, lost in their existential doubts, they are swirled through and round the Shakespearian tragedy. They are minor figures helpless in a dream they cannot understand.

In performance the play can grow on one, though Stoppard's better work, on which I believe his reputation will be most securely based, is discoverable in *Travesties* and *Jumpers*. Each is a dazzlingly intellectual comedy. *Jumpers* has for its hero (if that is the word) a Professor of Moral Philosophy at an unnamed university, who is married to a musical comedy star. In the Rosencrantz-and-Guildenstern manner they play visual and verbal games to divert themselves from painful reality. In sum, a philosophic phantasmagoria that involves a murder and a group of gymnastic dons who are mostly logical positivists. The Vice-Chancellor of the University says: 'The truth to us philosophers is always an interim judgment. Unlike mystery novels, life does not guarantee a denouement; and, if it came, how would one know whether to believe it?'

The other major play, *Travesties*, is (in Stoppard's description), 'a work of fiction which makes use, and misuse, of history. Scenes which are self-evidently documentary mingle with others which are just as evidently fantastic.' The place is Zurich during the First World War; Stoppard bases his narrative on the knowledge that such contrasted personages as Lenin, James Joyce, and Tristan Tzara (the apostle of Dadaism) were living there at the same time. What might have happened if they had met? The play is the answer: a surge of language, with at the centre of things an insignificant member of the British Consulate staff whom we meet first as a seedy, elderly cynic. Just as in *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern*, Stoppard assumes his audience's knowledge of *Hamlet*, so in *Travesties* he assumes that *The Importance of Being Earnest* is in every playgoer's pack.

Stoppard is a man apart. We can say this, too, of Alan Ayckbourn, my third candidate for a front-rank place. Ayckbourn is a remarkable technician —I cannot recall anybody recently comparable, and in fact it is hard to think of any dramatist with the same confident grasp of the impossible. He takes as his setting an apparently domestic scene and transforms it by the closest ingenuity and a sharp wit. Really, I find him a richer dramatist than Coward, who wrote a few major comedies (*Private Lives, Hay Fever, Blithe Spirit*) and a good deal of secondary stuff. Agreed, the major work is masterly, but Alan Ayckbourn, not forty yet, seems to me to be more potentially exciting and less artificial. Certain playgoers suspect him because they cannot yet appreciate the wit with which apparent cliches are transmuted, and the

needled, darting observation. Work such as the interlocking trilogy of *The Norman Conquests* is far more than glibly inventive—glib is the last word to use for this writer—and in *Just Between Ourselves* Ayckbourn startled his first-night audience by presenting a harassed wife who goes slowly out of her mind; the piece is, superficially, a comedy, but beneath the comedy there is intense pain. If Ayckbourn develops in this way—and the bravery of his last scene here must be experienced in the theatre—there is little that he may not do. He is exceedingly prolific and in control of his own theatre at Scarborough (where he tests his plays before they arrive in London). Lately the National has conquered with his *Bedroom Farce* in which three bedrooms are shown side by side on the stage and we have none of the goings-on the title might have suggested.

Pinter, then; Stoppard; Ayckbourn. Who else? Here we have to move into catalogue; Peter Nichols, though his last play, *Privates on Parade* (done by the RSC) was disheartening, has proved, as in *A Day in the Death of Joe Egg* and *The National Health*, that he can fuse humour and tragedy; Frank Marcus, as true a dramatist as critic, wrote the strongly original and sympathetic *The Killing of Sister George*; Edward Bond, relying too much on physical violence, can be nevertheless as apt and assured as in *The Sea*; David Storey, with a long, varied sequence at the Royal Court, wrote in *Home* an appealingly restrained portrait of a group of mental patients; and one can merely name such dramatists as Peter Shaffer (*Equus*), Christopher Hampton (*The Philanthropist*), Simon Gray, Alan Bennett, and the bewildering William Douglas Home. The most prolific man in our theatre, his work —comedy in particular—is a mixture of the zestful and the tired. You never know what he will do next; and, for all one's disappointments, he is by no means to be under-valued.

I must name also a pair of writers, divergent in manner but both pledged to the Theatre of Laughter. Ben Travers is, of course, the more important; and, indeed, he is the supreme farce-writer of our century. To everyone's surprise and delight, the master of the Aldwych farces (from the twenties and early thirties) returned in 1975, at the age of 89, with a comedy, *The Bed Before Yesterday*. It was not only one of the most distinguished pieces he had written, but also one that would go into the history of the theatre—not because of its author's age, but because of its acute, good-tempered dialogue and impeccable construction. N. F. Simpson, from the early Royal Court days, has done far less than we hoped he might in the real Theatre of the Absurd—a catchphrase now much overworked in another context. Simpson, as we saw in *One Way Pendulum*, inhabits a world of the non-sequitur governed by absolute logic. Either one finds him irresistible or sits unmoved; to explain either reaction is like seeking to dredge the ocean with the leaky limpet-shell Tregeagle, the Cornish giant, was given for Dozmary Pool.

We have, as I have said, the players for all seasons. To name more than I have done (and I have omitted the 'young star-captains') might be invidious, though I cannot resist naming such performances as those of Olivier at the National which he directed during its prefatory and exciting decade at the

Old Vic; the partnership of Sir Ralph Richardson and Sir John Gielgud in *Home* and *No Man's Land*; and Paul Scofield's South Bank achievement as Volpone, Ben Jonson's Fox.

The theatre is composed now of the great subsidised companies, the National (whose story Frank Littlewood has described in detail in the *Contemporary Review*) and the Royal Shakespeare, which has flowered at both Stratford-upon-Avon and the Aldwych; the forty or more theatres of the West End which, in Ivor Brown's phrase, are the Grand Fleet proudly at anchor (across the way the National is the flagship); the Royal Court, urgently at work in Sloane Square; the regional Repertories, such as those in charge at Bristol, Nottingham, Manchester, and Birmingham; the myriad mayflies (I am not being intentionally dismissive) of the Fringe; and a few gallant companies still on tour. To our pleasure, the Prospect company, one of the most welcome developments of late years and a great boon to the provinces, is now holding the stage at the Old Vic.

The Festivals continue: Chichester, Edinburgh (though there music rules) and, newly-restored, Malvern. The amateurs form a fringe beyond the fringe, working happily and unceasingly. In Jubilee Year we can talk of the Theatre Expanding: a different theatre from twenty-five years ago, but one, when all is said, that is ruled by 'the acting passion, beautiful and swift', and that has gained a fresh South Bank splendour.

I ought to talk of financial troubles, of the cares of the Arts Council, of reduced subsidies, of the economic woes that beset the theatre as all other things in this battling world. Yet, at the moment, I merely want to say that the English theatre, whatever the trials, is in good heart and hope. It is agreeable to end with five lines from a poet's ode of over sixty years ago. What John Drinkwater wrote for the opening of the Birmingham Repertory Theatre on a night in the spring of 1913 can apply today to a far wider stage:

> May you that watch and we that serve so grow
> In wisdom as adventuring we go
> That some unwavering light from us may shine.
> We have the challenge of the mighty line——
> God grant us grace to give the countersign.

[J. C. Trewin, Cornishman, stage historian, and London drama critic (since 1934; *The Illustrated London News* since 1946), has written more than forty books, principally about the theatre, and edited many others. They include *Mr. Macready, Benson and the Bensonians, Shakespeare on the English Stage 1900–1964, Peter Brook: A Biography,* and *The Edwardian Theatre.* A former Literary Editor of *The Observer,* he is Past President of the Critics' Circle and Vice-President of the West Country Writers' Association. He has lectured, on the English stage, in Hungary and Romania.]

ARABIA MODERNAE

by W. Norman McDonald

THE kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that parallelogram of land washed by the Red sea in the west and the Persian gulf in the east, is at present undergoing a modernisation programme perhaps unequalled in any other country. This has caused an upheaval in thought, travel and attitudes of mind. Upheaval, however, is no stranger to this contrasting land.

The first evident disturbance in this desert kingdom was geographic. Bordering the Red sea, a thin coastal plain subserviently crawls northwards from the Yemeni border to the Gulf of Aquaba, watched with haughty contempt by the cockscomb peaks of the Hejaz mountains rising in grandeur to nine thousand feet. The north-eastern slopes of the Hejaz drop gently to three thousand feet, and continue into the hinterland of the Levant. In its south-eastern reaches, however, this formidable barrier drops much more abruptly, its foothills abrasively smoothed by the largest body of sand in the world; Rhub-al-Khali, the Empty Quarter.

This sea of sand, roughly the area of Western Europe, stretches from the Hejaz foothills to the Gulf States, and is linked to the northern Arabian desert, the Nafud, by an umbilical cord of sand every bit as forbidding as the wastes it connects.

Only about a quarter of the population live in the sands. These people, the hardy indefatigable Bedouin, traverse this frightening region in the only way possible: by camel. They are the only true nomads left in a population once almost totally nomadic. The remainder have taken to the towns, or settled in the few places where a soil-based existence is possible.

It is thought by some authorities that the Yemen is the original home of the Semitic race, of which the Arabs form the major part. They divide themselves into two distinctly separate entities: Arab al Araba or pure Arabs; and Arab al Mustaraba, or adopted Arabs who originated in the north. Shut out by both sand and sea, these two branches of the same people have kept their racial purity to an extent unimaginable elsewhere in the world.

Other races have, as their respective civilisations reached their peak of development, attempted to impose their rule on the Hejaz and the Yemen with varied success. Persians, Egyptians, Abyssinians and lastly the Ottoman Turks have ruled the towns and settlements, and from these bases caravanned out to bring the tribes to heel.

Of the four, the Turks were probably the most successful yet their suzerainty was shadowy at best, and the tribes maintained their intricate mosaic of blood feud, tribal warfare and caravan plundering more or less unhindered.

On the desert perimeter, a long procession of peoples climbed the often bloody path to civilisation only to descend, equally bloodily, into oblivion.

In the southern regions Minaeans, Hemyarites and Sabaeans rose and fell with a consistency matched successively by the Sumerians, Babylonians, Phoenicians and Romans in the north. The tribes, safe in the impenetrable vastness of the sands, remained nomadic, timeless and unchanging, sustaining the noisey, brawling tenor of their ways.

With the fall of the Turkish empire the history of Saudi Arabia ceased to be the history of other peoples. Today relics of Turkish imperialism are still in evidence, and one could be forgiven for thinking that, judging by remains alone, the Turks are the only past Arabia can lay claim to. These relics are almost wholly of a military nature; fortlets, watch-towers and fortresses, all sited with the pessimistic care of the professional soldier. Their squat solidity conveys nothing if not mastery, yet herein lies the first of many paradoxes concerning this paradoxical land.

With the collapse of the Turkish empire, the Arabs began delicately to finger the image of unity, placed on the carpet before them by, among others, T. E. Lawrence.

This conception, the Arabs discovered, meant exactly what the dictionaries said it meant—oneness. Gone would be private fiefs, local satraps and tortuous nuances of tribal difference. This form of social organisation sits uncomfortably on the Arab mind, even in religion where the supposed unity of Islam is but a tent, sheltering a circus of religious schism from the noonday sun of public squabble.

Born in the lusty vigour of war, their idealism was not expected to live long, but it survived long enough to be adopted by one man who provided the vision, drive and ruthlessness required to make it a reality. This man was Abd al Aziz ibn Saud, head of the powerful Wahabis tribe, who, by a combination of carefully planned dynastic marriage, shrewd alliance and awesome arbitration of the sword, erected a tent of political unity appropriating for himself and his family the position of tent pole.

From this base, the new rulers began the trek towards the twentieth century, which could be seen through the mirage of power politics galloping headlong to meet them. It was this encounter—necessary if a little unreal—that would lead to oil, wealth and OPEC.

Yet this second shelter, built like the first to shade deep divisions, has had to open its side flaps on occasion and let the suns of division glancingly warm its interior. A man—however able he may be—is still judged by his religious sect, his tribal affiliations. Local satraps are still deferred to and appeased where it is politic to do so. Long held fiefs are still largely inviolate, as one suspects they always will be. On the surface at least, the veneer of unity appears smooth and unblemished.

Change has imposed, superficially at least, its own values and priorities on a deeply conservative people and their country. The results of this imposition are amusing, contradictory and illuminating. The ubiquity of the camel has given way to dependence on the pick-up truck. The faith formerly placed in gold now kneels at the feet of modernity's foremost totem—paper

money. The camel routes, antiquated by time, have given way to airline schedules. The suqs, anciently the mosques of trade, barter, and haggle, have perceptibly assumed the blandness of shopping centres. This outward facade, however, camouflages a profoundly unchanging interior. The relics of the past remain, stolid and established, mutely questioning the oil-fuelled hustle of modernity.

The Saudi Arab has a French conceit of linguistic purity, a Papal conception of religious originality with an American belief in his own abilities, the whole gift-wrapped in a Chinese wariness of 'face'. This results in a hypocrisy at once dangerous and laughable. In fact the hypocrisy at times spills over into the irrigation channels of split personality.

The towns clutch childishly at the skirts of the suqs or bazaars, and rightly so, for the suqs have mothered the towns since ancient times.

Like mothers everywhere, the suq is the universal provider. Their centres are benignly decrepit, aware that time if not passing them by, is certainly staying no longer than necessary. Lodged in the tortuous inner alleys, the ancient craftsmen such as tinsmiths, brass founders and carpet sellers indolently pass their day watching business and the world drifting further away from them.

These inner alleys dribble into wider paved walkways about the width of a pavement on any high street in Britain. The walkways radiate from a large circular open area where women, predominantly Negro, sell a sparse selection of nuts from trays held between their knees. Hard by, the professional writers squat, awaiting business, although now only a thin rearguard of the small army that have long decamped across the suq to richer pastures outside the Post Office.

Through this raucous montage of eastern business cars, animals, people and vehicles hoot, chatter and defecate their way, each intent on his own pursuits. With sanitation bordering on the medieval the centre of a suq is indescribably filthy by western standards, but this in no way deters the children who run barefoot through it all, chasing a football, a dog or each other.

As one strolls from the centre towards the perimeter, the character and appearance of the suq alters almost with each yard of ground covered. The filth becomes mere rubbish, the noise more muted, the animals less obvious. Modernity is beginning to make itself felt, pausing to regroup prior to its final assault on the centre. Clothing stalls, crowded with pattern and colour, rub shoulders with leather and shoe stalls, themselves but an inhalation away from the perfume stores, discreet—tasteful almost—with their glass shelves and display cabinets.

Ahead, stilettos of sunlight betray the perimeter, the haven of things to come. It is on the perimeter that modernity is at its most comfortable, its most assured. Bland shop assistants, their Arab dress spotless, glide from shelf to counter to customer with the aplomb of their European counterparts. That this is rich man's territory is evident from the profusion

of gold shops, sprinkled with a seasoning of consumer electronic stores and the odd money-changer come up in the world, and now calling himself a banker with all the solid respectability the name implies.

Paradox however is there aplenty. Among Saudi women, the time hallowed respect for gold runs deep. Despite an economy healthy beyond most imaginations, with a hard currency getting enviably harder, they remain stubbornly devoted to the yellow metal.

As one moves out from the centre, the towns smarten themselves up, new buildings—public and private—stand to attention. This is modernity's outer bulwark, brash with the newness of the paravenu, reminiscent of the fantastic hulks with which the Victorian railway kings studded Britain.

Just as the railways, with their speed and dependability, changed the face of nineteenth century Britain, so oil and its by-products are changing the features of Saudi Arabia. The result is equally hideous and extraordinary but contains a dash of eastern gaudiness peculiarly Arab.

Perhaps the most fundamental change, however, has taken place in the method of travel. Until recently the symbol of personal wealth was the camel. A man's standing was judged by the size of his herd, and the plentiful richness of its accoutrements. Nowadays he is judged by the quantity of half-trucks he can command, to which he has transferred not only his allegiance, but also the plethora of ornamentation with which he formerly burdened his camel. Initially, this development appears to be modernity's one solid success, until one observes a half-truck speeding along the road with a camel sitting incongruously in the back!

It seems that whilst they have privately decided to go along with modernity the while, the Saudis have also concluded that it cannot last, and so have kept their old insurance policy in being, against the day when the oil company geologists are proved hopelessly wrong.

These apprehensions run deep. They are as much a facet of the Saudi character as they are of the known or suspected quantity of oil remaining to be exploited. Although oil has thrown up a few entrepreneurs among the Saudis, the majority are innately lazy. As a result, skilled labour is at a premium, and in almost all the traditional skills, particularly the building industry, the craftsmen are Yemenis. Even in the business community, a small but close-knit Chinese Moslem mafia is evident, most of them refugees from Chairman Mao's post Nationalist cleansing of the Chinese mainland.

With the coming of oil the imported skill-dispensers, although welcome in one respect, were certainly not welcome in another. They were almost wholly non-Moslem. This fact the Saudis have learned to live with, if not totally accept. They have adapted to the situation where necessary by, for example, building a forty-five kilometre by-pass round the holy city of Mecca, to enable non-Moslems to reach Jeddah, and just stopped short of asking European women to adopt the veil, although they insist that short skirts remain banned. As oil and its related products develop more fully more, not less, non-Moslem skills will be required. How the Saudis will react to this remains to be seen.

Pervading this cobbling of efficient modernity to benign decay, of local satrap to central government, of state bureaucracy to individual trust is Islam, the only recognised religion and perhaps the only unifying force totally acceptable. Not surprisingly, it is Islam that engenders possibly the greatest paradox.

It was the advance of militant Islam, the Ottoman Turks in the van, that in its conquest of Constantinople indirectly fed the intellectual stirrings that would crack open Christianity's stultifying hold on the European mind. Thus the advance of one religion which in its very name was authoritarian to a degree, brought about by the flight westwards of scholars and craftsmen, a renaissance of thought among the adherents of an equally monolithic creed. Through this widening abyss in Christianity's intellectual certainty poured the damned-up ideas of four centuries, ideas which would lead to the Nation-State, self-sustaining economic growth and, most important of all, the industrial revolution and its increasing dependence on oil.

The coming of oil has brought the three W's; Wealth, Waste and Westerners. By far the most disturbing in Suadi eyes is the Christian westerners. With their technical skills has come the western way of life with its scepticism, its drive and, above all, its attitude to women. These three factors in themselves are enough to trigger off a possible backlash, with all that such an event would entail for the cradle of one of the world's major religions, a religion moreover every bit as hypocritically narrow-minded as medieval Christianity.

The guardians of the Islamic faith are the Matauwahs, a compound of religious police, doctrinal zealot and parochial nosey-parker, whose powers are no less real for being maddeningly vague. Their first stand against modernity took a form at once familiar and traditional even in western countries until the late nineteenth century; they vehemently opposed female education. Eventually they lost, but not before some bitterly contested concessions were granted them. They enforced the reading of the Quran for all girls for at least twenty hours per week and limited the choice of careers open to them to two: nursing and teaching. This blatant waste of talent will become increasingly evident as the country develops, and the demand for professional skill outstrips supply.

Even in the eyes of Allah, woman is by no means equal. Although permitted into the larger mosques, she must pray in seclusion and behind the menfolk in a section specially screened off for her. It is only in the last ten years that a government decree making the wearing of the veil mandatory has been lifted, but still the majority of women wear the veil in public, for she can only remove it at her husband's discretion; a discretion the Saudi male is very reluctant to exercise. Indeed one cannot escape the conclusion that Islamic society, in Saudi Arabia at least, is designed for nothing so much as the perpetuation of male dominance.

The part played by westerners, particularly Britons, in opening up Saudi Arabia and giving it a wider vision beyond the narrow Islamic horizon has been significant.

Of the great names in Arabian exploration, the four greatest are British. Doughty, who wrote the incomparable *Travels in Arabia Deserta*; Thomas, the first man to cross the Empty Quarter; Philby, the Cambridge educated Briton-turned-Moslem, whose travels throughout the peninsula made him a legend in his own lifetime and lastly Thesiger, perhaps the greatest of them, whose crossings of the Empty Quarter and his subsequent travels in the interior of the Gulf States established his reputation as arguably the greatest of modern explorers. In his book *Arabian Sands* he relates how, during one of his journeys through the Empty Quarter, he and his Arab guides stopped to rest and eat, close to a tribal village. At the end of the meal, an old Arab pushed his way through the throng muttering: 'I've come to see the Christian.'

His scrutiny made Thesiger wonder if this old man had seen more clearly than had the others, the threat that he, a Christian, implied: the inevitable disintegration of his way of life and beliefs by other Christians who would follow.

Yet the coming of the Christians has brought considerable benefits to this medievally modern Kingdom. Whether more will follow depends perhaps on some latter-day Luther who, when the Matauwah strikes him across the shoulder with his cane will, instead of meekly retiring to the mosque to pray, seize the cane and return the chastisement. This gesture alone would do more for Saudi Arabia than one furious monk and a piece of paper did for Western Europe.

POEMS

LANGUAGE OF THE BUDDHA

What greatly attracts me to the Buddha
is the civilised concern which he shows
for the temperate use of language.

For him a right way of speaking is one
of the strands in the eightfold path leading
to enlightenment and the end of suffering.

To attain this right way all lies,
all bitter and double-tongued words,
all idle babbling, must be avoided.

So equally must harsh abusive speech,
arrogant usage heeding only itself,
and crude expression tending to corrupt.

Style also is important, and bombastic
inflated language is condemned no less
than gentility and plausible fine words.

Above all the Buddha values restraint
with words, knowing that silence is often
more expressive than the finished poem.

RAYMOND TONG

IN ADVERSITY

At peace with the world:
all my leaves unfurled.
Sweet this audacity!
Not yet the catastrophe.

JULIE WHITBY

ZOLA THE PROPHET

by Denys Val Baker

ONE day in 1864, a French critic, Jules Valles, met the young novelist, Emile Zola, in Hachette's bookshop in Paris. They talked; and at one stage in the conversation, Zola suddenly stared at the critic and demanded: 'Do you feel yourself to be a power? . . . Speaking for myself, I feel I am one.'

In retrospect, one can feel that Zola was right to interpret himself so. It needed power for a man to dedicate his whole life to such an enormous undertaking as the twenty-volume series known as *Les Rougon-Macquart.* It needed power to carry that project through so comprehensively and thoroughly. It needed power to build up the series of novels, as an architect might build a cathedral or some other tremendous building.

But above all it needed power, the power of a genius, to blow the warm stuff of life into an essentially mechanically contrived groundwork, so that in every book one is conscious of the blood and sweat, the toil and turmoil of human beings in relationship, and in conflict, with one another, and with the world.

Zola stands out as one of the first great writers to portray, in the novel, the real position of the individual in society. Though many of his characters are vivid creations—often women, as Gervaise Macquart, or Thérèse Raquin—it is Zola's unalterable message that the individual is negligible, that what matters is the whole, and what each one of us contributes to that. In some of his earliest letters he expresses, rather morbidly, his realisation of this state of affairs:

> In the crowds that surround me I see not a single soul, but only prisons of clay; and my soul is smitten with despair at its immense solitude, and grows more and more sombre. . . . Man is alone, alone on the earth. I repeat, shapes pass before our eyes, but every day shows me the vast desert in which each one of us lives.

Unlike the English poet James Thomson who, when he experienced a similar feeling, gave way to complete despair and gave us his hopeless, though brilliant *City Of Dreadful Night,* Zola's immense industry and positiveness persuaded him to relate his feelings to the conditions of society, to try and make some sense of it all. Thus, towards the very end of his life, he disagreed with Ibsen's view that the strong man was the solitary man, and said that in fact the strong man was the man united in heart and thought to all other men, 'the individual in whom lives all humanity'.

For Zola, shall we say, there was no 'Outsider'. Every one of his characters, he painstakingly shows, is related to the people and institutions and processes around him. In this sense, as many critics have pointed out, Zola was a prophet for these times—one can imagine with what ardour and enjoyment he would have tackled still further novels, taking in mass psychology and mass entertainment—the alarming influences of atom bomb science, and so on.

Several English-speaking publishers have published new translations of Zola's more famous novels—books like *Earth* and *The Beast In Man*—and it is to be hoped they will secure a wide readership in this country. Even on a re-reading, these books have a habit of gripping the attention relentlessly: one can imagine the even greater pleasure of the experience of coming upon them for the first time.

This pleasure comes about in several ways. There is first the technique, or to use a phrase quoted before, the architecture. Zola himself gives us a fascinating glimpse of this in some remarks he made about his novel *La Débacle*, subtitled *A Study of the Horrors of War*:

> The subject was to be War. I had to consider War in its relation to various classes of society—War vis-à-vis the bourgeois, War vis-à-vis the peasant, War vis-à-vis the workman. I had to show in a series of types, France who had lost the use of liberty, France drunk with pleasure, France fated irrevocably to disaster. I had to have types to show France so prompt to enthusiasm, so prompt to despair. And then there were to be shown the immense faults committed, and to show by character how the commission of such faults was possible, a natural sequence of a certain psychological state of mind of a certain preponderating class which existed in the last days of the Empire. . . . Then each phase of action had to be typified.

Zola goes on to describe how, having got his novelist's approach worked out, he then read every bit of literature about the battle of Sedan, every General's report (each a different version!), as well as masses of letters from individuals. Then it became necessary to see the places, to study the geography of his book:

> So, with my rough draft in my pocket and my head teeming with the shadows of my marionettes, and of the things they were to do and to explain, I set off for Rheims and followed foot by foot the road which the Seventh Corps marched to their disaster. During the drive I picked up an immense quantity of material, halting in farmhouses and peasants' cottages and taking copious notes.

There is, perhaps, little need for Zola to explain his methods. Almost every one of his books bears testimony to an infinite, almost wearisome attention to detail. But ah, what is added to that!—what touch is it that transforms humdrum material details into memorable creations? The answer is power again, the power of a very formidable imagination, sometimes quite perverse and startling, never dull.

Consider, merely, the theme of *The Beast In Man*, with its constant and repetitive comparison of steaming, powerful railway engines and steaming, lustful sexual relationships between men and women. Zola said of this novel that it would portray the continual rumbling of trains, 'progress pressing on to the twentieth century, and that in the midst of an abominable, mysterious, secret drama . . . the human beast under the crust of civilisation'. Against the background he wanted to show the *status quo* of emotions, man fundamentally a savage.

The point is that Zola does indeed bring off this effect; his writing is so vivid and compelling that we quite share Jacques' belief that his engine, *Lison*, has a soul of its own, a 'mystery of the workmanship, that something that the luck of the hammer adds to the metal, that the assembler's twist of the screws gives to the plates: the personality, the life of the machine'.



The life of machines, the heart of crowds, the soul of factories, the living being of inanimate objects—these things seemed to fascinate Zola out of all proportion. But it was a fascination that suited his requirements, because it was necessary for him to be able to put over their reality, as opposed to the puniness of the individual.

Another striking aspect of Zola's art was his hatred of the hypocrisy of capitalism and of the equal hypocrisy of the Church. There can have been few more blistering attacks than *Verité*, written when Zola was a sexagenarian—indeed just before his death. He intended simply to take as his theme the reverse of the normal Gospel. The kingdom of heaven, he declared, was, as an idea, a cheat. And this is how he expressed himself in the closing page:

> A hateful word had once been impudently spoken: Blessed are the poor in spirit! and two millenia of misery had been brought forth by this mortal error. The legend of the bliss of ignorance was now exposed as a protracted social crime. Poverty, dirt, iniquity, superstition, lies, tyranny, woman exploited and brought into contempt, man stupefied and brought into subjection, all physical and moral evil were the fruit of this ignorance deliberately cultivated, developed as a system of political government and divine repression. Knowledge alone had the power to exterminate the untrue dogma, to scatter those who lived by lies, to be the source of great riches, at once of the fabulous harvest of the earth and the universal flowering of the mind!

No, says Zola, happiness has never sprung from ignorance, but always from knowledge; and in his closing years he felt that knowledge was about to transform the hideous field of moral and material poverty into a vast, fruitful plain, whose tillers would multiply its riches tenfold year by year.

Alas, Zola was too optimistic. But we should be grateful for this one man's vast enterprise, the strength of purpose which enabled him to fashion his mammoth creative undertaking and to give us such a vivid and imaginative interpretation of the human scene as it really is.

DO WE HAVE ENOUGH 'COMMON DECENCY'?: BARBARISM OR SURVIVAL?

by David Holbrook

WE hear continually of a national crisis, which will take all our resources to survive. Mr. Dennis Healey, discussing a recent budget, spoke of 'common decency'. By this he invokes certain values—that we should care for others in the community, for the common life, for quality of living.

But how much of this rather old-fashioned concern for social values remains? On a T-shirt in a shop window in Cambridge last week I saw the slogan, 'If it feels good, do it'. This is the maxim of the egoistical nihilist, of the barbarian—and it has become virtually the maxim of our society, inculcated into the people by powerful technological media.

Recently, some have raised the question of the quality of life. This is not to be measured in terms of income level, or acquisition. But in our society today this is how people *do* measure their sense of their own identity—and, although this is never discussed, such egoism conflicts with 'common decency'.

I have raised before in the press the way in which a culture of indulgence in sexual sensationalism and mental brutality was preparing the ground for a kind of fascism. Certain recent films have been accused by critics like Joseph Morgenstern of *Newsweek* of communicating to audiences a *machismo* which may be unfashionable, but which is growing rapidly—that a man can only be a true man when he has won his combat badges in rape and murder. There is, in such entertainment, a form of mental rage which inculcates at the deepest level a habit of indulgence in the humiliation and exploitation of others, to assert one's identity,

Film—A Very Efficient Teaching Medium, said a recent headline in the Business pages of *The Times*. A. S. Byatt, in the review pages, may tell us that *The Clockwork Orange* is 'moral'. But this film was also seen by the editor of the International Library of Psychoanalysis, Masud Khan, as a 'militant and malicious assault on human values', because it taught that a man could base his authenticity of identity on living at the expense of others, on hate—making no concession to the alternative, which is 'common decency'.

The slogan on the T-shirt endorses the attitudes to experience analysed recently by the Jewish magazine, *Patterns of Prejudice*. As in Fascist ideology, it says, the heroes of our pornokitsch culture are usually 'strong and healthy', 'normal and natural'. Self-realisation is put forward as a political theme, and the message hammered home is 'You are enjoying it, aren't you?' and 'It's bestial but it's fun!'. Sexual satisfaction (with or without responsibility) is presented as wholesome politico-social action, brutality and egoism (as in the *Playboy* ethos) as 'natural' and 'healthy'. These tendencies were examined in a book published in Germany by

Professor Edgar Mertner and Professor Herbert Mainusch, called *Pornotopia.* The theme is that 'just as fascism sought to unleash the instincts that would turn men into their neighbours' deadly enemies, so pornography is fostering the barbaric potentialities in man. It is claiming tolerance for offences to high standards of morality . . . the point being to ensure that evil things are done with a clear conscience'.

Today, in England, despite the spreading of a sadistic culture on a mass scale (*Emmanuelle,* for example), debate on this issue is still suppressed and silent, although this trend represents a form of mass education—against 'common decency'. And now certain magazines are an actual political force. At one election a journal advised its half million readers to vote Labour, to make sure there was no Indecency Bill. And in London the Labour group has been very active in releasing pornographic films, while in Cambridge a Labour group is even going to resist the intention of the local Public Protection Committee to look carefully at doubtful films.

What this really means, I believe, is that Labour is opening the gates for a powerful commercial form of exploitation whose effects are totally inimical to socialist ideals—but also politically dangerous, because they teach egoistical nihilism and chaos.

But there is a deeper effect which worries me as an educationist. Some psychotherapists argue that exposure to pornography and explicit sexual material, and to violence, makes it more difficult for children to control their own aggression. This is the view of Dr. Mary Miles, who writes in *The Observer,* and it is based on her clinical work. Dr. Leslie Bartlett, who investigated the problem of adolescent suicide attempts in Southampton after the Tina Wilson affair, believes that harm is being done to children because they are burdened too soon with adult emotional problems—and 'commercialism and blandishments of the media potentiate this drive'.

Writing in *The People,* Wilfred Lester, a consultant psychiatrist, has suggested that parents are becoming desensitised to violence. 'Parents watch brutality in colour on their television where the attacker is presented as a hero. They identify with the hero and when, later that night, their child cries too long they feel little compunction in punching it'. Whether baby battering is on the increase, or whether it is simply that we hear more about it, some violence to children, and among children, seems to be new. For instance, doctors report an increased number of bite marks on damaged children. In schools, violence has definitely increased: 1,500 cases were reported in 1970, and the medical correspondent of the *Spectator* believes this has something to do with premature adult sexuality, anticipating emotional maturity. He also declares that adolescent suicide is increasing.

What of the children themselves? How can they grow up to possess a sense of 'common decency' when their parents' tastes have become so barbarous? There are those who would protest that it is absurd to call the tastes of English adults barbarous. But in reply one has, surely, only to mention a few of the common artefacts in today's popular culture? *Tit-bits* recently displayed a naked girl with a whip looped around her, covered with weals. A million people have watched sodomy on the screen in

Last Tango, accompanied by cruel, perverted, and insulting dialogue. The mass culture of the British people today contains a substantial amount of sadism and humiliation of women—and this is barbarous, by any standards. Intellectuals, however, have moved beyond offering tolerance, to an acclaim of all this as beneficial!

The Labour Party will speak of the degrading effects on young people, of bad housing conditions, or bad conditions of employment. But surely a little more attention should be given to the effects of a 'liberated' culture that includes such debasements as public spectacles? The Cambridge Rapist case, surely, made the reality of corruption and depravity clear? Isn't the corruption of consciousness a very serious form of pollution?

One major effect, close to my interests, is that on idealistic young people who, a few years ago, used to go successfully into schools as teachers, to help transform society for the better by a more humane education. Today, these are disillusioned and many are giving up. The reasons are not to do with pay, or poor conditions, or even social background of the children: they have to do with the essential barbarism inculcated into the children by the media, by a debased culture, and the corrupt example of their parents.

No less than five years or so ago, those who worked to unleash upon us the new explosion of pornography and sadism in culture, had declared their intention of 'destroying society'. We gave them the benefit of the doubt, believing that there was a philosophical anarchy, which, perhaps, might bring benefits if tolerated. It now turns out that the philosophy was, in any case, bogus, and often a mere cloak for money-making activities. But insofar as they had a philosophy, it was that of egotistical nihilism, 'since the world is nothing and I am nothing, I might as well live at the expense of others'. This kind of nihilism is incompatible with 'common decency', with socialist ideals, or with the aims of 'progressive' thought. Yet progressive people are everywhere now enlisted behind this new barbarism which leads, inevitably, to an incipient fascism, of a new kind. The possible links between sadism and fascism are brilliantly discussed in Mr, John Fraser's *Violence in the Arts* (C.U.P.), as is the irresponsibility of intellectuals in this matter. But in response to the growing egoistical nihilism in children, the schools are reaching for the stick.

Certainly, now that this implicit philosophy of a sadistic culture has triumphed ('I have destroyed everything in my heart that stood in the way of my pleasures', as de Sade put it, through the mouth of one of his characters) there seems little chance of enlisting the mass of the people in the self-sacrifice and disciplines of 'common decency' necessary for our survival. This is what 'decadence' means, and it is no joke.

[David Holbrook is author of *Sex and Dehumanisation* (1972), *The Case Against Pornography* (1972) and *Gustav Mahler and the Courage To Be* (1975)].

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

OPERA

OFFENBACH *La Grande Duchesse de Gérolstein* Toulouse Capitole/Plasson. (2 Records) CBS Masterworks 79207. £6.29.

OFFENBACH *La Vie Parisienne* Toulouse Capitole/Plasson. (2 Records) HMV SLS 5076. £5.50.

PUCCINI *Suor Angelica* New Philharmonia/Maazel. CBS Masterworks 76570. £3.49.

PUCCINI *Gianni Schicchi* London Symphony Orchestra/Maazel. CBS Masterworks 76563. £3.49.

PUCCINI *Tosca* Royal Opera House, Covent Garden/Davis. (2 Records) Philips 6700 108. £7.00.

PUCCINI *La Fanciulla Del West* La Scala, Milan/Von Matacic. (3 Records) HMV SLS 5079. £7.95.
Also: Santa Cecilia, Rome/Capuana. (3 Records) Decca, Ace of Diamonds GOS 594-6. £7.50.

ORCHESTRAL

MAHLER Symphony No. 3. Chicago Symphony Orchestra/Levine. (2 Records) RCA ARL2 1757. £5.98.

RACHMANINOV Piano Concerto No. 3. Berman/London Symphony Orchestra/Abbado CBS Masterworks 76597. £3.49.

SCHUMANN Symphony Nos. 1 & 4. Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra/Mehta. Decca SXL 6819. £3.50.

CHAMBER MUSIC

SHOSTAKOVITCH Viola Sonata/Violin Sonata. Druzhinin/Muntyan and D. Oistrakh/Richter. HMV Melodiya HQS 1369. £2.50.

POPULAR MUSIC FROM THE TIME OF QUEEN ELIZABETH I. Camerata of London. SAGA 5447. £1.50.

ALTHOUGH in recent years there has never been any dearth of Offenbach operettas in the repertoires of our various domestic opera companies—always, of course, performed in English—that has not been the case with recordings. Indeed Offenbach works on record, in French, are rather more valuable to the music-lover than British productions sung in English. For fun as many of those have been, the particular style and wit of this composer's work has all too often been lost in translation. Offenbach's music, and the libretti of Meilhac and Halévy, are so archetypally French as to defy truly satisfactory translation. The problem is much the same as trying to perform Gilbert and Sullivan in French: I remember once having heard *Le Mikado, ou La Ville de Titipou* broadcast on Radio 3—it was fascinating, but concerned an entirely different world. Thus we are particularly lucky this summer to have had issued two complete recordings of Offenbach's operettas, which, though issued by different record companies, in fact come from the same highly authentic source: the Toulouse Capitole under the splendidly idiomatic direction of their conductor, Michel Plasson.

Of the two recordings, I suspect that the CBS issue of *La Grande Duchesse de Gérolstein* will give more lasting pleasure. It is not so much the performance or recording that are better—indeed the sound on HMV's *La Vie Parisienne* I found marginally less 'boxy' than the CBS issue—and both operas have the advantage of those two fine French sopranos, Regine Crespin and Mady Mesplé, in leading roles. What makes *La Grande Duchesse* preferable is the quality of the work and the opportunities it offers to the singers: there is a great deal more musical wit in it than in *La Vie Parisienne* which relies more heavily on dialogue, and was in fact written—as by Jean-Louis Barrault's and Madeleine Renaud's company it was some years ago most successfully performed—for a company of actors. In *La Vie Parisienne* Crespin's role of Metella offers few opportunities for her gifts, and it is really only Mady Mesplé's Gabrielle that has much chance to give musical satisfaction. The men too are sadly neglected by the score—though not in the dialogue—so that even Michel Sénéchal's admirable Raoul has only limited opportunities to shine. Nevertheless the work, for all its flimsiness, is given a thoroughly committed performance, the dialogue is beautifully handled, and the immortal sextet '*Votre habit a craqué dans le dos*' in Act 3, and the finale to Act 4 are both uproariously done.

But Offenbach's satire of military affairs in *La Grande Duchesse* is really a far pithier and more musical work than the skittish treatment of tourists in Paris, and the four sides of this CBS recording make truly exhilarating listening. Regine Crespin's '*Ah que j'aime les militaires*', and her magnificently grandiloquent, yet utterly tongue-in-cheek, '*Voici le sabre de mon père*' are joyous. As Fritz Alain Vanzo is a fine, pure-toned, very French tenor whose voice blends splendidly with Crespin's in their duets. General Boum is in the assured hands of Robert Massard, who sings with unfailing elegance and style, but lacks perhaps just a little explosiveness and cannon-like tone for an ideal performance of '*A cheval sur la discipline*'. Mesplé makes a highly attractive Wanda, and, as in *La Vie Parisienne*, not just the rest of the cast but the Toulouse Capitole chorus and orchestra perform vigorously and yet most musically. In truth no lover of operetta should be without either of these issues.

An interesting selection of Puccini operas has recently appeared on record. CBS are responsible for issuing two-thirds of *Il Trittico*, *Suor Angelica* and *Gianni Schicchi*, each excellent value as supplied in boxes with good notes and libretto for the normal price of a single record. *Suor Angelica* certainly wallows in sentiment with its melodrama in the convent, but nevertheless contains some beautiful, exquisitely fashioned music. The conductor, Lorin Maazel, pays the work the respect of taking it seriously in a spacious, well-detailed performance that occasionally seems just a little too lingering. It is cast from strength with Renata Scotto singing magnificently and thoroughly persuasive as Suor Angelica and Marilyn Horne immensely powerful and dramatic as her aunt, the Princess. Their confrontation is an epic experience. Ileana Cotrubas takes Sister Genovesa most sweetly, and the rest of the sisters are sung with commendable assurance by members of our various home companies. The New Philharmonia

play persuasively and the issue is well worth having. So too is its companion piece, *Gianni Schicchi*, with Tito Gobbi still unequalled in the title role. His voice nowadays may lack just a little of its former power, but it is insignificantly little in this role. Again CBS have cast from strength, and once more Maazel conducts with great finesse. Placido Domingo and Ileana Cotrubas are fine as the young lovers—though *'Il mio babbino caro'* while expressively sung, is just a little too 'breathy' for comfort. The other roles here are well taken by Italian singers, and the London Symphony Orchestra provide a polished accompaniment.

At first glance Montserrat Caballé might not seem an ideal Tosca, nor Colin Davis entirely in his element conducting the opera. In the result the Philips recording with the orchestra and chorus of the Royal Opera House works remarkably well, even if the performance does not supplant the De Sabata version, with Callas, Gobbi and di Stefano, in my affections. Davis takes the score scrupulously and expressively, paces it with sensitivity and gives commendable attention to detail. Needless to say he makes much of the big dramatic confrontations, which are highly charged. Caballé is mostly in admirable voice and makes her Tosca a thoroughly sympathetic character, less the tigress and more the woman who truly has 'lived for art'. As Cavaradossi José Carreras is in ringing voice and suitably passionate, but the set is somewhat let down by Ingvar Wixell's Scarpia, who is frankly not in the same class. Decently sung certainly, but sadly short on characterisation and lacking the lascivious capacity for evil that the role requires. The rest of the cast is strong, with Samuel Ramey a fine Angelotti, and the Covent Garden orchestra play with conviction. Philips have contributed an excellent, spacious recording.

To mark the new production at Covent Garden, EMI have reissued their 1959 recording of *La Fanciulla del West* with Birgit Nilsson in the title role and the Brazilian tenor João Gibin as Dick Johnson. This opera is well worth having on record, for despite its lack of set-piece arias, it contains some marvellous music, and, as well as having a particularly strong second act, offers great opportunities to the chorus of miners. But this medium-price reissue must be compared with the existing Ace of Diamonds recording which has Renata Tebaldi at the peak of her vocal form as Minnie, Mario del Monaco a stirring Dick Johnson and Cornell MacNeil as a most impressive Jack Rance, altogether superior to his counterpart, Andrea Mongelli, on the HMV recording. Where the latter does score is in the conducting of Lovro von Matacic, which is more expressive and involved than Franco Capuana's decent account for Decca. On the other hand the Decca issue has noticeably better sound quality, and, bearing in mind that it is also marginally cheaper, seems overall to be preferred.

Of late, James Levine, the young American conductor who is now Music Director of the New York Metropolitan Opera, has been establishing himself as a considerable Mahlerian, and his latest recording, of the great 3rd Symphony, certainly consolidates that reputation. He conducts the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, whose richness of string tone and polished wind playing would seem to make them the front-runner of American orchestras, and

the mezzo soloist in the 4th and 5th movements is Marilyn Horne, who displays impeccable intonation and great expressiveness in her singing. The symphony's colossal span and its variations of mood are scrupulously well managed by Levine, and the last three movements are especially effective. After a most beautiful *'O mensch'* from Marilyn Horne and fine singing from the Chicago Chorus and Children's choir in the 5th movement, the final movement with its great adagio is played with the utmost eloquence by the orchestra, and is admirably judged by the conductor. RCA have given the symphony a bright, yet resonant, recording, and the record will give great pleasure to any Mahlerian.

After some slightly disappointing recordings, the Russian pianist, Lazar Berman, has now wholly vindicated his reputation in a simply stunning performance of the 3rd Rachmaninov concerto, accompanied by Claudio Abbado and the LSO. The recording was made straight after a very successful Festival Hall concert at the end of last November, and it is one of those recordings in which everything goes absolutely right, and yet has all the intensity and fervour of a 'live' performance. One has the impression that very few 'takes' must have been needed when recording it. Berman's technique is stupefying: he throws off the most intricate figures in the first movement with incredible ease and gives a breathtaking account of the great cadenza. Yet there is far more to this than mere virtuosity, for his is an immensely musical performance and one which makes a great deal more of this concerto than the display piece it can often seem. He is immaculately accompanied by the LSO and Abbado, and this is a record which should on no account be missed.

During the past season Zubin Mehta has twice revealed his mastery of the orchestra to Covent Garden audiences, who will hear him again in *Die Fledermaus* at the end of the year. Recently Decca have released his recording of the 1st and 4th Schumann symphonies (the 4th is in fact the 2nd, chronologically, being composed straight after the first and then withdrawn and revised some years later) with the Vienna Philharmonic. These are individual, even idiosyncratic accounts of these fine romantic symphonies—very 'Viennese'—drawing polished, zestful playing from this magnificent orchestra. The 1st 'Spring' symphony is a most captivating work and is given, despite some vagaries of tempi, a heartfelt, satisfying performance.

HMV Melodiya have just issued a recording of Shostakovitch's last complete work, his Viola Sonata, opus 147, dedicated to Fyodor Druzhinin who plays it here with Michael Muntyan. It is a beautiful, elegiac work in three movements of which the last is longer than the first two put together. Like the 15th symphony it contains parody musical references, in this work to Beethoven's 'Moonlight' Sonata, which makes a telling effect. An imposing work and one which shows no diminution of the composer's powers. The coupling is the magnificent live performance of the Violin Sonata, written just before the great 14th symphony, given by David Oistrakh and Sviatoslav Richter in the Grand Hall of the Moscow Conservatory in May 1969. It is wonderful music, wonderfully played, and brings home just how great a loss was Oistrakh as well as Shostakovitch. We must be grateful we

still have Richter.

Finally a word for an extraordinarily attractive issue at low cost from Saga. The Camerata of London's record of popular Elizabethan music from stage, court and people is played on original instruments—beautiful virginals and crumhorns, lutes and viols, and has most attractive singing by Glenda Simpson, though I would hardly accept the sleeve's description of her as a mezzo-soprano. The Shakespeare songs—for example 'The wind and the rain' and 'Where the bee sucks'—are quite delightful, and Dowland's 'Sorrow, stay' and Campion's 'Oft have I sighed' most touching music. This is a record which gives a great deal of pleasure and should be snapped up at once.

The September issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Law in Transition* 1952-77 by J. A. Coutts, *Giscard versus the Gaullists*: by Donald N. Baker, *The Queen's Years*: *The International Scene* by Gordon Connell-Smith and *The Extermination of the Jews was no War Crime* by C. C. Aronsfeld.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THE POPULATION EXPLOSION

Syndromes of the Seventies: Population, Sex and Social Change. John A. Loraine. Peter Owen £6.00.

The dilemma of the doomwatcher is that in trying to shock people into doing something about the manifest dangers confronting humanity, he may produce political catalepsy, making the individual incapable of doing anything. So it is handy to have a doctor on stand-by. John A. Loraine is such a one. He is a distinguished medical scientist, who is actively concerned and impressively well-informed about the human predicament but treats it analytically. He does not predict; he prognoses. He does not say the patient has only six months to live; he examines the syndrome and the prospect of recovery.

A syndrome is not a disease which will respond to a specific treatment, like a shot of penicillin. It is concurrence of symptoms, each of which needs identification and all of which have to be considered. The world problems are like that.

Dr. Loraine, as a laboratory expert on sex hormones, was invited to South America in 1959 to lecture to scientific colleagues. He strayed into the shanty town in Santiago, Chile. 'Never before had I witnessed such degradation, poverty and squalor. But the transcendent impression was of people everywhere, the majority of them young, most of them malnourished and frankly starving . . . I never forgot Santiago.' He threw himself wholeheartedly into the population control movement.

No one, surely, doubts the portentous significance of the population explosion. The daily increment of mouths to be fed is the equivalent of 20 divisions of Martians invading this planet without their field-rations. Far and away the highest rate of increase is in the developing world—in Asia, Africa and Latin America. By the year 2000, nine out of every ten children will be born in the Third World. And that is already the Hungry World. As Robert S. MacNamara, President of the World Bank has said, "the greatest single obstacle to economic and social advancement of the majority of the people of the under-developed world is rampant population growth."

The population problem is a syndrome of great complexity. There is not a vast orgy of procreation going on. Couples are not having more children than before. More mothers are surviving the hazards of childbirth to have more children. More children are surviving to mate and have more children. For instance the average expectation of life of a girl born in India thirty years ago was 27 years. Today it is 48. She will live through her whole reproductive lifespan. This is the result of human ingenuity. We developed chemotherapeutics, antibiotics and insecticides. On a world-scale we controlled the pestilential diseases, the infectious diseases and the vector-borne diseases. We sawed the peaks off the mortality and morbidity curves in the high death-rate countries. It was clear thirty years ago what would happen. Boyd Orr, Director-General of the food and Agriculture Organisation was stressing the foreseeable increase in population and demanding (and being denied) the means to feed the extra mouths. Brock Chisholm, Director-General of WHO, while pressing on with his life-saving campaigns, was demanding (and being denied) the right of WHO to get into population control. Julian Huxley, as Director-General of Unesco, had Jacob Bronowski ("Ascent of Man") master-minding a series of

books and pamphlets on food and population. When I wrote, in 1950, the preface to the first World Social Survey, the UN allowed me to deal with demography but barred any references to population control. Dr. Loraine, like so many others who went to the Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974, was discouraged by the attitude of the Third World nations to the population question. What I found sardonic was to find the advanced countries, which had dominated the UN and its agencies thirty years ago, bitterly reproaching the less developed countries for using the same arguments which they themselves had once used and for not providing population policies and facilities which they themselves had prevented the UN and its agencies from promoting.

Dr Loraine deals with the population syndrome very thoroughly. Some headway has been made but there has been a serious set-back in India where the stupid attempt to enforce compulsory sterilisation has brought birth-control into disrepute and fouled up years of decent endeavour.

With case-book thoroughness and verbal agility, Dr. Loraine deals with the other syndromes—world hunger, energy, the menace of radioactivity, women's rights, a sustainable society, and, a fascinating excursion into his own special field to consider the endocrinology of homosexuality.

Millions of words have been written and spoken on his chosen subjects but, if someone were to ask, 'Where can I get a comprehensive and comprehensible run-down?' I could strongly recommend 'Syndromes of the Seventies'.

Lord RITCHIE-CALDER

WILBERFORCE: A NEW LIFE

Wilberforce. John Pollock. Constable. £8.00.

There have been several biographies of Wilberforce but none appear to have made adequate use of the manuscript sources. As a result of Mr. Pollock's research through many essential manuscripts, Wilberforce turns out to be not the weak dull character imagined by Dr. Eric Williams, nor the politically repressive one denounced by Cobbett, but a most exciting, lovable, and delightful personality.

Wilberforce was a Yorkshireman, son of a wealthy Hull merchant engaged in the Baltic trade. At the age of 17 he went up to Cambridge and entered St. John's College. During his sojourn at Cambridge he was much in London, frequently watching debates from the gallery of the House of Commons, often with William Pitt with whom a close friendship developed. Both were determined on a political career, and in 1780 Wilberforce was returned for the borough of Hull. Not content with representing one of the largest boroughs in Great Britain, he became member for Yorkshire in 1784, a seat he held for 28 years till the burden became so arduous—especially as he was in indifferent health for much of the time—that he relinquished it for the small pocket borough of Bramber in Sussex which he represented till his retirement in 1825. As may well be expected he knew almost everybody who was anybody and the book abounds in his relationship with many familiar people, both great and small.

In his twenties Wilberforce was quite a man about town. He was welcome to the luxurious clubs because he was rich, amusing, and could sing; he went to the Opera, the play, and the pleasure gardens of Vauxhall; he visited Boodle's primarily for drinking and chat, and Brooks for gambling; indeed he relished London's small close-knit world of politics and fashion. He owned a racehorse and spent his twenty-fifth birthday at York races. Soon after this, however, he

took a holiday through France and Italy in the company of an old acquaintance, one Isaac Milner, and in consequence of earnest discussions with him he was converted to Evangelicanism. He tried to forget it but by October 1785 spiritual anguish engulfed him; 'the crisis hung on the dilemma that if he became a Christian he must be fully at God's disposal; and then he might lose his popularity and friends, perhaps must abandon political ambition'. He had to make a choice between Christ and the world, and he wanted both. The dilemma was driving him crazy and realising he was in need of a spiritual counsellor he turned to John Newton, ex-sailor, ex-slave trader, and at sixty years old the Rector of St. Mary Woolnoth in the City. Newton calmed Wilberforce, urging him not to cut himself from his present circles or to retire from public life. In a letter some time after, Newton wrote: 'It is hoped and believed that the Lord has raised you up for the good of the Church and for the good of the nation'. Wilberforce took Newton's advice, so to the latter belongs some credit for keeping him in politics. There is no doubt that Wilberforce's Christian approach to life profoundly affected all his ideas and activities in the political sphere, and it is important to understand his Christianity in the context of his times.

The fight against the slave trade and slavery is *par excellence* the dominant theme but Wilberforce merits attention on many other grounds such, for example, as his efforts to improve the economic condition of the poor which are little understood, and his ideas of penal reform and parliamentary reform which till now have not been properly explored. Wilberforce in his old age stated that the inspiration for championing the cause of the enslaved African negro came from William Pitt who suggested that he give notice of a motion in the Commons on the subject of the Slave Trade. And so the campaign began but victory was not achieved till 1807; the climax was reached in the House of Commons when the Solicitor-General, Romilly, aroused the members to a pitch of excitement by his peroration. The House almost to a man then turned towards Wilberforce in a burst of cheers while he sat, head bowed, tears streaming down his face. It was just before his death that slavery in the Empire was abolished.

Mr. Pollock has written a fine, most sympathetic, and entertaining book about a great Englishman, often maligned in his own age and still misunderstood in the present; the value of the book is enhanced by references and notes, manuscript sources, a select bibliography, and a number of finely reproduced illustrations—it could well become a starting point for historical debate.

S. F. WOOLLEY

THE MISUNDERSTOOD STATESMAN

Sir Samuel Hoare—A political biography. Prof. J. A. Cross. Cape £10.00.

Over the last six years I have reviewed in these columns biographies of many leading statesmen, including the recent volume by David Marquand of Ramsay Macdonald. Sam Hoare's autobiography *Nine Troubled Years* and *Ambassador on Special Mission* appeared earlier; Professor Cross has drawn on both books, on Cabinet, Departmental Papers and many other unpublished sources. The result is a most readable book, fair and factual, and for the first time recording the undoubted achievements of this much misunderstood man.

Most people seem unaware that Hoare was Air Minister for over five years and together with Lord Trenchard helped to create the British Air Services; many underestimate the massive task he performed in conducting the India Act on to the Statute book, against the unscrupulous attacks by Churchill;

they forget his all too short stewardship of the Admiralty; his enlightened Criminal Justice Bill and his creation of the W.V.S. and appointment of Lady Reading; also they little know his 'superbly competent' (Lord Eccles's words) conduct as Ambassador to Madrid during the last war.

The best proof of these and other successes comes direct from those who served under him, starting with Lord Butler who writes a Foreword to this book. But other tributes come from Lord Lothian who preceded Butler as his Under-Secretary for India. Professor Cross writes: 'More political reputations have been tarnished rather than enhanced among occupants of the Home Office. Hoare's two-year term ranks among the most successful'. Lord Brabazon, no particular friend of the National Government wrote to Sam himself, then Lord Templewood: 'You were the kindest and most considerate boss I ever had in my life and never shall I forget it.' After tributes from such outstanding people (and I could have included Lords Hailey, Hankey and Beaverbrook, three utterly different characters), I am shy to include myself, because he was for a time my chief at the Admiralty, June 1936-May 1937, when I was Civil Defence Lord, but let Lord Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, speak: 'in a month he knew more about our Admiralty and Fleet problems than a First Lord usually learns in six.'

These quotations, often from personal memoirs, are inserted with scrupulous care by Prof. Cross either in the text or in the forty pages of notes at the end of the book. They tell their own story. Sam Hoare was not only a brilliant scholar at Harrow and Oxford; he was not only industrious and precise to a fault; he was also creative and imaginative and above everything a loyal friend, especially to subordinates.

Why then the Hoare-Laval Pact? Perhaps it is no excuse to say that Baldwin should never have appointed Hoare to be Foreign Secretary immediately after the gruelling three years at the India Office, but Lord Butler is quite adamant on this point. The man needed a proper holiday and his doctor warned him. Although he was a first-class shot, a proficient ice-skater and keen tennis player (as I know from practical experience,) his physique was not strong and in his early career he had a severe attack of typhoid fever.

The Abysinnian crisis was not only linked with the failure of the Stresa conference and our relations with an unreliable French Government, it coincided with a General Election. Vansittart and others were equally involved with Hoare-Laval agreement, but Vansittart remained in office until 1938 and became known as the arch opponent of appeasement. The Liberal side of Sam Hoare was persuaded to make an excellent speech at Geneva on collective security; the more realist side agreed to a compromise which had the support of the Chief of Staffs Committee. In any case 'public opinion' never forgave him. Public opinion on foreign policy in the mid-thirties was as anti-war as it was muddled.

Sir Samuel Hoare was soon back in Office and a member of Chamberlain's inner Cabinet, ending as Lord Privy Seal and finally back for a short spell at the Air Ministry, where not for the first time in his career he had to defend other people's mistakes, in this case Churchill's Norwegian adventure. He will always be associated with Chamberlain's policy. This is generally accurate, but the Cabinet Records reveal that he consistently stood out against his colleagues undervaluation of a Soviet alliance, because he believed that 'Russia constituted the greatest deterrence in the East against German aggression' for 'all experience showed that Russia was undefeatable' (Hoare's words). In spite of support from Chatfield, Oliver Stanley and Walter Elliot, it was too late. Hoare

wanted to end as Viceroy of India, but not under the unforgiving (in this case) Churchill. He was sent to Madrid. This did not prevent Churchill writing in Dec. 1944: 'Your mission to Spain has been a far longer one than either of us supposed. I know that it has often been a trying position, but the skill with which you performed it is measured by our success in preventing Franco and the Falange from bringing effective assistance to the enemy during our period of weakness and neither I nor any of my colleagues underestimate your great personal contribution to the maintenance of our interests in Spain.'

His posts of honour at the end are a fitting final tribute—Presidency of the Howard League and the Air League of the British Empire, Chancellorship of the University of Reading, President of the Lawn Tennis Association, Chairman of the Political Honours Scrutiny Committee at the invitation of Attlee. He held the Chelsea seat in parliament for thirty years, but he was more a partisan for causes, than a narrow party man.

KENNETH LINDSAY

AN INDESPENSABLE GUIDE TO MOZART'S OPERAS

The Operas of Mozart. William Mann. Cassell. £15.00.

If a work of musicology is at the same time readable it risks raising a certain amount of suspicion in the specialist mind. There seems somehow to be an inherent belief amongst music scholars that a work of analysis should not be written in everyday language, and still less should actually be a pleasure to read. Thus William Mann, who is music critic of *The Times,* has come in for a substantial amount of opprobrium for the style of his work on the operas of Mozart. It is felt, it seems, that his idiomatic, conversational style is insufficiently dignified, or serious, for the subject matter. After all, Mozart was one of the great musical geniuses, and his greatest operas, *Idomeneo, Le Nozze di Figaro, Don Giovanni, Cosi Fan Tutte,* and *Die Zauberflöte* are among the supreme works in the entire operatic canon. Thus, the argument appears to run, they are too great to be dealt with in an easy, still less chatty, manner such as the author adopts, and the operas can only be belittled by his approach. 'When Leporello gets to detail two horns revel in *forte* cuckoldry, flutes and bassoons almost wolf-whistle with astonished delight. There are reverent pauses when the total for Spain is reached, cheerfully counteracted by strings and wind as he repeats the amazing national yield." This description of Leporello's 'Catalogue' aria from *Don Giovanni* will doubtless serve to exemplify some of the objections that have been expressed to this book. For others, myself amongst them, it epitomises the quality of the author's work, and demonstrates the intelligence of his analysis.

For what the author has succeeded in doing is to produce a guide to the entire operatic output of Mozart which, because it is based upon actual experience of performances, is able to make music and drama come alive in a way that Professor Dent was never able to do, and in a way that the usual contemporary dry musical analysis, however accurate and careful it may be, tends wholly to fail to do. That is not to say that Mr. Mann eschews musicological commentary: he most certainly does not, and has indeed supplied over 500 carefully chosen musical examples to illustrate the points he seeks to make. He takes the operas chronologically in 22 chapters, beginning with *Die Schuldigkeit des ersten Gebotes*—a sacred music-drama in oratorio style written by the 11-year-old Mozart for performance in Salzburg during Lent of 1767, to *Die Zauberflöte,* composed for Emmanuel Schikaneder's company and first

given by them at the Theatre auf der Wieden, with Mozart conducting from the keyboard, on 30th September 1791, less than two months before the composer's death. At various points there are interpolated short sub-chapters on such topics as Mozart's choice of keys, Mozart and the *opera seria,* and Italian Comic Opera, which offer useful comment and observation.

In the ten years the author has spent in writing the book there has been an enormous increase in the number of performances of early Mozart operas so that works such as *La Finta Semplice, Lucio Silla, La Finta Giardiniera* and *Il Re Pastore* can now be discussed in the light of stage performance and gramophone recordings, and judged correspondingly the more acutely for the actual experience of having heard them. But for all the interest and stimulation, as well as revelation of facts hitherto unknown, provided by the chapters on the earlier works, it is with his masterly analysis of *Idomeneo* that the author comes truly into his own. These last ten chapters make compelling reading, those on *Don Giovanni, Cosi Fan Tutte* and *Die Zauberflöte* are superb. I read the analysis of *Don Giovanni* immediately before seeing Peter Hall's new production of the opera this season at Glyndebourne. What a remarkable difference it made to what one noticed afresh, both musically and dramatically, as the work unfolded.

On the whole the author has avoided value judgments—though one is left with the impression that for him *Così Fan Tutte* will always remain supreme, and certainly his chapter on that opera is both masterly and moving. Nor does he really attempt to speculate, far less try to explain, *why* Mozart wrote something the way he did. He merely points out *what* Mozart wrote, often comments upon that, and then leaves the reader to his own conclusions. This may disappoint some who look for answers, but for sheer power of expression and intelligence of analysis this description of the overture to *Don Giovanni* shows just how invaluable a work of contemporary musical analysis this book is.

> 'Imagine yourself a citizen of Prague in October 1787. The Don Juan story is well known, often performed as a horror-comic puppet show, sometimes as an operatic comedy. You have read the playbill where Mozart's opera is described as a *dramma giocoso,* a cheerful play. . . . The young maestro enters, you raise three cheers for him, and he brings in the orchestera. Whoosh! It would be a surprise like a thunderclap two feet away . . . the loudest and most demanding music imaginable. And you would know almost at once that Mozart was putting you in a suitable frame of mind for a play which ends, as you know, with the ghostly statue who comes to supper and drags his naughty host down to red-hot hell through a trapdoor. The trapdoor is a familiar stage-property; the music suddenly brings the situation to life, before it has been shown to you on stage. What a *coup de théâtre* before the curtain has risen!'

DAVID FINGLETON

A FRESH LOOK AT THE CRIPPEN CASE

Crippen: The Mild Murderer. Tom Cullen. The Bodley Head. £4.95.

The murder and dismemberment by Dr. Crippen of his wife, Belle Elmore, is one of the classic murder cases of the twentieth century. The story of the discovery of the filleted remains in the cellar of the house in Hilldrop Crescent, North London, of the flight of the doctor and his paramour, Ethel Le Neve, disguised as a boy, to Canada, and of their arrest on the high seas after a wireless message had revealed their presence aboard the S.S. *Montrose,* has remained curiously alive for sixty-seven years. A full report of the subsequent Old Bailey trial constitutes one of the volumes in the Notable British Trials series. More or less sensational accounts of the case appear in innumerable

popular anthologies of crime, and the episode is perennially rehearsed in magazine and newspaper articles. But, strangely, with the exception of a book by M. Constantine Quinn, published in 1935 and long out of print, there has been no complete study of the Crippen affair.

Mr. Cullen's book is, therefore, of great interest. Having traced the lives and interweaving relationships of the ill-destined members of the infernal triangle, Mr. Cullen propounds a novel motive for the murder.

Observing the undisputed fact that both Crippen and his wife had been indulging in mutually condoned extra-marital activities, and that Mrs. Crippen had known of, and tolerated, the Le Neve connection over a period of three years, he inclines to the view that the affair itself was not the trigger of the murder. He suggests that Crippen killed his wife in order to put an end to her recently mounted 'campaign of calumny' and continual public besmirching of his much-loved Ethel. The doctor could bear—and had borne—any amount of ridicule at his shrewish and unfaithful wife's hands, but when her attacks were directed against Ethel, a hatred which had lain dormant for years was disastrously activated. Mr. Cullen is also of opinion that Crippen's defence was mismanaged. Albeit the doctor was a most difficult client, adamantly proscribing the introduction of anything which, however beneficial to himself, was not consonant with the notion of Ethel Le Neve's entire innocence of involvement; but vital evidence which might have told in his favour was not put, rebuttal witnesses were not called, damaging statements by crown witnesses were not challenged as they should have been. Mr. Cullen does not go so far as Marshall Hall, who firmly believed that Crippen was innocent. It was Hall's view that the doctor administered hyoscine to his wife as a sexual depressant, and that although he caused her death by an overdose, the *mens rea* necessary to uphold a charge of murder was lacking.

The Crippen presented by Mr. Cullen is a figure of pathos. Ethel Le Neve, on the other hand, emerges as a character notably less innocent, less naïve, than she has hitherto been considered. She is described as a compulsive liar, and it is hinted that she may well have known rather more of the fate of Mrs. Crippen than she pretended. Mr. Cullen also reveals the fact that Ethel had been pregnant by Crippen, who was deeply distressed when she lost the baby. Reading the letters, reprinted here, which Crippen wrote to Ethel from the death cell at Pentonville, it is easy to lose sight of the callousness of his behaviour to his wife, and to see a sort of Paolo and Francesca situation which lends a spurious gloss of romance to a relationship which must, however, be seen against its true background of a rag, no bone and a hank of hair buried beneath the floor of a North London cellar.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Transfer of Power 1942-7. Volume VII. The Cabinet Mission. (H.M. Stationery Office. £35.00). This important volume in the series of official documents covering the transfer of power in India, edited by Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, is concerned with the three months, 23rd March to 29th June 1946, when the Cabinet Mission, consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander strove to initiate the process of bringing orderly independence to India. These documents cover a wide field in the negotiations between the Mis-

sion and Indian leaders and communications with the Cabinet in England. 'In sum', conclude the Editors, 'these papers collectively provide unusually full documentation of a developing historical situation and one, moreover, that was manifestly of great complexity. The one inevitable gap is that on the Indian side only the outcome, and not the course of debate within the leadership of the respective parties, is documented here'. The struggle between the Indian League and Congress was at the heart of the gravest problems. The Cabinet and the Mission were strongly against partition, regarding it as dangerous. Nonetheless the Mission put up two schemes, A and B. The former was for an All-India Union with extensive devolution. Scheme B provided for an independent Pakistan, with minimal sovereignty. Mr. Jinnah rejected this as being inadequate, and of course Congress was opposed to it. In the result, the Mission produced, after the failure of the Second Simla Conference, their own constitutional proposals for a united federal India linked to an independent constituent legislative assembly. There was considerable support for their Statement of the 16th May, but the proposals a month later for an immediate interim coalition government failed. On the 29th June the Mission ended. This volume contains more than 640 documents and the great bulk of the hitherto unpublished documents reproduced here are drawn from the India Office archives and the Wavell Papers.

Change and Decay (Studio Vista. Hardback, £8.25: paperback £3.95). This study which is edited by Marcus Binney and Peter Burman on the future of both Anglican and Free Church buildings in Britain is at once illuminating and depressing. It makes abundantly clear to the public as a whole the closing, decay and loss of many of our medieval and important churches and chapels. It is noted, for example, that in England by November 1976 592 churches had been made redundant. Of these 153 had been already threatened by demolition or had been destroyed, including twenty-three of special architectural or historic interest. By 1980 the redundancy figure is likely to rise to 1,000 churches. In 1974 and 1975, 676 non-Anglican places of worship in England and Wales were closed. Decay, of course, also reaches monuments and church woodwork, furniture and effects, often of great artistic merit. This volume describes the situation with numerous examples and illustrations. On the more optimistic side, it refers to lay adaptation of redundant churches and the restoration of churches and chapels by determined voluntary efforts. Mr. Binney makes the remarkable conclusion: 'Again and again the principal obstacle has not been the raising of money but the determination of the ecclesiastical authorities to close or demolish a church, regardless of the wishes of the parishioners'. This volume deserves the widest publicity, along with the exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum on the same theme.

A Time of Cherries (Cassell. £5.75). 'Sailing with the Breton Tunnymen' is the subtitle of this delightful book by Ronald Millar, now living in Brittany. This is really the story of tunny fishermen based on the village of Santez Edwette on the southern coast of Brittany. Mr. Millar came to be accepted to a remarkable degree by this close and tough independent community. He sailed with them to the north of Scotland and more particularly also joined the crew of a tunny ship which sailed south into the Atlantic. He gives a vivid account of his experiences, writing graphically with sympathy and appreciation. The book is full of atmosphere and the smell of the sea and fishing ships.

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THE QUEEN'S YEARS: THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

by Gordon Connell-Smith

IT is a truism that we live in an age of rapid, even unprecedented change. Certainly the twenty-five years since Queen Elizabeth II came to the throne have seen dramatic developments in international affairs. The Queen, who herself has had no less than seven prime ministers so far during her reign, has seen many leading actors pass from the international stage: among them Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, Charles de Gaulle, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mao Tse-tung. Of that generation only Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia is prominent among the survivors. New leaders have come and gone: the names of John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev and Gamal Abdul Nasser at once spring to mind. Fidel Castro has come and stayed. President Jimmy Carter and Mao's successor, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, have still to make their mark.

When the Queen succeeded to the throne in February 1952 the world was still in the immediate post-war period. Truman, Churchill and Stalin were still in power, though Churchill had been out of office for six of the post-war years. It was the era of the Cold War which, in fact, was then at its height, with Europe its main 'theatre'. The Western powers interpreted the Soviet domination of eastern Europe as part of a policy aimed at world revolution, while the Russians in their turn viewed the United States presence in western Europe as a threat to their security. Thus an 'iron curtain' had descended across Europe, most significantly dividing Germany and her former capital, Berlin, between the two protagonists. Western policy was to 'contain' the Soviet Union: to ensure that western Europe did not become communist as the east had done. The year 1952 threatened to bring an intensification of the Cold War. In the United States, opponents of the Truman (Democratic) administration denounced 'containment' as 'appeasement'. In the 1952 presidential election campaign the Republicans promised to 'liberate' eastern Europe; and their candidate, General Dwight Eisenhower, emerged the winner. His Secretary of State was to be John Foster Dulles, an ardent crusader against 'international communism' and firm advocate of liberating Russia's 'satellites'.

In 1952 there were hostilities in Korea. These had begun in June 1950,

and the United States, under the flag of the United Nations, was supporting South Korea, while North Korea was actively aided by the People's Republic of China. The establishment of the latter under Chairman Mao Tse-tung in October 1949 had been a severe blow to the United States, who had backed Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese (Nationalist) war-time leader, against the communists. The emergence of Communist China was seen as a considerable victory for international communism, which the United States regarded—erroneously as time was to show—as a monolithic entity. In 1952 there were also hostilities in Indo-China, where the French were fighting to re-impose their rule after the Japanese occupation of the territory during the war had greatly stimulated nationalism among the peoples there. The United States, at first hostile to European colonialism in South and South East Asia, had begun to give the French assistance after the communist victory in China. A state of war also existed between Israel and her Arab neighbours. The United States was firmly committed to support Israel; Britain and France still had significant influence in the Middle East.

Little over a year after the Queen's accession, however, there began a new phase in the Cold War. Within a few weeks of President Eisenhower's taking office, Stalin died (March 1953), and his death seemed to open up real prospects of 'co-existence' between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Such prospects were strengthened by what came to be called the mutual deterrent or balance of terror. In November 1952 the United States had exploded her first hydrogen bomb; the Soviet Union exploded hers in the following August. As it gradually became clear that military victory for neither side was possible—at least in the short term—search for an accommodation became a serious policy on both sides. The new Republican administration found that the liberation of eastern Europe was not feasible. This was demonstrated when the Russians put down serious disorders in East Germany in June 1953 and was confirmed when they crushed the Hungarian uprising in 1956.

Another major milestone in the Cold War was the Cuban missile crisis. The background to this crisis was remarkable. Situated a mere ninety miles from the United States, Cuba has been very closely tied to her powerful neighbour both economically and politically; and the United States maintains a huge naval base on Cuban territory (Guantánamo Bay). Fidel Castro's successful revolution in the late nineteen-fifties posed a very serious threat to United States interests. But could Castro survive in the face of inevitable United States hostility? He turned to Russia for economic and military aid. His alignment with the Soviet Union represented the most serious challenge ever offered to the Monroe Doctrine. President Monroe had declared in 1823 that the extension of an extra-continental political system into the western hemisphere would constitute a threat to the peace and security of the United States. And Castro's challenge came at a time when the United States had never been more powerful; indeed, the Monroe Doctrine had effectively been extended to other parts of the world.

Clearly, the United States would not tolerate the installation of nuclear

missiles in Cuba, and when, in October 1962, it was confirmed that the Soviet Union was in fact in the process of installing them, the world found itself faced with the most serious crisis since the end of the Second World War. The United States was in a far stronger position than the Soviet Union, however, since she could deploy her enormous local superiority in 'conventional' weapons to deal with the situation while the Russians would have to resort to nuclear war in order to prevent her doing so. Under these circumstances the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, gave way, agreeing to withdraw the missiles—apparently on the understanding that the United States promised not to invade Cuba. In global terms it was undoubtedly a victory for the United States president, John F. Kennedy; but the United States accepted the continuance of Cuba's membership of the Soviet system. It is of considerable significance that, in dealing with the missile crisis, President Kennedy demonstrated an awareness of the advisability of not pressing his victory to the point of humiliating his opponent. An important consequence of the crisis was to strengthen the search for détente between the two superpowers.

Another, much more prolonged crisis further underlined the need to re-think Cold War assumptions: United States involvement in Indo-China. This began substantially to increase after 1954, when the French were forced to accept the defeat of their efforts to regain control of the area. Under the Geneva agreements of that year, Vietnam, the most important part of the former French territory, was divided at the 17th parallel, north of that line being under a communist government. The United States was determined to ensure that South Vietnam did not fall to the communists. Her leaders declared that, if this happened, the remaining countries of South East Asia would 'fall like dominoes'. Gradually the United States commitment escalated. The supply of American equipment meant sending American experts to train South Vietnamese in its use; American military advisers were followed by growing numbers of combat troops. In the end, the latter numbered some seven hundred thousand. But victory remained elusive. It proved impossible either to bomb the North into submission or to prop up indefinitely a corrupt regime in the South. It was evident that the United States was fighting against nationalism rather than communism as she claimed. Meanwhile, opposition to the war grew in the United States as prospects of victory receded. In 1973 the United States agreed to withdraw her forces from Indo-China. Her withdrawal, signifying a moral defeat as well as political and military failure, revealed the limitations of even a super-power in the changing international situation.

Another major development on the international scene was the growing estrangement of China from the Soviet Union, which came into the open in the early nineteen-sixties, but had its origins much earlier. Czarist Russia had been an imperialist power encroaching upon Chinese territory in the nineteenth century. There were thus long-standing frontier disputes between the two countries. Between the two world wars Stalin had hindered rather than helped the Chinese communists in their struggle against Chiang Kai-shek, and in 1945 he secured gains at China's expense. Nevertheless, after

Mao Tse-tung's victory, Russia gave substantial economic aid to China and eventually relinquished the gains of 1945. For his part, Mao accepted Stalin's leadership of the communist world. After Stalin's death, however, Mao was not disposed to defer in the same way to Khrushchev, and opposed the latter's policy of peaceful co-existence with the West on both ideological grounds and those of national self-interest. Mao felt that a rapprochement between Russia and the United States would be at China's expense. It was, of course, true that the emergence of China as a potential super-power was regarded with misgivings by both the existing super-powers and that these misgivings encouraged their search for détente. Above all they viewed with apprehension China's becoming a nuclear power (which she eventually became). Yet, as relations between Moscow and Peking continued to deteriorate, the United States, whose power prevented China from fulfilling her most important objective of securing Formosa, sought to normalise relations with her. Eventually President Richard Nixon visited Peking in 1972, after the United States had acquiesced in China's admission to the United Nations (which she had long been responsible for preventing). Relations between the three leading actors on the international scene were a great deal more complicated in 1977 than they had been when Elizabeth II came to the throne in 1952.

Meanwhile, the bi-polar nature of international affairs had also been importantly modified by the emergence of the 'Third World'. In the immediate post-war years the world appeared to be dividing into two armed camps around the super-powers. But neutralism, or non-alignment grew, especially among the newly independent nations of Asia led by Mr. Nehru's India. In April 1955 there took place at Bandung in Indonesia a major conference of non-aligned states. As the process of decolonisation led to the creation of more new states—mainly African—so did the ranks of the non-aligned increase, until eventually they became the largest group in the United Nations. In the early post-war years the 'Free World', headed by the United States, had a substantial majority in the world body: hence United Nations involvement in Korea. But support for United States policies now began to diminish. The United Nations became increasingly concerned with colonial questions; and the apartheid policy of the South African government incurred particular condemnation.

The countries of the Third World regarded the Cold War as irrelevant—and even inimical—to their interests. For them the division of the world between rich and poor countries, developed and developing (a euphemism for under-developed), was—and is—the reality; and not one between 'free' and 'communist'. Their ideology was nationalism, and their immediate goal political independence for all colonial territories. With this substantially achieved by the early nineteen-sixties, the Third World countries turned more and more to problems of economic development. The world was experiencing the 'revolution of rising expectations', and the newly independent nations felt deep frustration when political freedom did not at once bring economic independence. For most of them continued to have 'colonial economies': that is to say, they were largely dependent upon the export of

raw materials to pay for imported manufactured goods and capital equipment. As a rule, the terms of world trade favoured the developed, industrialised powers. The latter were generally unwilling to concede to the developing countries better terms of trade and preferred to give 'aid'. This only too often was given with 'strings' attached, securing advantages for the donors and increasing the economic dependence of the recipients. Moreover, the granting or withholding of economic aid became an instrument of great power policy. For countries of the Third World this was 'neo-colonialism'. At the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held at Geneva in 1964, there was confrontation between the two groups. It was significant that the countries of Latin America joined with those of Africa and Asia in their demands upon the wealthier nations.

Although most of them became politically independent in the early part of the nineteenth century, the countries of Latin America still have largely colonial economies. In the twentieth century they have been dominated both politically and economically by the United States, with whom they are associated in the 'inter-American system'. In 1947 they signed a collective security pact with their powerful neighbour (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), and in the following year the inter-American system was formalised in the Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS). But Latin American nationalism has been growing ominously during the last twenty-five years. The Cuban revolution, in spite of the consequent alignment of the island with the Soviet Union, was essentially nationalist in character. As the Third World emerged so did Latin Americans come increasingly to identify themselves with it. In recent years they have tried to establish their own economic system in order to strengthen themselves vis-à-vis the United States and other industrialised countries. Individual Latin American countries have joined commodity associations for the purpose of obtaining higher prices for their primary products. The most important of these associations has been the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Venezuela and Ecuador are members. But the efforts of the Latin American countries to co-operate more closely to lessen their dependence upon the United States have had only limited success. Latin American frustration has been growing alongside nationalism.

More spectacular success has been achieved in the last twenty-five years by African nationalism, though it too has experienced a great deal of frustration. When the Queen came to the throne (interestingly she was in Kenya at the time), Black Africa contained only three independent states: Ethiopia, Liberia and—most important and under white rule—the Union of South Africa. Even after the process of decolonisation had brought independence to most of South and South East Asia the imperial powers continued to believe that independence for Black Africa was a remote prospect. In the event it came with astonishing rapidity. Britain led the way when her Gold Coast colony became the state of Ghana in 1957; French Guinea was given independence in the following year. Nigeria became independent in 1960: a year which brought independence to many more French

dependencies in the African continent. In that same year Belgium, having given the people of the Congo almost no training in self-government, capitulated when faced with a suddenly powerful demand for independence. In the inevitable chaos which followed, the United Nations was involved in helping to bring about stability and maintain the unity of the territory. For some years after this, Portugal, the earliest European imperial power in Africa, who declared her African dependencies to be 'overseas territories' and not colonies, refused to bow before the winds of change. But from the early nineteen-sixties she faced liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. Following a revolution at home in 1974, Portugal gave way.

The independence of Portugal's African territories weakened the position of the whites in southern Africa, especially those in Rhodesia (the 'self-governing' British colony of Southern Rhodesia) who unilaterally declared their independence in 1965. The newly independent African states, who in 1963 formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), are determined to bring an end to white minority rule in southern Africa. But they lack the power to do so. Moreover, they have their internal troubles and there is dissension among them. Nevertheless, the position of the whites in Rhodesia has become increasingly precarious as they face more serious guerrilla attacks assisted from outside their borders. The whites in South Africa are far more advantageously placed, being much more numerous and having a strong economy in which outside powers, including Britain and the United States, have an important interest. The South African whites are determined to resist the principle of one man one vote and implement the policy of apartheid, or 'separate development', as a means of maintaining their supremacy. In the nineteen-seventies, stimulated by events outside the country, unrest has grown significantly among the non-whites. With what appears to be the inevitable end of white rule in Rhodesia in the not distant future, pressure will mount upon South Africa. But the whites there have the physical means and the will to maintain themselves in power for a very long time to come.

There has been a risk that super-power rivalries will make the situation in Africa more dangerous. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been anxious to increase their influence in the continent. China has also been active in Africa, and the Cubans were prominent in the civil war in Angola which followed that country's independence.

Another, and hitherto even more critical, region has been the Middle East. Traditionally, the Middle East has been important because of its position as the bridge between three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa); and more recently because of its oil. Throughout the last twenty-five years it has been kept in a condition of tension by the state of war existing between the Arab countries and Israel, which has lasted from the creation of the latter in 1948. Hostilities have broken out between the two sides on four occasions: in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. As a result of these wars, Israel has considerably enlarged her territory at the expense of her Arab

neighbours. Initially the Arab countries refused to accept the very existence of Israel. In more recent years they have concentrated their demands on the return of the territories occupied by her.

Particularly acute is the problem of the large number of Palestinian refugees, who demand the return of the territory to the west of the River Jordan as their homeland, and who are a considerable embarrassment—and even a source of danger—to their unwilling 'hosts'. This problem has widened in its repercussions as Palestinian guerrillas have resorted to hijacking aircraft, kidnappings and assassinations in efforts to force the Israelis to give up the occupied lands. But Israel is determined to hold on to some Arab territories and will return the rest only upon certain conditions which she deems to be necessary for her security. The United States has been committed to Israel from the outset, but has shown a growing concern to improve her relations with the Arabs: a concern much stimulated by the energy crisis of 1973 and the importance of Middle East oil supplies. The Soviet Union has endeavoured to win over the Arabs, but has not been able to exert influence comparable with that of the United States in the region. This has disappointed Arab leaders, who now place their main hopes on persuading the United States to bring pressure to bear upon Israel. But such a course of action is very difficult indeed for any American administration because of the extent of Jewish political influence in the United States.

Another difficult international problem in the Middle East region has been that of Cyprus: an issue involving Greece and Turkey as well as the Cypriots themselves (approximately four-fifths of whom are of Greek, the rest mainly of Turkish extraction). Cyprus became independent of British rule in 1960, but there has been the ever-present possibility of the island's being united with Greece ('enosis')—something Turkey has strongly opposed. In 1974, following an attempted pro-Greek coup there, Turkey invaded Cyprus and she still occupies the northern part of the island.

Nationalism, then, has been the strongest ideological force in international affairs during the last twenty-five years: it has been far stronger than internationalism. Yet these years have seen significant developments in international organisation. The United Nations, if far from an unqualified success, has already survived for a longer period than did its predecessor, the League of Nations. During this period, membership has very nearly trebled and has become almost universal. United Nations successes have been modest, but the world body continues to provide a valuable form of multilateral diplomacy. In spite of the limitations set upon international organisation by jealous regard for national sovereignty, there has been growing acceptance of the interdependence of nations. Particularly important developments have taken place in the field of economic co-operation, including a degree of economic integration. Of these the most successful has been the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Its foundations were laid when six European countries (Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic,

Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. This embodied the concept of 'supra-nationalism, for the coal and steel production of its members were to be under supra-national control. The EEC could develop into a form of European government. In 1973 it was enlarged with the admission of Denmark, Eire—and Britain.

The Queen's years have been a period during which Britain has had to make great adjustments in her international relations, especially those with Europe. In 1952 Britain was still endeavouring to play the role of a great power or 'mini-super-power'. Her foreign policy was conducted in 'three circles', embracing the Commonwealth, a special relationship with the United States and growing links with Europe. In particular, Britain was reluctant to commit herself to the developing European community because this would be detrimental to her other two connections. However, the Suez crisis of 1956 revealed the weakness of Britain's role as an independent military power as well as the limits of the special relationship with the United States. It also raised important questions in respect of the Commonwealth, which was becoming more and more centrifugal and diverse in character. In the early nineteen-sixties this trend was accentuated by a considerable increase in membership following the independence of Britain's African colonies. Such developments forced Britain to reconsider her position vis-à-vis the European community. Gradually her leaders began to see, perhaps not so much the desirability, as the virtual inevitability of Britain's joining the Common Market. At first rebuffed mainly as a result of French suspicions, she adhered to the Treaty of Rome from 1 January, 1973. But that was not the end of the matter. Opposition to membership of the EEC in the Labour party caused Harold Wilson, returned to power in 1974, to 'renegotiate' the terms of Britain's entry. However, following an unprecedented national referendum on the issue in 1975, Britain's membership was confirmed. She remains a far from enthusiastic member. The adjustment from world power at the accession of Queen Elizabeth II to middle power at the time of her Silver Jubilee has been very difficult for Britain to make.

The Queen's years, then, have been years of great, even revolutionary changes on the international scene and, in particular, of Britain's role upon it. Predictions are always dangerous. But it is hard to believe that the next twenty-five years will witness less rapid changes and call for less far-reaching adjustments.

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GISCARD VERSUS THE GAULLISTS: (PART ONE)

Background to the Battle for Paris

by Donald N. Baker

IT is beginning to look as though the history of the Fifth Republic will be written in decennial segments. In 1958, the collapse of the Fourth and the emergence of the Fifth Republic; in 1968, the 'events' of May-June that hastened de Gaulle's departure a year later; and in March 1978 (if not earlier), legislative elections that may lead to major changes in French political institutions and economic structures.

What reasons are there to see the coming legislative elections in such a portentous light? First, there is the continuing polarisation of French political forces, a polarisation that President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a self-proclaimed Centrist, has been unable to diminish since his election in 1974. Indeed, all of the signs—public opinion polls, election returns in partial and local contests, party memberships, the direction of defections, public dialogue—suggest that the polarisation is growing, not lessening. To the extent that the pragmatic Giscard hoped to build up a Centrist constituency in order to emancipate himself in some part from the conservative weight of his Gaullist partners and to drain the appeal of the Socialist-Communist Common Front, one would have to judge his presidency a failure.

Second, the polarisation appears to be benefitting the Socialist-Communist Common Front. By May 1977, some 56 per cent of those willing to state a preference for a public opinion poll opted for the Common Front. That figure will almost certainly decline as the elections approach, but the trend is usually the significant thing in public opinion polls, and the trend has been consistently favourable to the Left. Because the Common Front is determined to bring about serious 'structural reforms', including a whittling down of the imperial presidency established by de Gaulle and an 'irreversible' change in economic institutions, a Common Front victory will almost certainly lead to a constitutional deadlock. Giscard, a middle-of-the-road liberal, would be obliged to oppose the changes proposed by the Common Front. Giscard would be unable to impose his government or policies on the National Assembly, which in turn would be unable to constitute a government or to ram its policies past the President and Senate.

Finally, the Centre-Right political alliance on which the president has rested his governments in the National Assembly is crumbling. The Gaullists, who constitute 'the majority of the majority', have begun to dissociate themselves from Giscard as the elections approach, hoping thereby to maximise their own position in the Assembly and to continue their dominance of the 'presidential majority'. In recent months they have baulked at some of Giscard's policy initiatives, have run candidates against Giscard's Independent Republicans in municipal elections, and have publicly repudiated his strategy for the coming legislative elections. The breakdown of the

'presidential majority' has reached the point that the government's ability to survive non-confidence motions in the National Assembly is in doubt. (The Gaullists hold some 184 seats, the Independent Republicans 54 plus about 20 close allies, 'independent Gaullists' 14, and the Radical and Centre Democrat parties about 20 in a 490-seat body.) So far the Gaullists have not dared to vote against the government on a confidence motion, no doubt made fearful by the trend in the public opinion polls. However, they are determined to maximise their own position in the next legislative elections and have indicated that in the future they will be far more demanding in return for any future support. Should the 'presidential majority' manage to retain control of the National Assembly, the Gaullists will try to exercise a veto over government policies.

Of course, the polarisation of French political life may well prompt a last-minute switch to the Centre by many voters frightened by visions of political 'adventures' by either Right or Left. But even if the Centre manages to hold on to the balance of power in the next National Assembly, the problems of polarisation will continue. For, as soon as the legislative elections are past, the whole of French politics will be reorientated towards the presidential election scheduled for 1981. Both the Common Front and the Gaullists are determined to show Giscard's ineffectiveness as a president without a significant parliamentary base of his own and will do everything they can, as the presidential election approaches, to make a renewed mandate unlikely. If they deemed it mutually advantageous, the Common Front and the Gaullists could even combine to stalemate the president and to force an early presidential election. There is no constitutional provision covering the possibility of a deadlock between president and parliament, but the obvious response by an embattled president would be to take the matter to the electorate. On specific issues this could be done by a referendum, but a general deadlock would require a more general response.

When the history of the Fifth Republic is written, historians may focus on the squabble in the ruling Centre-Right alliance as one cause of its demise. As on some other occasions in French history, the political elite has fallen into warring factions and is rapidly discrediting both itself and the existing political structure. Neither faction has carried the struggle to suicidal proportions as yet, but the battle between them is fierce and pervasive, and may be out of control.

The municipal elections of March 1977 brought the divisions within the governing alliance into the open in a spectacular way. Both the campaign and the results deepened those divisions and indicated the extent to which the governing alliance is in trouble with the electorate. The major confrontation between the Giscardiens and the Gaullists came in the city of Paris, and the story of the municipal election there is in some ways a microcosm of the events unfolding at the national scale.

To understand the significance of the confrontation in Paris one needs to know a little about the careers of the two chief actors, Giscard and Jacques Chirac, the head of the renewed Gaullist movement. Their careers

embody rather different strands in the fabric of French politics, albeit intertwined ones.

Both men are relatively young—Giscard was born in 1926, Chirac in 1932. Both are graduates of the prestigious Ecole Nationale d'Administration, a high-powered training school for top-level civil servants. And both rose through the old-boy network as protégés of leading politicians. However, their mentors differed as did the timing of their entry into politics. Giscard emerged under the wing of the liberal republican, Edgar Faure, who brought him into his prime ministerial office as an assistant in 1954. He first entered the National Assembly in 1956 as an 'independent republican', a posture he maintained after the formation of the Fifth Republic. As there was no viable Centre or moderate Left, Giscard joined the Gaullist parliamentary alliance but not the Gaullist party. Chirac emerged as a protégé of the conservative Georges Pompidou, who made him an assistant in his office as prime minister in 1962 and brought him into the cabinet in 1970, entrusting him soon thereafter with the powerful Ministry of the Interior. Unlike Giscard, Chirac was always a member of the Gaullist party.

For Giscard, the old-line political ideologies were intellectual and political deformations that prevented serious discussion of the real problems before the nation. Traditional political notions required a constant but empty posturing on every issue, as though each of the many parties actually had a separate and viable answer for every problem. Giscard endorsed a more pragmatic approach, which he later baptised as 'advanced liberalism', in which problems would be considered as discreet issues with technical solutions. Implicit in this approach, of course, was a profound criticism of de Gaulle's systematic anti-Communism. For this reason he never became a Gaullist, and he emerged as the major proponent of what became known as a *'oui, mais'* policy, that of qualified support. The most important occasion on which he said an outright *'non'* came on the crucial plebiscite of April, 1969, on which de Gaulle had staked his presidency. As the outcome was close, Giscard got credit for having made a contribution to de Gaulle's departure and earned a reward from the beneficiary, Georges Pompidou, who served as president until his death in mid-1974. The reward was appointment as Minister of Finance, a position Giscard had held from 1962 to January 1966 and that he was to hold again until becoming president himself.

It was during Pompidou's tenure that Giscard's own determination to build up a vital Centre became suspect. The logic of his arguments was that, as soon as the great deforming influence of de Gaulle was removed from the scene, Centrists of all kinds should mark their distance from the Gaullists' politics of polarisation and seek to expand the Centre as a distinct and separate entity. However, Giscard did not make that break. He decided to continue his alliance with the Gaullists, even though the Gaullists then had an absolute majority in the National Assembly and political tranquillity or effective government did not require the alliance. The Gaullists were not alone, by the early 1970s, in seeing Giscard as a politician whose personal ambitions sometimes overrode his political preferences. The point was some-

what obscured, though, by the 1973 legislative elections, which once again reduced the Gaullists below the majority point and made Giscard's group an indispensable part of the 'presidential majority'.

Chirac has not associated himself over the years with the more nationalistic groups in the Gaullist party. He has preferred to choose mainly symbolic matters, such as his endorsement of Quebec's independence in April 1977, for creating the impression of being orthodox in this sphere and has left to the old-line 'barons'—notably Couve de Murville and Debré—the responsibility for opposing such things as the International Monetary Fund accords or direct elections to the European parliament. His Gaullism amounts to two things: his defence of the imperial presidency established by de Gaulle; and his preference for the politics of polarisation ('chaos or me', as de Gaulle put it). For Chirac, the two elements are related. Only a strong president can provide effective government; only effective government can prevent the electorate from turning to the only alternative, the 'Socialisto-Communist' Left; and only a fear of that Left and its radical programme can unite the disparate elements of the Centre and Right, providing the president with the electoral base he needs in both presidential and parliamentary elections. This outlook is in fundamental opposition to Giscard's, for it implies a permanent politics of fear, the subordination of the Centre to the Right, and confrontation rather than dialogue.

Yet, despite their differences, Giscard and Chirac managed to work together for years, first in Pompidou's cabinet and then later, after Giscard became president. Indeed, Chirac played an interesting role in Giscard's victory in 1974. The leading Gaullist candidate was Jacques Chaban-Delmas, a Resistance hero, mayor of Bordeaux, one-time prime minister who had become something of a martyr following Pompidou's high-handed dismissal of him in 1972. In mid-campaign, Chirac, as Minister of the Interior, leaked an 'administrative' public opinion poll purporting to show that, although Chaban-Delmas could win the first round, he would lose to François Mitterand of the Common Front in the second, while Giscard alone could rally sufficient support to defeat Mitterand. This leak caused a sufficient swing to Giscard to ensure the defeat of Chaban-Delmas in the first round and to make him the 'majority's candidate in the second round. The grateful Giscard then chose Chirac to serve as prime minister and as his link to the Gaullist party in the National Assembly.

As prime minister Chirac was more successful in bringing the Gaullist party under his personal control than in providing vigorous or imaginative leadership. Perhaps, as he later claimed, he was not given sufficient authority by Giscard to be more effective. Using the power and patronage of office, he brought forward young men who owed their rise to him and pushed the old-line Gaullist spokesmen into the background. Slowly it became clear how clever Chirac had been all along—after disposing of Chaban-Delmas in 1974, he took over the party structure while the 'barons' were squabbling over who should assume the mantle of leadership. In so doing he provided his own government with a stable parliamentary base and prevented Giscard from taking advantage of the divisions within the Gaullist move-

ment. So long as Chirac was in office, and so long as no particularly nettlesome issues arose bringing differences between Giscard and his allies into the open, the arrangement worked harmoniously. But in 1976 the basic contradictions began to emerge. After two years of focussing on life-style reforms (divorce, abortion), Giscard introduced his first serious reformist measure of an economic sort—a proposal for a modest capital gains tax. He also placed two international issues on the political agenda: the new International Monetary Fund (IMF) accords, and the mechanism for direct elections to the European parliament, both requiring parliamentary approval. These three issues were like red flags to the Gaullist bulls. The capital gains tax had to be so watered down to meet Gaullist objections that in the end businessmen themselves approved the measure; and the Gaullist backbenchers issued a stream of objections to the other proposals, with as yet undetermined results. Rising inflation was also forcing the government to consider the introduction of wage and price controls. In addition to growing pressures from within the Gaullist party in opposition to government policy, political calculations were increasingly coming to the surface. The March 1978 legislative elections were beginning to loom on the horizon. For a whole variety of reasons, in sum, Chirac found it increasingly difficult to paper over the cracks in the 'presidential majority'. In the summer of 1976 he decided that his position was no longer tenable. He resigned and began the gamble of his political life—that of creating a sufficiently powerful Gaullist movement to dominate the Centre-Right and possibly the National Assembly itself, thus preparing the way for his own election to the presidency in 1981.

Giscard, suddenly vulnerable to the Right, decided to be cautious. Instead of naming another Gaullist as prime minister in the hope of splitting the Gaullists, he named Raymond Barre, an independent politician with a reputation as an economist whom de Gaulle himself had trusted, and launched a war against inflation. While Chirac was busy with low-level politicking, Giscard's lieutenants said, the president was busy with the affairs of state. The 'Barre plan', introduced in October, was the chief expression of this statesmanship, and its provisions for wage and price controls brought a massive outcry of protest from labour circles and small shopkeepers.

Chirac moved immediately to consolidate his leadership of the Gaullist movement. In September he proposed that the Gaullist party be transformed into a new *rassemblement* of anticollectivist forces whose purpose would be to turn back the Common Front in the coming legislative elections. This 'rally' would aim at a broader constituency than the old party and would seek in particular to attract Centrist elements and working-class voters unhappy with the 'totalitarian' Common Front. (His appeal to working-class elements came down to two things: a vague advocacy of greater workers' 'participation' in the direction of enterprises, and nationalism.) This transformation duly occurred at a huge convention held on Sunday, December 5. The Rassemblement pour la République (R.P.R.) was born. Chaban-Delmas refused to attend or participate. Debré and

Couve de Murville attended and joined, but spent more time on their own new committee—the Committee to Oppose Direct Elections to the European Parliament. The Gaullists were now Chiraciens. Adding to Chirac's momentum was his return to the National Assembly in a by-election that gave him a greater majority than he had ever had before. With the by-elections and party reorganisation behind him, Chirac then turned his attention to the next major political milestone—the March municipal elections.

Meanwhile, Giscard began to respond to the new political situation. In October 1976 he published a manifesto, *Démocratie Française*, which was designed to attract moderates by calling for an end to traditional political rivalries and for modernisation with social justice. He accepted the principle of 'alternation' in government, that is, the possibility of a Common Front electoral victory in the legislative elections. While thus seeking to enlarge his moderate constituency, Giscard also decided to take advantage of the presidency to advance the cause of his own party in the municipal elections scheduled for March 1977.

Events were leading both Giscard and Chirac to a rendezvous in the municipal elections of Paris—to what the French press later called 'the battle of Paris'.

From 1871 to 1977 Paris, alone among French cities, did not have home rule. Since the revolutionary Commune of 1871, the central government has governed Paris through its own appointed prefects and various ministry agencies. Occasionally national leaders themselves intervened—as Pompidou had in vetoing plans for extending the freeway along the banks of the Seine. The functions of the 90-member city council were limited to registering government decisions, a few discretionary powers, and budgetary recommendations. In practice the council acted chiefly as a pressure group on behalf of the city in its dealings with the national civil service. Its 'president' was only a symbolic mayor. Giscard, an advocate of 'participation' in government, decided to change this situation. In December 1975 legislation finally reestablished home rule for Paris (defined as the twenty central wards) beginning with the March 1977 municipal elections. The Mayor of Paris—quickly dubbed 'supermaire'—would become responsible for a budget of some seven billion francs and director of a bureaucracy of over 30,000 public employees.

In 1975 there seemed to be little political risk in making this change. With the emigration of the working class to the suburbs, the city's electorate had become increasingly conservative over the years. The 1971 municipal elections, the last ones under the old rules, had produced a majority of 49 for the Pompidolean presidential majority (a coalition without the Centre fractions that supported Giscard), 10 seats for the Centre, and 30 for the Left. It was reasonable for Giscard to assume that the new city council would be dominated by friendly members and that he might even have a direct influence in the naming of the 'super-mayor'. Paris, moreover, would become a highly visible political counterweight to the growing domination

of provincial France by the forces of the Common Front.

Giscard's political calculations, however, were somewhat scrambled by the growing rupture with the Gaullists. He was not to have the free hand in Paris that he had foreseen. The agreement among the partners in the governing alliance stipulated that all candidates standing in its name should be chosen as a result of consultation. When Giscard decided to move, he had Raymond Barre 'inform' the several partners that he preferred Michel d'Ornano, Minister of Industry and Research since 1974, an Independent Republican, and mayor of the seaside resort of Deauville since 1962, to be chosen as the candidate for the entire presidential majority. The announcement was made on November 12, two days before the first round of the by-elections in which Chirac was involved. At the time this seemed a smart preemptive strike by Giscard. The Gaullists were not only looking elsewhere but were in the process of reorganising themselves. It was as yet unclear how far they would go with Chirac in distancing themselves from the president. Giscard's manoeuvre put the issue squarely to them. If his manoeuvre succeeded, Giscard would strengthen his own position and weaken that of the Gaullists. He would replicate his own feat at the national level: that of capturing a key office and forcing the Gaullists into line for want of an alternative.

The Gaullists quickly bridled. Heartened by their victories in the by-elections and by the failures of the Independent Republicans, they stiffened in their resolve and moved, during two weeks, from mere grumbling to counter-action. Arguing that they had not been honestly consulted, that they were opposed to parachuting in a candidate unfamiliar with the city's problems, and that their dominant status on the city council ought to be recognised, they named a candidate of their own: Christian de la Malène, a Gaullist deputy, head of the city's finance committee since 1965, and the most powerful man on the old city council. Both sides then acknowledged that their competition would end after the first round, the losing side rallying to the candidate of the other.

At the start, d'Ornano's candidacy did not fare as poorly as one might have expected. He was initially on the defensive, explaining that, although he was not a Parisian by birth, he had lived for many years in Paris. But he was given more than generous coverage by the major television networks—to the point that the Gaullists felt constrained to protest that their man was being ignored. Despite his influence, moreover, de la Malène was little known to Parisians and not very charismatic. The Left did not present much trouble either. It chose Georges Sarre, a leader of the Socialist party's left-wing intellectual circle and, as such, a man unlikely to expand the Common Front's electoral appeal beyond established limits. Thus, by early January 1977 it was not absolutely certain that the Gaullists would win the mayoralty race, although it was clear that the race was really between the Gaullist and Giscardien candidates.

In the meantime, however, Chirac and his advisers had also begun to take stock of the new political situation. The president had already com-

mitted himself to a vulnerable candidate in Paris. The Left had been unable to find a candidate of sufficient stature to pose a real threat to the majority's position. The timing of the election was beyond manipulation. Political opinion polls showed that the trend to the Left in municipal elections would continue. At the parliamentary level, the initiative lay with Giscard and Barre. They could postpone the legislative elections until the legal deadline in March 1978 in order to let the dynamism drain out of the Chiracien movement or bring forth legislative proposals designed to provoke what might look like extremist Gaullist proclamations—for example, on the issue of elections to the European parliament. To make matters worse, Barre was beginning to emerge in public opinion polls as a major figure in his own right. There appeared to be a growing constituency for his soft-spoken, non-ideological but firm pragmatism, which contrasted with the vague rhetoric of Chirac. Thus, by early January 1977 Chirac and his intimates were beginning to think seriously about what others were not even imagining: that Chirac might replace de la Malène as the Gaullist candidate for the office of super mayor. Chirac could enter the race sufficiently late to dominate news until election day. His personal popularity was such that he would undoubtedly swamp d'Ornano. Success in Paris would keep up the momentum of the movement, would serve as a beacon of hope for those fearful of the Common Front's growing strength, and would be widely construed as a sign that the electorate had rejected Giscard's strategy in favour of Chirac's. Victory, moreover, would also give Chirac more flexibility. He would be able to stand on two distinct pillars—the RPR in the National Assembly, and the electorate of Paris. He could choose his forum to make or to obscure whatever points he wanted.

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LAW IN TRANSITION—1952-1977

by J. A. Coutts

EACH generation believes its own age is one of peculiarly rapid change. We are no exception. Future historians may not share our view of today's changes, but there can rarely have been so much *talk* about change. At the accession of Queen Elizabeth II, there was a feeling that great changes in society had already taken place and that at least some aspects of the legal system were no longer adequate in the new conditions. Even the lawyers themselves devoted an unusual amount of energy to discussing legal reform. The establishment of the Law Commissions was one of the results.

It must be confessed that the lawyers' debate has been entangled in a question which many laymen regard as trivial—the proper role of the judges in the reform of the law. In 1951, Lord Denning had called on the judges to stand up and be counted. Were they among the 'timorous souls who were fearful of allowing a new cause of action' or among 'the bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so required'? In the decade which followed, the courts were not very much concerned to develop the law to meet changed social conditions, so that an apparent gap opened up between the new social policies of the legislature and the individualist outlook of the courts. The judges still retain the tradition that they are in the retail, not the wholesale business. The scales of justice weigh the individual transaction. To the judges, it is abhorrent that any individual should be regarded as expendable. Parliament, however, may not be above thinking that, in the public interest, society may absorb the odd injustice to an individual or class of individuals—landlords, for example.

In the 1960s, the courts appeared to be taking a rather more relaxed view of the constraints which law places on their freedom of action. Even before 1966, when the House of Lords declared that it would no longer be absolutely bound by its earlier decisions, it had been accused of tampering with the law of murder, of creating an offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals and of changing the law relating to trade unions and that relating to negligent mis-statements. Surprisingly little, however, has come out of the 1966 declaration, although the courts are now more articulate upon social issues and there have been one or two innovations, such as the abolition of Crown privilege to withhold documents vital to litigation.

The difficulty of determining the right and duty of the judiciary to influence social and political development is demonstrated by the dilemma of those who greeted with rapture Lord Denning's call for 'bold spirits' on the Bench. The early self-styled iconoclast had their full support when 'allowing a new cause of action' if (as he—and they—saw it) 'justice so required'. What, however, of the Lord Denning who granted a mere member of the public an injunction against a trade union? When the Attorney-General was arguing his privilege to prevent any such thing, Mr. Michael

Foot was solemnly assuring the House of Commons that the Attorney-General was at that moment 'upholding the honour of Parliament' against the courts—a statement which must surely remain unequalled for utter fatuity in this (or any other) Parliament. The moral is that judges who claim to make law are inevitably seen to be taking sides on what are issues of party politics. Any judge who is 'in advance of', or who attempts to create or mould, popular opinion will run into trouble: witness the outcry against the judges who recently extended leniency to those guilty of rape and even (albeit on another charge) to an Old Etonian. 'They ought to be sacked', said one Member of Parliament.

The question of the proper role of the judiciary in the reform of the law is, however, not as important as lawyers think. The courts cannot give effect to the requirements of 'social change', if a rule of law makes unlawful that which 'social change' is thought to require. At best, the courts can make law only on the periphery, on issues arising haphazardly before them. For most of us, life would be no different if every one of the 'memorable' decisions of the courts in the last quarter century had gone the other way.

In the race to the millennium by way of social change, it is therefore—in racing parlance—Parliament first and the rest nowhere. Indeed, the legislator often regards the judge not so much as a competitor as a handicap. Complaint is made of the brake put upon legislation by judicial misinterpretation, though, to be fair, the complexity of statutes arises out of Parliament's mistaken belief that every conceivable detail must be included. In fact, more law means more loopholes, as tax and planning statutes show.

Though statutes need to be interpreted, it is the statute book itself which is the real means of controlling and planning the improvements in social relations. By statute, the government controls industrial relations, polices the market, enforces its fiscal policy and then distributes the results by its social services. In 1952, this double process of control and distribution was accepted as being based on the doctrine, which Roscoe Pound had taught an earlier generation of American lawyers, that law is 'social engineering', constructing an efficient and just social system by satisfying the maximum existing wants, desires, claims and interests of the community. And, although an eminent theologian denounced 'social engineering' as a process of tinkering, the doctrine continued to pass muster.

In the ensuing quarter century, however, the role of Parliament has been enlarged. Governments are no longer content to use the statute book to balance existing claims. Statute is used to *create* claims. Enter a post office, to buy a stamp. While your friendly clerk disburses the state's largesse to the assorted recipients standing in front of you or is licensing their activities or possessions or engages in seemingly perplexing banking transactions, you will have time to look at the notices on the walls. 'Have you got your rights?' you are asked. These rights have not arisen before their creation by statute. Many of the recipients are, like M. Jourdain speaking prose, astounded to learn that they have them. Only a fraction of those entitled to rent allowances under the recent statutory scheme could be persuaded to claim them. Many a tenant who has solemnly signed an

agreement for a lease and naïvely believes that he is bound by his signature is agreeably surprised to find that he can escape the vital clauses which tell him how much he has to pay and when he has to leave.

There is a second sense in which the use of the statute book has changed. In 1952, law had abandoned its initial role of arbitration for that of regulation. By 1977, the state had come to use the statute book as the title deeds to its new role of undertaker. Not only through its public corporations, but now more directly, the state is engaged in entrepreneurial activities, branching out from the older coal, gas and electricity undertakings to the new fields of oil and nuclear energy. Even greater changes in the legal system will surely be needed, now that the state not only distributes the country's wealth, but takes a hand in producing it.

Meanwhile, legal changes have affected both the citizen's 'personal' activities and his family, industrial, commercial and social relations.

The law's treatment of the individual is best seen in the criminal law, for it is still based on the notion of individual responsibility. (The idea of substituting 'social defence' for the criminal law has made little headway.) In many ways, the criminal law has been relaxed, to take account of our so-called permissive society, to accord with the gospel spread by the Wolfenden Committee that 'it is not the function of the law to intervene in the private lives of citizens'. Suicide and homosexuality between consenting male adults ceased to be felonies. Shop windows and supermarkets and railway bookstalls demonstrate the relaxation of the law, or of the enforcement of the law, of obscenity. Abortion is said to be 'on demand' for those who can pay, even if it is darkly hinted that, for those who can't, the N.H.S. sometimes requires ten months' notice. There has been a new deal for the mentally incompetent, both as to criminal liability and as to treatment. The (to us) novel concept of diminished responsibility has been introduced as a means of reducing the sentence. Capital murder has disappeared and the aim of penal reform has been to keep as many people as possible out of prison, though one outspoken judge has warned us that a cosy chat with a probation officer is no substitute for a custodial sentence.

Many types of conduct have been freed from the grasp of the criminal law. For the rest, the courts have tried to reinstate the idea of moral blameworthiness as the basis of criminal liability. On the one occasion on which the House of Lords went against the trend, by establishing an 'objective' basis for murder, this decision met with much criticism and was soon stultified by statute. The trend has not been all one way, however, for Parliament has extended criminal liability to conduct often unconnected with moral blameworthiness by its imposition of criminal sanctions on breaches of the newly legislated welfare codes. Moreover, the reformed criminal law has had its failures—in dealing with organised crime, industrial disputes, student sit-ins, for example. We seem now to be a more violent people, unless it is that violence hitherto unobserved is now televised for all to see. These failures are due not so much to defects in the law as to failures to enforce it, for a variety of reasons, many of them political. When a

Member of Parliament joins a picket line on which there has been much violence directed against the police, the whole legal process is cheapened. A policeman's lot is most assuredly not a happy one today.

In the civil law, the most striking feature is perhaps the new attitude to the family, reflecting, as it does, the economic emancipation of women. Discrimination on the ground of sex is now forbidden by statute. There has been a legal revolution in the property rights of the spouses, in the law's endeavour to treat them as equal in their claims to the matrimonial home, for example. Above all, there is the new law of divorce. The rights of the parties in the Divorce Court (so long based on the matrimonial 'Wrongs' done to them) have given way, not to an assessment of their moral duties, but to a determination of their financial obligations. The decree of divorce itself is simply a licence to remarry, obtainable in practice upon proof of little more than the validity of the marriage to be dissolved.

While family relations have shown a single trend, industrial relations have been subjected to a two-way stretch by party politics. The Donovan Report of 1968 remarked on 'the British tradition of keeping labour relations out of the courts.' The fate of the Conservatives' Industrial Relations Act 1972 and the N.I.R.C. established thereunder may be thought to show the danger of ignoring this tradition. The amending Act of 1974 adopted the hands-off principle in two important respects—the 'golden formula' that acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute are virtually beyond the law, while collective labour agreements are not justiciable in the courts, unless the parties have expressly stated the contrary.

Parliament's consignment of the problems of labour relations from the realm of law to that of 'custom and practice' has not, of course, solved them. Today's burning political issue is still whether the individual is to continue to be smothered under collective bargaining and job regulation, however advantageous to him the new law of unfair dismissal, redundancy payments and the like and however advantageous to the unions their release from control by the courts. On the more general issue, it may be remarked that in international law too, the most important disputes are not justiciable and this is its basic weakness as a means of achieving peaceful international relations through a rule of law. Is there a parallel in our labour law? Here, too, violence follows upon the belief that it is proper to keep important disputes beyond the reach of the law and of the courts.

The peculiarity of our recent labour law is highlighted by a comparison with our recent commercial law. Here, the law has not hesitated to attack the big battalions. The judges waged an incessant war on the 'standard form contracts' by which producers provide every commodity of importance. The ambit of liability for negligence has been extended by the courts. The judges' attack was not unsuccessful, but today it is Parliament's intervention, by statutes dealing with implied terms, trade descriptions, restrictive practices, company control and the like, which protects the consumer from the over-mighty producer and distributor. And the courts have been under-

pinned by an apparatus of statutory administrative agencies.

Of the new social problems which the wind of change has blown into the lap of the law, perhaps that of race relations has proved the most intractable. The courts may be colour-blind, but Parliament obviously cannot afford to be. Few would now question the need for statutory control of the immigration of Commonwealth citizens. In dealing with those already here, both Parliament and the courts can claim to have a good record. The courts discouraged 'nigger bashing' by exemplary sentences, as soon as there was any sign of it. Parliament made discrimination unlawful, but not criminal, wisely placing reliance on conciliation machinery, rather than the criminal courts (except for incitement to racial hostility). Of course, problems remain. Is the immigrant's conduct to be judged by the standard of the English reasonable man? One law for the Lion and Ox is oppression, said William Blake; but that solution is too simplistic. If, for instance, an immigrant has contracted a potentially polygamous marriage in his own country with a child well below the English minimum age for marriage, may he live with her in England as man and wife, simply because the marriage was recognised in his own country? Lord Parker C.J. thought that he should, because 'they develop sooner.' Whatever the soundness of the conclusion, the reason is, at least, dubious.

Has the law met the needs of our changing society in the last twenty-five years? One of the causes of the change has been the use of the internal combustion engine. How has the law met the impact of the motor car? With 8,000 killed each year and almost fifty times as many injured, the legal system is obviously called upon to try to ensure a measure of safety and, when that fails, a measure of compensation. The criminal law has endeavoured to obtain some measure of safety by imposing speed limits, by establishing road traffic offences and by the courageous introduction of the unpopular breathalyser. It is doubtful whether more can be done by law. When it fails, however, compensation depends largely upon proof of fault on the part of the driver. Undoubtedly, much loss and suffering may go unremedied. Parliament has been urged to make a fresh start, on the basis of automatic compensation for any road accident, but it is doubtful whether that could be done here except on the footing of the nationalisation of the automobile insurance industry, which is a political hurdle few seem to want to tackle.

It would be fair to say that Parliament has consciously striven to meet the challenge of change. Are legal institutions equally prepared for it? There has been a genuine attempt to bring the law to the people. Lord Beeching's rationalisation of the court system, though it offended some local patriots, brought us at last out of the Middle Ages. No longer will Assize judges visit small country towns for no purpose other than that of receiving a pair of white gloves and having a booze-up which puts 10p on the local rate. There has been an attempt to decentralise the courts by the local operations of the Crown Court and the increased business of the magistrates' courts. Most important work is, however, still centred on London and the House of Lords, though subject to sniping, still remains the

highest tribunal in a three-tier system. Its supporters would do well to change its name, for its lay critics often erroneously think it has something to do with the political body of that name.

The judges have gone out of their way to present a more 'human' image. Screaming Lord Sutch has been permitted to plead his own case in the County Court, dressed, we are told, 'only' in a tiger skin. There is an increasing use made of laymen in the administration of justice—in the proliferating tribunals and as assessors in the Crown Court—and lay magistrates are encouraged (by compulsory training) to play a more independent role. At the same time, our hitherto sacrosanct jury system has been subjected to much criticism, principally on the score that too many of the accused who are acquitted by juries are universally believed to be guilty. Indeed, if the thirty out of every hundred (for this is the number in this category) were all believed to be innocent by the public, would there not be an immediate outcry that so many innocent people should be subjected to the traumatic experience of a public criminal trial?

The changes made in our society in the past quarter of a century are not perhaps as profound as many fondly imagine, although modern methods of communication have no doubt made us more aware of such changes than earlier generations would have been. There has been no legal revolution, because there has been no social revolution. Has the law met the needs of such social changes as have occurred? Indeed, can the law ever do so? It can give effect to, and reflect, such changes in ideas as have arisen. It can occasionally, but only occasionally, be in advance of public opinion and this it may do (as we have seen) only at some risk to its credibility. The courts have very properly been conscious of the limitations of the use of law to improve mankind, though some members of the legislature have, avowedly and often genuinely, believed that by the statute book they may perfect us all. Perfection, said Arnold Bennett, is a form of death.

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TOLERANCE AND DEMOCRACY

by W. J. Stankiewicz

DEMOCRACY is a relatively new ethical set of values which, for most members of democratic societies, is replacing the 'other-world'—centred norms of religion. One of the history's many ironies is that though democracy originally derived some of its fundamental assumptions from religion and has always been associated with the preservation of private belief and religious freedom, its acceptance entails a shift in emphasis from the religious to the political sphere and with this the decay of what it seeks to preserve. A democratic State may claim to be 'under God', but it is difficult for a member of such a State—who believes that questions of policy should be determined by the interests and desires of its members—to suppose that the absolute values of a church have any absolute validity. In effect, he rejects the notion by accepting the right to vote and shifts from a belief in the authority of a moral order to a belief in the authority of the majority.

Democratic insistence that the ultimate decisions about goals must lie with the people undermines the very foundations of the Church's moral authority and with this the significance of being religious or holding a particular set of religious beliefs. Under a democracy, as is the case in North America, religion becomes a matter of taste: 'Pray in the church of your choice', as with the other piety of modern life, voting: 'Vote for the party of your choice, but vote'. It is no longer important how one prays or votes. What is important is that one performs the ritual which symbolises one's attachment.

Now if the 'public service' billboards which make the statements about praying and voting altered their wording only slightly to 'Support the political ideology of your choice', they would no longer be performing a public service. They would more likely be considered subversive, for as democratic society has usurped moral authority, there can only be one set of assumptions as to how society ought to be managed—those which assert the right of the majority to make decisions. All others are necessarily wrong.

Can democracy be tolerant of other political beliefs and statements? Hans Kelsen, arguing in support of democracy and tolerance from a relativist point of view, makes the following statement: 'We are sure of our political truth, to be enforced, if necessary, with blood and tears . . . we are sure of our truth as was, of his truth, the son of God'.[1] Naturally, this is a piece of rhetoric, a reply in kind to an absolutist, but it accurately reflects the limitation placed on tolerance by those who are convinced that the democratic system is a tolerant system. In other words, tolerance ceases to apply in the very area in which it must apply if it is to say something significant about the modern State. It is only when there are rival statements that the question of tolerance arises. It is as absurd to speak of a democratic

State's tolerance of Church doctrine under its jurisdiction as it would be to speak of its intolerance of criminal behaviour. An important function of the State is the maintenance of order and this is not achieved by the State suppressing statements which in no way conflict with its own or even by 'tolerating' behaviour which does interfere with the peace and good order of the realm, as for instance the anti-social behaviour of the criminal. Those who argue that tolerance is not applicable to the democratic assumptions are not talking about tolerance, but about the best method of maintaining social order in a heterogeneous society consistent with the sovereignty of the State. If the State fails to remain an impartial arbiter of disputes, if it supports one group against another, it becomes but the political arm of the group it fosters. The issue is that of the tolerance of the particular group by the State and not that of 'democratic tolerance'.

Having based its claim to superiority upon its system of values, of which tolerance is an element, the democratic State now faces the same problem that confronted the Church in the seventeenth century. If, under the principle of tolerance, one grants equal rights to a rival system of belief, one is not only recognising the right of private conscience but also implicitly making a statement about truth. Either one is assuming that truth will prevail or one is abandoning one's exclusive claim to it. The Church—acting under pressure from the State, which recognises the threat to civil order inherent in intolerance—has been compelled to decide upon one of these alternatives. But it is not possible for the State to do so. The assumption that truth will prevail is plausible only if the truth is self-evident—a position which can no longer be seriously maintained about democratic values. The alternative—abandoning one's claim to truth—is even worse, for allegiance in the modern State is largely determined by the set of values professed by the State. An admission that the ideology one accepts is no better than any other would play havoc with the citizen's sense of political obligation. Because belief in another ideology usually means a division in loyalty, complete political tolerance would make it impossible for the State to control the potential for subversion present among those who profess an alien system. Yet if a democratic State does not at least keep up some appearance of permitting rival statements to be made, it will only encourage disaffection, for adherence to the principle of tolerance is one of its claims to superiority and one of the proofs of its identity as a democratic State.

When Jaspers asserts that 'Democracy must be able to become intolerant of intolerance itself'[2] he is arguing that adherence to a norm excludes its contradictory. This appears to be one of those 'self-evident truths' which if propagated as fundamental insights can lead to misunderstanding. The norms of democracy are not only in the hands of philosophers but in those of ordinary citizens. Taught about the absolutism of individual norms—which Jaspers is trying to counteract by his assertion about contradictories—citizens have created difficulties for demoratic societies by insisting on 'pure' democracy. Their democracy is an unrealistic and illogical pretence that the normative system of democracy is not a normative system but a set

of unrelated absolutes, which must remain such even while being applied. (Jaspers's assertion, it should be noted, does nothing about this absolutism. It invites the absolutist to attempt to solve the normative issues, arising from the fact that democracy is a normative set, by ignoring the norm 'freedom' and classifying behaviour that we would call a threat to the norm 'freedom' as a threat to the absolutism of 'tolerance'.) What one needs to recognise is that a viable normative system cannot consist of absolutes—this is logically impossible—and the logic of contradiction is irrelevant to the issues raised by the system of norms.

Any normative set serving to define a group is liable to serious aberrations when the believers themselves—members of a democracy must be 'democratic'—have to interpret the norms. Were the norms just customary ways of behaving, as some relativists say all norms are, the problem would be simple. But the norms of democracy are not patterns of behaviour but general and quite abstract requirements. The democratic man believes in 'freedom', 'equality' and 'tolerance' and to act in accordance with these he must apply them to specific conditions. While many members of democratic societies insist that they are true believers—they have no doubts about the validity of the norms and insist that they act in accordance with them—yet they are not very good in applying these norms to particular situations.

We must narrow the problem further, ignoring the normative issues raised by the failure on the part of the citizens of democracy to be democratic and focus on their critics—those who insist on democratic absolutism and who believe that 'freedom', 'equality' and 'tolerance' either exist without exceptions and qualifications, or do not exist at all.

Absolutism is the bane of all normative systems but the fundamental requirement of any particular norm. It is not possible to defend 'tolerance' —or any other norm—if it is not put forward as an inviolable absolute parallel to other fundamental assumptions we make in order to organise experience. No exceptions are possible if the assumptions are to have any meaning. But to say that all the norms of democracy are traceable to one assumption, or to a set of orderly assumptions such as exist in mathematics, is another question. We could then say that 'democracy' means 'equality' or 'tolerance' or 'freedom' and establish that, logically, certain behaviour is required from the true democrat under certain conditions. There are people full of good intentions—and naïve beliefs—who attempt this. Their criticism of democratic societies goes back to the lack of 'purity' in normative behaviour: we are not 'equal' enough or 'free' enough or 'tolerant' enough. This would be right if we could assume democracy to be a norm instead of a normative set. In fact, no democratic society approaches the conditions that would exist if any single norm were applied absolutely and none shows any tendency to move towards such absolutism.

Normative absolutism is impossible when there is a normative set. It is also illogical to demand absolute tolerance when 'tolerance' is not the sole norm. The reason is that while each norm is an absolute by itself, it inevit-

ably interacts with other norms to produce something less than absolutism. Thus, those who argue that democracy must be absolutely tolerant are really arguing that 'tolerance' is democracy and that no other norms matter. But clearly, democracy is not the sole democratic norm. No assertion about the requirements of 'tolerance' in a particular situation can be made until one examines the statements made by other norms such as 'freedom' and 'equality'. Being true to the norm 'freedom', for instance, is an integral part of being democratic and no statement made by the norm 'tolerance' can be followed through until the requirements of the norm 'freedom' have been allowed to make their claim. Being 'democratic' requires a more or less even balance between them, not absolutism.

Oxymorons such as 'cruel kindness' or 'repressive tolerance' have been traditionally avoided in scientific and philosophic writing because to make sense conceptually, at least one of the component terms has to be redefined: if either of these phrases meant what it appears to mean, it would be self-contradictory. Those, however, who are working within the Hegelian-Marxian tradition, do not have such scruples, for to them such phrases can express the synthesis of thesis (tolerance) and antithesis (repression). In their eyes the synthesis is not a contradiction but a new insight, and the difficulty non-Marxists have to face when trying to guess its meaning can be ignored.

Marcuse is unaware that to make a case in a non-Marxist society he must redefine tolerance in order to remove the contradiction inherent in his concept of 'repressive tolerance'. For him, 'tolerance' is a conditional norm resting on the uncertainty principle—our consciousness that we do not know the truth but desire to attain it: 'The uncertainty of chance . . . necessitates freedom of thought and expression as preconditions of finding the way to freedom—it necessitates tolerance'.[3] If this is indeed the basis of tolerance, it follows with deadly certainty that when the truth is known, tolerance merely allows error to flourish. Some errors can have such dangerous consequences that the just society must repress them: 'But society cannot be indiscriminate where the pacification of existence, where freedom and happiness themselves are at stake: here, certain things cannot be said, certain ideas cannot be expressed, certain policies cannot be proposed, certain behavior cannot be permitted without making tolerance an instrument for the continuation of servitude'.[4]

With a little manipulation of concepts Marcuse makes his view resemble a logical extension of current democratic practice. Thus he observes that democratic society does not tolerate any of the behaviour proscribed by the criminal code. Though hardly a conservative himself, he advocates what is basically a 'conservative' view that in the extension of law lies the answer to social problems and that this extension is not really repressive: behind it there are ethical principles on which democracy is founded.

According to both Marcuse and many conservatives, democratic society is not relativistic. It is a fact that it is 'intolerant' of criminal behaviour. Hence if one can argue that current 'tolerance' (=absence of legal sanc-

tions) violates democratic norms, can one not argue that such 'tolerance' is undemocratic?

It is remarkable how unwilling our society has been to face the Marcusian argument. The standard response has been to invoke the principle of uncertainty or the principle of relativism, both of which have been represented as the essence of 'tolerance'. According to this view norms cannot be proved; they are tastes and attitudes. We should not be certain about anything, least of all about normative issues. Such relativism is not 'tolerance', of course, for it 'tolerates' everything, including intolerance, and no one who holds the norm 'tolerance' can also accept its contradictory.

Apart from the fact that the usual (relativistic) argument against repression is not based on 'tolerance', it is not relevant either. It demands from the advocate of intolerance an attitude to norms he does not have; indeed, it demands an attitude that hardly anyone has. By nature, norms express convictions about what we regard as universals. It may be quite true that none of us can 'prove' the validity of the norms we hold, but it is also quite true that no one can disprove them either; nor can anyone prove that we would be better off without them. Norms are necessary to human behaviour and almost all members of democratic society—as of all societies—have deep convictions about what is right and wrong. It is unrealistic to say that we 'should not' have them.

But if each of us is convinced of the validity of his norms, are we required to adopt Marcuse's intolerance? At one time, it should be remembered, his position was universally accepted. It is not long ago that the Catholic Church officially abandoned it. Throughout its history the Church has held —like Marcuse—that error should not have the same rights as truth. Only when ideologically-based political orders developed did this view show signs of being transferred to the political sphere: totalitarian societies have endeavoured to suppress alien ideologies. What has prevented democratic societies from undertaking the kind of behaviour advocated by Marcuse is the norm 'tolerance'.

'Tolerance' does not allow combination with its contradictory, and conviction about the truth of one's position has nothing to do with the issue, as the Catholic Church has at last realised. Despite its claim to being a normatively-based institution, the Catholic Church was slower in accepting the norms of tolerance than secular institutions, mainly because this required the Church to surrender all claim to secular power. As a result, the Church abandoned its age-old claims to a sovereignty opposed to that of the State. The issue of tolerance is now transferred to the State. (This has had the curious result that there is now no way of knowing whether the Church is showing true 'tolerance' or mere 'toleration'.)

What brought this situation about? At a time when a man like Marcuse is arguing that the State should take over the position formerly held by the Church, the Church has adopted a norm that the State has observed for some time and which according to Marcuse should now be abandoned. Will roles be completely reversed and will the ideologically- based State of the

future adopt the policies of the pre-Reformation Church? Did not the Church adopt tolerance in order to counter just such a development? To answer this question in the affirmative would be to explain the Church's current policies towards tolerance solely as a manoeuvre in its power relations; to assert that it is adopting the only position possible when its claim to authority is threatened. But there are other quite different reasons why the Church has incorporated tolerance as a norm and why the democratic State should not abandon it.

To the Catholic Church it must be abundantly clear that the prohibition of error and the inculcation of right-thinking does not lead to right conduct, as Marcuse imagines, but rather to self-righteousness and hypocrisy. In his Canterbury Tales Chaucer drew a striking portrait of the Church at the height of its power: a group of pilgrims ostensibly meets in pious duty, but all except the humblest—the poor Parson, who represents the ideal Church —are corrupt in varying degrees. Hypocrisy, as we see from the portrait of the Pardoner, has become a skill, a sort of virtue to boast about in the expectation that fellow hypocrites will acknowledge one's mastery of the art. Such a portrait cannot be dismissed as an attack on the Church: the presence of the ideal Parson makes that clear. It was certainly not an unfair portrait of the true state of morality at the time, as we know from other sources. Somehow, the regulation of human behaviour had not prevented a moral breakdown.

The lesson for democracy is clear. When moral action ceases to be voluntary and an expression of the self—the way we choose to behave because we think it is right—and becomes instead the kind of behaviour imposed on the self by society, the biological being with inherited impulses acquires an importance which it cannot have in a genuinely free society.

It is true that we can legislate and educate a society into certain types of habitual obedience. Society tries to do this, for instance, by penalising drunken driving. The partial success achieved with this type of 'moral' improvement has fostered hope for general improvement through legislation. Those—like some fundamentalists—who believe in the general depravity of man are convinced that this is the only way man can be improved. They point to the laws on murder and theft as evidence that society not only has the right to be intolerant of some types of behaviour, but must be. Marcuse himself uses this argument. Yet it is impossible to proceed from these particular instances of 'intolerance' in a democratic State to the general conclusion that legal prohibitions advance the cause of morality. Thus the lack of success attained in changing sexual habits through legislation shows that morals cannot be enforced. Ethical behaviour, which requires debate and reasoning about norms and the establishment of general principles of behaviour, vanishes under coercion. Tolerance is the norm necessary to norms. It stands against both relativism and repression and is closely linked with democracy, which cannot work as a purely relativist society.

To the philosopher, the norm 'tolerance' derives its normativeness from

the theory of knowledge: given the imperfection of man's knowledge as a seemingly permanent condition, and given 'truth' as a good, it follows that the suppression of, or even marked hostility towards, opinions other than one's own is not a 'good'. If 'tolerance' as we know it required such a lofty and detached viewpoint, it could never have become an issue in political science, which can hardly predicate itself on the assumption that the good society demands philosopher-kings. But the 'tolerance' that the philosopher requires is incorporated into the theory of sovereignty not as a demand on the goodwill, moral principles and intelligence of the sovereign but as a requirement of his self-interest: the sovereign who sided with one creed or interest-group against another would in effect be sharing sovereignty.

The modern emphasis on democratic norms as the central issue in discussions of the democratic State has given the issue of tolerance a peculiar 'democratic' bias. Instead of being a necessary attribute of the sovereign, tolerance is represented as the necessary quality of a democratic society. The people of a democracy are supposed to have the attributes of a philosopher-king: calm rationality, objectivity, 'tolerance'—no matter what ideas are presented to them, or in what manner. Otherwise, they are not 'democratic'.

This attitude has had an unfortunate effect on the tolerance debate. Philosophic relativism has made most demands for 'tolerance' irrelevant. When the 'good' can no longer be rationally discussed but represents private interests, the issues in a normative dispute are necessarily personal. At best, the 'good' man sees himself as the representative of a larger class whose interests he promotes in opposition to those of his adversary, who either speaks for himself alone or for some narrower interest. Any technique then becomes acceptable. 'Reason' is excluded from debate; invective and personal insult are cultivated as ways of making a point, and tenacious adherence to one's position is admired. To be open to reason is to be uncommitted and commitment is all-important when 'truth' is out of the question. Among relativists, 'tolerance' is necessarily in disrepute. In its absence, force and violence become legitimate techniques of settling normative disputes. They become, in fact, the only possible techniques.

At this point, of course, the new attitude to 'tolerance' clashes with democratic tradition, which excludes violence as a technique of settling normative differences. Democracy attempts to solve the rising acrimony of debate and the demands for a show of force against State policy by fostering adherence to the system of 'majority rule', the submission of disputes to a vote and the like. In other words, the State itself does not demand 'tolerance' or 'reason' but—as a minimum requirement for life under a democratic order —agreement to a mere expedient for settling differences. In a relativist-orientated society this is put forward as the essence of democracy and democratic law and order.

The discussion of 'tolerance' in a modern democracy differs from earlier debates on 'tolerance', in which the limits of tolerance were set by the definition of liberty. The question then was: how 'free' can a State be; to

what extent must the democratic norm of 'liberty' constrain the State in its relations with its members so that it can remain 'democratic'? Now, when the democratic State is (self) defined as a system, no such question arises. The norms of democracy are replaced by an arbitrary method of settling disputes and taking action. It is clear that, on the assumption that the system is democratic, the State cannot tolerate rejection of its method. 'Tolerance' becomes subversive of law and order and at least an indirect invitation to violence.

Those who find this new attitude to 'tolerance' unpalatable must be quite clear about what lies behind it. It is not an emotional response to disorder in society, the view of 'conservatives' or the result of the rise of the 'systems' view in political science. Behind the so-called 'conservativism' and the new systems analysis lies the relativist view of norms. Only when this is shown to be philosophically unsound will ideological tolerance become part of democratic order.

NOTES

[1] Hans Kelsen, 'Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLII (October 1948).

[2] Karl Jaspers, *The Future of Mankind* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1967), p. 295.

[3] Herbert Marcuse, 'Repressive Tolerance' in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Beacon Press, Boston 1965), p. 88.

[4] Ibid.

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The October issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Giscard versus the Gaullists (Part Two)*. *The Battle Joined* by Donald N. Baker, *Brazil: Race, Colour and Class* by Frances Rust, *British Poetry* 1952-77 by Howard Sergeant and *A Farewell to Bretton Woods* by André van Dam. The *Quarterly Film Review* has been unavoidably held over and will be published in the October issue.

CONCERN GROWS FOR SAFETY OF OFFSHORE WORKERS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

by Larry Kohler

NO lives were lost in the recent accident on the 'Bravo' platform in the offshore Ekofisk petroleum field in the North Sea; all 112 workers were safely evacuated from the platform—there were no explosions, no fires. But what will happen next time?

The world's first offshore well was completed from a wooden pier in 1896 and for 50 years offshore activities were carried out, primarily in Venezuela and the United States. However, since the first offshore well was completed from a mobile platform in less than 30 feet of water in 1947, offshore petroleum technology has progressed rapidly and dramatically and by its very size and scope overshadows a crucial aspect of the industry —the day-to-day safety of thousands of workers who work as well as live offshore in many areas of the world.

Today approximately 400 mobile offshore drilling installations are active in almost all parts of the world searching for new petroleum resources. They are manned by crews living and working in difficult environmental conditions—extreme cold in the North Sea, extreme heat in the Middle East—usually for 12 hours a day in shifts ranging from 7 to 28 days without break.

In 1975 the offshore petroleum industry produced 21 per cent of the world's total oil production. It is predicted that this will rise to between 35 and 40 per cent by 1985.

With its rapid expansion, the offshore petroleum industry has encountered increasingly difficult and challenging conditions which have demanded dramatic technological developments. The water depth record is a case in point. In 1965, it was 632 feet, but by 1976 a well had been drilled in water 3,460 feet deep (the well was drilled to a depth of 14,000 feet) and it is expected that in the near future wells may be drilled in over 6,000 feet of water.

As new exploration areas are opened up, further technological challenges must be met. Highly sophisticated production platforms which can withstand severe climatic conditions—high winds and waves, even the threat of passing icebergs—are being designed and constructed.

Each new technological development carries with it the potential of new safety hazards for the workers. Over the past 30 years, governments, employers and workers have made continuing efforts to improve offshore safety. However, serious problems still remain and with nearly 80 countries engaged in offshore activities at varying stages, the situation is a global one and is critically important not only to the workers involved but also to the millions of people on land who will become increasingly dependent on the offshore petroleum resources.

While many of the hazards encountered by the offshore workers are the same as those in related industries on land. Appropriate codes of practice and guidelines should be developed or expanded to include the occupational dangers unique to offshore installations. Such dangers are evident in all three offshore occupational activities: construction, petroleum drilling and production, and diving.

Offshore construction workers are faced with particularly hazardous working conditions during the offshore construction of platforms and deep sea pipelines. Special safety problems have also been encountered during the transfer of supplies offshore, especially in rough weather.

Fire at sea is a recurring nightmare for all seafarers, but the presence of oil and combustible gases and the many sources of ignition on offshore production platforms make it a constant one for both offshore construction and petroleum workers. Detection and warning systems must be installed and fire protection and fire-fighting equipment made available and constantly maintained. In addition, emergency evacuation facilities must be carefully designed and offshore workers must be familiar with all emergency procedures.

Excessively high noise levels carry a two-way threat for the workers. Levels of over 100 decibels have been recorded on drilling rigs (continuous exposure at 85 decibels constitutes 'a warning limit value', according to ILO experts) which could not only impair hearing and produce fatigue but also complicate effective and necessary communication among the crew while working.

Divers, who play an important role in the offshore petroleum industry, are faced with safety problems related to the difficult tasks they are required to perform as well as the diving process itself.

Psychological problems caused by the enforced close proximity of the workers for extended periods of time can create situations which endanger both the safety and efficiency of the crew.

Such safety problems, among others, will be examined by an International Labour Organisation tripartite Meeting of Experts on Safety Problems in the Construction and Operation of Offshore Drilling Installations in the Petroleum Industry in October 1977.

The ILO plans to invite 24 experts from all regions of the world to participate. These experts will discuss not only the actual safety problems offshore but also the recent development of international, regional, national and industry standards to improve the safety situation offshore. The meeting has been asked to advise the ILO on its future role and activities in this area.

[Larry Kohler is a member of the Industrial Sectors Branch of the International Labour Office and he is currently engaged in the preparations for the October expert meeting.]

THE EXTERMINATION OF THE JEWS WAS NO 'WAR CRIME'

by C. C. Aronsfeld

ANTISEMITES no longer wish to be described as antisemites. They parade, almost rationally and respectably, as 'anti-Zionists' or, more lately, as scholars who have discovered that the Nazis never exterminated millions of Jews. In this 'argument', the Final Solution is made to appear as at worst one of the many nondescript 'war crimes' which were committed on both sides. Jews were killed, yes, but, for the most part, they only had themselves to blame as they were simply victims of a war which, after all, they (like Britain) had declared on an ever so peace-loving Germany; the real crimes had been the bombing of Dresden and Hiroshima, and so the balance is clearly and conveniently tipped in favour of Hitler.

This treacherous sophistry is having a notable effect not only on the largely ignorant, indifferent, if not callous, bystanders but even upon seasoned students of the story inasmuch as they endeavour to counter it so to speak on its own ground. They seem to accept the brazen claim that the holocaust was indeed a 'war crime', and they produce documents (which are promptly scorned as fakes), eye-witnesses (who are abused as liars) and learned authorities (who are dismissed as biassed—Jews or Communists). On this ground also they are liable to be confused by the all too plausible sleight-of-hand asserting that tall stories will be told in (or about) any war, and altogether, not unreasonably, seen in the strict and narrow setting of armed conflict, the very enormity of the crime will be discounted as literally unbelievable (which, in some ways of course, it is).

It seems time to restate the truth in terms that make sense. The destruction of millions of Jews was not a 'war crime'. It had nothing to do with war (except that it happened during the war). It was part of the Nazis' campaign from the very beginning and was to be enforced, war or no war. It was the consummation of twenty years of incitement to a hate that was to be indulged in with a ferocity which could leave no doubt of the murderous outcome—even if it had not been intended. This hate is deliberately ignored by the neo-Nazi presentation of the events as (isolated) 'war crimes'. But it is this hate that must be understood if the slaughter is to appear to a new generation credible as well as intelligible.

The hate was proclaimed back in 1920 under the slogan 'Perish Judah', which, in its English version, does not remotely reproduce the foul brutality of the German original *Juda verrecke!*—perish like a lice-ridden cur in the gutter. This was the slogan of a party's leader who for once meant precisely what he said. He did not always mean what he said and he was, of course, an accomplished liar, but so far as the extermination of the Jews was concerned, he had every right to jeer (in 1941) at those 'silly fools' who 'ought to have read what I have written not once but a thousand times. More often than I, no one has ever explained what he really means to do'.

In his very first political statement, in 1919, Hitler explained that his antisemitism would be different from that of his forerunners and rivals. Their antisemitism, he said, was 'purely emotional' and so would 'ultimately express itself in pogroms'. This, he argued, had always failed to bring about a final solution—after all, the Jews were still around—and therefore this was not what he had in mind.

Nor was it expulsion, or 'emigration'. Had the Jews been shipped to a German-controlled Madagascar (and this was realistically considered after the fall of France), 'Auschwitz' would have been enacted there, for since Jewry was thought of as 'the racial tuberculosis of the nations', a 'fearful threat to *every nation*', Hitler obviously could see no 'solution' in an action which, from his point of view, would only spread what he regarded as a 'pestilence', 'bacilli worse than the Black Death'. Dr. Robert Ley, the Nazi labour chief, summed up the idea: 'It is not enough to isolate the Jewish enemy of mankind, the Jews have got to be exterminated'.

Not that 'emigration' was entirely ruled out, but as conceived by the Nazis it was to serve the 'final solution'. Alfred Rosenberg, the party philosopher, put it this way: 'Germany will regard the Jewish Question as solved only after the last Jew has left the Greater German living space. Europe will have its Jewish Question solved only after the last Jew has left the European continent'. It hardly requires more than ordinary imagination to understand when and how the 'Jewish Question' in the world would be so 'solved' as to satisfy a Nazi's obsession.

The obsession was refined by the calculation that the ruthlessly impoverished Jews who were allowed to emigrate would add to the difficulties of such countries as might agree to receive them; these difficulties were to be Hitler's opportunities. Moreover, expulsion was carefully contrived to advance the grand design of extermination by producing a 'mass influx' of aliens, which, exploited in the traditional manner, would expand the bounds of aggressive antisemitism. With this strategy, Hitler could hope to win either way: when the Jews were admitted, antisemitism (i.e. pro-Hitler feeling) could be expected to grow; when Jews were not admitted (as happened more often than not), the democracies could be exposed as false to their ideals, undeserving of trust and thus, so far as the Jews were concerned, a broken reed.

There was amazing method in the madness. The 'purely emotional' antisemitism of others was converted by Hitler into a 'rational' one—*Antisemitismus der Vernunft*—involving (he stressed in 1919) not only 'the planned legal repeal of the Jews' privileges' but 'ultimately, implacably, the elimination of the Jews altogether', an aim to be pursued with a 'determination to attack the evil at its roots and to eradicate it root and branch'.

This aim which barred any alternative was always uppermost in his mind. He committed it to paper in his book *Mein Kampf* which roundly outlaws the Jews and dooms them to a fate to be enforced with 'ruthlessness', 'brutality', 'fiery fanaticism' and 'infallible intolerance'. No words occur more frequently than these in that Bible of Hate, and 'extermination' is constantly in the writer's thought when he talks of any of the objects of

his detestation.

Nor did Hitler leave his intention to cold print which might be (and in fact was) read by few. He spread the lawless incitement in countless public meetings and in other vehicles of propaganda designed to 'pour oil into the fire' so persistently that (he vowed) only a miracle could prevent an explosion. In 1921 the *Berliner Tageblatt* noted the Nazis' 'blood-curdling posters' and their campaign 'exceeding any record ever reached in the field of the most vicious and hate-infested party polemics'. Konrad Heiden, the classic historian of the early Nazi movement, writes: 'Hitler and his likes had for years filled the country with violence, murder and destruction, and the State had not found the strength to suppress them. . . . Where Hitler began to speak, murder could be expected to follow'. After a brief spell of 'honourable detention' in 1924-25, he resumed his campaign with an immediate call for 'the extermination of Jewry'—'the very images of the devil'.

This theme was hammered home by an army of agitators up and down the country. Dr. Goebbels, the chief propagandist, openly declared Jews to be human beings in the sense that fleas were animals, fit only for extermination, and another, sneering at conscientious scruples, elaborated the point: 'You don't say there are decent fleas after all and decent bugs—you kill the lot!' One of the storm troopers' most popular songs contained the lines: 'And when Jews' blood spurts from the knife, Things go twice as well'.

All this was long before 1933. In 1930 the London *Times* referred to 'the moral nausea felt by everybody outside Germany at recent attacks, surpassing all previous brutalities, upon the Jews'. One of the chief German Jewish papers then pathetically warned against that 'raving disease of the mind and arrant sadism' which was 'impatiently anticipating the moment when they will be free to throw themselves upon the Jews unrestrained'.

When that moment came, putting Hitler in absolute control, calculation and obsession combined to act upon the murderous programme in now distinctly traceable stages. They conformed to the rule laid down in *Mein Kampf* (p.273): 'Where it is a case of achieving seemingly impossible demands'—as the extermination of Jewry certainly was—'you have to divide the path before you into various successive stages and then make every, even the most determined effort to overcome them, step by step'. This design, applied likewise in the larger field of Hitler's international policy, was able to benefit from the lack of interference by a largely unsuspecting, unbelieving or uncaring world. In the extermination campaign the stages were the nation-wide boycott (in 1933), the 'Nuremberg Laws' (1935), the burning of the synagogues (1938) and finally the deportations (begun in 1940) to the places of physical destruction.

All the time, day in, day out, a technically consummate propaganda accompanied the 'solution of the Jewish question' with the oldest of Nazi slogans that Jews—'things that only zoologists will recognise as human beings'—existed, like vermin, only for the purpose of being killed off. In 1935, the Berlin Correspondent of *The Times* wrote: 'Like so many Nazi catchwords, *Juda verrecke*—"May Jewry Perish"—was meant literally and

will be literally brought to pass if the fanatics have their way'. They had. The most fanatical of them was Hitler himself who kept repeating (nine times) the solemn 'promise' ostentatiously given before the war that his 'prophecy' of the 'extermination of Jewry' would indeed be fulfilled.

Certainly as a Jew-hater, Himmler was less of a fanatic than Hitler. He eventually (1945) agreed to parley with Jews—Hitler would never have even considered the idea, in fact he sacked Himmler when he heard of him engaging in negotiations with the enemy.

It is difficult therefore to understand how a historian today can arrive at the conclusion—solemnly presented as a discovery too—that Hitler did not authorise or even know about the extermination of the Jews, that the Final Solution merely meant expulsion 'to the East' and that the—undenied—crimes were perpetrated behind his back by Himmler, the SS boss. Mr. David Irving, in his recently published book *Hitler's War*, produces in evidence the brief note of a telephone call by Himmler from Hitler's headquarters on 30 November, 1941, telling Heydrich, 'Protector' of Bohemia, that there was to be no liquidation (yet) of one particular transport of Jews from Berlin. This casual message is to be regarded as a general ban on the extermination. In his review of the book, Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper drily remarked: 'Generally speaking, one does not veto an action unless one thinks that it is otherwise likely to occur', and Mr. A. J. P. Taylor finds 'the idea too silly to be worth arguing about'.

Incidentally, Mr. Irving's 'discovery' is not original. The copyright belongs to Germans. As far back as August, 1956, the neo-fascist monthly magazine *Nation Europa*, while not denying the extermination, found satisfaction in the thought that 'secret crimes were committed by a group of secret agents acting behind the back of the German people, the German soldiers, even behind the back of the National Socialists'. (In making this claim, the champions of authoritarian leadership did not appear to realise —or perhaps did not care—how they were discrediting their own case.)

If not all Jews were exterminated, it was not for want of Nazi determination. Many managed to escape, either through their own exertions or the humanity of brave souls who refused to be degraded to raving beasts. Also the most efficiently concocted schemes are liable to miscarry at some point; there are limits to the cunning of iniquity: the wicked don't always have it all their own way. How many exactly perished, no one can tell with certainty. Who could keep statistics in a slaughter so vast and indiscriminate? Some of the chief killers have put the figure at six million; Himmler thought there must have been more. Conscientious scholarship has since arrived at an estimate somewhere between four and five million. But there is little point in the 'numbers game'. The murders began not just on arrival in the extermination camps but long before—during the inhumanly conducted transports which in themselves were calculated to kill, or through suicide, starvation, forced labour, action by special murder squads and countless other varieties involved in the crime.

This background to the crimes appears to be increasingly neglected as new, insidious manipulators of history arise.

CRIMES FIGURED OUT BY INTERPOL ORGANISATION

by Benjamin G. Cavanero

MUTUAL assistance in the enforcement of law and prevention of crimes which are international in scope was the main point agreed upon during the week-long third Asian Regional Conference of the International Police Organisation held recently in Manila, Philippines. President Marcos in his opening remarks called on the police organisations of the world to work together not only to combat crime, but to lay the groundwork for better understanding among all peoples of the world.

'It is my hope', the President said, 'that Interpol (Asia) will find the means to work closer together, extending hands to each other and continuously improving the techniques and facilities to dominate the battle against its enemies.' He added that by cooperation, goodwill and good faith, the organisation will not only 'triumph over the dark forces of crime but lay the groundwork for better understanding as an important element in the making of a better world.'

The President called attention to the three most serious problems obtaining in the region, namely: traffic in contraband goods; peculiarity of the problems of crime prevention in Asian cities; and the possibility of developing a sustained exchange of ideas among the various police agencies. He also expressed the hope that the assembly will find its way to regional cooperation on public order so as to match the initiatives being taken in diplomacy, trade and cultural exchange.

The illegal traffic in drugs was considered by the conference as the world's number one crime today. In California, the number of juveniles arrested for narcotics violations has in a year jumped more than 167 per cent. Adult arrests are up 57 per cent. Most suspects are caught with marijuana, and despite debate that 'grass' isn't harmful, state narcotics officials insist it is. John Warner, field supervisor of the California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, quoted a statement released by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics indicating that one of every eight persons arrested for marijuana offences was subsequently arrested within five years for a heroin offence.

Although Warner's statistics were compilations of arrest reports of law enforcement throughout the state, he pointed out that more than 80 per cent of the state's narcotics traffic and arrests were in Southern California. Thus statewide narcotics arrests jumped from 2,146 in the first half of 1966 to 5,735 in the first half of 1967. Of those, marijuana arrests were 1,606 in 1966 and 4,526 in 1967.

In Europe, the problem of drugs is so great that the Ministers of Justice of the member-countries of the Council of Europe studied it at length during their last meeting in The Hague. The Ministers agreed on the principles of a joint policy with regard to drug-taking: a distinction between

the less dangerous forms of drug-taking and the activities which encourage it; cooperation among the medical, social, judicial and public-information departments; and examination of the timeliness of distinguishing between the different categories of drugs in relation to their intrinsic danger.

These principles were inspired partly by an inquiry carried out in Denmark in 1968, thus showing well the extent of the problem. Of 350,000 young people in schools, about 42,000 had absorbed drugs or given themselves up to it. However, of those 42,000 young people, 4,000 had become habitual drug-takers, that is, less than 10 per cent. Today it is believed that the proportion has reached 20 per cent.

The drug used in 90 per cent of cases was Indian hemp. Nearly 17 per cent had sought a more powerful drug after a period varying according to the individual: the latter figure shows that, contrary to what is often affirmed, cannabis creates a need for 'effects' and constitutes the first stage in the abuse of drugs. From there, the victims go on to amphetamines or other chemical products taken through intravenous injections, to opium and its derivatives, in particular heroin, which constitutes most often a point of no return.

Heroin-taking is also a serious problem particularly in the United Kingdom. The number of known cases was 68 in 1959. In 1968 it had reached 2,240 and continues to rise. It must be made clear that known drug-taking is estimated at 10 per cent of total toxicomania. There too, the increase in the number of users under 20 years old is significant, bearing in mind that it was 700 per cent between 1960 and 1969.

Furthermore, it is noted that in all countries of the world, four new constants are specifically mentioned in the matter of drug-taking: it is the young in particular who give themselves up to it; these young people often take several products (polytoxicomania) whereas in former times, drug-takers took only one narcotic; the drug is then taken in a new form: most often in collective smoking dens, in mixed groups and through intravenous injections; at the outset, most of the young persons affected were students. Others belonged to artistic circles; then other groups, belonging to a certain type of sub-culture, were also affected.

The etiology of the abuse of drugs has not yet been discovered; however, it is probable that it is linked with the very swift change in the environment in which mankind is living and that this causes an increase in cases of social maladjustment. Majority of the findings is that half the young drug-takers come from families with problems, families of divorcees, alcoholics, and from badly-housed families. However, it has also been noted that more than a quarter of the young drug-takers had no special reason for giving themselves up to narcotics, and that they had reached toxicomania after having 'made an experiment'.

Besides the often catastrophic consequences of drug-taking on health, it was recorded during the Danish inquiry that 70 per cent of the young people who smoked hashish regularly no longer work because they became completely apathetic. However, among the young and up to now at least,

few cases of criminality directly imputable to drugs were found, apart from theft or forgery of medical prescriptions and breaches of the laws on drugs. Prostitution, both male and female, is a habitual consequence of drugs and among young drug-takers a very definite increase in alcoholism was also noted.

Raymond Edward Kendall, chief of the specialist drug squad of the Interpol, stated that illicit drugs, particularly those coming from the so-called 'Golden Triangle' (Laos, Thailand, Burma) countries in Asia find their way into the industrialised regions. He revealed that although illegal drug trafficking cases decreased last year with the arrest of some suspects, a new phenomenon in drug smuggling has started to appear. As Kendall explained:

> Three or four years ago, authorities did not pay attention to the problem. Now, a number of countries have set up drug abuse centres.

Likewise in the Philippines, there are a number of drug rehabilitation centres located chiefly in chartered cities such as Baguio, Tagaytay, Quezon, and Fort Bonifacio. Dr. Rodolfo Laserna, head of Tagaytay rehabilitation centre and chief psychiatrist of the National Bureau of Investigation, said that most patients at the centre 'are children of wealthy families'.

The majority of the addicts in the Philippines are teenagers who usually yield to the temptation of heroin, barbiturates, pep pills, and marijuana. Opium and LSD seem not to have seized the students yet, probably because opium is hard to come by and LSD's attractions are not obvious enough. However, while heroin, just like opium, has to be smuggled, many students somehow manage to obtain it.

The Chief Psychiatrist of the NBI explained that narcotic drugs are divided into five groups: 1) opium and heroin, which have no medical use (under this group are two synthetic forms—morphine and demerol, which are prescribed by doctors); 2) barbiturates or sleeping pills, branded Seconal or Sodium; 3) pep pills and other stimulating drugs, under which are several kinds: Dexidrin, Benzedrine, methedrine, amphetamine, etc.; 4) LSD, and 5) marijuana. The first two groups cause addiction, while the last three are habit-forming.

In the students' pharmacopoeia are heroin, barbiturates, pep pills and marijuana. Student addicts use pep pills especially during examination period so that they won't fall asleep when reviewing their lessons or taking the exams.

One curious aspect of dope addiction is the appearance of the addicts. Some of them possess features that seem to have been chilled into a graveyard mask. Others have eyes that are icy and hooded, and talk in a voice that sounds like a rheumy whisper. Worse still is the crime of violence likely to be committed when these drugs penetrate into the nerve tissue of the head, causing psychosis or brain damage.

Test cases reveal that when an addict does not get the 'shot', he immediately shows signs of stress, his face screwing up in inexplicable agony. Before pushers—cold-blooded ogres who would part with none of their

illegal stuff unless paid for—the addict will wring his hands in despair and beg the pusher in grovelling terms to give him the shot. After he gets it, the addict's eyes glow with pleasure and he sighs with the satisfaction of one who after hours of toil has completed a crossword puzzle, not realising that he has gone off the deep end of mental and physical destruction.

The dope problem is at its worst today, for where before it involved mainly non-students mostly living in slums, it now includes students, most of whom are at high school and come from average and well-to-do families. Student and non-student users of heroin have constantly been nabbed by the police during the last decade. Police estimates place dope addicts in the Philippines today at about 6,000. However, some 90 of these are now serving sentences at the NBI Rehabilitation Centre in Tagaytay City.

The treatment of addiction is no bed of roses. 'Chances of being cured are slim', as Dr. Laserna said recently. 'It takes five years on average to cure an addict. However, it takes only three to five months to cure an insane person. It is said that once an addict, always an addict.'

At the conference, Dean Napote, secretary-general of the International Criminal Police Organisation, declared that narcotics smuggling is a major form of criminality and should be included among the grounds for extradition.

'Extradition treaties', a French police officer said, 'are a good means by which nations could cooperate with one another and exert coordinated efforts in the fight against international criminals.'

He urged that all crimes against common laws in various countries should be included in such treaties, particularly smuggling and crimes of violence. Extradition crimes are those illegal activities punishable between countries by way of agreement. Thus, extradition treaties facilitate the arrest of criminals in other countries because they can be immediately returned to the country in which they commited the crime.

In the presence of this development, the delegates take up proposals to stop or at least minimize instances of illegal drug traffic in Asia. The members also discussed measures to counteract economic offences, traffic in human beings, international prostitution, thefts of works of arts, and the fraudulent use of fake passports. Furthermore, the conference took into consideration internal needs of the organisations such as communication, training and new policies in the fight against crimes and lawlessness.

The meeting was attended by 56 delegates of the 120 member-nations of the International Police Organisation, consisting of top-ranking police officers in their respective countries. The National Bureau of Investigation, headed by Director Jolly Bugarin, hosted the conference. Henceforth, they also cited similar cases of hostages being taken, hijacking and kidnapping, bombings, mugging and house-breaking. As a solid front against crime, they finally agreed that a concerted effort among nations is needed to combat these additional menaces.

THE PARADOX OF MATERIALISM

by Richard Parkhurst

LIVING in an oil-rich city like Kuwait, one is particularly struck by the curious paradox of materialism: the materialist—who spends the major part of his time and energy in the pursuit of wealth—is not a materialist at all. He is a romantic, a peculiar kind of idealist. He certainly does not love material things, let alone worship them. For, like the luckless Don Quixote of legend, he inhabits a self-made world of ideas, a world in which the idea never quite succeeds in catching up with reality. With the result that reality—tragically, if you remember your Cervantes—is forced by the sheer weight of circumstances to catch up with it.

The tragedy of the materialist view of life is that it concerns itself exclusively with the ideal of material, never with its actuality. A concern with its actuality would mean, amongst other things, its enjoyment: i.e. the practical use and enjoyment of the solid material things it can buy—as against the abstract monetary symbols of those things—from the noisiest and most expensive tape-recorder or the gaudiest watch, to a trip along the coast to Falaheel in one's own super-powered yacht. The central paradox of materialism, so evident in Kuwait from the first moment of touch-down in the busy airport, is that the pursuit and acquisition of wealth is not synonymous with its enjoyment. No less is the pursuit and capture of women (whaam baam, thank you, ma'am) necessarily their enjoyment. The other Don of legend was hardly your satisfied lover!

But why Kuwait, you may ask? What is so different about life in Kuwait —as compared, say, with life in New York or London—that marks it out as the target for this diatribe? Certainly it can't be the phenomenon of the Tired Business Man, far too tired to enjoy the fruits of his labour and, in this sense at least, gravely out of touch with material things. One has only got to take a walk along Wall Street any weekday, or pay a visit to the City of London in the rush-hour (preferably by tube) to pick them out at ten a new p. No, it goes without saying that this strange animal the TBM is really no more tired in Kuwait than anywhere else in the world. But he will find himself in an almost ideal environment; a city where the supreme joy of making money, for moneymaking's sake, is taken entirely for granted; where there are so many poor neighbours obsessed with the idea of getting rich quick in a country they hate and to which they feel they owe no loyalty, since they intend to get the hell out just as soon as they've made their pile; and where their more fortunate brothers, who are out of the rat-race by virtue of their citizenship, could easily afford to live wisely and well without struggle if they only knew how; where so many other foreigners come with moneymaking solely in view; where the shopkeepers work absurdly long hours in unthinking service to the presiding deity and compel their hard-working staff to do likewise; where no one lets slip from his pocket even the smallest token of the universal object of worship. In all of eight months I can't remember having seen a single 5 fils coin on the pavement (it would

be like spilling the holy wine); yet where, paradoxically (Kuwait is a city of paradoxes), WELCOME is written in capital letters on the doormats of one of the most hospitable peoples in the world.

A foreign acquaintance of mine burst into my flat one day recently. 'How are you?' he inquired politely. Since he hadn't stopped to ask me that question for weeks, though we had brushed up against one another with monotonous frequency, I was naturally rather surprised at this sudden show of interest.

Without waiting for a reply he went on to treat me to a jumbo-sized version of his life story to date. I'm not an unsympathetic listener, but it so happened that this was not the best of moments. I had just returned from the supermarket somewhat weary from a day's heavy slog, and had succeeded in dropping the huge bag of shopping (breakables, of course, at the bottom) all over the kitchen floor. I was actually in process of cleaning up the resultant gooey mess just as he arrived.

Sensing a certain impatience in his audience, he got straight to the point. As a friend of mine, he said, he had something to tell me to my advantage. I pricked up my ears immediately. Was he going to invite me out to a meal, or a surprise visit to the Sports Club in his new Lamborghini? (Wild thought)—had he entered my name for a tombola? And won! No, not quite, unfortunately. It turned out that his real business was life insurance. And he was wondering if . . .

To cut a long story short I didn't go in for his subsequent life proposal. Firstly, because I was not that interested. And, secondly, because, in spite of his enthusiastic claims, the premiums seemed considerably higher than his rivals, according to my computer at any rate. Undeterred, he immediately switched his line of attack to accident and health insurance. Didn't I realise I might get maimed and incapacitated in a car accident even if I weren't actually knocked down and killed outright (the way the pedestrian is treated on the roads here by certain of the young rich 'out for an evening's sport' gave this question a horrible ring of truth) or already hospitalised by one of the many fashionable killer diseases? Such is the power of suggestion I was beginning to feel my days on earth were numbered. Fancy imagining that I could have gone on living all this time without the thought of being suddenly stricken ill and confined to hospital for a long period, with a huge bill to pay at the end of it (assuming I recovered). My resistance began to weaken. Not content, however, with a politely expressed general interest in the subject, I found myself inveigled into making a firm date to see him again about the matter. 'I'll get in touch' had not been sufficient to grant me a reprieve. On leaving, his parting shot was: 'You're not wasting my time, are you?'

A day or two later he appeared at my door with a proposal. Feeling slightly paranoid by now, I asked defensively if I might see a descriptive leaflet. I would certainly have a look at it some time. (Did it include shopping accidents, I wondered?) This sent him into a right huff. He would tell me anything I wanted to know. Was I doubting his word?

It was at this point that I burst. I told him in no uncertain terms what I thought of his tactics. What earthly right had he to come invading my privacy for business reasons—all in the name of friendship! Was that the right way to go on? What was he living for, anyway?

To my surprise he was extremely interested. Maybe the Tired Business Man wasn't so tired and business-minded after all? One thing led to another and in the ensuing discussion we touched on the psychology of salesmanship, the 'facts' of economics, our personal philosophies of life—even venturing into the dark and dangerous country of metaphysics.

'Money is real, you know', he affirmed with vehemence. 'I don't care what you say' (I had been trying to say something about the true nature of reality). To cap his argument he pointed out that this discussion of ours had cost him 3 dinars in lost commission.

I was at the souk—the fruit and vegetable market. Though I had already filled two large bags to bursting point with fruit, there was still room for one or two bananas at the top of one of the bags. Doing a rather skilful balancing act, I managed to succeed in grabbing hold of a small bunch. The stallholder, who was a short and burly man, put it on his scales. 'Miah fils!' he cried. Still doing my balancing act I released one hand cautiously and let it slither down into my trouser pocket. I had only 70 fils. Mainly by means of gestures (facial) I tried to put across to the man that I wanted fewer bananas. He immediately lost patience with me. Snatching the bag away roughly, he waved me away, muttering curses to himself in Arabic.

Not to be beaten I continued my quest for *maoz* a few stalls further on. Gingerly lifting up what I hoped was a smaller bunch, I asked the price.

'Miah fils', was the reply.

'But I've only got seventy!' I expostulated somewhere between hope and despair. I showed him the coins in my possession and gave the best imitation I could managed under the circumstances of separating the offending bananas from the mother bunch.

With a twinkle in his eyes that lit up that brown, old, time-creased face and made it new, he put the bananas in a bag and handed it to me with a smile: 'Welcome', he said.

Perhaps I was wrong. Maybe the central paradox of Kuwait is—in that city at least—that materialism has two faces.

[Richard Parkhurst has studied art and interior design in Britain and America, also metaphysics and philosophical psychology at the University of Karachi.]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND IN THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

by F. D. Littlewood

THE last quarter of a century has been an historic, if troubled time for local government in England, and for that matter in Scotland and Wales as well. By the time Queen Elizabeth II came to the throne, it was generally accepted that the arrangements which had served so well for so long were creaking badly and that the time had come when some kind of change was unavoidable. England has always been a country of strong local government. Also, from the time of the hundreds and shires, the older cities and boroughs with their ancient charters, customs and privileges, had specially close links with the Crown. Reflecting the British character in many ways, solid and slow moving, often illogical, bound up with precedent and the slow process of the law, local administration had, however, not had a thorough overhaul for over a hundred years.

The Reform Act of 1832, which swept away the rotten and pocket boroughs for Parliamentary purposes, was followed by the appointment of a Royal Commission leading in turn to the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 and the establishment amongst other things of a democratic franchise. In 1888 County Councils were set up and alongside them 59 County Boroughs, i.e. broadly speaking Boroughs with the powers and responsibilities of Counties. Two County Boroughs were also created in Wales. So many County Boroughs was not at all the original intention but most cities and developing industrial towns showed their strength and clambered on the 'band wagon' only meant for a select few. This left all other municipalities within their County framework. Apart from the Local Government Act, 1894 which provided for elected urban and rural district councils, this in outline was the form of administration that saw the country through many social changes, both in peace and two world wars with their inevitable aftermath.

The system was essentially local with considerable freedom from central control and finance. It catered for many services that these days are just taken for granted. The combined responsibilities included drainage and sewerage, the supply of water, a vast field of health powers, the provision, repair and cleansing of highways and streets, an expanding concern with housing and in due course planning, and a range of smaller but important services such as cemeteries and libraries. Public education too with its own special story was founded on the County, County Borough and certain other Councils as well as, of course, with their particular history, the Police. Many town councils ran their own tram and bus services, as well as electricity and gas undertakings; often in addition to hospitals and mental institutions. During the last war besides Civil Defence responsibilities, essential services had to be kept going under air attack as well as housing, feeding and caring for the homeless, planning for and rebuilding the

damaged areas and repairing an enormous number of individual houses. All at the same time as sharing concern with the problems of an increasing and often unsettled war-time and post-war population. So it was not really surprising that mere tinkering with the system, however well intentioned and flexible, was not enough. A Local Government Boundary Commission, with Sir Trustram Eve (later Lord Silsoe) as its Chairman, but without a specific brief to do so, had a look at the functions local authorities might be expected to carry out and made some fairly dramatic proposals. It reported to the Government of the day in 1947, but the ideas were unacceptable to the responsible Minister, the Rt. Hon. Aneurin Bevan, and the Commission was wound up in 1949.

As the country moved into the 1950s it became clear that sooner or later far-reaching measures would be necessary in the public interest. But the local government associations, who represented the various categories of local authorities and the larger councils individually sought opportunities to influence the direction of affairs in their own interest, so that in the early years of the Queen's reign local government was 'torn by bitter fights between municipal and county councils, as county boroughs sought to expand and non-county boroughs struggled to acquire county-borough status'.[1] National party politics were increasingly making their presence felt both in Council Chambers and Committee rooms, often out of place in relation to the issues involved. Individual services were being lost to nationally based bodies, e.g. electricity, gas and much of health. Central control through the offer of grants and financial assistance was becoming more and more an important factor as ratepayers, often without sufficient thought as to the consequences, sought to avoid their ever-increasing burdens, pressed for the acceptance of this kind of help whatever the terms. White Papers were published by the Government in 1956/57, innumerable consultations took place and the Local Government Act 1958 was passed, leading to the setting up of a Local Government Commission for England and Wales. The powers of this Commission, however, were far too closely defined, the procedure laid down was detailed, laborious and involved. Further surrounding the whole of the Commission's work was a reluctance by the Government to come to any effective decisions on the recommendations it made. The work for these reasons got slower and slower and by 1965 only a few changes had been made.

In February 1966 the Prime Minister (Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson) announced the winding up of this Commission and other bodies then sitting and stated a Royal Commission would be set up to undertake a completely new and comprehensive review of local government in England. A similar body was to be appointed for Scotland with a somewhat different procedure for Wales. So 'by Her Majesty's Command' and 'in the fifteenth Year of Our Reign' the Rt. Hon. Roy Jenkins signed the appointment of the Royal Commission—a truly historic moment for local government in this country. Sir John Redcliffe-Maud (later the Rt. Hon. Lord Redcliffe-Maud) was appointed Chairman: his name, now so much a household word in local government and other spheres of public life, gave a special confidence in

the work that lay ahead and this was strengthened by the inclusion as a member of Dame Evelyn Sharp (later Baroness Sharp) who had spent a lifetime in serving local government as a civil servant in Whitehall, culminating in her appointment as Permanent Secretary of the responsible Ministry.

The Royal Commission[2] reported to Parliament 'at Her Majesty's Command' in June 1969, after having heard and studied the evidence of 2,000 witnesses and many lengthy and well prepared memoranda from the departments and organisations involved. It was truly a massive report, published in three volumes, with sets of maps and research appendices and a Memorandum of Dissent by an outstanding member of the Commission, Mr. Derek Senior, whose views have since been quoted in some quarters with considerable favour. The Commission said they were unanimous in their conviction that local government in England needed a new structure and a new map. Local government areas did not fit the pattern of life or work in modern times, and the fragmentation of England into 79 County Boroughs and 45 Counties made development and administration quite impossible and resulted in an atmosphere of hostility. In addition, many local authorities were too small in size and revenue to employ the highly qualified manpower and technical equipment. The Commission noted that there were in England no less than 1,086 county district councils, consisting of 227 non-county boroughs, 449 urban district and 410 rural district councils.

The Commission (from whose terms of reference Greater London was excluded as having already been dealt with by 1965 along the lines of an earlier Royal Commission[3]) proposed that England should be divided into 61 new local government areas each covering both town and country. In these new 'unitary authorities' 58 should be responsible for all services, but in the three very large metropolitan areas around Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester, responsibility should be divided between a metropolitan authority and district authorities. The new 61 local authority areas were grouped together with Greater London in eight Provinces, each with its own Provincial Council.

The reactions to this plan were, of course, various. The local government associations, individual councils and the political parties all had widely differing ideas. However, the Labour Government broadly accepted the Commission's recommendations for England based on unitary authorities and, in a White Paper published in February 1970, added two further metropolitan areas and modified the distribution of functions in the metropolitan two-tier areas.

Following the return of a Conservative Government in June 1970, the Royal Commission's Report and the previous Government's White Paper were rejected. A new White Paper continued the idea of metropolitan areas, but replaced the unitary authority concept with a two-level structure in counties and districts. This meant all the county boroughs outside the metropolitan areas were to lose their autonomy and become districts in administrative counties. At the same time a Consultative Document on

Wales rejected previous thoughts and proposed instead a county district pattern for the whole of Wales, and to complete the picture another White Paper accepted the broad principles of a regional and district system advocated in the 1969 Royal Commission on Scotland.

Again local government was in a complete turmoil. Wide ranging criticisms were made, a number pointing out that not sufficient attention had been given to financial considerations. However, the Government, in particular the Minister most concerned, seemed quite determined to impose this plan on the country and in due course in order to try and make it work changes were made in the central administration by creating, amongst other things, the huge Department of the Environment. In November 1971 the Bill which became the Local Government Act 1972, was introduced into Parliament by the Secretary of State responsible, the Rt. Hon. Peter Walker, supported by other Ministers also in some measure concerned. The Bill became law in October 1972 and came into force on 1 April 1974. The whole system had to be recast, further Commissions had to be appointed to settle areas, sort out differences and the many staffing problems that were bound to occur. New timetables for elections were introduced as well as a whole mass of detailed and complicated administrative amendments, which obviously became necessary. As far as the public were concerned, two things took their attention. First was the change in name of their local council that was so often to occur, and secondly and more important the enormous cost of the alterations in areas and procedures and how little it all seemed necessary. What was not so apparent to the man in the street was the further reduced power of his local council, the intricacies of making his views known to the effective authority and the increase in staff and expenditure the re-organised system would require.

Perhaps financial reconstruction should have preceded reorganisation. Many indeed hold this view, but the new system is now faced with the proposals of a Committee appointed in 1974 with Mr. F. H. Layfield, Q.C., as Chairman. The Committee, given the task of investigating in depth questions of local government finance, did so with unprecedented thoroughness and submitted their Report in May 1976. The Report, though recognised by those concerned with Government administration in the country as a work of great authority, was greeted by the general public with silence. This is not altogether surprising as many of the issues were only capable of being fully appreciated by the specialist, and the conclusions of the Report were responsibly described as 'having a rather unreal abstract vigour'. The Report argued that basic changes in the pattern of accountability were needed, and that the boundaries of central and local responsibility for expenditure and for the raising of the taxes to pay for it were to be clearly identified. This could be done either by leaving relatively much or relatively little scope for local initiative but 'tinkering' with existing arrangements could only lead to muddle and waste and 'a steady drift towards central control'.

One year to the day after publication of the Layfield Committee's Report, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Rt. Hon. Peter Shore,

announced the Government's response rejecting the Committee's argument that the dilemma facing local authorities could be solved only by adopting a system of either central or local control. In his statement to the House of Commons, Mr. Shore said 'the Government considers that the responsibilities involved in the provision of local services are inevitably shared'. The Govenment rejected the possibility of a local income tax and of any other source of local revenue and were to concentrate its efforts on improving the present system of rates supplemented by Government grants. However, it was proposed that capital valuation based on the market value of houses should be adopted in place of the existing system based on a notional rental value, the intention being to introduce the new system in 1982/83. Though the various local government Associations welcomed certain of the Government's proposals, that which concerned a unitary grants system to be introduced in place of the present rates support grant met with immediate protest, but the reaction to all this 'tinkering'—for tinkering it is though on the grand scale—was on the whole fairly warm if somewhat resigned.

One of the more interesting aspects of the Government's proposals were the views of the Conservative Party in opposition. Possibly on account of the unpopularity of rates—and nothing can quite equal the indignation that arises as each new rate demand breaks yet another record—the Conservatives announced a plan for the abolition of rates in favour of some form of tax on property, details of which were left rather obscure. Whatever virtue there is in this idea, and there is undoubtedly a good deal, the essential argument against abolishing rates is that it would fundamentally alter the status of local government. No system of grants, however much discretion local authorities are given, can compensate for the discipline of having to account to the local electorate.

It is against this background that reorganisation is going through its teething troubles, and the populace in the long run will make what they want of it. However, there are further complications on the way in the form of the proposals for some kind of national and/or regional devolution currently a matter of Government, Parliamentary, political and general discussion. There have been fairly recent debates at the national local government conferences of the two largest political parties as to whether another change in local government is not already necessary. The questions were seriously discussed but fortunately nothing seems likely to happen just yet, for whilst there is much that could be improved, it would surely be most unwise to uproot the new growth, however misshapen it may be, before it has had a chance to gain some strength and possibly straighten itself out in some way.

NOTES

[1] *Report of Royal Commission* 1966-69. HMSO Cmnd. 4040, p. 25.
[2] See *supra*; also *Shorter Version*, HMSO Cmnd. 4039.
[3] 1960 HMSO Cmnd. 1164.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THE RUSSIAN ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY

Russia's Political Hospitals: The Abuses of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union. Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway. Foreword by Vladimir Bukovsky. Gollancz. £6.95.

This book is the work of a psychiatrist and a social worker, both recognised authorities in their respective fields.

In his foreword, Vladimir Bukovsky describes it as 'a kind of encyclopaedia, an indispensable source for all those interested in the problem of psychiatric abuse'. The words are impeccably chosen for undoubtedly the treatise will become a classic of the final quarter of the twentieth century. In its damning indictment of Soviet psychiatric methods it throws into clear perspective the type of society which communist ideology has fostered. At a time at which the Belgrade Conference is pending and when the human rights issue is thrusting itself increasingly into public consciousness, its effect at the global level could be nothing short of seismic.

The authors are at pains to emphasise that psychiatry is the least robust of medical specialities; it is frail and vulnerable, its frontiers murky and inchoate. Psychiatrists quest for objectivity as Sir Galahad sought the Holy Grail. They remain haunted by imprecision *vis-à-vis* diagnosis, by the manifestly inadequate methodology at their disposal, by the necessity to find their *point d'appui* in social, ethical and even legal criteria. In the Soviet Union the weakness of psychiatry has been ruthlessly and relentlessly exploited. Psychiatry has become a political weapon of great ferocity, a monstrous form of oppression which has been used to emasculate those who dissent from the system or fail to conform to it.

Purveyed in this way, Russian psychiatry has polluted and scarred the practice of medicine; it has degraded and defiled the healing art, perhaps irretrievably. Worst of all it has been responsible for the emergence of a group of doctors so venal that they are prepared to dub perfectly healthy people insane, to confine them in psychiatric hospitals for lengthy periods of time, and therein to inflict upon them brutal, punitive and totally inappropriate forms of treatment designed not to cure disease, whether the latter be real or imaginary, but geared instead to elicit from the subject a recantation of his political credo.

Drs. Bloch and Reddaway trace the sad and complex story with admirable clarity, due restraint and rigid analytical detachment. The principles of Marxism-Leninism are inculcated in the embryo physician at an early stage of his undergraduate career. Stalin made no secret of this fact that political qualifications 'took priority over professional ability and expertise'. In the 1930s, dissenters first started to be interned in mental hospitals; the notorious 'Doctors' Plot' of the early Fifties just before Stalin's death indicated that the regime was prepared to act against the medical profession with an admixture of savagery and guile. In the mid-Sixties the West first became aware that the Russians were using psychiatry for political purposes; by the end of the decade opposition to psychiatric abuse was beginning to flare within the Soviet Union itself. By the Seventies the issue had become international, the Bukovsky papers being, of course, the catalyst for this development. Amongst others, Bukovsky cited the case of Zhores Medvedev, the celebrated biologist, who had been placed in a

psychiatric hospital by 'extra-judicial means'; he implored Western psychiatrists to investigate the situation in the Soviet Union within the general framework of human rights.

I found the chapters on diagnosis and treatment especially compelling. The concept of the 'core' psychiatrist—an ideological puppet, believing for sincere or opportunistic reasons that 'the party knows best', prepared to regard dissent as a pathological process and to collude with the state in declaring healthy individuals insane—provides a glimpse of Soviet society almost incomprehensible to doctors like myself who have trained and practised in the Western world.

Intimidation and punishment of dissidents by drug administration is graphically described and seems to have been widespread in institutions bearing the sinister appellation of Special Psychiatric Hospitals. Sulphur has been used to induce high fever and to cause a feeling of general malaise. But it is with the tranquillisers that abuse has been most florid. Gross overdosages have been given. Recipients have had convulsions; their mental state has been affected; there has been gross intellectual and emotional deterioration, depersonalisation associated with depression, feelings of utter hopelessness and pathetic attempts at suicide.

At the World Conference on Psychiatry held in Mexico City in 1971, apologists for Soviet psychiatry held the floor, and by a series of equivocations and obfuscations succeeded in sweeping these misdeeds under the carpet. Bukovsky in his foreword comments that this was a 'sad episode which, I trust, will not be repeated this year in Honolulu'. If, in Hawaii in late August 1977, Soviet psychiatrists are indeed called to account, this book by Bloch and Reddaway will most certainly have been a major factor in altering the situation in a manner beneficial to the whole of mankind.

JOHN A. LORAINE

TEN PILLARS OF CIVILISATION

Enemies Of Society. Paul Johnson. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £5.95.

There is no one whose books resemble those of Paul Johnson, and I say this by way of compliment. He deals trenchantly and concisely with the history of England, of Christianity and now of Society in general. This new book, with its 260 sparkling pages, risks the charge of superficiality but does not deserve that title. Mr. Johnson's reading is impeccably wide and he gives every evidence of hard original thinking before he offers his provocative conclusions. One cannot begin to summarise what is itself a prolonged summary. One must concentrate on the conclusions.

He cannot be placed too easily in any known pigeon hole. He seems about to tell us, though he does not put it so crudely, that everything is going to the dogs. 'New tyrannies have replaced old ones and fresh injustices have been generously heaped on the heads of countless innocents in every quarter of the earth. Few sensitive souls can look around the world today with feelings of satisfaction or optimism', but his message is not the obvious one. He goes on to tell us that 'The revolution through which we have passed was both just and inevitable'. In his view 'The hopes of mankind almost always prove illusory and we have only a limited ability to devise permanent and equitable solutions to problems which spring from human nature'.

Nevertheless, he is no defeatist. He gives us no encouragement to fold our hands in despair. Instead he sets out what he calls the 'ten pillars of our

civilisation, new and secular Ten Commandments'. If we can bring ourselves to follow these, we shall make the best of man's condition, which is inherently painful and full of disappointment. I will not set out the Ten Pillars seriatim, but one or two must be indicated. The first and most important in Mr. Johnson's life is the reassertion of our belief in moral absolutes. Next comes support for democracy as the least evil and, on the whole, the most effective form of government. On the same level can be placed the duty always and in all situations to stress the importance of the individual. Already we see a strong liberal code emerging. Some of the other Commandments operate on a more restricted basis—noticeably his peon of praise in favour of the middle class. It must be realised that these Commandments are derived from the account of history provided in the earlier pages. Christianity figures hardly at all. Johnson fans, like the present writer, will be aware of what he has to say and particularly his powerful conclusions on the subject from his *History of Christianity*. If we assessed him on the present book alone, we would underestimate considerably his spiritual interests.

The following paragraph is an example of what is to me least satisfactory in this remarkable book:

> The standard ethical and moral code of our civilisation is the product of Christian religious teaching, as modified, selected and emphasised by the dynamic middle class responsible for its main economic and cultural achievements.

This tendency not to distinguish between what I can only call levels of value is perhaps an inevitable defect in a polymath who moves so easily and so fruitfully from one level to another.

I have said above that it is impossible to pigeon-hole Paul Johnson. The temptation, however, is irresistible to find someone in political history who can be placed in some kind of comparison with him. Obviously not a twentieth century figure. Certainly not any kind of socialist or egalitarian. A strong 19th century liberalism has much in common with the Johnsonian doctrine. Gladstone would probably have approved all his Ten Commandments with the possible though not certain exception of the emphasis on science. But Gladstone, in his later days, was a great demagogue. 'What they give him in vapour he gave them back in flood.' Gladstone possessed or came to possess a fundamental conviction in the moral inspiration of the popular will which would appear to have no attractions for Paul Johnson. So perhaps the nearest comparison must be with John Morley whose literary and historical achievements Paul Johnson might not be ashamed of. Yet Morley, as we all recall, was a dogmatic rationalist. Paul Johnson is a firm Christian, even if the fact is not very noticeable here. So in the end, he stands alone. And what he writes will always have his own peculiar panache, audacity, and brilliance.

FRANK LONGFORD

POLITICAL THINKERS

The First Fabians. Norman and Jeanne Mackenzie. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £12.50.

Whatever judgment the critics may pass on this highly intelligent, witty and well-researched book, the authors can claim an Oscar for readability. The period covers about forty years, roughly 1880-1920, the decline and second wind of the Liberal Party and the birth and rise of the Labour Party. The Fabians, after many false starts, became a constituent part of the Party: or as the Mackenzies write: 'The essential ideas of Fabianism had at last become official Labour policy'. Sidney Webb wrote *Labour And The New Social Order* about

1918 when some of us were at the University and made it officially possible for those who 'work by hand or brain' to join the movement. Sidney Webb was elected M.P. for Seaham (a constituency later held by Ramsay MacDonald and Emmanuel Shinwell) and held the posts of Board of Trade and the Colonies in the Labour Cabinets of 1923 and 1929 respectively. It is interesting to reflect that Beatrice Webb's first love, Joseph Chamberlain, held the same portfolios.

In a recent review of David Marquand's *Ramsay MacDonald* I pointed out that Ramsay MacDonald was, more than anyone, the creator of the Labour Party, in so far as he brought together the many converging streams, the Labour Representation Committee, the Independent Labour Party, the Trade Unions, the Co-operative Movement, The Clarion Clubs, the Social Democratic Federation and the Fabians. The Mackenzies take note of all these other streams because, if for no other reason, they and Ramsay MacDonald himself were for ever battling with the Fabians, over Marxism, over class questions, over working arrangements with the Liberals. Moreover, the Fabians had their full share of internecine conflicts among themselves. In the end, differences were muted because, *mirabile dictu*, Labour became the government, albeit a minority one. By 1931, however, the Webbs, Bernard Shaw and Graham Wallas were pretty disillusioned with MacDonald and possibly with *Labour And The New Social Order* and democracy itself. So much for the political story, except to say that Sidney Webb (reluctantly Lord Passfield) was awarded the O.M. and was buried in Westminster Abbey; Shaw was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1925; Beatrice Webb has left a permanent mark on social research and a marvellous diary; Graham Wallas for some of us became the outstanding political scientist with *Human Nature and Politics* and *The Great Society* and certainly influenced me in helping to found P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning); he died in 1932. Annie Besant, 'the greatest evangelist of all of them', turned to Theosophy; Sydney Olivier, after a career in the Colonial Service, became Secretary of State for India in the first Labour government, and as I now remember kindly sent me a donation when I fought Oxford City in 1924. Two other original members, Pease and Bland, faded out in 1913 owing to differences with Beatrice Webb. Pease, the arch-organiser and secretary, formaly handed over the keys of office thirty years after the Society was founded in his rooms. In the same year the bohemian Hubert Bland lost faith in the Webb's 'inevitability of gradualism' and resigned, financially supported by his successful novelist wife Edith Nesbit.

The Mackenzies have a brilliant knack of devising Chapter Headings within their five Parts, namely Ardent Disciples, Pride and Politics, Prophets and Permeators, The Civilising Mission and Judgment Days: here are a few Chapter Headings—The Nicest Set of People; Little Busy Bee (Mrs. Sidney Webb); Postulate, Permeate, Perorate; Wirepullers; Luxurious Perversity. Within these Parts and Chapters all sorts of people, places and publications recur. I will give a sample—Arthur Balfour, Granville Barker, John Burns, Joseph Chamberlain, Gladstone, Haldane, Keir Hardie, Hyndman, Ramsay MacDonald, Ben Tillett, William Morris, H. G. Wells; The Court Theatre, Toynbee Hall, London County Council, Trades Union Congress; The New Age, The Fortnightly Review. I omit the London School of Economics and the New Statesman because they were Sidney Webb's own creations.

The Macknezies spare the reader little enough of the gossip, the intrigues, the philandering, the crankiness of the early Fabians. It is difficult at times to remember that the great majority of them were English, but then England has always had its fair share of eccentrics and dissenting religious groups. On the whole they were class-ridden, egocentric and priggish and little influenced by

external events or foreign affairs. When the Russian revolution came they swallowed it as the new Heaven. Not only the Webbs, but their younger relation by marriage, Malcolm Muggeridge, failed to understand what Iverach Macdonald of *The Times* and Robert Conquest saw, namely the starvation and forced labour of millions of Russian peasants. The Fabians were also split over the Boer War and the Webbs flirted with Milner Imperialism.

What, then, is the contribution of the Fabians to British politics and more particularly to the Labour party? Their devotion to research and essays, to lectures and summer schools influenced and systematised political thinking and gave the Labour party the semblance of an intellectual basis for their Socialism. But they did not impregnate the party: there were always other influences, such as the Pacifist group, largely ex-radicals from the Liberal Party, the Buxtons, Ponsonbys and Trevelyans who found themselves more at home in the I.L.P. with H. N. Brailsford, Clifford Allen and E. F. Wise and Jimmy Maxton. Not even Tawney, unmentioned in this book, was a typical Fabian. It was G. D. H. Cole who inherited the mantle, rebuilt the Society and helped to produce an impressive range of policy documents. The Mackenzies say that 'more than half the staggering Labour majority in 1945 were Fabians, ten of them in the Cabinet'. Although some of this number were 'nominal' Fabians, the total influence on policy was quite considerable.

KENNETH LINDSAY

LLOYD GEORGE'S LATER CAREER

Lloyd George The Goat in the Wilderness 1922-1931. John Campbell. Jonathan Cape. £10.00.

In recent years there have been many books about Lloyd George. When he died in 1945, his reputation was not very high. Yet two elements vital to any historical rehabilitation have occurred: the passage of years and the opening of his papers. In particular, it is this latter aspect (with the Lloyd George papers first at the Beaverbrook Library and now in the House of Lords' Library and at the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth) which has provided historians with the basis of many important studies. One thinks of two recent biographical attempts: Peter Rowland's large work and the first of John Grigg's multi-volume study. Neither has established itself as a definitive work. In addition, studies, such as those by Dr. K. O. Morgan, have added immensely to our understanding of the 'Welsh Wizard'. Various accounts by members of his family and by friends, as well as selections from his correspondence, have provided insights—both favourable and damaging—to Lloyd George's career. This is especially the case with regard to the publication of the diaries of his second wife.

The latter part of his career, that is the time after he fell from office in 1922, has received considerably less attention than it ought. After 1922, Lloyd George never again held public office. Yet until 1931, he remained the most famous and the most controversial politician in the country. Lloyd George's return to office was expected by most political observers. Such a return (so reminiscent of his hero, Napoleon) remained his passionate wish. Dr. John Campbell examines Lloyd George in the period from 1922 until 1931: the latter year being that of the National Government's formation, a formation which did not include Lloyd George. Dr. Campbell's particular concern is with the reasons for this exclusion.

This is a well researched and well written book. Like most other writers on

Lloyd George, Dr. Campbell makes it quite clear where his loyalties lie. He is an unabashed admirer of Lloyd George and goes to great length to defend almost every aspect of his hero's life. Thus he dismisses most criticism of the 'Lloyd George Fund', that mysterious fund which provided for his political manoeuvrings. To counter the charges that Lloyd George sold honours during the Coalition Government of 1916 to 1922, Dr. Campbell asserts that Baldwin most likely did the same. The persistent rumours of Lloyd George's 'trafficking' in honours (so reminiscent of more recent times) did much to hurt his post-war reputation and deserves fuller treatment than it gets here.

Perhaps the most important part of the book is the excellent discussion of the role that Lloyd George could have played in the 1931 National Government had it not been for his illness. This account, plus that in David Marquand's biography of Ramsay Macdonald, offers us new insights and high-lights the need for a new general study of 1931. One wishes that Dr. Campbell had not ended his book in 1931, but had carried it to the end of Lloyd George's life in 1945.

The author is rather hard on Asquith and those Liberals who continued to follow him after 1916. In particular he is a little unfair to Viscount Gladstone (the son of the great Prime Minister). Nevertheless, he does show that it was Lloyd George who had the ambition and the ability to repair some of the damage which those aspects of his personality had caused the Liberal Party; and he points out that, largely because of Lloyd George, the Liberals had many imaginative proposals in the 1920s.

Not surprisingly, Dr. Campbell is convinced that Lloyd George was kept out of office after 1922, by men far inferior to him. He believes that this exclusion caused great harm to twentieth century Britain: damage that is still evident. Yet he does not believe that Lloyd George was without fault. Although he claims that Lloyd George was the first 'professional politician' (a somewhat controversial assertion, excluding as it does Chamberlain) Dr. Campbell admits that his hero lacked certain attributes of the political animal. Above all, he failed (as both he and Dr. Campbell admit) to follow Joseph Chamberlain's advice to Lloyd George: to keep the party organisation sound above all things. Dr. Campbell attacks 'the two party tyranny that destroyed Lloyd George' and which still has the country 'paralysed' today. He makes an effective case against it in this interesting informative account.

R. F. MULLEN

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL WORKER

Happy Families: Recollections of a Career in Social Work. Ruth Evans. Peter Owen. £5.

As Professor Olive Stevenson well summarises in her foreword, social work, from being a quiet area of endeavour, is now subject to considerable public debate, especially since the Maria Colwell inquiry in 1973. Moreover, sociologists (and others) have questioned the very rôle of the social worker, as an 'agent of social control', who may be preserving the status quo and papering over the cracks of poverty and inequality by substituting 'casework' for radical action. Just as disruptively, in its way, the Seebohm Report led to the 'generic' social worker, in 1970, *inter alia* abolishing in local authority social services the separate specialist categories of child care officers, mental welfare officers, and welfare officers. The chaos caused, and the lowered standard of work done, could only be appreciated by those striving to continue in the field. Professor

Stevenson does not commit herself—'In my view, it is far too early to dismiss such a (generic) trend as unsuccessful and we have to find ways of working out the best kinds of service to clients'. Clearly, Mrs. Evans does regret the change and feels nostalgia for her old rôle of child care officer. Now, the latest development is the proposal to make social work a 'profession', in the sense that there shall be a British council of social workers which will set up a formal register, with powers to register and suspend. Ultimately, only qualified social workers will be eligible for inclusion. At present, the majority of practising social workers, to include residential workers, are not qualified.

Mrs. Ruth Evans is a fully qualified and experienced social worker, well versed in 'casework' techniques. She is, however, an unusual social worker, in that she entered social work in her middle years, and came from a cultured, academic mixed European background. Many social workers are fully aware of the rich human material streaming through their hands and files, but lack the skill and objectivity to write about it all. It comes as no surprise that Mrs. Evans published a novel. Her first chapters of reminiscences are autobiographical, leading up to her late career decision. After this, she selects a few cases through which to present the essence of her work, but she avoids the temptation of choosing those clients with whom she was spectacularly successful, those whom she improved, or whose life-situations she improved. These are really bad cases, and no easy reading for those wanting to know what a social worker really *does*. Her excellent imaginative prose, with which she describes the plight and family dynamics of her clients marks her casework, with her interpretations, as a kind of art form: there is no science about it, but a great deal of insight, dedication and humanity. Raw young recruits to social work may fail to perceive the subtlety of Mrs. Evans' perceptions, and may mistake her compassion for 'involvedness'. They may even resist her apparent truism, 'The words "care" and "welfare" have gone from our titles, but I hope and trust that they will always remain as guiding principles'.

MOLLY TIBBS

SHORTER REVIEWS

Maud Gonne. (Cassell & Co.) £6.95. Maud Gonne was undoubtedly a beautiful woman. Whether she actually amounted to much else is more open to question. Born around 1860 to well-to-do parents, she lived a life which always had one foot in the demi-monde. There was little if any trace of Irish blood in her ancestry, but she acquired a taste for the Anglo-Irish troubles from the time her father, to whom she was devoted, was garrisoned there. She thought of herself as an Irish patriot—the Irish were rather more suspicious — they thought she was a spy. William Butler Yeats was devoted to her, affections she scarcely returned. Before that she had lived in Paris where she had had an affair with Lucien Millevoye, by whom she probably had an illegitimate daughter.

Samuel Levenson's well-researched biography reads easily as he spans Paris and Dublin at the turn of the century. He is already the author of a biography of James Connolly and so knows his 'Troubles' well, but it is surprising that the Anglo-Irish patriot Erskine Childers does not get a mention. Surely he must have crossed Maud's path somewhere. Possibly we shall have to wait for John MacBride's son, Sean, to allow the publication of

the letters between Yeats and his mother to give a full picture, but in the meantime Mrs. MacBride comes through as a rather charming and undoubtedly upper-class Lola Montes. —(J.M.)

That Sunny Dome (Dent. £5.95). In this 'portrait of Regency Britain', Dr. Donald A. Low surveys the years 1811-1820. He sets out to trace 'the central idea running through the Regency', namely 'a varied quest for freedom', as revealed in life and literature. 'It differs from the earlier studies of the period in treating the contemporary written word of journalists as providing some of the truest evidence on which to base a historical view'. In the result a great part of this study is directed to the work and influence of the outstanding artists, poets and writers during these ten years. It is concerned primarily with 'Regency Britain and its way of life', not with religion, education, science or medicine. It was a period of appalling contrasts, of rich and poor, the privileged and the 'dispossessed'. The author spares only 25 pages, out of 200, to the latter. He quite rightly compares the Regency with the French Revolution 'in terms of social and political ferment'. The struggling movement and eruption from below deserved much more detailed treatment. This imbalance is the disappointing part of an otherwise stimulating, informative and attractive study.

Master and Man and Other Stories (Penguin Books. 90p. USA $2.50). In this latest addition to the Penguin Classics Series in paperback, Mr. Paul Foote has translated three of Tolstoy's stories written between 1890 and 1904. Apart from *Master and Man*, the others are *Father Sergius* and *Hadji Murat*. Mr. Foote might well have published *The Kreutzer Sonata* and *The Devil* along with *Father Sergius*. However, he finds the sexual theme in the latter only of secondary importance to that of ultimate humility and compassion. Indeed, Mr. Foote links it more closely in moral approach with *Master and Man*. *Hadji Murat* goes back to the Russian occupation of the Caucasus in the 1850s and the resistance by the native tribes. Tolstoy confessed that he wrote it 'with an expression of pleasurable guilt'. Mr. Foote concludes aptly, 'It was a piece of self-indulgence for which no reader of the story would wish to reproach Tolstoy. The story is didactic, but didacticism is not the major concern. Where it occurs, it comes blatant and sharp in Tolstoy's thrusts at Russian state institutions and historical figures; it is not conveyed through the soul-searching of an Olenin, Levin or Nekhlyudov.'

Joseph Andrews (Penguin Books. 95p. USA $1.95). In this valuable addition to the paperback Penguin English Library, Mr. R. F. Brittenden has edited with annotations Henry Fielding's 'thoroughly delightful' novel and has also written a short Introduction. It is certainly worth republishing. This also applies to another addition to this library, **Sir Thomas Browne, the Major Works** (£2.00. USA $3.95) which has been edited by Professor C. A. Patrides. The volume provides the complete text of *Religio Medici*, *Pseudodoxia Epidemica* (selections), *Hydriotaphia*, *The Garden of Cyrus*, *A Letter to a Friend*, and *Christian Morals*. Also included is the short piece, *On Dreams*. An Appendix prints Samuel Johnson's, *Life of Sir Thomas Browne*. Apart from Notes, Professor Patrides has contributed a substantial Introduction.

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RHODESIAN IMPASSE: A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP

by Richard Hodder-Williams

STANLEY BALDWIN once said that the Press 'enjoyed the prerogative of the harlot through the ages—power without responsibility'. In Rhodesia successive British governments, though not totally without influence, have in effect suffered from responsibility without power. How they must have wished to be harlots! Their fundamental predicament is crystal clear. The formal responsibility for resolving the Rhodesian impasse is, in law, unquestionably Britain's. International opinion has constantly reiterated this and domestic political forces have ensured that, as far as possible, British governments should take the prime responsibility for seeking a peaceful accommodation between two apparently irreconcilable forces. On the one hand is a minority in firm control of the coercive forces and apparently determined to employ them to preserve their privileged position; on the other hand is a majority, itself constantly undergoing a process of fission and fusion but broadly united on the basic aim of ending those privileges. As the years have passed, more actors have become involved, so that the ideal settlement must now satisfy not merely the British government, the white Rhodesians and the black Rhodesians, but also the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, and the governments of South Africa and the USA. It is a daunting prospect. But if there is no accommodation, the future Zimbabwe is likely to be a country where tolerance, generosity, and mutual cooperation will be singularly lacking and the rancours of a bitter guerrilla and civil war will fester on. All those involved in the drama must share the responsibility for the outcome, though obviously not all to the same extent. Even Britain, limited though her direct powers may be, cannot be altogether immune from blame.

In retrospect British governments have not handled the situation well. The tone of their discussions with the Smith government has not helped. The fact that Rhodesia was not constitutionally independent begat the fiction that its Prime Minister was consequently of little significance. But the starting point for all negotiations must be the fact that he controls Rhodesia and only he or his successors, barring an armed invasion, can deliver a white capitulation. What has been worse, Smith's cooperation has been lost by the grossly dismissive treatment he has received in the past, culminating

in Ivor Richard's unconcealed hostility at Geneva. Few, indeed, among British politicians have managed to overcome their entirely understandable moral objection to the man and thus treat him merely as another de facto leader of a state in negotiations with Britain. The downplaying of Smith stemmed partly from pique that he had survived and partly from estimations of Britain's proper image in the international community. It also tended to exaggerate the power and importance in the short term of the African leaders who enjoy the greatest visible backing in the international community and possess arms, rather than those whose links with black Rhodesians inside the country may well be stronger. Backing the winning side in a violent confrontation may be sensible pragmatism; but if the first prize really is a negotiated settlement that will last, preferring external leaders to internal ones—whoever they may be—seems a policy borne more of expediency than of principle. Certainly that is the way it is perceived by whites in Rhodesia.

Indeed, perceptions of the issues involved provide classic instances of mutual incomprehension. British expediency follows from a clear picture of the national interest which, to put it baldly, values good relations with Nigeria higher than bailing the white Rhodesians out of a predicament of their own making. Few whites in Rhodesia appreciate how British commercial and strategic interests are increasingly dependent upon good relations with the poorer, black, and ex-colonial countries of the world. Too few British appreciate how the world looks to white Rhodesians. The rational and reasonable men of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for instance, may instinctively despair of persuading Smith of the necessity to make concessions, but they believe intellectually that 'the logic of events' will force him to do so. The picture from their London offices is clear enough. It just is not possible in the medium term for 250,000 whites, increasingly occupied in defensive military action and gradually losing active manpower through emigration, to retain their privileges and powers in the face of a rapidly expanding African population, already more than six million and growing fast in numbers, political awareness and expectations. It is, then, not merely morally correct but pragmatically necessary if Rhodesia is to avoid a violent confrontation in which only radical Marxists would be victorious for Mr. Smith to negotiate seriously. The future of his soldiers' children demands it. However much the politicians and civil servants dislike Mr. Smith (and they heartily dislike him and deeply distrust him), they believe that 'the facts' *must* bring him to the conference table in chastened mood. Certainly, their lives in the international community would be much easier if he did.

But Mr. Smith, though he has come to the conference table, has not come for long in chastened mood. In Salisbury 'the facts' look very different. The prospect seems less stark and the choices more constricting. Few white people in Rhodesia are actually aware of the extent of the numerical disparity between blacks and whites. Since eighty per cent of white Rhodesians live in Salisbury and Bulawayo where segregated patterns of housing ensure that blacks are scarcely more visible than whites, this is not altogether

surprising. The ability of the security forces so far to contain guerrilla incursions is defined as success and the deteriorating situation of the last eighteen months is obscured beneath the momentary pleasure of survival. The mass media strengthen this illusion of victory. Given this perspective and the high status ascribed to the fighting forces (non-combatants are virtually denied girlfriends), it is difficult for white Rhodesians to envisage the possibility of granting concessions to politicians associated with the guerrillas. Until recently, too, senior figures in the Rhodesian administration assumed that the Western powers would not sit idly by if the climax to the Rhodesian drama became a naked armed struggle between the forces of African Nationalism, armed by Russia, and the forces of 'civilised' white settlerdom and they therefore saw little need to end the war by negotiation with Africans.

Apocalyptic visions of Rhodesia being the last battleground between the forces of good and evil are common. The issue, as politicians and media stressed from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, was simple: was Rhodesia to be the country of 1965 or was it to be run by a radical anti-white government with a propensity to internecine warfare reminiscent of the Congo? This bipolar view of choice, denying the inequities of 1965 and exaggerating the prospect of chaos in 1985, has dominated white Rhodesian perceptions. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Smith's implicit acceptance that there may be a third choice, involving perhaps an 'internal settlement', grossly offended much of his party, for whom the bipolar scenario remained sacrosanct. To a very great extent, then, the issues and the facts themselves are perceived quite differently in Salisbury and London, and this complicates any attempt at finding an acceptable solution to the problem.

Of course, the future of Rhodesia is more important to those who live there than to those who do not. It is not surprising that their focus is essentially parochial. What makes this more serious is the democratic and participatory nature of white politics. The Rhodesian Front is a populist party in which activists constantly urge their views onto their leaders and expect to be heard. The strength and skill of Ian Smith has lain in his ability to articulate these concerns and to bend to pressures, thus responding to and reinforcing the day-to-day prejudices of the normal, unsophisticated farmers and artisans who make up his party. But in Rhodesia above most places the long-term interest has always necessitated a partial negation of short-term self-interest. The primary role of leadership in Rhodesia should have been to educate the electorate, prepare it for changed circumstances, soften the antagonisms and conflicts between and within the races, and thus to preserve some at least of the existing conditions which make life for whites so agreeable. Instead, leaders have misled their followers, convinced them of the possibility of outright victory, exacerbated the divisions both between and within the races (the broadcasts in Chishona and Sindebele do much to cement latent tribal animosities), and thus jeopardised much of the present pleasant conditions. It is probably too late to educate the whites and satisfy the blacks at the same time; so Ian Smith's leadership will probably be

remembered in history not, as he would have liked, for his valiant success in preserving western civilisation but for his contribution to a bitter war which denied his fellow whites security and set back the establishment of liberal institutions for several decades.

To say this is not to minimise Mr. Smith's difficulties. He is, after all, being asked to do what no democratically accountable politician has recently been able to do, to dismantle the state apparatus which buttresses the inequalities associated with racially stratified societies. In the southern states of the USA, it required the Supreme Court first and then the law-making powers of the central government to remove the formal stigmas of race discrimination in the south; in Kenya, it required the British government with very real powers to force the settlers into an acceptance of a colour-blind constitution. Perhaps we can take heart from the experience of the southern states and Kenya, different though they undoubtedly are from Rhodesia, because their experience implies that entrenched attitudes can be eased and the consequences of dismantling racial segregation are less horrendous than the privileged sometimes imagine.

To solve the Rhodesian problem, however, requires more than just a change of policy on the white Rhodesians' part; it requires the assent of the black Rhodesians as well. This sounds simple enough, but it conveniently ignores the central point that we do not know who speaks for the genuine hopes and aspirations of the majority. Sorting out the divisions on the African side is no easy task. Alliances are constantly being made and then denied; organisations are publicly merged but in practice remain separate; individuals appear to unite in their condemnation of the present Rhodesian administration but divide over issues of status, rank, and ideology. Because of the strict limits on political activity within Rhodesia, the action has largely taken place outside the country's borders, where friendly African leaders have tried, in vain, to impose some sort of unity onto enduring diversity. The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe did no more than spawn a further nationalist grouping; the United African National Council soon broke into competing factions; and the Patriotic Front has proved quite incapable of integrating the supporters of Nkomo and Mugabe, let alone the black Rhodesians whose allegiance is owed elsewhere. These splits accentuate Britain's problems of finding a responsible leadership to which power could be transferred, dismay continental African leaders on whose support the guerrillas depend, and encourage white leadership in Rhodesia to emphasise the potential instability that transfer of power to such leaders would entail. In all cases, settlement is hindered.

These divisions have historical roots as well as contemporary causes. The Nationalist movement split in the early 1960s into two parties: one, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), acknowledging Joshua Nkomo as its leader; the other, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), recognising Ndabaningi Sithole. During the 1960s both Nkomo and Sithole were prevented by the Rhodesian authorities from participating in public politics, Nkomo being restricted and Sithole for the most part imprisoned. In these circumstances, though their memories lived on, their hold over

their followers naturally weakened. The rise of Bishop Abel Muzorewa to prominence in the 1970s, when he articulated the Africans' deeply felt suspicion of the agreement initialled by Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Ian Smith, injected a new and respected leader onto the stage. At the same time, dissent within the Sithole faction led to a bid by Robert Mugabe to replace him as the leader of ZANU. Divisions of personality, style, and policies had been the fundamental causes of the initial split; now, new political opportunities and the narrow personalised politics of the detained added to the existing divisions so that, when the Rhodesian authorities freed men like Nkomo, Sithole, and Mugabe, there were at least four people who claimed a right to speak for the black people of Rhodesia.

The experience of exile or the limitations of detention have always tended to exaggerate cleavages within any political group. Lacking elections to fight or posts of genuine authority to fill, the only rewards that are available are the status and privileges associated with high offices. Arguments then tend to stress personal distinctions, the character or tribal affiliation of individual leaders, and thus amplify existing divisions. Bitter infighting within the exiles leading to violence and murder was fuelled both by resurrecting competition between ZANU and ZAPU supporters and by competition between Shona groups for domination of the ZANU wing of the liberation movement.

Still more potent as a motive force is the desire of the aspiring leaders to be the chief inheritor of a transfer of power. Personal ambition of this kind is not of itself indefensible, but the cynical manipulation of negotiating positions is something different. Nkomo 'supped with the devil' in early 1976 seeking in vain for an internal settlement before forming the Patriotic Front with Mugabe; this radical change from conciliatory to confrontationist position was prompted by a belief that Mugabe's guerrillas held the key to the future. Since the Front was created, Nkomo has matched his radical words with the build up of his own countervailing liberation forces to substantiate his claim to the succession. In all these moves, he has been calculating how best to maximise his opportunity of inheriting the Rhodesian state. Mugabe's tactics have been predicated on similar grounds; lacking popular support within Rhodesia, he has sought out the political leadership of those with arms, a leadership granted to him grudgingly because of his fluency and experience rather than due to any intrinsic popularity on his part, and has steadfastly opposed any early test of support at the polls. Muzorewa, seen by many of the elder nationalists as a 'Johnny-come-lately' and as lacking the true nationalist's fire and hardness, has been denied support outside the country both physically and diplomatically and he must thus stress the need and propriety of elections which, it is widely believed, he would win. Sithole has followed Nkomo's path in reverse; denied the leadership of his own party and lacking the muscle of armed guerrillas, he has had to replace the harsh words of confrontation with the promises of conciliation and negotiation, for only by becoming an integral part of an internally fixed settlement can he hope to be the chief inheritor. Buttressing these personal calculations, though not causing them, are ideological con-

siderations; certainly, some of the radicals believe quite understandably that moderate solutions are inevitably neo-colonial solutions, by which formal independence comes to a country but in which the substance of independence is denied because of the continuing, and deeply ingrained, economic and social structures. If the denouement in Rhodesia creates a Zimbabwe born out of the desolation of racial war and a heightened sense of intertribal and intratribal antagonisms, the leaders of that Zimbabwe, revolutionary or evolutionary though they profess to be, must take their share of the blame.

To arrange a compromise between the white elected government of Ian Smith and the disparate forces of the nationalist movement would be difficult enough. But there are other actors of crucial significance in this drama. Behind Smith lies the South Africa of John Vorster, supplier of credit and oil and general servicer of international operations. For Vorster, Rhodesia remains a major embarrassment; he has been convinced for some time that the interests of South Africa would best be served if a negotiated settlement between Smith and some of the less radical African leaders could be achieved. Such a neo-colonial solution, though clearly not ideal, is much preferable to a long and bloody battle bringing to power in Rhodesia a cohesive and ideologically committed government of radical, almost inevitably anti-white, perspective. But, as the Foreign Minister Pik Botha has made clear, a transfer of power to radical leaders and the integration of guerrilla troops into the armed forces of the new state would not form an acceptable negotiated package. There are difficulties in Vorster's eyes in matching his pragmatic calculation with the realities of South African domestic politics. To have assisted in the successful operation of sanctions and to have been primarily responsible for the capitulation of a white government to black pressure of arms, he estimates, would reap a bitter electoral harvest. Vorster is therefore willing to pressurise Smith with words, but not on the whole with actions.

Behind the nationalists lie the Front Line Presidents and much of the world community. They too have the opportunity to pressurise their clients towards the conference table, but they cannot ensure that the conference will be productive. They provide the military bases, the logistic back-up, the moral support, and the international voice without which the guerrillas could never be successful. But they, like Vorster, cannot make their clients follow the path of ordered negotiation because they, like Vorster, have their own constituencies and their own principles to watch. Thus, any settlement which could be interpreted as a victory for the white minority, however simplistic such an interpretation may be and however ghastly the alternative may appear, will fail to receive the stamp of their approval.

What resources, then, has Britain to resolve this almost irresolable problem? Britain can, in the first place, call on support from other powers, as she was forced to do from the earliest days in her recourse to the United Nations. In recent months, she has developed a close accord with the Carter administration of the United States; but this has its price. Although the American concern to remoralise American foreign policy after the Vietnam

War and the Kissinger image has produced a sharp shift in the emphasis of American policy in Southern Africa, its very morality has the danger of pushing Britain further than she might like to go, for instance by imposing mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Recently, too, there has been a coordinated approach to South Africa by the EEC countries over Namibia which seems to have brought some dividends. But these are in essence only peripheral actors. In the second place, Britain has a few economic cards to play, but the hand is not strong. Britain is as dependent upon the good will of black Africa as South Africa is dependent upon her and Rhodesia has become so self-sufficient in recent years that Britain can no longer employ economic blackmail to influence policies there. Third, Britain still enjoys close social, cultural, and personal links with many of the actors involved, although mostly those not directly involved in the fighting. This cannot be quantified, but it certainly allows the government a modicum of flexibility and trust it would not otherwise enjoy. Finally, only Britain can, through Act of Parliament, constitutionally grant Rhodesia its independence. It is this power which binds Britain to the thankless task of mediation. Given such scanty resources, it is not surprising that Britain has made little headway. Governments must have been sorely tempted, lacking the power, to disown the responsibility and merely announce a solution, as Belgium did in the Congo and Portugal did in Angola, knowing that it could not be imposed and would not last.

The initiative of the British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, and the American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, suggests that neither Britain nor the USA wishes to take this easy, but dangerous, option. Their proposals for a settlement clearly cannot satisfy fully all the parties involved; but they do provide an opportunity for statesmanship of the highest level to be practised by all sides. Smith, having won his greatest ever electoral victory on a platform singularly lacking in specifics, is surely in a strong position to lead the white Rhodesians towards a negotiated settlement. But he is a cautious man and deeply hostile to the guerrillas, so that, while it is possible that he could be persuaded to do a deal with Sithole or Muzorewa, it is unlikely in the extreme that he would sign a document which even implicitly gave the victory to Mugabe or the newly militaristic Nkomo. Certainly Vorster, blithely unprogressive in his own domestic policies, would not press him to do so. Nor are there signs from the Patriotic Front's side that its leaders are prepared to tone down their demands. The time has thus come, therefore, for some participants in the drama to fail in their aspirations, for it is logically impossible for all sides to 'win'. At the moment there can be no voluntary agreement between Smith and the guerrilla leaders in which the guerrillas, inexperienced and to some extent ideologically radicalised, would take the leading part in the forces of law and order in an independent Zimbabwe. Neither Vorster on the one side nor the Front Line Presidents on the other could, or would want to, force their protegés into a compromise formula. And Britain, on whose final word a settlement depends, will not jettison the Patriotic Front and its backers and cannot impel Smith, elector-

ally victorious and strengthened by a more wary Vorster, to capitulate. The prospect must therefore be one of renewed and unremitting violence in which the majority of Rhodesians, whatever their colour, will suffer physically and morally.

Is this pessimism entirely justified? In theory at any rate I am sure there was a genuine possibility that the problem could have been resolved, but it called for leadership of the highest quality and of the greatest vision. I have no doubt that Smith could in the past have led the white Rhodesian electorate along a path which would have dismantled segregation and paved the way for a democracy such as that in Kenya; I am sure Vorster could, if he had really chosen, lead white South Africa along a path much more moderate and more urgent than he is presently pursuing; I am sure that consecutive British Governments could have treated the white Rhodesians less abrasively and thus antagonised them less; I am sure that British governments and their friends in Africa, all of whom prefer a peaceful solution to a destructive battle for control of territory and plant, could have taken a firmer line with the African leaders; and I am sure that the rivalry between the African leaders, while explicable, was not inevitable. Nobody would have been fully satisfied; but is that not the implicit assumption of the process of negotiation?

But the real world is the world we must live in. The theoretical possibility I have just outlined may seem to run completely in the face of reality, since the real Ian Smith and the real John Vorster have behaved in very precise and definable ways negating the possibilities outlined. But such a criticism is merely an ex post facto ordering of what did happen. I believe firmly that, while history and the physical environment set limits to what is psychologically and politically possible, leaders are still left within those limits room for choice; the measure of leadership is the use to which that choice is put. Rhodesia, it seems to me, has suffered from a lack of statesmanship and imaginative leadership at a time when only the highest qualities could possibly resolve the problems inherited from the past. Rhodesia's own leaders failed them; and the leaders of the other states involved are also not without blame. The people of Zimbabwe may well come to regret, in the 1980s and 1990s, that the various leaders grappling with that sad but beautiful country's future in the 1960s and 1970s lacked courage and vision. Theirs was no easy task; but their failure will exact a heavy and painful price.

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GISCARD VERSUS THE GAULLISTS: (PART TWO) THE BATTLE JOINED

by Donald N. Baker

CHIRAC's announcement of his intention to run for the office of mayor of Paris came in rather dramatic circumstances. On January 17, Giscard held his annual New Year's news conference. In the future as in the past, he said, he thought the 'majority' should be 'pluralist', consisting of partners who would treat the first round of elections as primaries but unite for the second round and collaborate later. Where possible, they should even unite on the first round. This he described as 'organised pluralism'. In response to questioning about what he would do in the event of a Common Front victory in the next legislative elections, he vowed not to resign but to complete his term (which runs until 1981). It was the duty of the president to defend 'the institutions' of the Fifth Republic, and he would not abandon that responsibility.

On January 19, Chirac dropped his bombshell. After visiting Barre, to offer the RPR's formal assurances that it would continue the Gaullists' support for the government's economic programme, Chirac announced to the press that he had also voiced 'the most extreme reservations' about the way in which the government was preparing for the forthcoming municipal and legislative election campaigns. Indeed, to prevent the nation's capital city from falling into the hands of the 'Socialo-Communists', and to provide a new direction and élan for the 'majority's forces' all over the country, he felt obliged to enter the municipal elections personally, as candidate for the office of mayor of Paris. The time was past, he said, for 'party compromises and corridor negotiations'. M. de la Malène then publicly stepped aside so that this higher purpose could be served. The 'battle of Paris' was under way.

The first stage of the campaign was dominated by a bitter exchange between Giscardiens and Chiraciens. Barre reacted immediately, warning that Chirac was encouraging divisions that could only undercut the government's economic programme and its coherence and credibility and that the result could only be a strengthened Left. Jacques Dominati, general secretary of the Independent Republicans, described Chirac's move as a deliberate challenge to the president's authority and as 'a dangerous threat to our institutions'. Spokesmen for the small Centre parties were naturally angry, seeing themselves as the likely victims of the R.P.R.'s tactics. Some of the Gaullists who had continued to unite membership in the R.P.R. and support for Giscard found they had to make a choice. Olivier Stirn, Secretary of State for Overseas Territories, resigned from the R.P.R. in protest and formed a committee of dissidents.

The most remarkable dimension of this early stage, however, was an epistolary exchange between Barre and Chirac. The exchange was prompted by Giscard's request to Barre to see if he could not get both sides to withdraw their candidates in favour of a mutually agreeable third person. In

response to a telephoned request to his office to meet with the Prime Minister, Chirac wrote that he would not attend the meeting. Noting the 'aggression and bad faith of certain of your ministers' and the 'regrettable campaign' against him in the government-controlled media, he went on to state his reasons for refusing either to withdraw or even to discuss the matter with Barre.

> First, the election of Paris must be won with a certain panache. Parisians don't like mediocre attitudes and Florentine combinations.
>
> Next, the election of Paris must be won in an exemplary fashion in order to advance the struggle we have launched against collectivism. Thanks to this election . . . , we shall be able to block the thrust of the Opposition which . . . is presently claiming to be the majority in the country. If we downgrade the importance of this election, or if we lose it, nothing more will be possible.
>
> You can see, then, that I am resolved and won't change my mind except for grave and imperious reasons. Like me, you know that only the President of the Republic can have such reasons. Given the recent past when, as he doubtless recognises, I served him loyally, would it be too much to ask him to tell me personally the *raisons d'état* that are leading the government to oppose my candidacy?
>
> Rest assured that in my mind it does not diminish your authority in the slightest, nor our common esteem, to ask the Head of State himself to tell his former prime minister the reasons for such ostracism.

To that remarkable epistle Barre replied immediately and in kind. After the usual amenities, he wrote that he felt constrained 'to observe' that Chirac had announced his candidacy at precisely the moment that Barre, at the president's direction, was trying 'to create an entente among the diverse formations of the majority in Paris'; that while Chirac had been courteous enough to inform Barre of his decision moments before telling the press, he had presented his decision as 'definitive and irrevocable' and had refused Barre's request to inform the president personally before announcing it; that Chirac's behaviour since resigning as prime minister indicated a deliberate 'challenge to the president of the republic and a deliberate snub to the government'; and that there were indeed 'serious and imperious reasons' for Chirac's withdrawal from the race in favour of a compromise choice.

> Let me tell you again of my disquiet. I fear that, despite your professed intentions, your candidacy for the mayoralty of Paris will only provoke a serious division within the majority that will in turn cause an unfortunate loss of confidence in the majority throughout the country; that your candidacy will only advance the cause of the Opposition that you want to fight; that it undermines the political formation that you lead and that has played an eminent role in the political life of our country since 1958; and that it will lead ultimately to an institutional crisis the country does not need.

Barre added in another letter that the President was ready to meet with Chirac in order to give his 'grave and imperious reasons' for wanting Chirac to withdraw.

Chirac wasted no words in being polite or even diplomatic. He would not discuss the matter with the president. Moreover, he added,

> I cannot accept your reproach of threatening our institutions. Who will believe that my candidacy for the mayoralty of Paris harms those institutions when it appears that they could function normally with M. François Mitterand as prime minister?

There the 'dialogue' ended. The Elysée palace withdrew its invitation for Chirac to visit the President.

Chirac's themes during the campaign were few and familiar. He was always careful to strike one moderate note: an endorsement of the President's appeal for 'organised pluralism' within the majority. At the same time, however, he said repeatedly that the chief responsibility for organising the pluralism fell to 'the majority of the majority', not to 'the minority of the majority'. His chief themes were twofold: a sustained criticism of 'the state' for its 'hesitation', 'abdication', 'delinquency', and 'failure'; and an assault on the 'totalitarian Socialisto-Communist' Left. He was especially critical of Giscard's statement, made in his January press conference, that he could 'accommodate' to a Common Front victory in the next legislative elections and that he would complete his mandate in that event. To Chirac, this was 'suicidal' talk. It encouraged voters to think that they could support the Common Front for the National Assembly while having Giscard to safeguard 'the institutions'. The fact is, Chirac argued, that the parliament could easily neutralise the president and create chaos, and that chaos would serve as the pretext for creation of a Leftist dictatorship.

Chirac's polarising strategy and his brazen assault on the government threw Giscard and Barre onto the defensive. Giscard was forced to respond. In a series of major speeches he asserted that he had not meant to imply that he would 'accommodate' the powers of the presidency to a diminished status but that he, as president, would 'appreciate' and take into account whatever new political realities came out of the legislative elections. He vowed not to resign his position or 'to efface' the presidency 'in the event of difficulties or political tensions'. He was even pushed to the point of swearing that as president he would never permit 'the institutions' of the republic to be 'touched' by the Common Front and to assert 'the primacy of the presidency' among those institutions.

By comparison with these grand themes the appeals of the lesser actors received little attention. The uninspiring d'Ornano focussed almost exclusively on the problems of Paris, having the audacity to publish a book with a title drawn straight from de Gaulle: *Une Certain Idée de Paris*. Throughout he gave the impression of being an able but somewhat hesitant spear carrier for the president, one who had virtually given up when Chirac entered the race. Like d'Ornano, Sarre dealt with the issues at hand rather than generalities, promised major reforms in the procedures of municipal government, and answered the Chiraciens' charges that the Socialists were dupes of the totalitarian Communists. The major new element was an 'ecological' ticket which embodied a kind of urban protest vote against the trends of recent 'development' in Paris and perhaps a 'plague-on-both-your-houses' response on the part of some voters who had once supported the majority.

Sensing defeat and trying to limit the damage, Giscard and Barre tried to get the Gaullists to separate the open warfare in Paris from arrangements in the provinces, where the Left was much stronger. The Gaullists proved remarkably obdurate, given their own vulnerability. In the end, the Gaullists

and Giscardiens were able to form single tickets for the first round in only 30 per cent of the municipalities of France—a figure that was markedly down from the 85 per cent in 1971. In the face of what looked like nearly universal disaster for his own forces, Giscard began to back-pedal. He insisted that affairs of state, particularly the war against inflation, occupied most of his time and that the responsibility for political arrangements fell on Barre, who, as prime minister, had the task of finding majorities in the National Assembly. Giscard's contingency plan was becoming visible: in the event of disaster, he was preparing to soar into non-partisan statesmanship.

The municipal elections provided a sweeping victory for the Common Front. The Socialists did particularly well. They moved from control of 1,261 town and city councils to control of 2,246, while the Communists moved from control of 1,327 to 2,230. (There are no analogous figures for the Gaullists or Independent Republicans.) In the 230 cities over 30,000 in population (excluding Paris and its immediate suburbs), the Common Front and its allies won control of 159 city councils. (The Socialists moved from control of 46 to 81, the Communists from 50 to 72.) By contrast, the Gaullists fell from control of 27 to 15, the Independent Republicans from 20 to 13, and the Centre—the Radicals and Centre Democrats—from 29 to 11. These results confirmed a decade-long trend towards the Left in local government, a kind of muted protest against the dominance of the national political scene by the Right over the years.

The election in Paris was also no surprise, although it was uncommonly confusing. Some 875 candidates ran on 121 labels for the 109 seats on the new council. (The seats were in turn divided up among 18 voting sectors, all of them along ward lines except for the combination of the 1st and 4th wards and of the 2nd and 3rd.) The new mayor was to be chosen, not by direct election, but by the 109 aldermen. In the first round, on March 13, the Chiracien candidates defeated the Giscardiens in eleven of the 18 sectors, thus eliminating d'Ornano in accord with the principle of 'organised pluralism'. However, the Chiraciens' margin of the popular vote was rather narrow—26 to 22 per cent for the Giscardiens. In the second round, pro-Giscard voters and perhaps some Gaullists not enamoured of Chirac abstained from voting in large numbers, with the result that the majority saw its margin reduced. The entire majority lost between 5 to 9 per cent of the vote in over half of the 18 sectors, retaining its 1971 percentages in only two (the 5th and 17th wards). By contrast, the vote for the Common Front's candidates was up almost everywhere. In the first round the Common Front even outdrew the Gaullists, 32 per cent to 26. The upshot was a weakened 'majority' and a somewhat strengthened Left in Paris. The Independent Republicans received especially heavy blows. Both d'Ornano and Dominati, the general secretary, were defeated for the council. A particularly interesting dimension to the election was provided by the 'environmentalist' ticket. It drew about 10 per cent of the vote in the first round. Almost all of that vote later went to the Common Front or 'extreme Left' candidates—a sign that Chirac's movement was not serving as a lightning rod for dis-

content.

More important, however, was the distribution of seats on the council. The accompanying table indicates the balance of parties in 1971 and in 1971 and in 1977 and the measure of the majority's decline. In 1971 the Pompidolean majority, lacking the Centre parties, had commanded a substantial and well-disciplined bloc. In 1977, the same combination could barely muster a majority of one (55 seats of 109), and could do so only with the support of a large number of 'independent' Gaullists and *'majoritaires'*. The core components of the old combination, in sum, were now much smaller and much less well-organised than had been the case. It seemed likely that Chirac, as mayor, would have to depend in part on the Centre component in Giscard's presidential majority. That meant in turn that Chirac would probably have to take a somewhat more conciliatory and less imperious role as mayor than he doubtless would have liked.

MAJORITY	1971		1977	
Gaullists	35		31	
Independent Republicans	10	49	8	
Others	4		16	69
CENTRE				
Radicals, Centre Democrats	10		14	
LEFT				
Communists	20		22	
Socialists	8	30	14	40
Left Radicals, Other	2		4	
OTHER				
Independent	1		0	
TOTAL	90		109	

While the Common Front increased its proportion of the vote and its number of seats from 33 to 36 per cent of the council, it did so in a context in which 'demographic evolution' was against it, as André Laurens observed in *Le Monde*: 'And that is a success worth at least as much as that of M. Chirac.' In Paris as elsewhere, however, the trend to the Left favoured the Socialists over the Communists. Some voters were doubtless attracted by the Socialists' programme and its leadership; others may have calculated that, in view of the growing appeal of the Common Front, it would be wiser to strengthen the Socialists and to keep the Communists in a secondary role. The Left accomplished its feat with a budget of only 1.3 million francs by comparison with budgets of 9 million for Chirac and 6 million for d'Ornano.

The electoral returns intensified the growing divisions between Giscard and Chirac. Their collaboration in the second round had been a product of necessity, not of genuine reconciliation. For the Chiraciens, Chirac's victory in Paris was evidence that he had been correct in his assessment of things: everywhere else there had been ruin. Only where Chirac had himslf taken a stand, challenging the President and the Left, had there been noteworthy

success. Against the Leftist tide he had held the capital city for the forces of 'liberty'. The Giscardiens charged that the cause of the electoral disaster on the national level lay in Chirac's splitting of the governing alliance, his defiance of presidential authority, and his attack on Giscard's motives and abilities—all to serve his own personal ambitions. Growing fear of defeat in the coming legislative elections lent both sides a new sense of desperation, giving greater impulsion to their sense of being right and their anger at the other partner.

Giscard hastened to save what he could from the débâcle. He asked for the resignation of Barre's government and replaced it with a new 'non-political' cabinet. Barre was again named as prime minister, but Michel Poniatowski, formerly Minister of the Interior and Giscard's chief political agent, was dropped, as well other ministers known for their partisanship. The government's aim would be to set the economy right and to get on with the necessary business of government while others focussed on political squabbling.

Giscard's new strategy was immediately challenged by both Chirac and the Common Front (through the labour unions). The new government had to face the parliament and receive a vote of confidence. On the grounds that it did not truly express the balance of forces in the National Assembly and particularly the balance of forces in the presidential majority, the Chiraciens threatened to withhold their support from the new Barre cabinet when it appeared before the National Assembly in April. But then Chirac, having made his point about the government's vulnerability and the preponderance of his party in the majority, decided in statesmanlike manner to provide the necessary support in order to permit the government to carry on with its commendable economic programme. However, Chirac's support did not extend to other government initiatives, including direct elections to the European parliament.

The government had hardly survived this threat when the trade unions began a round of strikes to protest against the Barre government's renewed pledges to maintain wage and price controls. Pointing to the report of the OECD in the autumn of 1976 showing that, of all major industrial societies in the West, the distribution of income was most inequitable in France, the unions loudly refused to accept wage controls that kept the distribution of income where it was. On May 24, 1977, the protests crystallised in a 24-hour general strike, the first since 1968. In the face of these manoeuvres Giscard's spokesmen threatened to call early legislative elections, with the blame falling on both the Chiraciens and the Leftists for an 'unnecessary' crisis, but this was bluff, given the state of public opinion polls.

Who won 'the battle of Paris' in March 1977? At one level, of course, Chirac did. He took on a convenient but unnecessary challenge and conquered it, strengthening his image as a man of audacity and imagination, *'un vrai chef'*. His gamble in Paris had made him the second most powerful elected official in France (the prime minister is appointed), provided him with a new political base and new political options, and kept the momentum of his movement going. His personal success, moreover, helped to obscure

the dimensions of the disaster in the provinces and signs of electoral weakness in Paris itself. By dividing and discrediting the presidential majority, thus lending the Left a new allure, he had also enhanced his own position as the champion of the anti-Red forces and proved himself the master of the self-fulfilling prophecy, at least up to a point.

At another level, however, one could say that the Common Front was the victor. The open struggle within the governing majority certainly contributed to its successes, permitting the election of some Leftist candidates who otherwise would have been defeated. The struggle for Paris, moreover, sharpened the differences within the majority and made the likelihood of its continuation as a coherent force more doubtful. On the other hand, the advances of the Common Front in Paris came by default, the main contenders in Paris having dealt each other stunning, if not necessarily mortal, blows.

Yet again, time may show Giscard to have been the ultimate winner. Certainly 'the battle of Paris' ended in defeat and humiliation for his forces. But at the same time it heightened suspicions about Chirac's motives and common sense. Chirac, after all, had provoked a major crisis where there had been only a relatively small one and had rebuffed all efforts at compromise—and all of this over an office he did not need and for demagogic reasons (the Red menace) that struck many Frenchmen as an unfortunate carry-over from the past. It may well be that as the next legislative elections approach many conservative and liberal voters, anxious to avoid the hysteria that Chirac's politics encourage, will throw their support to the Centre parties and Independent Republicans as a counter balance. Although the results in Paris were disappointing in this respect, they might be different when a broader constituency is consulted, the stakes are higher, and Chirac's momentum slows.

Will this dispute within the governing coalition lead to its demise and perhaps to a fundamental transformation in the Fifth Republic itself? The municipal elections and public opinion polls at least suggest the possibility. However, as Leftist commentators are keenly aware, things have a way of working out against the Left. Not only is the electoral system gerrymandered in favour of the Right, but the duel between Giscard and Chirac may serve to mobilise the largest possible constituency for the governing coalition. Voters who want change can vote for Chirac while those who want the status quo can vote for Giscard—or vice versa, depending upon what one thinks they represent. As soon as the elections are over, one Communist writer has suggested, the old alliance will be reconstituted in the blink of an eye and everyone will suddenly see that the whole thing was merely a sham battle between factions of the same movement. Perhaps! But the outcome suggests that the electorate may no longer be prepared to play the old games.

[Part One of *Giscard versus the Gaullists* was published in the September 1977 issue of the *Contemporary Review*.]

BRAZIL: RACE, COLOUR AND CLASS

by Frances Rust

IT would be a rash observer who would use the term 'national psychology' about a country such as Brazil, perhaps the most diverse and paradoxical in the world. In area over 3 million square miles with a population of 110 million who represent a 'racial mix' of Indian, African, Portuguese, Italian, German and Japanese and provide a colour spectrum of all shades from black to white, Brazil can certainly not be summed up in easy clichés. Yet, one is tempted to see some significance in the motto: *'Ordem e Progresso'* (Order and Progress) on Brazil's national flag. This quotation from Comte, the French positivist philosopher, can be presumed to have had more influence on the development of Brazil's social structure, and to possess greater appeal to Brazilians, than such slogans as: Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité to which all Europeans feel they must, at least, pay lip service.

In any event, without reading too much into national slogans, it is clear to critical observers both inside and outside the country that the two 'running sores' of Brazilian society are: first, extreme inequalities in income, welfare and living standards, and second, the restriction of civil liberty and civil rights. The former seems almost endemic (though none the less unacceptable) in Latin American countries and the latter has been particularly predominant in Brazil since 1964, the year of the military coup which set up the present authoritarian and repressive style of government.

It is the purpose of this article to explore the part played by race, colour and class in the inequalities typical of Brazil's social structure: from the most basic inequality of all—the opportunity to stay alive—to inequalities in the economic, political and social sector.

Since the coup in 1964 the key words would seem to be the 'Brazilian economic miracle': during the years 1964 to 1975 the rate of economic growth averaged 10%, and in 1975 was a 'mere' 4½%. Probably the most persistent criticism levelled both inside and outside Brazil is the pattern of distribution of income and welfare that has accompanied these growth rates. For the years between 1960 and 1970 the per capita *real* income of the lowest income receivers increased by only 0.75% whereas, for the top 1% (already immensely rich) the figure was 11.2%, and the middle classes also did well. From the social point of view, it is the 'undistributed' economic miracle, as it has done nothing whatever to even out the pattern of prosperity.

Sao Paulo, the centre and hub of the economic boom, is a city where, it is said, the 11th and the 21st centuries exist side by side. A recent study carried out by the University there has shown that the poorest sector of the population in Sao Paulo spends on food only 29% of what would be necessary if the family were to be adequately fed, and as a consequence the majority of children in this sector are suffering the effects of malnutrition.

Quite independently, a leading newspaper of Sao Paulo recently had an editorial which criticised the nutritional standards of the very young, pointing out (the cynics might say, as much from an economic as from a human-

itarian point of view) that in the next 15 or 18 years these young people 'will be entering the labour market. People discuss enthusiastically the amounts of electricity which will have to be supplied in 1981 . . . there are long debates about the volume of fertilisers and non-ferrous ores which the economy will demand in the next ten years. . . . To put it crudely, Brazil is becoming a country where the machinery tends to be in a better state than a large proportion of the men. . . . '

Everyone now knows that the period of rapid growth in Gross National Product is over, largely because of the rise in the price of oil, a factor responsible for the country's massive balance of payments difficulties. (Brazil imports about 80% of her oil which costs the country approximately 3,000 million dollars, one third of the value of all her exports.) A big re-think is going on and within Brazil itself, as we have been, anxieties about the social effects of the 'miracle' are being voiced. One practical outcome was the raising of the minimum wage by 41% in 1975.

The greatest suffering falls on those without work, either because they are in the poor North-east where opportunities are limited and where cultivation of the land is fraught with the perennial hazard of drought, or because, in general, they are ill and illiterate and cannot get or keep regular employment. In other words, suffering continues in the lowest socio-economic stratum which struggles to keep alive in the *favelas* and shanty-slums: in 'houses' made out of packing-cases and bits of tin, without sewage, drainage or water supply. Significantly, infant mortality, generally taken as an indicator of a nation's well-being, is overall 108.68 per 1,000. This means in the worst areas of the North-East one death for every four live births (a rate of 250 per 1,000). The average expectation of life (and again one must bear in mind that this figure is an amalgamation of rich and poor) is approximately 56 years.

Finally, a look at education. In the years 1960 to 1970 the allocation of resources to education made possible an unparalleled expansion of secondary and, especially, higher education. UNESCO figures show that the expansion for secondary was 247% and for higher education 357%. But unfortunately nothing was done for primary education. It is well-known that in Brazil millions of children drop out of primary school after the start of the school year, and millions never even start. In more precise terms, a study in Brazil in 1971 estimated that six million out of Brazil's 17 million children between the ages of 7 and 14 were not attending school. The reasons are varied: ranging from insufficient primary schools owing to an inadequate budget, badly underpaid teachers (who are tired because they frequently have second jobs as well), apathy and malnutrition among children and parents, children under 14 who are doing odd jobs to supplement the family income, and the undeniable counter-attractions of sea and beach for children who are neither actively encouraged to go to school nor discouraged from playing truant.

The enormous gulf in status between primary and higher education became clear to me in different ways while I was in the North-east in 1973. A friend who was a lecturer at the University of Joao Pessoa in Paraiba

told me that her salary was exactly ten times that of a friend of hers who was a school-teacher. And the university itself, splendidly equipped with the most modern facilities including a computer simply for dealing with student applications, and a beautiful 'tropical style' library built on a grassy floor with a sliding roof to let in sunshine and fresh air was unbelievable in the capital town of so poor a region.

Along with the parlous state of primary education goes the large number of adult illiterates in Brazil. This is doubly important because the qualifications for voting are age and literacy: over 18 and ability to read and write. Here a bouquet must be handed to Mobral, the world's largest adult literacy movement. Starting in 1970, Mobral operated (and continues to operate) throughout Brazil with a five months' basic literacy course. In less than six years Mobral *alfabetizou* or made literate 8½ million people (measured in terms of their 'diploma' at the end of the course) bringing the adult illiteracy rate down from 33% of the population over 12 in 1970 to 18% in 1976. Of course there are criticisms of Mobral: one is that they are aiming at very basic literacy and are unable, in the present political climate, to increase social awareness (one of the objectives of the great literacy campaigner, Paulo Freire), but granted this limitation the achievements of the movement and the enthusiasm of the adult students is nothing short of remarkable. The most obvious comment about the work of Mobral is that it would not be necessary—or at any rate not *so* necessary—if there were sufficient primary schools, together with the basic conditions, including adequate teaching salaries, which would ensure attendance.

Given these representative facts and figures from various sectors, no special expertise is necessary to see that Brazil is an *élitist* type of class society, with a large under-privileged 'sub-proletariat' lacking the most elementary standards of housing, nutrition and education.

The difficult question now arises: to what extent are these disadvantages compounded by the question of race and colour? Brazil's racial mix at the Census of 1950 consisted of 62% whites, 28% mulatos (mixed blood) and 10% black. Bearing in mind that there is an acknowledged 'colour hierarchy' in Brazil with 'white' firmly at the top, together with the fact that at the 1950 Census the enumerators took 'self-descriptions' of colour, it is extremely likely that the 62% whites included a sizeable number of mulatos. The figures quoted are the most up-to-date available since Brazil (though colour conscious) is very far from being obsessional about race and all questions of colour were ignored at the 1970 Census.

The basic issue can be summed up: 'Is there or is there not racial discrimination in Brazil?' Gilberto Freyre, the historian and sociologist, for many years taken to be the authority on such questions in view of his classics, *The Masters and the Slaves* and *New World in the Tropics*, has always taken the view that Brazil is a shining example of an unprejudiced multi-racial society. The severest critics of this line of thought (which has come to be known as the 'national myth') are the Sao Paulo school of sociologists, led by Florestan Fernandes. They have pin-pointed many areas of discrimination which cannot be brushed aside as non-existent, exceptions or simply 'un-

Brazilian'. These critics do not go to the opposite extreme of equating the prejudice and discrimination that exists in Brazil with that, say in Rhodesia or South Africa. This would be as inaccurate in its own way as the opposite extreme—the national myth. There is a welcome absence in Brazil of theories of genetic inferiority or racist philosophies to give moral sanction to discrimination. But discrimination there most certainly is.

The facts and figures are very hard to come by because race and colour are generally not recorded in official statistics. There have, however, been some fairly recent studies by sociologists within Brazil which repay attention. A study in the early 1950s carried out in Bahia showed that blacks and mulatos together comprised almost 70% of the population but accounted for only 11% of the diplomas taken at the end of secondary school. This study is confirmed in the 1950 Census figures showing that whites made up approximately 30% of the population (this area is well-known as being the most 'African' region in Brazil) but accounted for 83% of secondary school leavers. Education is, of course, one of the primary ladders of social mobility in a class society and a further study by Professor Azevedo of Bahia in the 1950s comes as no surprise with the following results:

Blacks	20% of population of Bahia	2% of the members of the liberal professions.
Mulatos	47% of population of Bahia	22% of the members of the liberal professions.
Whites	33% of population of Bahia	76% of the members of the liberal professions.

Going back a further ten years to the 1940 Census (quoted by Fernandes who points out that later figures are not available) we find that in the City of Sao Paulo negroes and mulatos participated in the occupational structure in keeping with their proportion in the population, only as employees—and within this category a high proportion of both sexes were engaged in domestic types of service. Their participation as employers was almost zero and their role as self-employed was very low.

Blacks and mulatos may be under-represented in secondary schools, universities, as employers and in the liberal professions but they are mightily over-represented in the shanty slums and *favelas*. Here, one has only to use one's eyes but, if necessary, one's own subjective impressions can be confirmed by the estimate of Costa Pinto, a Brazilian social scientist, that in 1968 blacks and mulatos constituted less than one quarter of the population of Rio but accounted for two-thirds of the *favela* dwellers.

It is well-known that in Brazil no legal or codified discrimination exists but there is such a thing as an unofficial and uncodified colour bar—such as has long been said to exist in certain prestigious government institutions such as the Naval Officer Corps and the Foreign Office. Here too one can use one's eyes and come to the conclusion that it cannot always be coincidence that getting into any prestigious institution and seeing the person in charge is so often like ascending a colour ladder. The porter at the outside gate may very well be black: a clerk at an inside desk mulato, and as one gets sent from place to place by clerks higher up in the hierarchy they will

tend to be lighter shades of brown, until, finally, if one manages to get to the director at the summit he will almost certainly be white. (This does not mean necessarily of completely white 'stock': what the Brazilians appear to be interested in is appearance, not ancestry—and there have been bizarre cases of 'white' Brazilians who have been refused accommodation when visiting South Africa.)

The majority of Brazilians, when faced with evidence such as this, will not deny the facts, figures and impressions but will explain them in terms of class and education rather than race or colour. This explanation is given by Brazilians white, black and brown, sometimes even by those in the lowest stratum of society and almost invariably by those who have achieved a measure of social mobility. The argument runs: 'I have attained a good education and a reasonable job, perhaps a profession. I am black (or mulato). If I can do it anyone can, if they study hard . . . work hard . . . etc. There is no colour prejudice in Brazil. If you have money you can go everywhere, do everything. . . . ' If this were to be taken at its face value—if colour is irrelevant to the whole issue and what matters is poverty or its lack—the problem of the blacks and dark mulatos as a special group would lose its urgency, provided that measures could be taken to raise the standard of living and opportunities in the lowest socio-economic sector as a whole. And there is no question that there *are* millions of white Brazilians in this sector, at the bottom of a class hierarchy—and equally *they* have no chance of attaining higher, or even secondary education, or a middle class profession or the status of employer.

There are at least three arguments against the 'class not race or colour' view of discrimination (which does not mean that it has no validity, only that it can never be more than a partial answer).

Firstly, there are certain jobs which are not at all prestigious and which do not demand a high level of education but in which blacks and the dark-skinned are under-represented (if at all). For instance, to be a waiter in a high-class hotel or a shop assistant at a cosmetic counter in a fashionable store does not require a university degree, nor even a secondary school diploma: it does not carry high prestige but involves long hours and low pay. The fact that it is very rare to find blacks or dark mulatos occupying such positions must mean that there is discrimination in favour of whites based on the same kind of prejudice well-known in other countries, especially USA. The way such prejudice is translated into discrimination is the advertisement stipulating: *'Boa aparencia'* (Good appearance) which is generally taken to be a euphemism for 'White' or 'Near white'. When asked about this phenomenon, hoteliers and store managers will say they do this in order not to drive away their wealthy tourists from North America . . . which may well be true but is rather feeble in a country which allegedly prides itself on the absence of race and colour prejudice.

Secondly, there is the result of fairly recent research into attitudes carried out by Brazilian sociologists and extensively reported by Degler in his *Neither Black Nor White*. I personally am not a great believer in the total validity of 'attitude tests' and so-called 'attitude measurement' but it is

significant that the research (based on tests similar to that of Bogardus' 'Measure of social distance') without exception confirmed the existence of prejudice—particularly amongst upper-class whites. The prejudice as expressed in the tests was against admitting non-whites to 'intimate social relations'—whether as 'member of my club', 'close friend' and, of course, particularly as a 'member of my family through marriage'. As might be expected from what is known about regional variations, the prejudice was strongest in the south.

Thirdly, there is the incontrovertible fact that blacks and mulatos are so much over-represented in the lowest socio-economic stratum. Why is there such a concentration? The answer often given is that it can be entirely explained by the heritage of slavery. When slavery was abolished, freed blacks had no option but to occupy the lowest social and economic positions: having no property, no money, no education. . . . And up to a point this is, of course, true. But slavery was abolished in 1888 and as we know from the history of Brazil (unlike other slave societies) millions of blacks were freed all through the centuries of slavery. Why, then, are they still so concentrated in the lowest stratum—particularly as white immigrants who came to Brazil in the 19th century (likewise with nothing) have succeeded in achieving great mobility? It is a very significant question, and all the evidence points to the fact that, in a competitive class society, the non-white person has his colour to contend with, as well as his initial class position. When, today, one finds a black or dark mulato in a position of power and responsibility it does not mean that there was no initial prejudice: it means that he was able to overcome it. To win, the black has to be exceptional, and feminists will see an immediate parallel with the social group they are most concerned with—women.

The much discussed question of whether it is class or colour that maintains the black Brazilian in a highly disadvantaged position in a white-dominated society might seem in some senses academic or even irrelevant, since it is clear that the two disadvantages reinforce one another. Black Brazilians tend to be in the lowest socio-economic stratum—a fact due originally to the historical carry-over from slavery. Being in the lowest class means that they are in poverty: poverty means malnutrition: malnutrition means low motivation and low educational achievement: low achievement tends to go with low ambition and low self-esteem. This is a cycle which leads to the commonly held unfavourable stereotype of the unambitious black Brazilian—and hence to prejudice. Another reinforcing element is the fact that colour prejudice in Brazil (just as in USA and Britain) narrows horizons. Young blacks are discouraged from being ambitious, saying: 'The best jobs are always for whites' and do not bother to compete. Similarly black or dark-skinned parents often restrict their children's horizons by setting low occupational goals for them in order to save them from failure and disillusion. Hence, no doubt, the apt saying: 'There is no racism in Brazil: the Negro knows his place'.

Despite what has been said, all students of the Brazilian scene remark on the notable absence of racial tensions in that country. Brazil is a violent

country but the violence does not follow racial or colour lines: it is a society that has not known (for hundreds of years) legal segregation or legal discrimination, hence it is spared the problems and tensions of 'legal integration' so obvious at present in the USA. It is a society which has never known obsessions with 'racial purity' and on the contrary with its long history of past and continuing miscegenation (or inter-racial sexual relations) has a special place for the person of mixed blood—the mulato. It is also a society which acknowledges the place of the black and the mulato in the making of the nation, both historically and culturally, to an extent undreamt of in other white-dominated multi-racial societies.

Even Fernandes, the most realistic appraiser of discrimination and prejudice and the greatest demolisher of the 'national myth', states: 'Brazil is probably the most racially tolerant nation in the world'. 'Tolerance' as a word has a somewhat hollow ring, of course; it implies the absence of blatant racism but not the absence of prejudice, since if there were no prejudice why would one need tolerance? The point is that an absence of racial tension and a racially tolerant atmosphere indicate not so much an absence of discriminatory practices but rather a low level of social awareness amongst the most disadvantaged section—plus a certain fatalism summed up in the oft-repeated *'Se Deus quiser . . . '* (If God wills). But what of the future?

Observers of Brazil predict that there will be significant changes before long, although they do not all agree on what is likely to happen. One factor is the fairly rapid rise in literacy. To be at the bottom of the socio-economic scale is also to be at the bottom of the political scale in the sense that illiteracy debars one from voting. Mobral's successes are adding millions of the disadvantaged to the voting register, year by year. To be sure the right to vote means rather little in the present political set-up, but elections *do* take place, for the *municipios* (townships), States and Federal government. There *are* arguments about candidates and the fact that the military Government would deprive of political rights any candidate too outspoken or dangerous does not mean that the right to vote is totally meaningless. It could be the beginning of greater social and political awareness for many blacks and mulatos.

Apart from the possibility of exercising an admittedly low measure of political power, there is the economic fact pointed out by many observers, that the poorest section of the community is very gradually becoming a little better off. No one claims that the gap between rich and poor is narrowing: the rich are becoming richer but the poorest are becoming less poor. This is being brought about gradually by the rapid increase in industrialisation and the ever-increasing growth (though now at a slower rate) of the economy. This state of affairs combined with better educational opportunities—which are now being pressed for at primary level—inevitably will mean some opportunities for poor blacks (and whites) to rise. In this connection, it is very interesting that a study in Sao Paulo parallel to that mentioned for Bahia showed a much more favourable situation for blacks and mulatos in that city, although in fact there is much greater prejudice against blacks

and mulatos in Sao Paulo than in Bahia. The figures show that (for the 1950s) black and mulato constituted 11% of the population and accounted for 7% of secondary school leaving diplomas. This can be contrasted with (as may be recalled) the figures for Bahia which were: 70% of the population accounting for only 11% of secondary school leavers. The explanation lies in the greater economic opportunities provided by the Paulista economy compared with the Bahian. An expanding economy encourages black and mulato to fight for greater equality of opportunity, rather than to adopt the fatalistic assumption that education and the good jobs are for the whites.

The time is coming, many think, when black and mulato will want to go further, beyond their present limited opportunities: and the question is—'What will be the attitude of the whites then?' Some see this development as bringing about a decline of racial antagonism, as blacks cease to be 'marginal' and become more and more integrated into the mainstream of society. Others take a different view and foresee a rise in racial tensions as blacks and mulatos come to compete on more equal terms with whites. Cardoso, a Sao Paulo sociologist, takes the latter view: 'The social ascension of blacks in a class society, contrary to what one supposed in the past, far from signifying an end to prejudice, can indicate in fact the beginning of a "Negro problem" in the same terms that it existed and exists in the U.S. . . . '

In this sense, it could be said not that Brazil has solved her racial problem but that, up to now, the racial problem has not existed: it has lain dormant and the challenge is still to come. Whatever happens in the future it should never be forgotten that there is no 'black problem' as is so often assumed, but a 'white problem', since the entire situation—as with all ex-slave societies —is of the whites' making.

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The November issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Slow Progress on the Law of the Sea* by P. W. Birnie, *Asean: the New South-east Asia* by Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Sexual Side of Disability* by W. D. R. Stewart and *Tourism: A Boom Industry* by Sir Mark Henig.

A FAREWELL TO BRETTON WOODS

by André van Dam

THERE can hardly be any world peace unless the industrial nations of the North abandon status quo'ism and the developing countries of the South exchange rhetoric for pragmatism. That was the overwhelming impression from the Conference for International Economic Cooperation, the first meeting ever on a government-to-government basis outside the United Nations. The time was December 1975 to June 1977; the place, Paris.

The French President had originally proposed the meeting in order to iron out serious discrepancies in the supplies and prices of petroleum. At the instigation of OPEC, the agenda and participation were widened to discuss many economic contentions, such as supplies and prices of commodities, foreign debts, the transfer of technology and trade preferences. The South aimed at a farewell to Bretton Woods, an economic order that had served the North well but does not suit the South. Although the Conference quietly fizzled out like a damp squib, it still reflects a lasting shift in international relationships. It is bound to alter the world economy. The underlying assumption is that the North and South identify common goals and acknowledge conflicting interests. Without common goals, they have little to bargain for; without conflicting interests, nothing to negotiate about. The missing element in this question is a set of entirely new instruments which could accommodate reciprocal dependencies.

The Conference was allowed to go out like the snuff of a candle simply because of the low level of consciousness about the entire *problématique*—among grassroots, elites and even policymakers. The spirit of a Marshall Plan was altogether lacking. There were no sweepingly imaginative proposals that heralded a new post-Bretton Woods era.

The Conference was aware of the need for new instruments to accommodate the discordant stances. Instruments as strong and multilateral as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Some instruments were proposed, for instance an International Resource Bank, an International Industrialisation Institute, an International Energy Agency. Plagued by domestic issues, unemployment, inflation, slow and erratic economic growth, the North was in no mood to properly fund such endeavours.

Currently, a number of new instruments are under discussion. For instance, the United States proposes the establishment of an 'International Resource Bank' in order to encourage the output of raw materials in the South. This Bank would, for example, fund the maintenance of buffer stocks which are considered essential in order to stabilise the price levels of commodities, ideally at remunerative levels. The vagaries of the weather, warscare and market speculations conspire to create wild gyrations in the prices of key commodities. These gyrations play havoc with the balance of payments and development plans. This is especially perilous in nations

which depend upon one single commodity for most of their export earnings: Bangladesh (jute), Cuba (sugar), Gambia (peanuts), Jamaica (bauxite), Uganda (coffee), and Zaire (copper).

In this connection, the establishment of an 'International Industrialisation Institute' deserves foremost attention. The South lags seriously in industrial development, as mirrored in this regression: The non-OPEC South accounts for 64% of world population, 32% of global commodity exports, 16% of total global trade, and 8% of our planet's output of manufactures. The South will require a much stepped-up transfer of technology, especially of technology appropriate to its climes and mores, educational level and production scales and, last but not least, to its raw materials in the extractive and agricultural sectors.

The suggestion of an 'International Energy Agency' is the handicraft of the North, especially the United States. After all, the North used the Conference on International Economic Cooperation primarily as a leverage to negotiate stable supplies of petroleum at non-inflationary prices. The energy-deficient nations of the South appear, however, to bank more on sustained solidarity with and by OPEC than on lower petroleum prices—which may reduce the effectiveness of such an Energy Agency.

The South is keenly interested in formalising the at present fragmatic 'General Systems of Preferences'. It lies outside the scope of the GATT 'Tokyo Round' of multilateral negotiations for reducing tariffs on the trade of manufactures. This should be viewed in conjunction with the South's preference for extending the 'Stabex' mechanism embodied in the Lomé Convention—which all but removes Europe's trade barriers to specific imports from 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific developing nations, all former colonies of Western European powers.

What is the outcome of all this? 'We have heard your voices', the U.S. Secretary of State wrote in a policy speech in September 1975. But it went in at one ear of the North and out at the other. This is partly due to the opaque layer of rhetoric with which the South covered its bargaining position. The new instruments needed at all levels are those which cut right across political stances, vested partisan interests, partition and rhetoric! This requires world leaderships, elites and grassroots to recognise this truism: North and South are increasingly interdependent.

Mutual dependency is felt when most important problems are dynamic, global and interlinked. It is futile to appraise the petroleum crisis outside the framework of commodities which are crucial to the South, whether bananas or bauxite; tea, timber or tin; cocoa, coffee, copper or cotton. It is equally vain to divorce the issue of foreign indebtedness from the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade obstacles. And one cannot separate industrialisation from the transfer of (appropriate) technology.

Likewise, agreements reached in buffer stocks will have an impact on demands made on international transfers of funds. In addition to such mechanisms as the 'Committee on the Transfer of Real Resources to the Developing Countries' (sponsored by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), there is room for effective private mechanisms, e.g.

between the transnational corporations which transfer technology, management and other resources. The same can be said of academia, universities and the rising number of NGOs (non-governmental organisations). Willy-nilly they all have a stake in the North-South dialogue.

In that perspective, commodities ought to constitute the focal point of the North-South dialogue. They are the backbone of most developing countries. They frequently constitute the prime source of employment—directly or indirectly. They account for most of the export revenues. On-the-spot refining, processing and transformation constitute *the* safeguard of rural development, training, employment—while sheltering the South against the excesses of industrialisation and urban alienation. In most instances, they respect the ecology.

The on-the-spot upgrading of primary products will give rise to a much enhanced trade between developing nations. The North-South transfer of science and technology is the next logical step. (At present, the United Nations is preparing two major world conferences on this issue.) The entire topic of research and development of appropriate technology[1] is eminently applicable to a wide range of raw materials. It will then prove acceptable to the North to reverse its present policy whereby raw materials pay low import duties and finished products based on commodities suffer high tariffs. Commodities, technology and trade will thus structurally alter the global flow of financial resources, including foreign indebtedness and petrocurrencies.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the World Bank cooperate in financing the exploitation of mineral (and petroleum) resources in eligible energy-deficient countries of the South. Minerals include cobalt, chromite, manganese, and nickel, platinum, tin. The strategy is designed to diversify the output of critical raw materials in the South and reduce the vulnerability of the North to political embargoes.

Lest this strategy be construed as a Northern endeavour to increase supplies and reduce prices, preference should be given to financing on-the-spot processing, refining, labour-intensive sophistication of key commodities, including renewable natural resources. Regional development banks and new financial tools should channel investments in that direction. The multilateral aspects of this strategy safeguard the interests of investors' home countries. This calls for unprecedented consultation, and 'joint ventures' by government agencies and private enterprise.

The above pragmatic approach stands in shrill contrast to the futile shadow boxing that for too long went on in Paris. It will soon be imperative to acknowledge that a new global order requires a 'Marshall Plan' type of spirit and vision in which neither rhetoric nor status quo concepts can find a place. It will demand that the new world order be viewed as a trade-off, between competition and cooperation, growth and equity.

Trade-offs are indeed the crux of the matter in a genuine North-South dialogue. It translates into a so-called non-zero-sum-game in which both North and South gain, although the South should profit proportionately more. Besides trade-offs between competition and collaboration, between

growth and equity, one may envisage trade-offs between productivity and employment, and between investments and consumption.

The North may be tempted to trade off the delivery of arms, the establishment of strategic stocks and the granting of trade preferences against substantial OPEC concessions. The South may attempt to utilise OPEC as leverage to secure raw material agreements and a voice in international monetary matters. Such trade-offs should be widened to accommodate other global economic contentions. They will only work, however, if the constituencies are properly sensitised to the underlying issues at stake, e.g.

1. It is in the best long-term interest of the North to conserve petroleum; to develop local sources of energy such as coal, hydro-electricity, natural gas, solar, tidal, wind energy; it will relieve untenable pressures upon the balance of payments and upon the human environment;
2. It is in the best long-term interest of the South to share in the future growth of the North; to avoid unilateral and abrupt measures which reverberate throughout the worldwide economy, and boomerang against energy-deficient developing countries;
3. Indexation of Southern commodity prices to those of Northern manufactures, if multilaterally managed, will tend to reduce inflation, scarcities, stockpiling, embargoes, defaulting on foreign indebtedness; and will create orderly raw material and financial markets;
4. The North-South dialogue interlinks the bargaining power of OPEC, World Bank/IMF's rollover of foreign debts, UNCTAD's integrated commodity programme, GATT's Tokyo Round of trade liberalisation, private transfer of technology and management.

The entire North-South dialogue calls for a new spirit of 'economics as if people mattered'. It serves little purpose to continue expanding the world economy unless its benefits trickle down to the forgotten ones—the one billion poorest of the poor. Nowadays they have no access to the essential amenities of life: dignity, education, employment, food, health, shelter, water. These compelling basic human needs *must* bring the North-South dialogue to fruition. This crucial, cruel trade-off should be uppermost in the mind of those who negotiate, and of those on whose behalf they negotiate.

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[1] Documented in the June 1977 issue of *The Futurist*, Post Office Box 30369, Bethesda Branch, Washington D.C. 20014, U.S.A.

[André van Dam, a Dutch economist and social writer, is reporting on The Conference for International Economic Co-operation for the *Contemporary Review*. He attended the June 1977 workshop held in Teheran, sponsored by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies.]

BRITISH POETRY 1952-1977

by Howard Sergeant

ONE of the difficulties of writing about the poetry of a specific period lies in deciding where precisely to begin, for poetry cannot be contained within periods in this way. All trends have some links with the past, if only as a reaction from what has been the prevailing influence of the preceding years. New poets will often form groups of one kind or another as a means of securing an audience; and in order to establish their claims, or to emphasise certain aspects of poetry which they feel have been neglected, they invariably call attention to themselves by denouncing the ideas or styles of writing of the previous generation of poets. In a way it is all part of the recognised procedure for catching the limelight, and during the last 50 years or so, English poetry has been remarkably susceptible to such literary manoeuvres. Within a few years such groups disperse, having made their points (and possibly a few reputations in the process); and the genuine poets amongst them will pursue their own lines of development. Since we live at a time when communications and the mass media exert a growing influence upon public opinion, it is to be expected that the poets concerned will make the utmost use of publicity when staking their claims. It may well be the case that the new poets feel stultified by the prevailing climate and need to foster a change in taste so that their own work can be properly appreciated. Unfortunately, it may also distract attention from the work of poets who prefer to write in isolation.

For a variety of reasons, the end of hostilities in 1945 brought with it a decided change in the climate for poetry. There was a marked slackening of interest in poetry, partly because there was no longer a shortage of suitable reading material, but more particularly because there were many other pressing matters calling for attention in the post-war scramble for demobilisation, housing, employment, rehabilitation, and better conditions than had been known before the war. To some extent the war had served to simplify attitudes during the 1939-45 period. By the early Fifties the wartime boom in poetry had spent itself. Apart from the work of well-established poets whose reputations were secure, there was so little demand for poetry that publishers were refusing even to consider the work of younger and unestablished poets. This may explain why the initiative in poetry seemed for a few years to pass to older poets such as Edith Sitwell, Robert Graves and Edwin Muir, or those who had not served in the Forces, such as Dylan Thomas and Norman Nicholson. It also explains why several of the new poets of the Fifties were introduced to the public by means of pamphlet collections published by such small presses as the Fantasy Press (Kingsley Amis, Elizabeth Jennings, Thom Gunn), the Hand and Flower Press (Charles Causley, Thomas Blackburn, Michael Hamburger), the Marvell Press (Philip Larkin, though his *The Less Deceived* was a hardback), and the Fine Art Department of Reading University (John Wain, Kingsley Amis).

If there were no dominating groups at the beginning of the period we are reviewing, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish three main trends which had been exercising their influences upon what was being written at the time. Firstly, there was the continuing strain of neo-romanticism, shown at its best in the later poems of Dylan Thomas. Secondly, there was the marked tendency for some poets to become increasingly preoccupied with religious and metaphysical subjects (almost as if the poets concerned were intent on renewing or discovering a faith within themselves), approaching at points the Christian existentialism of Kierkegaard, Marcel and Jaspers, and making effective use of mythological and archetypal imagery, as can be seen in the work of Edith Sitwell, Edwin Muir, David Gascoyne, Norman Nicholson, Kathleen Raine, Anne Ridler and Vernon Watkins. Thirdly, there were various regional and nationalistic tendencies, notably in Wales, Scotland and Ireland, or in the work of such individualists as Norman Nicholson, Vernon Watkins, Sidney Goodsir Smith, and R. S. Thomas. Although Dylan Thomas wrote very few poems after the appearance of his *Deaths and Entrances* (1946), he continued to have a powerful influence over poets throughout the English-speaking world.

With the advantage of hindsight it is possible to see that new attitudes to poetry, reflecting the reactions of some of the younger poets (especially those at the universities) to the current social situation, were in fact already being formulated in the early Fifties. For instance, in 1950 *Penguin New Writing* printed an article by John Wain recommending the work of William Empson, at that time a very neglected poet. One can clearly discern the influence of Empson on the early work of John Wain, A. Alvarez, George MacBeth and many of the young university poets. The death of Dylan Thomas in November 1953 seemed to spark off a controversy between those who regarded Thomas as an important figure and those who deplored his style of writing. According to John Press in *Rule and Energy* (1963), 'it was . . . understandable that a young poet after the war should feel obliged to choose between the poetic worlds of Thomas and Empson, to commit himself to one of them as an act of faith'.

But it was not until 1954 that the new fashion in poetry hit the headlines of *The Spectator* when Anthony Hartley announced the arrival of 'The Movement' on the literary scene—'For better or worse, we are now in the presence of the only considerable movement in English poetry since the Thirties'. As I have already remarked, new poets often form groups of one kind or another to secure a sympathetic hearing and usually call attention to themselves by denouncing the ideas and styles of their predecessors. It was perhaps inevitable that the Movement poets should attack both the political preoccupations of the Thirties and the romantic trends of the Forties, but there can be no doubt that despite the various differences in style and treatment, many of the younger poets had definite characteristics in common. The Movement, as well as being 'anti-phoney', was 'anti-wet, sceptical, robust, ironic, prepared to be as comfortable as possible in a wicked, commercial threatened world which doesn't look . . . as if it's going to be changed much by a couple of handfuls of young English writers'.

In an article entitled *The Making of the Movement*, Iain Hamilton observed:

> The odd thing about Hartley's communique was the transparently calculated tone in which it was delivered; the tone, pushing and unblushing, of the hard sell . . . it was a takeover bid and it brilliantly succeeded. By the time the Movement anthology *New Lines* came out in 1956 it had evidently succeeded all too well. Almost every young university poet had become a Movementeer . . . the magazines, little press pamphlets, the column-ends of many of the weeklies, were brimming with neatly balanced ironies, with feeble neo-Augustan posturings, and effortless Empsonian pastiche . . .

The Movement anthology, *New Lines*, edited by Robert Conquest, contained the work of nine poets: Philip Larkin, Elizabeth Jennings, John Wain, Kingsley Amis, Thom Gunn, D. J. Enright, John Holloway, Donald Davie and Conquest himself. For these poets 'a neutral tone' was to be preferred. Images drawn from mythology were very much out of favour.

As if to demonstrate that not all the younger poets were in sympathy with the ideas of the Movement, this anthology was followed in 1957 by a rival anthology, *Mavericks*, edited by Dannie Abse and myself, presenting the work of an equal number of poets outside the Movement who were making 'a valid attempt to grapple with problems beyond those of mere technique and to communicate, lucidly and honestly, what they feel to be significant experience'. The poets selected for the purpose were David Wright, Dannie Abse, Vernon Scannell, Michael Hamburger, John Smith, Anthony Cronin, J. C. Hall, Jon Silkin and W. Price Turner.

This is not the place to discuss the relative merits of the opposing Movement and Maverick poets, other than to point out that the conflict between them was something more than competitive rivalry; it was concerned with ideas fundamental to poetry, and both groups have contributed to poetry as we know it today. Though both groups have separated and developed their own individual talents, some of them are amongst the most important poets writing at the present time: Philip Larkin, Thom Gunn, Elizabeth Jennings, Dannie Abse, Jon Silkin and Vernon Scannell. In his anthology, *Flashpoint*, Robert Shaw defined the argument between them as a modern version of the classicists versus romantics controversy.

1957 also marked the arrival of Ted Hughes on the British scene. Hughes has always been something of a mystery. For one thing, there was the manner in which he suddenly sprang into prominence, to be welcomed as a 'remarkable poet' by the distinguished critic Edwin Muir. Until he won the First Publication Award of the New York Poetry Center in 1957, Ted Hughes was practically unknown in this country (though he is a Yorkshireman). Only about 11 of his poems had previously appeared in print and these had been published almost exclusively in American magazines (submitted by Hughes's wife, Sylvia Plath). When the prizewinning poems were published by Fabers in 1957 under the title of *The Hawk in the Rain*, they came as a complete surprise to the British reading public. It was, of course, the vitality of his work, vigour in the use of language, and the combination of intellect and feeling that made Hughes's poetry so exciting, but the influences of Hopkins, Lawrence and Dylan Thomas could clearly be

discerned. What did stand out was the preoccupation with brute force and violence, almost, it seemed, for their own sake. Certainly his work came as a refreshing change from the 'neutral tone' of the Movement. Hughes's second book, *Lupercal* (1960), was perhaps the most outstanding achievement of that year so far as poetry was concerned. It contained better poetry than the first volume and by this time Hughes had succeeded in assimilating his influences. The imaginative poems of *Lupercal*, featuring the brute force and the blind instinct of the animal world, were based on unusually accurate observation and detailed knowledge, and had a peculiar relevance for the period. Continuing his preoccupation with the animal and insect world in his next book, *Wodwo* (1967), Hughes included poems about monkeys, wolves, jaguars, bears, gnats and spiders, using them as symbols of the unruly forces that lurk beneath the surface of human nature. More important was his discovery of a means of extending his individual vision to create a semi-mythical world of savage, half-human, and mysterious creatures.

It was probably this interest which led to his creation of *Crow* (1970), a semi-mythical but monstrous bird protagonist, who is represented as having been present at the Creation, having witnessed the Fall, and having experienced all kinds of catastrophic events, to survive as a pessimistic commentator upon the human condition. Hughes's latest book, *Season Songs* (1976) is supposed to be for children, but it will certainly be enjoyed by adults. Divided into four sections corresponding with the seasonal phases of the year, the book emphasises the natural rotation of birth, animation and death. It is, in fact, very reminiscent of his first two books in the sharpness of image and clarity of observation. His split chestnut 'opens an African eye'. His spring buds 'burst into tatters—like firework stubs'. All very exhilarating after the macabre antics of *Crow*.

To go back to the Sixties, in 1963 there appeared an anthology entitled *A Group Anthology*, edited by Edward Lucie-Smith, and featuring the work of yet another group of poets. Although the Group originally came into existence at Cambridge in the Fifties, under the leadership of Philip Hobsbaum, it was never more than a small gathering of university poets criticising one another's work, until the meetings were switched to Chelsea and organised by Edward Lucie-Smith. In some ways the Group can be regarded as a development of the Movement, though it certainly had more vigour and a wider range of styles. It was a loosely linked collection of poets who met regularly and commented upon each other's work. At each session one poet presented a set of poems on cyclostyled sheets and these were criticised in some detail by those present. The Group philosophy was based on the concept that 'the process by which words work in poetry is open to rational examination'. There can be no doubt that these meetings were of considerable value to the poets attending (I attended myself for a number of years), but as soon as the Group publicity campaign started, people began to crowd the meetings and it became impracticable to pursue any line of pertinent criticism. With a controversy staged in the literary magazines, a new fashion was started.

It was a fashion that required a taste for brutality of both manner and

matter, and could be seen as a reaction to the main concerns of the Movement. The influence of Ted Hughes was immediately recognisable. The prevalent style was sharp and ironic, the prevalent emotions were shame, disgust and anger. There was a common interest in domestic affairs, childhood experiences, and insect life (every member had his 'bug' poems). But the Group helped to introduce the work of some outstanding poets: Peter Porter, Alan Brownjohn, George MacBeth, Peter Redgrove, Edward Lucie-Smith, Zulfikar Ghose, Adrian Mitchell and David Wevill. Peter Porter can be regarded as one of our leading satirical poets. When the meetings became too unwieldy to allow proper critical discussion and Edward Lucie-Smith resigned as chairman, the Group as such dissolved, and most of the members have continued to develop their own individual styles. In the meantime, Philip Hobsbaum, having taken up an appointment in Northern Ireland, attempted to establish a similar group in Belfast which, if not entirely successful as an outpost of the Group, certainly encouraged and helped such poets as Seamus Heaney, Michael Longley and Derek Mahon.

During the last 12 years or so the climate for poetry has changed in a quite dramatic manner; one might almost say that a revolution has quietly been taking place. If one is to judge by the interest displayed by the ordinary public in poetry readings—ranging from Arts-Council-sponsored tours by poets, public recitals at the Royal Festival Hall, and readings in schools, colleges, social clubs, hospitals, and pubs, to all-night marathons at the London Roundhouse, it would appear that poetry is in a far more flourishing state than at any other time in this century. More poetry is being written today by young and old alike; more magazines have been put into circulation to cater for the demand; more competitions are being held, both for children and adults; more awards are being given and more poetry festivals are being organised than ever before.

There have always been poetry readings, of course, but until the last 12 years or so they tended to be the special preserve of the initiated and had most appeal to small middle-class audiences. It was rare to find more than three or four dozen people at a reading, and rarer still to find many young people there. Yet in the summer of 1965, when an international poetry reading was organised at a week's notice at the Albert Hall, an audience of 7,000 turned up to hear Allen Ginsberg, Laurence Ferlinghetti, Adrian Mitchell and other poets. The Albert Hall reading was simply a reflection of something that had been happening all over the country for a number of years, and particularly in such urban centres as Liverpool, Manchester, Edinburgh, Newcastle and Bristol, without which the Albert Hall meeting would have proved an absolute failure. By 1965 Pop or Public poetry was in demand.

What had brought about this change in public response? Obviously a variety of factors. I am quite sure that school-teachers have played an important part in encouraging creative expression and appreciation, allowing children to express themselves freely in words, as well as in action, colour and music, in a creative atmosphere. Another factor may have been the building of the new universities and the introduction of the Students Grant

Scheme, which made it possible for thousands of teenagers to continue their education at universities. It may be that the publicity given to the reading tours of Ginsberg, Ferlinghetti, and Yevtushenko exercised an influence. By the early Sixties the success of such pop groups as the Beatles, and of such protest singers as Bob Dylan, certainly encouraged the development of pop poetry readings in many of the larger towns.

The best of the Liverpool poets were Adrian Henri, Brian Patten and Roger McGough, and they were introduced to a national public through such anthologies as *The Liverpool Scene* and *The Mersey Sound*, though all of them have published their own volumes since then. Another of these pop regionalists was the Newcastle-born Tom Pickard, who wrote his poems in Geordie dialect. In addition to the groups in the regions, there are many pop poets in London and elsewhere who refer to themselves as 'the Underground' (for no good reason since they are openly accepted). Whatever criticism can be raised about their simplicity of form, their lack of compression and their disregard for literary technique, it has to be acknowledged that these pop poets have succeeded in bringing back verse to a new and larger audience.

So that one can now distinguish two broad groups of poets: the academically-educated poets, working within established literary traditions and looking towards such masters as Yeats, Eliot, Larkin or Hughes, or even taking their models from America; and the pop poets with their eyes on the protest singers and marchers, and the pop music groups. Of course there is much crossing of lines. Many of the 'academic' poets have not been slow to exploit the situation and poets like Dannie Abse, Alan Brownjohn, Vernon Scannell and Patricia Beer do a considerable amount of reading in public, often on the same programmes as the pop poets. On the other hand, there is a tendency on the part of some of the pop poets to become more literary in approach to their themes after their first books are published (as in the case of Brian Patten).

There are some dangers in this recent development. If immediate audience reaction should become the criterion for judging the quality of poetry there is a possibility that standards may fall, as some critics have acidly pointed out. There may be a tendency for poets to play to the gallery by concentrating on what seems to go down well at public performances. My own view is that the revival has been exciting and that the extension of the audience and the wider ranging approach to poetry have been beneficial in a variety of ways. Nevertheless, we must always be careful to distinguish clearly between good poetry and good entertainment, whilst maintaining the capacity to enjoy both.

[Howard Sergeant is Editor of *Outposts* and serves on the Editorial Board of the Borestone Mountain Poetry Awards.]

CLAUDE CHABROL AND OTHERS

by James Morton

CLAUDE Chabrol commenced his film career as a writer in the influential magazine *Cahiers du Cinema*. His entry into film studios came when he was press attaché for Fox in 1957 and his first film *Le Beau Serge* followed a year later. It was a story of French provincial life, neat and analytic. It was followed in the same year by *Les Cousins* in which a country bumpkin came to Paris and became involved in a triangular affair with his cousin and a girl. It was part of the New Wave and even now I can recall the stunning impression it made on me.

From then on with few exceptions Chabrol has kept to this deceptively simple formula of a triangle of people either emotionally or literally killing each other in the French countryside. Very often the characters have had the same names from film to film—Charles, Paul and Hélène.

Before he quite settled down to this pattern Chabrol fell into disgrace with the French film industry and in the middle sixties made a series of French 'James Bonds', one of which turned up on television (dubbed, of course) some little while ago and was surprisingly entertaining. But with the exception of *Nada* in 1974 he has maintained this deliberately low key image very much in the style of Hitchcock whom he admires and about whom he wrote a book in the late fifties.

The permutations of the triangle are endless. Sometimes the man kills the other, (*Juste avant la nuit*); sometimes the woman is the killer (*La Scandale*), sometimes the man intrudes on the relationship of two women (*Les Biches*), or one of the men plots with the woman (*Les Noces Rouges*, *La Decade Prodigeuse*) and occasionally one of them acts independently, as in *Que La Bête Meure*.

Even in the two films he made for RTF, Chabrol has maintained the quiet infighting of his full-length work by translating two Henry James stories including *The Author of Beltraffio*.

In recent years Chabrol's films have been delayed in their screening in this country. *Innocents With Dirty Hands* also suffered from appalling dubbing and so did *Doctor Popaul*, both of which turned up some years after they were made. The tardy appearance of *Une Partie de Plaisir* at least is not spoiled by dubbing. It was first shown at a new cinema, the Plaza, in Camden Town and comes with subtitles. In many ways it is the most personal of Chabrol's films. Paul Gégauff and his family appear in roles which have at least a basis in their own life styles. Gégauff has been Chabrol's scriptwriter in a number of his later films and he appears as principal in this story of the break-up of his liaison with Danielle Gégauff, who plays his girlfriend, Esther.

It is a curiously compelling film. Gégauff as Phillipe would appear to be a writer on the skids. He has lived with Esther for some years during which time he has had a number of affairs. Questioning Esther over dinner he finds she has remained faithful to him during their time together and he

suggests she would broaden her experience if she took a lover. When she does so he does not like it and this, coupled with his falling income, precipitates their move together with their little daughter to Paris and the gradual disintegration of their relationship. Gégauff, while protesting his complaisance in her infidelity in principle, dislikes in practice her choice of lover, but one suspects he would disapprove of whomsoever she chose.

After displaying ever-increasing violence to her, he forces her to leave and then spends the rest of the film alternately wallowing in self-pity or trying to get her back. Eventually, when she finally refuses, he brutally attacks her and is sent to prison. Even inside he is still endeavouring to manipulate their daughter, who visits him, to negotiate on his behalf for a reconciliation.

The film is a delicate study of the disintegration of a relationship and a man. How much is cinema *verité* is difficult to fathom. Gégauff admits to being at least a fifth accurate, but understandably he will not indicate which fifth! The difficulty with this sort of film is that while Gégauff has, of course, been connected with the cinema for many years and as such much of the technique has brushed off onto him, he is not an actor. And it shows! On the other hand his wife, Danielle, has been appearing in Chabrol's films for ten or more years, albeit in minor roles. Accordingly she is infinitely more accomplished and the balance suffers. There are the usual Chabrol set pieces with friends and dinners and a particularly attractive pair of sequences in Brittany reminiscent of *Que la Bête Meurt*. This is indeed high class Chabrol.

In his time Chabrol has filmed the novels of American detective writers such as Stanley Ellin (*Tour de Force*) and Ellery Queen (*La Decade Prodigeuse*) but I do not believe he has ever used a Simenon novel. Of course, many directors have and many actors from Jean Gabin downwards have given their interpretation of Maigret. Bernard Tavernier now joins the directorial ranks of those who have used the Belgian master's works as a basis for a film. *L'Horlogier de Saint-Paul* is not a Maigret nor, although it concerns a murder and subsequent flight by the killers, is it really a detective story. The admirable Phillipe Noiret is as excellent as ever as the law-abiding watchmaker. At the start of the film he stands in a deserted street waiting for the 'Cross' sign for pedestrians to work in his favour, even though there is no traffic on the road. By the end of the film he has in a very small way totally changed his position into that of an anarchist—even if a non-physical one.

The cause of this metamorphosis is his son who is suspected of killing a local factory owner and setting fire to his car. It seems that he and his girl friend have coldbloodedly gunned the man down and then escaped. The film is a cat and mouse game between the police inspector (Jean Rochefort) and Noiret, with the former trying to trap the watchmaker into revealing the whereabouts of his son. In any sort of detective novel or film it is unfair to reveal the ending, but it is fair to say the whole film is beautifully played by both the principals in a muted key. This is Bernard Tavernier's first feature film and it harks back to those splendid films with Raimu and Louis

Jouvet where the actors dominated the screen. Indeed, in the credits the dedication is to Jacques Prévert. Although it is a politically based film with good lefties and rotten rightists, this is never allowed to intrude into the portrait of two lonely middle-aged men who find themselves thrust together and grow to like each other. It will be interesting to see Tavernier's second film, *Le Juge et L'Assassin*, which was shown at last year's London Film Festival and which has never resurfaced.

What else has been around? Well, certainly the best film I have seen this year has been Joseph Losey's *Mr. Klein*. This was premiered on BBC TV and later opened in the West End—a trend which is becoming increasingly common. Alain Delon—always good with a firm director (vide *Il Gattopardo* directed by Luchino Visconti) is the Aryan art dealer who becomes entwined with his namesake, a Jewish resistance worker. First, a magazine is delivered to him, then he is sent an invitation to dinner in the country. He traces the other Klein to a deserted flat but by then the security police are following him.

This is an acting tour de force by Delon who, smooth as always, somehow strengthens his role as *Le Samourai* and adds an all-pervading sense of tragedy to the inevitability of that film. It is beautifully acted by the supporting cast and strikingly photographed.

Delon also appears in *Le Gang*, a romp à *la Rififfi Meets Borsalino*. Set in Paris after the Second World War, there is a good deal of machine-gunning and car-chasing to enliven the proceedings. Delon's playing is in contrast with that in *Mr. Klein* and shows what happens when he gets the upper hand of a director.

Walerian Borowczyk is a director whose work I have always admired—at least up until last weekend when I saw *Contes Immoraux*. Now any film by the *auteur* of *Blanche* and *Story of a Sin* must initially command respect but I found these four slight pornographic stories boring in the extreme. Of course, they are beautifully photographed, of course his composition is good, of course . . . etc. But the truth is that they are commercial soft core porn, and not very jokey at that. The best is *La Marée*, the story of a boy who takes a girl on the beach to teach her the delights of *fellatio*. The reason for its being the best might be that it is the first. I can only hope that the film was made to finance something rather more serious—otherwise, like restaurants which have offended, he will be crossed off the list.

The cinema art houses have been going through a rough time recently and are not being helped by the GLC having a drive against the sex film clubs. The GLC intends to force the clubs to make high membership charges and also to require building works to bring the clubs up to the safety standards of the much larger public cinemas. Inevitably in the net will fall the little art house cinemas such as The Essential, the ICA and the Other Cinema. Of course, the porn merchants with the funds they have at their disposal will survive, but the real clubs will not. It will be a sad day when we have only the NFT left. Admirable though that is, the art house circuit does provide alternative fare, and competition is good for everybody.

THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY IN FLORENCE AND THE EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN BERLIN

It is hoped that the following information, supplied by the European Communities Commission, will be of interest.—*Editor*

THE inauguration of the European University Institute in Florence on 15 November, 1976, marked the realisation of a long-held dream.

As far back as 1961, the then Heads of State or Government of the Six expressed the desire to create a European University or Institute to foster the advancement of learning in fields which are of particular interest to the development of Europe, and thus to make a contribution to the intellectual life of the Community.

The Convention setting up the Institute came into effect in April 1972. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland acceded to it early in 1975. Seventy post-graduate students are now enrolled for the first academic year.

It would be difficult to find a more beautiful setting for the Institute than Badia Fiesolana, on the slopes leading up to Fiesole from Florence. The buildings include a 12th Century church and a monastery, its cloisters designed by Brunelleschi. Because of the immense problems of founding a new full-scale university it was decided, instead, to create a graduate school open to highly qualified students intending to prepare a doctor's degree or to do advanced research in specialist fields. Among the 70 are 11 British students participating in all the disciplines offered.

Aim and Programme

The aims of the Institute are (i) to help outstanding research students in preparing a doctor's thesis or in doing advanced research, and (ii) to be a research centre, closely co-operating with other centres of learning, in order to foster knowledge and understanding of the problems of our age, whether in historic perspective or in their present-day setting.

Thus the Institute is open to students who have already started work on a doctoral thesis or those needing assistance in defining or choosing a subject.

While seeking to keep its programme flexible, courses will centre on: *History and Civilisation:* Here it is hoped to undertake a major research project, supplemented by seminars, comparing the two post-war reconstruction periods of Europe after 1918 and after 1945, and the political systems and ideological movements that have emerged since the end of World War I.

Economics: The focus will be on the political economy of inter-dependence and the reforms that may be needed to meet the demands of a

world that has vastly changed since the Community was first established. *Law:* Major emphasis will be on a project concerning the evolution of human rights and a critical assessment of protection for citizens in this field in different countries.

Political and Social Sciences: Students here will examine particularly the effect of 'overload' on democratic governments, caused by taking on responsibilities formerly carried out by private organisations, and the effect this has on their decision-making function.

Administration

The Institute is administered by:

1. The High Council — composed of representatives of the governments of the Nine, which must meet at least once a year in Florence.
2. The Principal of the Institute — M. Max Kohnstamm, born in Amsterdam in 1914 and formerly Secretary to the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community and President of the European Community Institute for University Studies.
3. The Academic Council — This consists at present of eight Professors from different universities within the Community, the Principal, who acts as President, the Secretary and the Librarian. The Librarian is Mr. Kenneth William Humphreys, formerly Librarian of the Universities of Leeds and Birmingham; the British Professor on the Council is Professor Charles Wilson, a Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge.

Qualifications for Admission

All candidates must have the equivalent of a good honours degree and their post-graduate work must be relevant to the aims of the Institute. They should be able to speak at least two of the Community languages. Member States have made available a number of Scholarships for candidates accepted by the Entrance Board. In the United Kingdom applications for consideration should be directed to the Department of Education & Science (HFE IV), Elizabeth House, York Road, London SE1 7PH.

The European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training was officially opened in Berlin on 9 March, 1977.

The ceremony was attended by Mr. Hendrikus Vredeling, Vice-President of the Commission, responsible for Employment and Social Affairs, Mr. Klaus Schütz, Governing Mayor of Berlin, and M. Jean Degimbe, Director-General for Social Affairs of the Commission and Chairman of the Management Board of the Centre.

The establishment of the Centre was proposed as part of the Social Action Programme adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1974 and was decided by Regulation (EEC) No. 337/75 of 10 February, 1975.

The Berlin Senate has made a considerable financial contribution to the Centre and has also given it support in other ways.

The purpose of the Centre is to assist the Commission in encouraging, at Community level, the promotion and development of vocational training and continuous further training.

Its scientific and technical activities will contribute towards the implementation of a common vocational training policy in the Community. The Centre's main tasks will be to compile selected documentation relating to the present situation, the latest developments and research in the relevant fields; to contribute to the development and coordination of research in the above fields; to disseminate all useful documentation and information; to encourage and support any initiative likely to facilitate a concerted solution of vocational training problems, and to provide a forum for all those concerned with vocational training.

In carrying out its tasks, the Centre will establish appropriate contacts, particularly with specialised bodies, whether public or private, national or international, with public authorities and educational institutions, and with workers' and employers' organisations.

In 1976 special attention was paid to the problem of unemployment among young people with reference to vocational training, and to the difficulties of the transition from school to work. After preliminary discussions in May, a conference was held on these subjects in December 1976 from which pointers for the Centre's future activities emerged.

In 1977 the Centre will also tackle the following projects and subjects:

— a three-day conference in Berlin from 27-29 April on the compilation of selected documentation and the presentation of information,
— vocational training to meet industry's requirements arising from technical progress.
— vocational training with reference to equal opportunities for women,
— vocational training with reference to better opportunities for migrant workers,
— compilation of a glossary of the main terms used in vocational training.

CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Editor,

I am at work on a critical biography of the poet and dramatist, Stephen Phillips (1864-1915), and I should be extremely grateful if any of your readers who know anything of the poet and his family, or the whereabouts of any letters, papers or diaries would communicate with me.

Yours sincerely,

Richard Whittington-Egan,
32 Albert Mansions,
Albert Bridge Road,
London, S.W.11.

August 23rd, 1977.

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE WORLD POPULATION CRISIS

by John A. Loraine

IN the early Fifties, the salience of the population issue was still low. World population had reached the 2,500 million mark—about 100 million more than at the beginning of the Century. In the developed countries of Western Europe, the post-war baby boom was largely spent; it was confidently expected that the low birth rates characteristic of the late Thirties would again become the order of the day.

But in the Third World of Africa, Asia and Latin America a very different situation prevailed. The Medical Revolution had been in full swing for some years. The treatment of many infectious diseases had been radically altered, and one by one the once formidable 'captains of the men of death' had been emasculated and overwhelmed. Malaria had yielded to drugs such as paludrine, mepacrine and chloroquine; the mosquito had met its match in DDT. Better techniques for vaccination and the introduction of a whole spectrum of antibiotics had reduced the virulence of organisms and the lethality of diseases such as yellow fever, smallpox, cholera, plague and sleeping sickness. The health of women was gradually improving; infantile mortality rates were plummeting; everywhere hygiene and sanitation were on the upgrade.

By the early Fifties, a certain degree of control over death had been achieved in the Third World, and in many such countries during the next twenty years, death rates fell precipitously, soon coming to resemble those of the industrialised West. But birth rates were much less affected by the Medical Revolution. They remained obstinately high, being redolent of an agricultural rather than an industrial society; family planning programmes, however assiduously practised, did not seem to be reducing fertility. The imbalance between birth rates and death rates persisted and was at the kernel of the population dilemma; between 1952 and 1977 it was to lead to the greatest explosion in human numbers which the earth had ever experienced.

The problem was compounded by the fact that in the mid-Fifties a surge in birth rates took place in the developed countries of Western Europe. The UK, France, Federal Germany and Italy were the principal participants in this phenomenon which was destined to last for approximately 10 years. Thereafter, falling birth rates throughout the whole of the developed world were to become a rubric of society. There is as yet no satisfactory explanation why reproductive habits in the West changed so radically between 1955 and 1965. Perhaps there was a sense of optimism in the air; perhaps people felt that a new *belle époque* was dawning. Certainly it was the era of ever-mounting consumerism, of 'getting and spending', of materialism *à outrance*. Politicians provided their own distinctive imprimatur on events; in Britain in 1959 Harold Macmillan won an election for

the Conservative Party under the slogan of 'you've never had it so good'. The shadows of the Seventies were still to fall on the industrialised world. The concept of the finite planet had not forced itself into people's consciousness; the voice of the Club of Rome had not been heard; the change from a growth-orientated to a more sustainable type of society had not been predicated.

At the global level the horsemen of demography were at full gallop during the Fifties. By the end of the decade, world population had reached 3,000 million. By the mid-Sixties, another 350 million people had been added; by 1971, numbers had climbed to 3,700 million. At last, official bodies and prestigious individuals began to sound the tocsin of alarm. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs declaimed 'the growth of world population in the next 25 years . . . is at the very heart of the problem of our existence'. The US Academy of Science warned that either the birth rate must come down or the death rate must rise precipitously. Lord Caradon, former permanent British Representative at the UN, proclaimed that failure to tackle the population problem would sweep away all our political and economic advances 'like sandcastles before the advancing tide'.

In March 1976 a highly significant event took place. World population topped the 4,000 million mark. The media accorded this momentous event little publicity. There were too many other pressing problems—deep recession in the West in association with galloping inflation; resource depletion on an unprecedented scale; escalating nuclear proliferation bringing the world several steps nearer to an atomic holocaust. Yet in spite of this imbroglio, the importance of the population issue should not be underrated. It is a chronic and persistent malady; there will be little or no remission in its symptomatology during the remainder of this century. UN sources are currently projecting a 55 per cent increase in numbers to 6,182 million by 2000 AD; the Washington-based Population Reference Bureau considers that the current growth rate of 1.8 per cent per annum will continue for some time yet and that by the late Eighties, 5,000 million people could be competing for the earth's rapidly dwindling resources.

The world of 1977 is demographically divided between the rich and poor countries. The developed world houses about one quarter of the total. These nations have certain features in common. Most of them are highly industrialised; they have a high literacy rate, a good life expectancy, satisfactory diets, efficient medical services and, even in a time of global recession, a relative plethora of occupational opportunity. Another factor which they now have in common is a falling fertility rate, and this is taking place irrespective of whether the ideology of the individual nation state is Capitalist or Marxist.

The British scene is typical of the situation in the rich countries. In 1970 there were 784,000 live births in England and Wales; the corresponding figure in 1976 was only 585,000. The birth rate in England and Wales in 1976 was below 12 per 1,000, the lowest since accurate records started to be kept several decades ago. During the Seventies, the average age at

which people enter marriage has gradually risen; following marriage couples are tending to postpone the birth of their first child for a longer period than in the heady days of the Fifties and the Sixties.

As compared with the affluent nations, the situation in the Third World is as different as night is from day. Amongst them, Asia, Africa and Latin America house 75 per cent of the earth's people; 85 per cent of births are taking place in these great land masses. Even more importantly, 90 per cent of the additions to the planet between now and 2000 AD will be in the Third World.

About one-third of the earth's population live in India and China. These countries occupy a pivotal role in the population scenario. How India and China manage their population policies in the future will be closely bound up with the survival of the human race.

The story of India can scarcely be dubbed a success. The country has had a population policy based on family planning since the early Fifties; since then numbers have increased by almost 300 million. India's population policy has been operated disproportionately by doctors—of Western training and orientation; until recently paramedical staff have been employed on an exiguous scale. The oral contraceptive Pill has never attained the primacy in India as a method of birth control that it has elsewhere; it was as late as 1971 before the Indian Government enacted a reasonably liberal abortion law based on its British counterpart. The intimate relationship between population control and socio-economic development has never been adequately appreciated in India; the maxim of the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974 that if you took care of the people the population would take care of itself has never really been practised. And when in 1976 the Indian Government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi finally recognised the transcendent importance of the population issue it attempted to deal with it by a method which was anathema to the populace. Compulsory sterilisation might have been enforced by someone as barbaric as Hitler, as sadistic as Stalin, as paranoiac and tyrannical as Idi Amin. But in 20th Century India, nurtured in the gentle non-violence of Mohandas Gandhi and in the progressive democratic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru, the terrain was manifestly inappropriate. It is little wonder that compulsory sterilisation became the epicentre of the election campaign of March 1977, that the Congress Party suffered a *dégringolade* at the polls, that the rout was especially prominent in the areas of the country in which the sterilisation campaign was at its most intense and that both Indira and Sanjay Gandhi—strong exponents of 'compulsionist' policies—lost their Utter Pradesh seats by large margins.

The Chinese situation is much more hopeful. An unprecedented fall in fertility has been in progress during the Seventies, and recent estimates put the current growth rate of Chinese population (just over 1 per cent per annum) in the same range as that of developed countries such as Argentina, Japan and New Zealand.

From the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the Mao Tse-tung administration perceived as its supreme task the feeding and the raising

of the nutritional standards of over 700 million people. A realistic population policy was obviously mandatory, and it was conducted with vigour and sagacity. The Government recommended late marriage for men and women and the two child norm within marriage. Restraint in reproductive activity was regarded as a patriotic gesture which gave evidence of a 'raised political consciousness'. As part of its campaign against Confucianism the Government proselytised for women's rights and female emancipation, a dictum carrying with it strong anti-natalist overtones. It was the Great Helmsman himself in the Fifties who declaimed that male chauvinism was now taboo and should be relegated to the 'rubbish heap of history'. Instead it was *women* who held up half of heaven; now the time had come for women to 'smash the thousand year old chains of male supremacy'. The recent political upheavals in China—the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung within one year, the somewhat tentative stance of the new leadership, the activities of the notorious Gang of Four led by Chiang Ching—seem unlikely to alter the country's population policy. The new Chairman Hua Kuo-feng has already come out strongly in favour of it; its success is plain for all to see; an exemplar has been provided which other Third World countries labouring under the debilitating effect of population pressures, could well follow.

The Chinese have not been the only pacesetters in population control. During the last decade islanders throughout the world have also curbed their fertility. In Singapore in 1965, the birth rate was over 30 per thousand; by 1974 it had dropped by 10 points. The Hong Kong birth rate in the mid Sixties was 29, in 1974 only 19; the corresponding figures in Barbados were 26 and 21, in Cuba 35 and 25. Even Haiti, for long the fief of the tyrannical François Duvalier who operated a regime as obnoxious as any in the world, is now taking some slow and hesitant steps along the road to a viable population policy. All these islands with the exception of Haiti are developing rapidly. Family planning services are now broadly based; literacy rates are high; female emancipation is fast becoming a powerful historical force and serious attempts are being made to distribute wealth on a more equitable basis. Undoubtedly this beneficent tide of change is making a significant contribution to falling fertility rates.

In the Third World the effects of overpopulation are even more malign. The imbalance between population and food causes more than 400 million people in the poor countries to go to bed hungry each night. Overpopulation predisposes to unemployment and underemployment; it has an adverse effect on literacy; it is a force inimical to women's rights; it has rendered many family planning programmes—of which that of India is the classical example—almost nugatory.

In 1976 the close relationship existing between overpopulation and excessive urbanisation was highlighted by the UN sponsored Conference on Human Settlements held in Vancouver. Man's habitat is changing at an unprecedented rate; in 1900 only 13 per cent of people were urbanised. In 1976 the percentage was 40; by 2000 AD for the first time in human experience, townsmen will outnumber rural dwellers. The stampede to cities

in the Third World represented a *cri de coeur* on the part of a burgeoning rural populace whose aspirations had been nullified and whose future held no promise. But in cities there was always the chance that the streets might be paved with gold and that their lives might become more useful and purposeful. Alas, when they completed their trek they found no gold; nor did they find employment, adequate hygiene, satisfactory medical care or even the most rudimentary form of accommodation. They reacted by building the notorious shanty towns which have proliferated like a cancer on the outskirts of many Third World cities. These are the places where remorseless boredom scars the soul, where street sleeping is commonplace and where human squalor and degradation come close to their apogee.

Overpopulation and armed conflict have now come to be recognised as familiar bedfellows. Population pressures can jeopardise political stability and exacerbate tensions both within and between nation states; they can predispose to poverty, lawlessness and vandalism; they can erode personal freedom; they can ravage democratic institutions. In the twenty years after the end of the Second World War population factors played a role in at least fifty cases of armed conflict in the Third World. The Organisation of American States claims that they were of pivotal importance in the clash between El Salvador and Honduras in 1968. Their role in the events in the Indian sub-continent in 1971 which culminated eventually in the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh cannot be over-emphasised.

The last 25 years have demonstrated that overpopulation is one of the dominant historical themes of our time. The population bomb is far from having been defused. Let us hope for the sake of posterity that during the next quarter of a century, the bomb will not explode with a shattering detonation.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Lovers And Tyrants. Francine du Plessix Gray. Andre Deutsch. £4.95. *Janine*. Philip Callow. The Bodley Head. £3.50. *Johnny I Hardly Knew You*. Edna O'Brien. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £3.65. *Falconer*. John Cheever. Jonathan Cape. £3.95. *Horseman Pass By*. Diana Raymond. Cassell. £3.95. *The Dead Father*. Donald Barthelme. Routledge & Kegan Paul. £3.95. *Lucky Ham*. Shaun McCarthy. Macmillan. £4.50. *Drums For Rancas*. Manuel Scorza. Secker & Warburg. £3.90.

To combine a sensitive study of an unusual childhood with a sophisticated adult story might seem a proposition doomed to failure. Yet Francine du Plessix Gray succeeds brilliantly with her first novel, *Lovers And Tyrants*, moving effortlessly from the youthful Stephanie incarcerated with an Edwardian-style Polish governess, to 'Steph', the progressive, if not depraved American journalist she is destined to become.

Stephanie's erratic career in authorship begins in the claustrophobic Paris home where her aristocratic parents inflict wounds on themselves and their vulnerable child. The father adores his daughter, yet has scant information as to how to deal with her; the mother offers no semblance of maternal sympathy or love. Perhaps mercifully the devoted 'Mishka' is imported to direct the nursery scene, although with a frightening ignorance of hygiene or psychology. Never mind her wrong-headedness, she fills the vacuum to become a lasting influence on the grown-up Steph, and provides the major thread of continuity in this long, many faceted novel.

Stephanie's father dies in mysterious circumstances during the early stages of World War II. She becomes reunited with her mother in the United States and after many vicissitudes marries an American, Paul, at first glance an ideal husband—so ideal that Steph soon rejects him for his very predictability. She then embarks on an affair with a frustrated homosexual, Elijah, whom she converts to heterosexuality through the uncomplaining practise of various sexual deviations. Admittedly, these scenes of excess are hard to identify with the contemplative and romantic-minded Stephanie of the childhood years; yet this dividing of both the novel and the character into two separate entities has its clear purpose in underlining the destructive influence of the early repressions. The final outcome, with Steph sweltering in blinding sunshine pandering to the outrageous Elijah while tethered in thought and preference to her worthy husband and attractive children, is pure tragedy. Steph is really too complex and inconsistent to be subjected to the traditional ritual of fictional psychoanalysis, which is what makes *Lovers And Tyrants* so abundantly worthwhile.

A frustrated and bewildered woman of a totally different type provides the centre-piece for Philip Callow's new novel, *Janine*. The character of the title is in fact little more than a child in her approach to adult life—the result, once again, of an oppressive and wrong-headed upbringing. Her protagonist in the unorthodox love affair which follows is forty-six year old David Lowry, battered by his own marital failure and ripe for a relationship with enigmatic Janine.

In fact, the nineteen year old girl is experienced and ruthless, despite her youthful gaucherie. Lowry invites her to live with him in his mother's delapidated terrace house and the ill-assorted pair attempt to build some semblance of domestic life together. Other characters hover on the periphery, uniformly tongue-tied or off-beat, and are meticulously observed. In fact, throughout this edgy, nerve-charged portrayal of youth and age, Philip Callow never strikes a wrong note. In view of their bickering and obvious incompatability, the reader might have anticipated that David Lowry would be ditched by his attractive mistress. Instead, the final pages describe their marriage ceremony, as drab and ill-prepared as all their other actions.

A much more appealing heroine is Edna O'Brien's Nora who, despite being neurotic and generally anti-social, contrives to lay a charm on all who contact her. In *Johnny I Hardly Knew You* the reader is aware from the outset that Nora has murdered her lover, Hart, a boy half her age and a friend of her only son. Suspense lies in discovering the reason for this bizarre crime. The cause and circumstances are revealed through Nora's thought sequences while she awaits her trial. Nora is actually less mature than Hart and she has suffered a crippling marriage, following an unhappy childhood. Scarcely surprising that, deprived of the care of her only child, she has lovers—one of them a woman—though without serious emotional involvement until Hart awakens hitherto unsuspected passions.

A succession of memorable scenes and incidents enliven the unfolding of this unedifying situation—Nora's marriage home, a visit to Tuscany and the gathering of a group of students, including Hart and her son, performing on the Edinburgh 'fringe'. On every page the reader is halted to rejoice in Edna O'Brien's rapier-like wit and the pinpointing of a scene's essentials. We are not told if Nora was convicted and sentenced for smothering Hart with a pillow while he was in the throes of an epileptic fit. The mechanics of criminal procedure are not the objective, but rather the suggestion that in killing him the wife-lover-mother was revenging herself on all men. This wider implication seems less important than the narrative pace and unerring comprehension of people and their motivations.

Retrospective murder also forms the basis of John Cheever's new novel *Falconer*, yet it is told against a very different background—an 'American Correction Center' (or prison). The opening, when Zeke Farragut arrives to serve a sentence for killing his brother and for drug addiction, is probably the most effective scene in the novel. The least convincing is the finale in which Farrugut contrives his escape by posing as a dead man 'zipped' into a prison shroud. But in between these two extremes lies a vast, bewildering territory of order and anarchism, virtue and vice, the exploration of which is accompanied by a penetrating commentary which, with all its grisly detail, undoubtedly presents an accurate picture. It may be regarded as strange that Zeke Farrugut, described as a 'University lecturer', manifests so little connection with his habitual cultural and academic background and sinks all too easily into communal depravity, obsessed by the necessity of procuring regular 'fixes'. Into the macabre and often witty exposition of a group of incarcerated males at the lowest human ebb is woven a tapestry of memory in which Zeke relives his past life and human relationships. Neither provide much ground for self-congratulation. Sad that the nerve-torn Farrugut should have been tormented by a wife who had little more to offer her husband in intellectual parity than the majority of his prison mates.

Details about the murder for which Zeke was sentenced are withheld until the final pages and prove something of a damp squib, when a startling denouement might have been anticipated. *Falconer*, in common with other American importations, is presented to the UK reader with a barrage of laudatory quotes from the other side of the Atlantic,—a current publishers' practice and one which may have the obverse effect. There can be made about John Cheever's latest work reservations and criticism. Yet despite discrepancies, inconsistencies and occasional crudities, this off-beat revelation of life in an American penetentiary makes an unforgettable impact.

A far gentler world is described in Diana Raymond's new novel, *Horseman Pass By*, although it has dark undertones. These are perceived and recounted by an eleven year old boy, Jason Fitzgerald, who arrives in England from Rome to stay with uncongenial relations after his father has been killed in an air crash. Evelyn Fitzgerald, a celebrated writer and journalist, was himself on his way home, after an absence of many years, when the accident occurred. Instead, it is Jason who picks up the threads of the past; his father's past liaison with an important actress; the unexplained means by which the boy's mother died when he was little more than a baby; a strange love-hate relationship with Alex, once a fellow prisoner in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp and now mortally ill—all arouse anticipation of exciting explanations. In the event, these seem rather tame, possibly because Jason lacks the necessary sensitivity and perception to sift and analyse an admittedly bewildering array of clues.

The situation of a child battling to understand adult reactions, particularly as they may affect his own destiny, is one which has appealed to many novelists down the years; yet the imposed discipline presents many pitfalls, which is perhaps why Diana Raymond 'cheats' by including quite a number of scenes during which Jason is absent! Many interesting side issues are introduced into this quiet picture of rural England—Rome, the theatre, echoes of World War II;—serving as a tantalising reminder that with another ground plan *Horseman Pass By* might have provided the author with a better vehicle for her acute understanding of character and sly observation of outworn attitudes and conventions.

Few contemporary readers are prepared to admit that a current work of fiction is totally beyond their comprehension. Yet no blame is attached to anyone who admits to finding *The Dead Father* baffling to the point of obscurity. The author, Donald Barthelme, is a successful American writer and this is his first novel for many years. For his 'comeback' he has elected to discard any semblance of a recognisable plot or character, thus leaving himself unfettered to unfold an allegory in which the 'dead father' is dragged across a desolate terrain by people who neither know nor care whether he is dead or alive. Word patterns on the printed page and flashes back and forward are frustrating—yet the reward for perseverance comes on the final page—when the burial of the Dead Father—though still alive in the purely physical sense—comes over with unforgettable significance.

A suspension of disbelief is also demanded by Shaun McCarthy for his first novel, *Lucky Ham*. But in this case the message—if one is intended—is delivered through the disguise of a brilliantly hilarious farce. *Lucky Ham* is a satire on Hamlet and an Oxford college known as 'Mouldie'. Strangely, these two unlikely opposites mix well. The newly elected president, Claude, becomes Ham's stepfather rather abruptly following, as Ham comes to believe, the poisoning of Ham's father, the former president. Further parallels to the Shakespearean

tragedy are that Claude marries Ham's mother—the lady Gert, while supporting characters are Ophelia and Polonovski. Claude, however, is no match for Ham, who soon has him discredited and on his death bed before departing to continue his research project in South America, leaving a trail of speculation and scandal in his wake.

Finally, another puzzling yet undeniably powerful novel, *Drums for Rancas,* which deals with the shameless exploitation of a Peruvian village by an American mining company. Although the story has its origins in truth, it is not quite clear why the author, Manuel Scorza, has elected to report the virtual destruction of a culture and way of life through a series of 'folk' incidents and fables which, though effectively conveyed, block any realistic exposition of the outrage, leaving the reader foundering between fact and fancy. Lately, the fashion for blending fantasy with documentation in contemporary fiction seems to be gaining ground. But in this instance, the heart-rending picture of a helpless peasantry capable only of the most ineffective protest gains nothing from the fairy tale approach.

ALSO RECEIVED

The Dragon. Alfred Coppel. Macmillan. £4.50. This rather confusing novel about the obscure higher echelons of espionage shifts its scene between the continents of the world yet remains predominantly American. Though gripping and compulsive, even horrifying at times, *The Dragon* is yet another example of the disadvantage of rating action above characterisation.

Charlie Is My Darling. Mollie Hardwick. Eyre Methuen. £4.95. Mollie Hardwick is a conscientious researcher whose romances remain well within the confines of documented history. This vivid and interesting novel about some isolated happenings in the life of the Young Pretender is not only extremely readable; it also serves to draw attention to some little discussed facets of 'Bonnie Prince Charlie's' activities in Paris and London.

Lion By The Mane. Eva Dane, Macdonald and Jane's. £3. Troubadour Books under the above imprint continue to provide rewarding reading along predetermined lines. *Lion By The Mane,* an unsentimental and exciting account of life and adventure in Africa, is one of the season's best titles on this ever-growing list.

Chase The Wind. E. V. Thompson. Macmillan. £4.95. The winner of Macmillan's £7,500 prize competition for a historical novel has chosen an interesting if not entirely original setting for his entry. *Chase The Wind* deals almost exclusively with the conditions of mining in Cornwall during the first half of the nineteenth century. His researches into this and the effects of the Corn Laws are always more important than the central characters, whose emotions often become less than real when judged against the grim background of executions and transportations. Those on the periphery, miners, housewives and agitators —are consistently convincing.

The title of Margaret Butler's new historical novel is *The Turbulent Priest* and not *The Turbulent Heart* as stated in the July issue.—*Editor.*

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

THE FAILURE OF SOVIET SOCIALISM

Socialism and Liberty. Tibor Szamuely. Aims for Freedom and Enterprise. 40p.

Aims for Freedom and Enterprise had the constructive idea of republishing Tibor Szamuely's essay 'Socialism and Liberty' which originally appeared as a postscript to 'Half Marx' by Tufton Beamish (then an M.P., now Lord Chelwood). It is as timely in 1977 as it was when first written six years ago, and is the legacy of a remarkable man. It is indeed a disturbing reflection that the most perceptive—and the most damning—commentary on the British march towards Socialism should come from an ex-Soviet citizen. Why are so few native voices heard with this message?

Tibor Szamuely was born in Moscow in 1925 to Hungarian refugee parents. His uncle was an associate of Bela Kun in the Hungarian Soviet Republic established in 1919 and his father worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Thus Tibor was raised in that half-world of the Cominform among men like Tito and Gottwald, Rakosi and Rajk, the Soviet's agents in the 1930s who after 1945 could emerge as leaders of movements of national liberation in Eastern Europe. But he was never quite of them. He had two years (1932-34) at Bertrand Russell's Beacon Hill School before returning to the U.S.S.R. in 1934. In 1937, in the Army purges, his father was arrested and disappeared without trace. Tibor served in the Russian Army in the war, but in 1951 was arrested and sentenced to 8 years in a labour camp. He was released after 18 months, on Rakosi's intervention.

From 1953 he was back in Hungary, where he lectured on modern history, and in 1958 became Vice-Chancellor of the University of Budapest. He had a year in Kwame Nkrumah's Ideological Institute in 1963 and used that sojourn as an escape line to Britain in 1964. We had hopes of a job for him in Glasgow, but it was Reading University that found a post for him in Political Science. He lectured there until his sad and all-too-early death in 1974. In those years, however, he wrote extensively, talked endlessly, genially and with quite outstanding absence of malice, and wrote a major book, *The Russian Tradition,* published posthumously. No one who met him could fail to be captivated. And it is good to have this essay republished.

It stays alarming reading. In 1971 it was a devastating exposé of the failure of Soviet socialism. It is even truer now, and the editors have usefully added some new data. Russia's prison population is estimated to be between one and three million, against Britain's 40,000; fifty years after collectivisation, with one-third of its total labour force engaged in agriculture, it is still unable to feed its population, and regularly needs capitalist American aid; it has only two-fifths of America's railway network; urbanisation is proceeding slowly; the great majority of its school children do not reach beyond primary grades. The facts of Russian failure under Socialist 'planning' are plain, and perhaps this message is slowly getting through. The Left does not now so readily invoke the call of the Fabians, Shaw and the Webbs of the 1920s, that in the Soviet system there was a new civilisation—that halcyon call that misled a whole generation. But the drift towards egalitarianism, collectivisation and uniformity in Britain nevertheless proceeds apace, with the gifted penalised and comprehensiveness the slogan for 1984. We are moving, under Labour, along a Soviet road. Nationalisation of the economy, said Szamuely six years ago, means 'the destruction of political freedom, the deprival of the individual freedom of

choice not only in economic matters but in practically every question affecting his daily life. It would ineluctably lead to the destruction of every freedom we hold dear'. He knew, and he learnt the hard way, of the total divorce of socialist idealism from economic and political reality. Socialism, in fact, is the corruption of a dream of justice. Between the dream and the reality is Big Brother and Newspeak. This is a disturbing and all too relevant tract for our times.

ESMOND WRIGHT

NELSON: A RE-APPRAISAL

Nelson. The Essential Hero. Ernle Bradford. Macmillan. £6.50.

There has been such a plethora of books on Nelson that it would seem supererogatory to produce yet another; there is, however, always the need for a re-appraisal, and Ernle Bradford is just the man to do this as he has a flair for this sort of writing born from a genuine love of the sea. Moreover, he himself is an experienced sailor, having served in the Royal Navy during World War II, crossed the Atlantic three times under sail, and navigated most of the seas Nelson knew.

The author does not confine his attention solely to the naval operations in which Nelson played a prominent role, although these provide the highlights of the book, but finds adequate space to comment on the essential hero's personal qualities—his tendency to sound his own trumpet, his frequent illnesses which, apart from the later wounds, indicate that he was something of a hypochondriac, and even his sex life. Although a parson's son, the author avers that he was sometimes guilty of adultery even before Lady Hamilton came into his life. John Masefield, the poet, wrote that 'a captain of a ship at sea in Nelson's time was a kind of parallel to Deity. No sailor could speak to him with his hat upon his head. One uncovered to one's captain as to one's God'. Yet Nelson cared about his men; he had rigid rules about the ventilation of the below-deck areas and about the issue of lime and lemon juice as a prevention against scurvy. Indeed, Nelson displayed some of his finest qualities when maintaining the highest morale among the seamen who, for months on end, besieged the French fleet in Toulon in 1798 and again in 1804-05, the first siege ending with the victory of the Nile, the second with Trafalgar. Those self-same seamen who had endured the rigours of the sea with none of the comforts of the landsman were still capable of aiding their leader to achieve two of the most glorious victories in British naval history. Under the conditions of many monotonous months at sea, it was the captain who could make or break a ship, for his influence was all-pervasive.

Nelson's advancement in the Royal Navy—he was a post-captain before he was twenty-one—owes much to influence. He was rated on the books of the *Raisonable* as a midshipman at the age of twelve; he had no qualifications, but his uncle, Maurice Suckling, was Captain and that was enough. Moreover, Nelson's monther was the great-niece of Sir Robert Walpole, and that was a help. Captain Suckling later became Comptroller of the Navy and continued to be a good friend of the young Nelson. Influence, however, was not enough without zeal and competence, and Nelson had both to a marked degree. Ernle Bradford has much to say about the life of the seamen on these 18th century ships and is particularly informative about the types of ships, their design and construction, and the guns with which they were armed. All this is valuable information to the non-seafaring man who seeks to understand 18th century navigation and warfare.

Nelson was a true professional, planning his own novel tactics in battle; he

had the moral courage to disobey orders if the outcome could justify it, as with his 'famous indiscipline' at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, and his rejection of Hyde Parker's order to Leave off Action at Copenhagen. In both cases a moderate victory was converted into an overwhelming success. Annihilation of the enemy was always his aim. Ernle Bradford has assuredly written a most entertaining book which will grip the reader from start to finish, its attraction enhanced by many illustrations and helpful diagrams.

S. F. WOOLLEY

'THE RING' TRANSLATED

The Ring of the Nibelung. German text with English translation by Andrew Porter. Faber Paperbacks. £4.80.

Between the beginning of 1970 and early 1973, Sadler's Wells Opera, as it then was, English National Opera as it now is, built up year by year productions of the four operas which form Wagner's *Ring of the Nibelung*. As each of the four was heard for the first time at the London Coliseum, audiences also had their first hearing of an entirely new English translation written for this production of the Ring Cycle by Andrew Porter, who was then the highly respected music critic of *The Financial Times*. It is fair to say that these truly superb translations were as fundamental to the success of the enterprise as the musical performance; and it is appropriate that Mr. Porter, in his helpful and highly instructive Introduction to this book, declares 'the large inducement was that the musical interpretation, the production, and the translation would be created together, by a team of British artists new to The Ring, inspired by Reginald Goodall, whom I revered as the greatest of living Wagner interpreters'. Such was the success of his translation of each of the four operas that it was rumoured that Wagner-lovers were coming specially from Germany to hear it, and that some actually admitted that for the first time what the Master was saying had become fully clear.

That, perhaps, is not entirely surprising, for in his Introduction to the collected translations, having listed six principles that guided him in his work, Mr. Porter goes on to say 'A seventh requirement is conspicuously absent from those above: any attempt to reflect what Martin Cooper has called "the cloudy, archaic literary style that was an organic part of Wagner's mystique". Deliberately so. For I felt that anyone who wanted to listen to The Ring not-quite-understanding what is said could well listen to it unspoiled, in the original cloudy German.' The six 'mutually unachievable' intentions listed by the translator are: '(1) To provide a translation that is close to the original and at the same time makes audible sense at first hearing. (2) To keep important words—such as *Liebe, Leid, Ring, Rhein*—and especially the proper names exactly where Wagner put them. (3) To keep, wherever possible, the *Stabreim* (Wagner's use of alliteration) as an essential part of the patterning in the score's structure. (4) To echo the sound of the German—the ring of bright forward vowels, the full shadows cast by dark ones, the attack of hammer-stroke consonants, the hiss and splutter of certain sibilant sequences. (5) To reflect the differing tones, ranging from the elevated and rhetorical, through Froh's—and Fasolt's—lyricism in *Das Rheingold*, to Loge's airy wit and Siegfried's boisterous sallies; to let such jokes as Siegfried and The Wanderer make be heard as such. (6) Most important of all to find words that fit the music closely.'

Witness to Mr. Porter's success in achieving these intentions is borne by the intense, silent concentration of audiences wherever and whenever The Ring is performed by English National Opera in his translation. His success can be still

more closely analysed when one listens to the complete recordings of the three productions, *Rhinegold, The Valkyrie* and *Siegfried,* that HMV have already issued, and will be further enjoyed when their recording of *The Twilight of the Gods* appears next year. Now, happily, the translations are also available in this handsomely printed paperback edition, side by side with the original German, generously spaced and clearly set out so that they can be read and absorbed with ease. The truly remarkable thing about the quality of the translations is the pleasure that they give when read simply as a great folk-epic of Nordic mythology. Without being anywhere near to the music itself, in either opera house or on gramophone record, the whole atmosphere of Wagner's 'Ring' in this lucid, sensitive, and supremely intelligent translation leap at one from the printed page. To read Alberich's curse on the gold, Siegmund and Sieglinde's expression of love awakened by Spring, Wotan's narration to Brunnhilde and her annunciation of death to Siegmund is a moving experience. Similarly it takes no music to conjure up the visual imagery of the rapturous final scene of *Siegfried,* or the comedy of Mime and Alberich that preceded it, nor the infinitely touching despair of Waltraute's doomed confrontation with Brunnhilde in the first act of *Twilight of the Gods,* the heroic naïvety of Siegfried's narration, and the final exultation of Brunnhilde as she leaps, with her horse, onto the funeral pyre at the very end of the Cycle. It may have set out as a practical essay for Sadler's Wells Opera, but this translation by Andrew Porter has ultimately succeeded in becoming one of the great examples of the genre, and one which gives as much pleasure as poetry as when it is complemented by music.

DAVID FINGLETON

A FRANK NEW BIOGRAPHY OF DR. STOPES

Marie Stopes: A Biography. Ruth Hall. Andre Deutsch. £5.95.

Although one had an inkling that the life of Marie Stopes was unusual, and that her achievements were, if worthy of chronicling, not so godlike as she estimated them, one was unprepared for the sheer richness and savour of this first unfettered biography, for the construction of which Mrs. Hall had free access to the mass of material—even larger than Gladstone's collection—bequeathed to the British Museum.

First of all, let it be said that Marie Stopes' ideas were not original. 'Her thinking was compounded of Havelock Ellis, Edward Carpenter and Olive Schreiner, with genetic overtones from Darwin and Galton, and a dash of Empire from Kipling.' However, she was undoubtedly the central figure in the social revolution which liberated men as well as women from the misery of sexual ignorance and haphazard reproduction. *Married Love* (1918) lay hidden under tissue-paper at the back of countless wardrobes, beside the brandy bottle and the tablets of lavender soap, for several decades. The pathetic letters written to her by frustrated married clergymen in response to her book are well worth reading.

To understand how the remarkable young female academic, a brilliant palaeobotanist, and, in 1905, the youngest Doctor of Science in Britain, evolved into the passionate and even somewhat paranoid pioneer and prophet, we turn first to her late Victorian upbringing, and we are not disappointed. Her mother, a formidable intellectual, eleven years older than her father and from whom Marie inherited her polemical gifts, was the first woman in Scotland to take a university certificate. She disliked the physical aspect of marriage—even writing to her poor husband after she had visited him on his death-bed, 'The sensual look has passed away from your face that so pained me.' And so Henry Stopes

concentrated his affections upon his elder daughter, Marie. We recognise with a pleasant shock the world of Darwin and Edmund Gosse. The little girl followed her father around the gravel pits of Swanscombe (the home of Swanscombe Man), trained to dig, wash and catalogue the fossils therein. Here was the genesis of the young woman we see bent, in a poignant photograph, over her microscope with the fervour of Marie Curie and the touching intensity of Eleanor Marx. Childhood Sundays were traditional, and Marie developed such an acute sense of sin that, in a kind of Gosse-like misinterpretation, she rubbed herself in a sheepskin mat, dyed crimson, imagining it as the purifying Blood of the Lamb. She was rarely praised by her mother. She identified her father with the sea, whose breezes quivered up the flanks of sheltered bays.

Small wonder, then, that, as an adult, she—and this is very well put—'exuded a yearning for passionate attachment'. Those who responded to her signals were harbingers of disaster: a schoolmistress who nearly destroyed her capacity for heterosexual love, a married Japanese professor who rejected her in his homeland, a pale husband who was so devirilised by her that he was never able to consummate their marriage, and a second husband, after an annulment of the first marriage, who became so unsatisfactory to her that she cast him forth, fleeceless, from the matrimonial home. It is endearingly typical of Marie Stopes that when she (finally) realised what was wrong with her marriage, she spent months researching the whole subject of sex, in English, French and German, at the British Museum. Her life and her work thus, like Havelock Ellis' more abnormal career, are counter-stimulative to an unusual degree, even if this is to understate the complicating factors. It is tragic that she was herself such a physically and emotionally frustrated person, still virginal at the age of thirty-seven, when she remarried, so that, like Edith Wharton, she had to cram so much into the later part of her life. Life had not been fair to Marie Stopes, hailed by a grateful East Ender as a 'beautiful Goddess, preaching a sermon of hope.'

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

TWENTIETH CENTURY PRIME MINISTERS

British Prime Ministers in the Twentieth Century. Vol. I. Balfour to Chamberlain. Edited by John P. Mackintosh. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £8.95.

The study of Prime Ministers threatens to become an academic 'growth industry'. Until a few years ago there was scarcely any reputable study of either the office of Prime Minister or the comparative record of various occupants of that office. There have been several attempts to fill this vacuum lately. There was a two volume study of various Prime Ministers edited by Herbert Van Thal which consisted of unequal short biographies of Prime Ministers from Walpole to Heath; this has recently been re-issued in paperback. Lord Blake has published his lectures on the office of Prime Minister and Sir Harold Wilson will act as compère of a programme about Prime Ministers. A glossy companion volume will be issued in time for the lucrative Christmas trade. The present book, edited by the M.P., John Mackintosh, is the most useful of these efforts, although by no means a definitive work.

The study will, when finished, consist of two volumes; the period covered is limited to the twentieth century. This present volume extends from Arthur Balfour to Neville Chamberlain, i.e. from 1902 to 1940. It was decided to exclude Bonar Law and, in the forthcoming second volume, Sir Alec Douglas-Home on the ground that their tenure of the office was too brief substantially to contribute to the office's development. The book's aim, therefore, is not to present a collection of biographical studies but rather to use biographical studies

of a man's tenure of the office to show how that office has developed. One might think, therefore, that it would have been better to include Law and Home for it might be argued that a short tenure might still affect the development of the office. The editor, John Mackintosh, has contributed a short Introduction which provides a summary of recent writings on the role of the Prime Minister in the British Constitution.

The authors in the first volume are: Peter Fraser on Balfour, Jose Harris and Cameron Hazelhurst on Campbell-Bannerman, Hazelhurst on Asquith, K. O. Morgan on Lloyd George, Trevor Lloyd on Macdonald, John Campbell on Baldwin and Alan Beattie on Chamberlain. Many of these authors are acknowledged experts in their field and they provide good Introductions to the subjects. As might be expected, not all of the essays are of equal weight. The first, on Balfour, contains several errors, e.g. Lord Selborne was Balfour's cousin only by marriage; the guillotine *was* used during debates over the 1902 Education Bill. The essay on Campbell-Bannerman is a good introduction to a much under-rated Prime Minister. This essay was originally written in 1969, and thus it appeared before John Wilson's biography of Campbell-Bannerman (reviewed in this Journal). However, it was been revised to take account of the new work. The essay on Asquith again has appeared elsewhere and is, perhaps, slightly out of date.

The essay on Lloyd George by Dr. Kenneth O. Morgan is a valuable contribution. Dr. Morgan is particularly skilled in showing the influences on Lloyd George's career, the means by which he rose and, unlike some of the other contributors, Dr. Morgan has pointed out exactly how Lloyd George helped to shape the structure of the Prime Minister's office. He shows how Lloyd George used the press to aid his career. The essay on Ramsay Macdonald suffers from the fact that the author, Trevor Lloyd, wrote it before David Marquand's biography of the first Labour Prime Minister was published. Thus the essay is not a very useful work for those who have any acquaintance with Macdonald's puzzling career. John Campbell is far more critical of Baldwin than his more recent biographers have been, finding Baldwin essentially a 'dilettante'.

The final essay, on Neville Chamberlain, is one of the best in the book. The author, Alan Beattie, notes that his view of Chamberlain was changed considerably by a study of his papers. He admits, as did Chamberlain himself, that the war was proof that his foreign policy had failed. Nevertheless, Beattie maintains that Chamberlain was a man of considerable skill. He likewise shows that much of the 'myth' about Chamberlain has been due to those who wished to glorify not the more obvious man, Churchill, but the one successful politician with whom Chamberlain could be compared, namely Lloyd George.

It is, of course, impossible to assess fully a book that is only half finished. For the present, however, one can say that most of the essays offer at least a useful introduction for the student and general reader. It may be doubted, however, whether or not the book has achieved the aim set out for it, namely to show the development of the office through a study of the office-holders. Two of the essays, those on Lloyd George and Chamberlain, have much to say and the volume as a whole is certainly the best on the topic yet to appear.

R. F. MULLEN

ALONE IN AN ARCTIC WASTE

The Year-Long Day: One Man's Arctic. A. E. Maxwell and Ivar Ruud. Gollancz. £6.95.

Hating cold, I marvel that men can wilfully submit themselves to Arctic or

Himalayan ordeal. Ivar Ruud, a Norwegian already familiar with the rigours of Antarctic whaling, spent an Arctic year alone, hunting and trapping, on Main Cabin bay, Hornsund Fjord. To reach his cabin from the ship that landed him he had to make fifteen 15-mile treks with gear, stores, guns, knives, food, coal, books, in 100 lb. loads. 'By the eleventh', we read, 'he was an automaton . . . effectively deaf and blind.' It shames the fuss we make, packing for a holiday trip, grumbling at lack of porters.

The cabin had been left more or less habitable by scientists, but at times he was so cold his clammy clothes raised goose bumps all over his body. Hunting seal for blubber for his huskies was no picnic. When he had shot his seal he had to haul it into his boat, inch by inch, with numbed hands; an 800-pounder he would try to tow through a four-foot swell, a welter of minor icebergs. On stormy nights he would grope his way to the shore to ensure his two boats were secure. 'The Arctic darkness mixed with the driving white snow made a seething, slate-coloured stew that obliterated all landmarks. There was neither sky nor ground, only gravity and the pealing wind.'

At Christmas he decided to trek along the coast with one of his huskies to share a goose dinner, whisky and talk with another lone trapper and friend. Each man's life, we learn was delicately balanced. 'One could not depend too greatly on the other, for if disaster came, each would be alone.' Ruud's way back was through a blinding snowstorm that drove him to tunnel a cave in a snowbank for shelter and rest.

He had more than one close-range encounter with a bear. One smashed through the window above his bunk at night. Ruud 'flattened himself on the bunk, trying to avoid the bear's probing paw as he peeled the sleeping bag off his body and kicked free. He started to sit up, but his head crashed into what felt like a rock . . . the polar bear's lower jaw.' Somehow he contrived to reach the adjoining storeroom, grab his gun, and shoot it. If his testimony can be taken on trust this was a truly terrifying experience, breathtaking to read.

A simple philosophy sustained him through his solitary year: *'In this place I am complete . . . I'm not a god here. I can't make the wind blow or the snow fall. Sometimes I can't even make my huskies behave. But I'm the next best thing to a god. I'm a man, alive, and no thanks to anyone else for it.'* It points a well-written narrative worth shelving beside Nansen's, Scott's, Shackleton's, Ommaney's, Sverdrup's, and other records of glacial adventure.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Socialism With a German Face (Jonathan Cape. £6.95). Jonathan Steele, the author of this comprehensive account of the East German Republic, has made repeated visits to the GDR, particularly during the period from 1969 when he was appointed the *Guardian's* East European Correspondent. In many ways it is sympathetic to the regime, though not condoning its evil side. He has much praise for the economic achievement in East Germany, particularly since the erection of the Berlin Wall in August, 1961 and the outflow to the West of professional, managerial and scientific talent. We have the inevitable account of the social services which envelope the individual from the cradle to the grave. There is little

room for individual expression outside the socialist norm. The Churches are tolerated, but the individual Christian cannot reach the top. In industrial relations, Unions, of course, are little more than welfare organisations without industrial power. Strikes are forbidden. The East German has a comparatively high standard of living, particularly compared with Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe as a whole. There is no liberty of movement outside the Eastern bloc except in a few cases. A husband has to leave his wife behind when he visits relatives in West Berlin. In the final resort there is no rule of law and, of course, no freedom of assembly. There appears to be a reaction against collectivism to some degree, even among the Communist party stalwarts. 'After all the talk of collective consciousness, the growing "privatisation" with its accent on leisure, home life and the family might seem a contradiction. To some of the older ideologists perhaps it does. The present leadership accepts and encourages it.' East Germans have a craving for the West, stimulated, no doubt, by Western radio and television programmes, and by the prospect of freedom. The Wall is the great barrier. Nonetheless, the author suggests that many might return after meeting unemployment, inflation and the economic crisis. The East German government does not appear to take this view.

The Penguin Dorothy Parker (£1.25). Dorothy Parker, wit, critic, doyen of the *New Yorker,* outlived her talent. In the twenties and thirties she was one of the stars of the Algonquin Round Table which she shared with Benchley, Robert Sherwood and Edna Ferber. They were the second division of American Literature of the period. The first division, Scott Fitzgerald, Lardner, Hemingway, did not grace the table. The second division was witty, bitchy and now is almost unread. The most endearing of the table is Dorothy Parker. Her style, particularly in her book reviews, is so much that of the *New Yorker* that it is difficult to say which came first. Her stories seem to be rather whimsical and in fact formless. After a lengthy opening they suddenly come to an abrupt halt. At her best, in, say, *'Here We Are',* she writes very much like Ring Lardner, whom she greatly admired. The book is a thoroughly amiable read but after a while one longs for something more substantial, such as the great Lardner himself. (J.M.)

The Middle of the Journey (Penguin Books. 95p). The late Lionel Tilling has written an Introduction to the reissue in the Penguin Modern Classics Series of his novel first published in America in 1947. He writes that his 'story was committed to history—it was to draw out some of the moral and intellectual implications of the powerful attraction to Communism felt by a considerable part of the American intellectual class during the thirties and forties.' The only historical figure that Mr. Tilling depicted was Whittaker Chambers in the person of the novel's Gifford Maxim. In his Introduction, he tells how, unbidden, the character of Chambers became embedded in the fabric of the story. It provides a fascinating insight into the creation of this classic.

The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht (Eyre Methuen. £2.95). This 'study from eight aspects' of Brecht's work by Mr. John Willett was first published in 1959. It was revised and brought up to date in the third edition in 1967. In this new paperback edition, the author points out that 'only some very minor corrections have been made to the main text, but the Bibliography has been entirely revised to take account of the great number of Brecht publications since that date.'

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RHODESIA'S FORGOTTEN ELECTION

by John Day

THE Rhodesian General Election of 31 August, 1977 was widely dismissed as an irrelevancy in the Rhodesian crisis, because only the white minority had an effective voice. The day after polling the announcement of the Anglo-American proposals for Rhodesia's constitutional future eclipsed for the public outside Rhodesia the overwhelming electoral victory of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front. Yet this emphatic confirmation of Mr. Smith's leadership probably has more significance for Rhodesia's political development than the protracted discussions of Dr. Owen's plan, which may prove to be yet another in the long line of non-Rhodesian schemes for Rhodesia that have received massive publicity and aroused great hopes throughout the world, but have changed nothing within Rhodesia. Dr. Owen may join the distinguished company of Sir Harold Wilson, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kissinger, who have all tried and failed since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 to achieve a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia.

The 1977 General Election produced the Rhodesian Front's fifth successive win over a period of nearly fifteen years. This was also the fourth time that Mr. Smith as Prime Minister had led his party to electoral victory and that the Rhodesian Front had won all fifty white seats. The Rhodesian Front is more popular than ever with the white electorate: this year the party received 85% of the white votes, compared with 78% in 1970 and 75% in 1974.[1]

During the recent Election campaign the Rhodesian Front was attacked from right and left by two newly formed parties. The Rhodesian Action Party (RAP), contesting forty-six of the fifty white seats, accused Ian Smith of selling out the white community to black majority rule, while the National Unifying Force (NUF), which fought eighteen seats, condemned the Government's determination to exclude black nationalist guerrillas from power in any constitutional settlement. At the polls the Rhodesian Front crushed all their opponents. The results in the sixteen constituencies where all three parties competed showed the Rhodesian Front's great strength, for it attracted 78% of the votes, while the NUF took 12% and the RAP 10%. In the twenty-seven constituencies that staged straight fights

between the Rhodesian Front and the RAP, the Rhodesian Front did even better, with a similar turnout of the electorate, than in the three-cornered fights, receiving almost 90% of the votes, while the RAP fared about the same as in the contests where the NUF took part. This suggests that potential NUF voters supported the Rhodesian Front where there were no NUF candidates. The invulnerability of the Rhodesian Front was underlined by the weakness of its most successful opponents' challenges. A few well-known politicians performed well enough to save their deposits by securing at least one-fifth of the winning candidates' votes (which forty-four RAP and fourteen NUF candidates failed to do), but no one came anywhere near defeating a Rhodesian Front nominee. Allan Savory, the eloquent leader of the NUF, polled a mere fifth of the votes in Highlands North, a wealthy suburb of Salisbury which is traditionally less enthusiastic than most places about the Rhodesian Front. Dr. Ahrn Palley, an Independent, who is the most able and experienced white liberal opponent of Ian Smith, secured just under a third of the votes in Salisbury City, which the Rhodesian Front won by only three votes in 1974 and which contains quite a large number of Asians and Coloureds (of mixed race), who are classified as European for the purpose of voting. The most successful RAP candidate, Mr. J. Wright, won 22% of the votes in the Eastern constituency. Those RAP candidates, like Mr. Wright, who had been Rhodesian Front M.P.s before leaving the Government Party and forming the RAP, attracted over 40% more votes than their RAP colleagues without parliamentary experience. Yet no slight variations in the degree of failure among the opposition candidates could hide the impressive weight of the Rhodesian Front triumph. Before the Election the Government could not command the two-thirds majority in the Assembly that is necessary to pass constitutional amendments, because the revolt of twelve right-wing M.P.s earlier in the year left it with only thirty-eight supporters in the House of sixty-six (the remaining sixteen are Africans). By the 1977 Election Mr. Smith regained his two-thirds majority, eliminated the white opposition and increased his popular support.

The magnitude of the Rhodesian Front's victory looks particularly impressive when viewed as the climax of a year in which the Rhodesian Government faced exceptional difficulties. The gravity of increased guerrilla attacks, which placed great strain on the manpower and economy of white Rhodesia, was exacerbated by the accelerating rate of white emigration. In September 1976 Mr. Smith, under pressure from Dr. Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, agreed to a constitutional package which included majority rule in two years' time. This appeared to be a sensational *volte face* by the Rhodesian Prime Minister, who had previously asserted that there would be no African government in Rhodesia in his lifetime. The Rhodesian Front seemed suddenly to have abandoned most of what it had stood for. Yet Mr. Smith managed to persuade the parliamentary caucus of the Rhodesian Front to swallow this unpalatable medicine, presumably convincing its members that South Africa would cut off Rhodesia's sole surviving rail routes to the outside world if the Rhodesian Government did not make moves to transfer some power to the Africans. By the beginning

of 1977 Mr. Smith's agreement with Dr. Kissinger looked less like surrender, as difficulties had arisen to prevent a smooth and rapid transfer of power to the Africans. At and after the Geneva Conference the Rhodesian Government and the African nationalist leaders had failed to agree on the nature of the regime that would supervise the move from minority to majority rule, Mr. Smith refusing to yield more than he had offered to Dr. Kissinger, the Africans demanding significantly more. However, in February 1977 the right wing of the Rhodesian Front, having reluctantly stomached the Kissinger deal, revolted at the Government's decision to relax some of the law on land segregation, which many whites regarded as their Magna Carta. Twelve M.P.s left the Rhodesian Front and formed the RAP. Never before had the Rhodesian Front suffered defections on this scale, and the revolt was made more serious by the desertion to the rebels of some prestigious senior members of the Rhodesian Front, like Des Frost, the influential Chairman of the Party. With the RAP accusing the Rhodesian Front of betraying its principles, Ian Smith boldly called an Election to test the strength of the opposition. The gamble could have gone badly wrong, but in the event Mr. Smith's judgement was triumphantly vindicated.

Although the Election was obviously important in deciding that Mr. Smith would continue to act on behalf of white Rhodesia in any negotiations about a constitutional settlement, the precise significance of his return to office is not, at first, or even second, sight, clear, because he is a master of diplomatic ambiguity. Critical scrutiny of the Election campaign, however, can throw some light on Mr. Smith's intentions. Election promises are unlikely to reveal the whole truth about Rhodesian Front policy, but they do provide some evidence of feelings and aspirations that Mr. Smith's statements to hostile statesmen and journalists tend to obscure. He did not want to tie his own hands in future negotiations by committing himself to concrete proposals, but he was sufficiently precise before the Election to rebut the RAP accusation that he was demanding a blank cheque from the electorate. Also, by unambiguously rejecting the policies of the RAP and the NUF Mr. Smith defined the boundaries within which he was prepared to manoeuvre.

The main argument between the three parties who fought the Election was over the best way to defend the interests of the white minority. All the parties purported to believe that what is good for the Europeans is good for the Africans, but few of the white voters were fundamentally concerned about the black majority. Some of the supporters of the NUF were genuinely philanthropic, seeking the good of all races, but such people have always been an insignificant force in Rhodesian politics. The NUF appealed to white self-interest by arguing that the most prudent course for the white minority was immediately to concede one man, one vote, and to accept the consequent black nationalist government. Eventually the guerrillas would win the war against the Rhodesian security forces, the NUF maintained and, if the whites waited for the guerrillas to impose their rule as a result of military victory, the whites would receive rougher treatment than if they quickly and voluntarily accepted black rule and guerrilla participation in

Rhodesian politics. Mr. Savory, the leader of the NUF, forcibly expressed this view to the white electorate, drawing on his experience and expertise in the guerrilla war. 'I know your fears. I'm a Rhodesian like you. I'm a Rhodesian right-winger. A Conservative . . . I have two ranches here. My home is here . . . I share your fears—but you have not got an alternative.'

The RAP, by contrast, claimed that the only way to defend white interests was for the whites to keep political control and fight the guerrillas more efficiently. The RAP believed that Mr. Smith was betraying the white people by making political concessions to foreign governments. They accused him of undermining white confidence by indecisive leadership.

The Rhodesian Front retaliated by attacking the RAP as inflexible and the NUF as defeatist. The RAP was offering a 1963 solution to a 1977 problem, according to the Rhodesian Front, which no longer felt that it could ignore pressures from the rest of the world. Ian Smith strongly implied that South Africa gave Rhodesia no alternative but to move towards a more liberal constitution and that the Rhodesian Front had learnt the necessity of political concessions to ensure economic survival. To the Rhodesian Front the RAP's adamant refusal to compromise was as suicidal as the NUF's desire to surrender to black nationalism. The Rhodesian Front admitted that the security forces could not win the guerrilla war, but, unlike the NUF, it did not believe that the guerrillas could win it either. The idea of giving in to their enemies was anathema to the Rhodesian Front. They saw themselves battling bravely against overwhelming odds like the British in 1940 with Ian Smith neatly fitting the role of Winston Churchill. The Prime Minister's wife, Janet Smith, expressed well the Rhodesian Front's subtle combination of pragmatism and indomitability. 'You have to adapt to survive and the Rhodesian Front is determined to adapt and adopt adaptations so we will survive, and we will not give in.' The objective of the Rhodesian Front, to protect white interests as well as it can, has remained unchanged since it was first elected in 1962. What has changed is its view of the most prudent tactics to achieve that end. Strategic retreat has now replaced entrenched resistance.

Precisely how much the Rhodesian Front intends to concede is not clear. The RAP accused it of being prepared to hand over to black majority rule. To Dr. Kissinger in 1976 and to the electorate in 1977 Mr. Smith insisted that he would accept majority rule only if the guerrilla war were stopped. This condition is unlikely to be met because, as Mr. Smith will not transfer power to the guerrillas or allow them to form the core of the Rhodesian army, the guerrillas will not stop fighting. So Mr. Smith's promise of majority rule may be less of a surrender than it seemed, although he can scarcely admit that he promised majority rule on a condition that he knows will not be met.

There are other subtleties in Mr. Smith's agreement to majority rule. He is unambiguously opposed to one man, one vote, which the black nationalists make their central demand, and he wants to preserve a qualified franchise. Furthermore, he has, in 1977, made a distinction between majority rule, which he accepts, and black majority rule, which he does not. This

seems to mean that he will not introduce a political system in which the blacks, who outnumber the whites by nineteen to one, would elect a totally black government, although he recognises with regret that this will come in the long run. Mr. Smith hopes under 'majority rule' to have constitutional safeguards to protect white interests and, apparently, to see some white faces, perhaps even a majority, in the government. One nationalist leader, Ndabaningi Sithole, suggested that Mr. Smith wants a white government with black faces. Ian Smith himself unambiguously declared that he would not accept a rapid handover of power by the Rhodesian Front to an African nationalist government.

In the Election campaign Mr. Smith stated that he did not expect that the Anglo-American plan would prove acceptable to white Rhodesia, as indeed it has not, and he planned his own 'internal settlement'. He proposed to speak with any African leader who would denounce terrorism, which excluded the Patriotic Front leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, but which could include other nationalists, notably Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Sithole, if they positively dissociated themselves from the guerrilla warfare that in the past they vigorously supported. Mr. Smith planned to take some 'moderate' black leaders into his Cabinet in order to work out a new constitution. White Rhodesian Front members would remain in the majority, Mr. Smith would keep control and the Africans would remain in the Cabinet only as long as they behaved. When the Cabinet had fashioned a new constitution, designed to be the basis of a settlement, the white electorate would be invited in a referendum to accept or reject it.

From this plan one can deduce the limits of the Rhodesian Front's liberalism. Some Ministers seemed to suggest before the Election that a white-dominated Cabinet containing invited Africans who had no standing in Parliament was as far as the Rhodesian Front intended moving towards majority rule, although Mr. Smith presented such a Cabinet as an interim measure, a means for achieving the end of a revised constitution. However, the difference between Mr. Smith and men like his Foreign Minister, Mr. P. K. van der Byl, may be insubstantial, for it is impossible to imagine any constitution emerging from the procedure proposed by Mr. Smith that would be more than a parody of majority rule. The so-called 'moderate' nationalist leaders, Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Sithole, have declared that they will not negotiate with Mr. Smith except on the understanding that he is about to concede one man, one vote. Even if, for the sake of argument, one assumes that Mr. Smith succeeded in persuading some nationalist leaders to join his Government in working out a new constitution, it is unlikely that anything much more radical would emerge from this Rhodesian Front-dominated group than a system designed to perpetuate a government containing black men but controlled by white. If, by some chance, a genuinely liberal constitution did emerge from Mr. Smith's internal negotiations, the white electorate could still strike it down in the referendum that Mr. Smith has promised them. It looks as if Ian Smith, while going through the motions of preparing for important constitutional changes, has in fact worked out elaborate procedures to forestall them.

The Rhodesian Front Election victory does not, then, represent, as it might superficially appear to, a defeat for the policy of defending white interests above all else and a victory for steady progress towards a constitution fairly representing the African majority as well as the European minority. The voters decided to let Ian Smith go on playing the diplomatic game of dodging and delaying at which he has excelled since becoming Prime Minister, judging this the best way of giving up least. He will accept radical political changes only if powers outside Rhodesia sharply twist his arm.

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[1] Tony Kirk and Chris Sherwell, 'The Rhodesian General Election of 1974', *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 1975, pp. 1-25. The Elections of 1970, 1974 and 1977 took place under the 1969 Constitution by which white voters elect white representatives and black voters elect black representatives. In the two previous Elections of 1962 and 1965, under the 1961 Constitution, the voters were not strictly segregated by race, but in fact fifty of sixty-five seats were virtually elected by A roll voters, the vast majority of whom were white. In 1962 the Rhodesian Front won 56% of the A roll votes for the fifty 'white' constituencies, and in 1965 79% (James Barber, *Rhodesia: the Road to Rebellion*, Oxford University Press 1967, pp. 311-2).

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During the summer and autumn of 1977 we have published a series of articles on various subjects of current interest and in particular those which have developed significantly over the past twenty-five years. The series concludes in the December issue with *25 Years of Architectural Development* by Sir Hugh Casson and *Salutation From a Distant Isle* by Terry Tucker. Particulars of the series and single copies may be obtained from the Business Manager. Also included in the December issue will be *The Army as Social Engineers in Nigeria* by Arnold Hughes and *Conflict in the Horn of Africa* by Peter Woodward.

SLOW PROGRESS REPORT ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

by P. W. Birnie

THE 6th Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) concluded on the 15th July 1977 leaving the LOS package still in its wraps and with the knots in the First Committee, dealing with the establishment of a legal regime for the exploitation of the deep seabed beyond the continental margins, if anything tightened.

The President's Report on the 5th session, although expressing disappointment at the slow pace of negotiations, had suggested ways to compromises on the various blocks in the 3 committees (outlined in the article in the December 1976 issue of *Contemporary Review*). That session was devoted to the first discussion of the Revised Single Negotiating Text produced by the 4th session, the principal points of which also were explained in the above article.

The President, at the end of the 6th Session, said that 'a certain degree of substantive progress was made' and a new text, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) was produced which is to be the basis for negotiations at a 7th Session in Geneva from March 28th 1978. The text differs from the earlier ISNT and RSNT in drawing together the four separate parts of those versions, which had been prepared individually by the President and the Chairmen of the 3 main committees. These 4 worked on the ICNT as a 'team under the President's leadership'. Before we look at the contents of the new parcel, analyse the ways in which it differs from the earlier packages, and assess its significance at this stage in the UNCLOS we should first put it into its context within the year's events in the Law of the Sea, which included a spate of unilateral assertions of maritime jurisdiction.

Following the failure of the 5th and 6th sessions to adopt a Treaty, several states decided to act unilaterally on the basis that the UNCLOS at least evidenced a general consensus in relation to the articles in ISNT and RSNT concerning fisheries jurisdiction, which remained substantially unchanged in both texts. These articles proposed that coastal states should be given 'the sovereign right' to explore and exploit all the living resources of the zone and to determine the total allowable catch (TAC) within it. Only if a coastal state has not itself the capacity to harvest the entire catch would it be obliged to make any surplus available to other states.

Certain general criteria were proposed for the allocation of this surplus, including 'the need to minimise economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of the stocks, as well as the special needs of developing states'. The right conceded in RSNT at first sight appears to be exclusive but in substance is only preferential, as although the coastal state concerned has an exclusive right to determine the catch 'taking into account the best scientific advice available to it', it *must*, if there

is any surplus to its own abilities, make it available to others. Moreover, the text requires it 'to promote the objective of optimum utilisation' of the stocks, though it must avoid over-exploitation, co-operating to this end with appropriate global and regional organisations. The new ICNT, although it makes some changes, follows much the same lines, permitting the coastal state wide powers to license vessels, make regulations of all kinds, place observers on board, supervise joint ventures and to enforce all these as necessary. It will be recalled from the earlier article that this fisheries jurisdiction in the RSNT is only one item in a bundle of varying jurisdictions referred to as the Exclusive Economic Zone, including economic uses, scientific research, seabed exploitation and pollution.

None of these texts can yet be said to be law as they have not been formally adopted as a composite treaty. However, international law can be developed not only by treaty but also by the creation of new customs. Two elements are required for this, first an objective element, state practice, and secondly a subjective element, the so-called *opinio juris*, i.e. evidence that the states concerned are acting in the belief that they are under a legal obligation to do so. Unilateral declarations can be part of this process, i.e. they introduce new state practice but they do not of themselves make new law. The second element is still required and is more difficult to assess. In the past the *opinio juris* preceded the act; now the acts seem intended to force the issue. Clearly when unilateral declarations are few and introduce a dramatic change in previous customs a period of waiting is required to determine whether the states affected will accept the change and acquiesce in it thus creating a new obligation. The declaratory states' seriousness of purpose, their ability to enforce the new regime, the prevalence of similar acts and the prevailing state of international negotiations now all enter into the assessment of the status of the new practice as law. In a provocative paper presented at the recent Commonwealth Law Conference Professor O'Connell[1] suggests that the recent unilateral proclamations of fisheries and pollution zones have obscured the differences between the two main streams of doctrine concerning law creation—the Grotian tradition of moral order, which he defines as rules which refer to 'what the society of mankind requires for its regular moral order', and the Vatellian tradition of acquiescence and consent referred to above. Governments are not now acting, he says, from legal conviction but from motives of power and gain, upsetting the previous workable methodology, and setting out to break with traditional rules in order to bring about the changes they seek, based on effectivity, i.e. use (or threat) of force, so that law becomes the product of, not the curb on, force and a premium is put on unilateral action.

Immediately after the failure of the 6th Session to make substantial progress towards a treaty both the United States (which had already legislated the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act) and Canada, alleging that overfishing could no longer be countenanced, moved to implement 200 mile fisheries zones in 1977: Canada's effective from 1st January 1977 and the United States' from March 1st. Several South American states, 2 African and Iceland had already asserted 200m. zones

(before the RSNT) either as fisheries or economic zones or as territorial seas. The United States F.C.M.A., however, closely follows the RSNT; foreign fishing for the surplus TAC is allowed only under permit requiring the foreign country to abide by US regulations, and to accept wide enforcement powers including boarding, arrest and seizure of the vessel, and the placement of US observers on board at foreign expense. Heavy fines are imposed for violations and both permit and vessel may be forfeit.

The USA has already concluded agreements with 17 countries—the EEC, Bulgaria, Cuba, Taiwan, West Germany, South Korea, Poland, Romania, Spain, the USSR, and Canada and Japan. Many other countries have also acted—Norway (using the term 'economic zone' although only the fisheries element is implemented). Also EEC coastal states in 1977 (Denmark, the FRG, Ireland and the UK limiting themselves to fisheries zones and France claiming an Economic Zone); Portugal; Bangladesh (1974); the Bahamas (EEZ 1977) and Vietnam (1977); Japan and the USSR both initially opposed these developments, not surprising in view of their huge distant water interests. Japanese took to the streets with banners demanding 'Stop the 200 mile zones' but the inexorable spate of declarations induced both countries eventually to follow suit. The Soviet Union prefaced its fishery zone edict with the word 'provisional', stating that it would 'work in the future for the regulation of the pressing problems of the legal regime of the World Oceans on an international basis and for the conclusion to this end of a convention in which such problems . . . would be resolved in an integrated and interrelated manner, taking into account the legal needs of all states'.

A confusing picture is emerging as some states follow the RSNT language, whilst others do not; some claim F.Z.s, some EEZs and some territorial seas; some have agreed with foreign fishermen, others have not. Boundaries of overlapping zones remain to be established though it seems likely that in the interim any existing boundaries on the continental shelf will be observed for fisheries zones, however inappropriate. There have been several violations, incidents and arrests but on the whole states affected are acquiescing in the coastal states regulation of the new zones.

The EEC states largely avoid the boundary problem (though observing seabed delimitation lines for coastal state enforcement purposes) since they are obliged by the Treaty of Rome, the Accession Treaty and Regulations pursuant to them, to formulate a Common Fisheries Policy, based on conservation needs, but allowing common access for all member states to the living resources of the pooled coastal state zones. The so-called 'EEC pool' is, subject to these requirements, under the jurisdiction of the individual coastal states. A CFP is proving difficult to agree because of the dichotomy between the requirements of equal conditions of access and of conservation, which necessitates drastic cuts in catch to preserve depleted stocks. EEC member states have built up large fleets and fish processing industries based on the previous regime of freedom of fishing on the high seas, limited only by their voluntary cooperation in Fisheries Commissions, such as NEAFC. At a time of economic recession and high fuel costs they

find it particularly difficult to cut catches; moreover, states, such as the UK and Eire, which inter alia make a larger contribution to the common pool than others, and have regions particularly dependent on fisheries as have also e.g. Belgium and France, consider that their fleets should bear less of the burden of retrenchment than others, and that they should be protected by variable but exclusive belts of up to 50 miles. The UK recently amended its demand to a 'dominant preference' in such belts.

Some of the above states have retained, by the use of the phrase 'Exclusive Economic Zone', the option of claiming that under the ICNT pollution control is inter alia included. The UK recently protested about an Argentine assertion that this was so. Canada persists in her 100 mile Arctic Pollution Zone (protested by the USA) and although their 200 miles Order related only to fisheries, a Canadian authority recently asserted that this would include wide control of all forms of pollution insofar as it is necessary to preserve fisheries.

It is not surprising in the light of the above that UNCLOS's President Amerasinghe stated at the 6th Session's opening that 'the indications are that unless we reach agreement within a matter of two or more substantive sessions including this one . . . events will have overtaken us.'

Most of the 6th Session, as did the 5th, took place in private, informal meetings, off the record and without formal reports. The first three weeks were devoted to consideration of the International Sea-bed Area (declared by the UN to be 'the common heritage of mankind'), where the manganese nodules lie; delegates next discussed the general LOS issues, e.g. status and limits of the EEZ; the marine environment; scientific research; transfer of technology. There were also informal plenary meetings concerned with dispute settlement.

The First Committee (seabed regime) met informally in a body, open to all members, known as the Chairman's Negotiating Group (CNG), under Jens Evensen of Norway. An informal intersessional consultation had been held in Geneva from 28th February to 1st March 1977 under his Chairmanship on matters of concern to this committee, particularly the system of exploitation, since there was a widespread feeling that further progress at UNCLOS hinged on these questions. Five topics were examined then—the main provisions governing the award of contracts of exploration and exploitation, rules on financing and establishing the Enterprise body; resource policy; permanent versus transitional regimes and a 'review' clause; and (briefly) dispute settlement procedures. Mr. Zulueta (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to UNCLOS) who attended the consultation reported that it 'was notably marked by a sense of pragmatism and an atmosphere of compromise and goodwill'. More than 80 countries (of the 148 attending the 6th Session) were present and 'the talks showed clearly that avenues to compromise are open'. It is not proposed in this article to map these avenues; suffice to say that many delegates felt that the ICNT, which reverted more to the kind of seabed regime proposed in the first ISNT, firmly closed the door on the compromises in spite of the progress made by the Evensen Consultation and CNG.

A comparison of the critical statement made by Mr. Elliot Richardson,[2] the leader of the US delegation, on receipt of the ICNT, with that of Judge Elias[3] (Nigeria) to the Commonwealth Law Conference approving the line adopted in the ICNT reveal exactly how far apart the developed and developing states still are on these crucial seabed issues. However, the UNCLOS will continue and two papers produced at the 6th session on the costs of a Sea-bed Authority and the means of financing its activities may help to bring the parties together. Mr. Richardson, nevertheless, concluded that in spite of the real progress on some vital issues (international security and freedom of navigation; the legal status of the EEZ; scientific research; pollution prevention in the territorial sea; dispute settlement machinery) the ICNT 'substantially sets back prospects for agreement on an international regime for the conduct of seabed mining'. He added threateningly that 'both the substance of the text on this issue and the lack of fair and open processes in its final preparation (it was produced privately, without discussion and released after the session closed) require me to recommend that the US undertakes a most serious and searching review of both the substance and the procedures of the Conference'.

The ICNT is, he says, 'now fundamentally unacceptable' since 'it deviates markedly from the proposed compromise text'. It does not, he says, give the assurance of access to resources necessary if the developed states are expected to finance the Enterprise and to accept 'parallel' exploitation by the Enterprise and contractors as a basis of compromise; it impliedly requires technology transfer by contractors as an access condition, as well as mandatory joint ventures between contractors and the Authority. It not only sets no limit on the contractors' financial burdens, but combines a range of alternative burdens which may end up being compounded. It even sets a limit on seabed production of minerals from nodules, far beyond, in the American view, what is required to protect land-based producers in developing countries; indeed, against the general interests of the Third World. It gives unacceptably wide powers to the Authority to regulate all other seabed mineral production 'as appropriate' as well as scientific research in the area. Minority interests are not sufficiently protected on its governing body; and benefits are to be distributed even to peoples not party to the Convention. Lastly, if agreement to the contrary is not reached in 25 years the regime is to be converted into a 'unitary system', i.e. exclusive exploitation by the international Enterprise; state and private contractors being involved only if the Authority invites them to conclude joint ventures with it.

Against this must be set the 'Group of 77' view represented in the ICNT, that the common heritage principle can best be effected by curbing states' and multinational companies' access to the resources of the area and fully internationalising both exploitation and control. There is said to be 'a wide consensus that the (UN) Declarations (on common heritage) actually establish new rules of international law which are binding on all states' so that the principle is not negotiable and any convention must accord both with this and the Third World's view that it must in some way meet the

requirements of a New World Economic Order. A number of international conferences, on Food, Population, Water Resources, etc. have taken place simultaneously with UNCLOS and aspirations engendered by them have become linked with it.

The second committee and its three negotiating groups also met informally. It requested a study showing on maps and in figures the differences in area between various approaches to defining the limit of national jurisdiction over the continental shelf. ICNT included new provisions on the status of the EEZ which safeguard the traditional high seas freedom within it except for coastal state resource rights under the Convention. The texts on passage through straits were retained in face of determined opposition, with some redrafting to accommodate the need for environmental protection in narrow straits. There was much discussion of access to fisheries in the EEZ by the LLGDS group (land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states) and a new article exempts from access states whose economy is 'overwhelmingly dependent' on fisheries.

A formula for sharing revenue from resources on the continental margin beyond 200 miles was arrived at, i.e. in the 6th year after commercial production begins states should contribute one per cent of the value of that production to the International Authority; increasing this by one per cent annual increments until 5 per cent is reached in the tenth year.

The overlap between Committee II and Committee III concerning marine pollution regulation was referred to in the previous article. The more restrictive Committee II text on who should set the standards for prevention of pollution—coastal states, or flag states acting internationally—seems to have prevailed. It is proposed that coastal states may not make regulations concerning the design, construction, manning and equipment of foreign ships unless 'they are giving effect to generally accepted rules or standards'. Coastal states can still regulate discharges and liability for pollution in their territorial sea and port states (i.e. the state of the next port of call of a ship) can fix all conditions for entry into harbour, including construction, etc. regulations. This accords with the demand by President Carter, especially to IMCO, that regulation and enforcement on sub-standard tankers should be tightened up, following several oil tanker disasters off the USA in 1976. Provisions concerning ecologically 'special' areas now allow for the extra laws to be approved by the appropriate international organisation (IMCO) simultaneously with the area's designation.

A new proposal is that states should establish national laws 'no less stringent' than international ones to prevent pollution from seabed mining. It should be noted in this context that during 1976 a new North Sea regional convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations was signed, establishing strict liability for, inter alia, Ekofisk type blow-outs and setting limits of liability and insurance requirements. It is not yet in force but the Ekofisk incident is encouraging States Party to the new Convention to expedite ratification, though the agreement is open to some criticism.

The problem of the extent to which scientific research in the EEZ should

come within the control of the coastal state is resolved in the ICNT in favour of only modified coastal state control. Consent would be required but must be granted 'in normal circumstances'. States could withhold consent if the project is of 'direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.' The RSNT restrictions on publication of research results are abandoned. Disputes over research would be subject to dispute settlement procedures except for conflicts arising over the discretionary right to withhold consent. Mr. Richardson approved, envisaging the text being written into national laws and thus 'regularising what has until now been a capricious situation'. There had been considerable fears that exclusive coastal state control over research would seriously, if not fatally, impair such important current projects, of benefit to the whole international community, as research into the nutrient upwellings of the ocean floor off North-west Africa, or the movements of 'El Nino' off the West coast of South America.

The ICNT clearly represents progress to compromise and consensus in Committee's II and III but the key to the negotiations remains the resolution of the problems concerning who is to exploit the 'common heritage' areas and on what terms. The ICNT whilst offering new acceptable solutions on some of the remaining contentious issues seems, in overlooking the Evensen reports, to have failed to produce a sufficiently compromising solution on this issue. One must be found for, as the UN Secretary-General said at this 6th session, 'If a new and broadly accepted law of the sea does not emerge through international agreement we face the prospect of each State determining its own view, with ever-widening claims to ocean space and resources. The acceptance of such a situation, favouring as it would power at the expense of justice, and risking unforeseeable possibilities of conflict, is unthinkable'. We are, as illustrated by the events described at the beginning of this article, on the brink of the 'unthinkable'.

It is not too late to turn back but it may soon be so for Mr. Richardson concluded that he was 'led to recommend to the President . . . that our Government must review not only the balance among our substantive interests, but also whether an agreement acceptable to all governments can best be achieved through the kind of negotiations which have thus far taken place'. There will certainly be no 'balance' of international interests if the negotiations do not continue and a treaty is not arrived at since the Group of 77 are not technically able to exploit the International Area and the Enterprise does not exist—and never will without a treaty.

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[1] D. P. O'Connell, 'Trends in The Law of the Sea', paper presented to 5th Commonwealth Law Conference, Edinburgh, July 1977.
[2] Press Release US UN-57 (77) 20th July, 1977.
[3] Judge T. O. Elias, 'Consideration of The Results of The Law of The Sea Conference', paper presented to 5th Commonwealth Law Conference 1977.

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OPEC AND HIJACKING IN SWEDEN

by Francis P. Walsh

IN a resort outside Stockholm, Saltsjöbaden, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries polished off its 49th Ordinary Meeting on 12-13 July 1977 in the respectable time of 27 hours.

The member states of OPEC (now 13) have been holding such meetings regularly since the Organisation was founded in 1960. The question that most interests the world is whether there will soon be a further increase in the price of oil, but it had been stated in advance that no important decisions were likely at this meeting.

The last price increase of 10% occurred in December, 1976. Then Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates contented themselves with '5% plus friendship'. They have now lined up with the majority, on condition that there is no further increase before the end of 1977. The matter will then be reviewed in the light of the world economic situation—the degree of recovery—at that time.

These two States are the 'doves' of OPEC. The 'hawks' are Libya, Algeria and Iraq, which are already demanding a price rise in 1978. Iran, OPEC's No. 2 producer, was taking a hard line last year, but finally compromised with the Saudi proposals. The Iranians further asserted that the price increases were being more than offset by price rises for Western exports and that an indexing system might provide a solution. They have since dropped this idea.

The arrangements for the Saltsjöbaden meeting were elaborate. Following the kidnapping of delegates in Vienna last year, the Swedish authorities left nothing to chance. They cordoned off the hotel where the meeting was held and the delegates stayed, and brought in 400 policemen with helicopters, sandbags, wire fencing and launches. The 600 journalists found themselves sitting around in a specially set up press centre for three or four days, awaiting a few press releases that finally said almost nothing.

In a TV interview, Their Excellencies Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Jamshid Amouzegar and Hernandez Acosta, from Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela, showed a united front: 'Prices will be determined by the play of market forces, the laws of supply and demand. However, it's not the price of oil that will be crucial, but its availability. If the West does not learn to economise oil, the shortage in the 1980s already will result in much higher prices than today's'.

Sheikh Yamani recalls that between 1960 and 1973 the price of oil remained almost stationary. Then the OPEC States discovered their power and put it up by about 400% within a couple of months—which caused serious dislocation in the Western countries. Now, says Yamani, OPEC has learned its lesson: it will try to avoid further drastic measures and instead proceed with moderation, allowing the West to adapt to a gradual rise in prices. He spoke like a statesman, not a cartelist.

The major role played in the interview by Yamani and the nuances of

deference in the roles of the minor Excellencies reflected the difference in oil production in their respective countries (Saudi Arabia 422 million tons, Iran 289, Venezuela 113). However, they were united in their confidence and readiness to provide the West with advice: 'Economise on energy and seek alternative sources. Why are your cars only 30% efficient in utilising petrol?' OPEC is not a bunch of big bad wolves trying to ruin the West or, at least, wring out the last drop of profit. 'We need you as much as you need us; time will show what price increases your economies can bear.' The forces at work are impersonal: 'If there is another war in the Middle East, oil will not flow.'

The real price of oil has indeed dropped in the past couple of years. 'When we raise our price by 10%, the West puts up its export prices by 20%,' says Jamshid Amouzegar, Iran's Minister for Petroleum. Rising prices are a problem particularly for those developing countries which have neither oil nor industry. OPEC claims to be aiding them now far more than are the Western countries. The latter say that OPEC caused the problem.

The desire to present a united front apparently lies behind the decision to postpone certain agenda items to the next meeting. Agreement will be sought on a better price relation between the different qualities of oil produced by the various member countries. Libya and Algeria want price increases for their highly-demanded light oils and advantages from their location closer to the oil markets of Western Europe.

Another item concerned applications for membership by certain countries. The names of these have not been revealed but they are thought to be Syria, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville.

The question of OPEC's attitude towards the 'North-South dialogue' was taken up. Secretary-General Ali Jaidah was at the recent 'North-South meeting' in Paris and gave the delegates a resumé of the proceedings. 'As indicated by Their Excellencies, 'Yamani says unctuously, closing the interview, 'we shall try to arrive at common decisions by a process of discussion.' Their Excellencies have the assurance of men who possess the goods and will not be underdogs again for a very long time.

The last OPEC meeting was held in Qatar and the next one also will take place in a member country, Venezuela. Why was this meeting assigned to Sweden?

The Iraqi chief delegate is said to have suggested Sweden ('a neutral and friendly land') to the OPEC Secretariat in Vienna, which then asked the Swedish Government if it would host the meeting. Of course it would.

At the price of £650,000 to the Swedish taxpayer, the 27-hour gathering seems an expensive occasion of enforced hospitality. What do the Swedes get out of it? OPEC's goodwill? Personal contacts between Swedish leaders and big men like Yamani and Amouzegar? The idea of bi-lateral agreements between Sweden and individual OPEC States—'to spread the risks'—is making no progress.

On the other hand, Swedish exports to the OPEC countries rose by 45% last year—but were still only 75% of imports.

Eventually, the time came for the 600 journalists to pack their bags. Some

had acquired a nice suntan on the beach behind the sandbags, if little else. 'I was sent to the last OPEC meeting, so why not go to this one too? Something might have happened,' declared the representative of a leading Western journal.

On the closing day, a suspected 'Red Army' terrorist from Japan was arrested in Stockholm.

Several days earlier—on July 10, 1977—two Soviet citizens with a couple of hand grenades hijacked a Russian plane in the air and ordered the pilot to fly to Stockholm. He told them he had not enough fuel, and landed in Helsinki. They insisted on continuing to Stockholm after refuelling. However, the Swedish Government, when contacted, refused permission to land.

The young pair, aged 19 and 22, then lost control of the situation. Exhausted by over 30 hours of negotiations, they fell asleep and the hostages were able to escape from the plane. The hijackers were then arrested (the grenades were found to be unloaded) and were returned to the USSR under a Russo-Finnish agreement made in 1974.

About six weeks previously a Latvian named Sosnovsky hijacked a Soviet plane on a domestic route and forced it—also by means of a bluff—to land in Stockholm. Under a Hague Convention of 1970, Sweden could either return him to the USSR or try him for the crime. It chose the latter alternative. Sosnovsky has just been sentenced to four years' imprisonment and says he is happy with the outcome.

The Soviet authorities alleged that it was the handling of this case by the Swedes which had encouraged the subsequent hijacking. A spate of similar hijackings might be expected. The Swedes replied that there was a difference between the two cases and that they handled both correctly. In the first hijack, the plane was in flight, short of fuel and had little choice but to land in Stockholm. In the second, the plane was on the ground in Finland.

No doubt, a connection can be established between the two hijackings. The sentences for this crime are more severe in Russia than in Sweden. Moreover, the Swedish handling of the first case was seen as a 'victory' for the hijacker, since he was allowed to take his punishment in Sweden.

One may speculate as to how the Swedish Government might have acted if the two hijackers had been able to land in Stockholm. Probably they would have been handed back to the USSR, not only because of the more serious nature of the case, but also because of the need to discourage repetitions. With the exception of the Communists, the Swedish press generally approves the action taken by the Swedish authorities in these hijackings.

Opinion here recognises that hijackings carried out in dictatorships such as the USSR raise serious problems for the countries to which the plane is taken. Terrorists must be stopped, but consideration must also be had for people who flee from a dictatorship and seek asylum.

In the latest case, the Swedish authorities escaped with a fright. Finland clearly had to surrender the hijackers; it cannot give asylum to Soviet citizens, for then the Russian neighbour might tighten the noose, and in this connection, the criticism of the Swedish Government for not surrendering

the previous hijacker has blown up afresh in certain quarters. The Soviet authorities and the Swedish Pilots' Association are united in the view that further hijackings were encouraged.

It would be incorrect to say that Sweden encourages hijackings. The attitude here is very negative to this kind of crime: it must be punished and the culprits will not get off lightly. However, Sweden, as a democracy, must also have regard to other circumstances. The Government evaluates each case on its merits, not least as concerns the humanitarian aspects. Accordingly, Sweden would probably not surrender a person who would risk a death sentence in his homeland. A political refugee, in particular, would not be handed over.

A distinction is also made between the kind of hijacking in the two cases mentioned above and organised terrorist attacks in a political connection and system, such as those carried out by the Palestine guerillas. Their aim was to exert pressure for the liberation of imprisoned terrorists.

The Latvian hijacker, Sosnovsky, who got to Stockholm, was unarmed. He bluffed the crew, like the boys in the second case. They were as far from being bloody terrorists as one can imagine. There is thus a difference between escapes and terrorist deeds; and here Sweden is in a position to make independent evaluations which are impossible for Finland.

However, it cannot be denied that even these 'bloodless' hijackings involve considerable risks. In the Sosnovsky case, the plane had fuel enough for only a few more minutes' flying time. Soviet pilots on domestic routes do not generally speak English and moreover they may be forced onto international routes with which they are unfamiliar.

In the latest case, five representatives of the Soviet embassy went to Stockholm airport to take charge of Soviet citizens on the plane if it should land there. One of them said: 'Sweden's refusal to accept the Soviet request for the surrender of Sosnovsky is a provocation to all countries that are fighting terrorism. It is a definite breach of international law. If the world is to stop terrorism, all countries must work together.'

The idea that each case must be judged on its merits is rejected by the Russians. Two young Swedes, members of a Christian movement, are being held in a Soviet prison 'for spreading anti-Soviet propaganda', and a connection with the hijacking cannot be excluded. Sweden is in a delicate position vis-a-vis the USSR because of the complicated fishery limits negotiations. Russia is opposed to Sweden extending its limits in the Baltic Sea. However, the Swedish parliament has decided that this shall be done and the Minister for Agriculture says that it will go into effect in autumn, 1977. Swedish-Soviet relations can become seriously disturbed if more hijacked planes are allowed to land in Sweden.

The Swedish Government is likely to take a harder attitude in future if it has to decide further cases of this kind. This is probably an inevitable consequence of the hijackings, even if in each instance there must be a careful examination of all circumstances before the decision is taken.

FOOD FOR WORK IN BANGLADESH

by Iain Guest

THE work is impressively methodical, belying the fact that in Bangladesh unemployment runs at between 9 and 15 million: a small group of labourers hack earth from the side of a silted canal and pile it into wickerwork baskets, which are then carried headhigh over the brow of the hill and the earth deposited.

This was the scene—line after line of labourers—on a Food for Work project near Kushtia, to the west of Dacca. The work went on, twelve hours a day, seven days a week, between November and March. 5,000 labourers were involved, and each day the work inched towards a goal that in hungry Bangladesh ranks as a high priority: widening the link canal between the River Ganges and a 46-mile irrigation canal which carries water through 120,000 acres of agricultural land.

The project is one of 626 which were jointly operated this year by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Bangladesh government. Being Food For Work (FFW), the labourers are paid in wages of wheat, not money; 3 kilos of wheat (which all comes from abroad in the form of food aid grants or sales on concessional terms) is paid for every 70 cubic feet of earth moved. The labourers work in teams of 15, so it is easy for the project authorities to determine when the requisite amount of earth has been moved, and pay individuals. One million labourers were employed on FFW projects throughout Bangladesh last year, and they excavated about 2,000 miles of canal. This year, the number of projects has almost doubled and between 2 and 3 million labourers have been involved. While the overall volume of food aid coming into Bangladesh has fallen from 1.5 million tons to 600,000 in 1977, the percentage of food aid used as wages on FFW projects has risen, until this year it topped 100,000 tons—over 10% of the incoming food aid.

This upsurge in FFW projects reflects what the Bangladesh government calls an end to 'the begging bowl mentality.' FFW began in January 1975 when the government found itself feeding over 4 million people who had been forced to flee from the summer floods in 1974. The food, in the form of food aid, was continuing to come in from abroad and was being distributed at 5,600 gruel kitchens. When the floods subsided the government decided to put the food to constructive use.

Food for work is not, of course, a new idea. Over the last decade the WFP estimates that it has created over 5 million jobs. Up to 1975 the WFP, which was created in 1963, was administering 696 projects in 98 countries at a cost of $1,955 million. But FFW has particular relevance in Bangladesh. No way has yet been found of providing the rural poor with employment. Out of a population of 81 million, 9 million are said officially to be out of work. But the figure rises steeply to 15 million after the harvests, which employ many of the landless labourers (who make up 40% of the country's workforce). So putting idle hands to work—one of the ILO's chief concerns —is well served by FFW projects.

Equally important is the work being done by these thousands of labourers. Drainage is one of the country's most pressing needs. During the monsoons, 70% of the country is flooded. Excessive rains, or too much snow melting in the Himalayas a thousand miles away, can turn the two great rivers, Ganges and Brahmaputra, into raging torrents in Bangladesh. World Bank studies have concluded that damming the rivers in Bangladesh is impossible, because the land is too flat and the rivers too wide. The only solution seems, therefore, to clear the water away as quickly as possible. This requires a far more efficient system of drainage than exists at present. The second objective of the bulk of FFW projects—irrigation—needs no emphasising in a country where malnutrition is rampant. During the dry season Bangladesh is as much in need of water as it fears it during monsoons.

With an area of 55,000 square miles, there is little land not being used. And yet food production has to keep up with the population growth rate of 3% a year. The only way is to produce more on the land already under cultivation. FAO studies reckon that in 1969/70 Bangladesh was producing a mere 11,600 kilograms of rice on each hectare compared with the 46,000 kilos produced in South Korea and 39,900 in Taiwan. This was due to the failure by small farmers to use high-yield seeds, fertilisers and controlled irrigation. So the relevance of FFW projects speaks for itself. But the question must still be asked, are they providing employment, or are they merely a welcome stop-gap until well-paid employment of the kind sought by the ILO can be found?

Abdul Mia, the chief engineer at the Kushtia project, is enthusiastic about the possibilities offered by FFW projects. 'There is nothing we can't do with the food wages,' he told me. 'Why, we could even clear village ponds!'

His enthusiasm is understandable. But Trevor Page, from the WFP in Dacca, is more cautious. 'Food For Work is no substitute for paid employment,' he says. 'We are really the employer of last resort.'

This caution manifests itself in various aspects of the WFP policy. The labourers are paid in wheat only, but not in rice (the staple Bengali food) so that the food wages won't undercut the local rice farmers. The farmers receive less for their rice if there is more available on open market, and this means they can afford to pay less to their already impoverished workers.

Wheat by itself, however, does not provide the labourers with a balanced diet. The WFP recognises this, but again insists that the wheat wages are no alternative to the kind of balanced meal that a regular wage would provide.

The WFP does, however, make one exception to the 'wheat-only' rule. Not strictly food for work, this involves 800,000 women and children under the 'vulnerable group feeding programme.' They are fed at 2,272 centres on wheat, fish concentrate, skim milk, edible oil, and sorghum. This mixture gives them a balanced diet. It may seem like a food handout, but it is also easy to justify in a country where 3 out of every 10 infants die before the age of five, many from malnutrition.

Another 'check' by the WFP is that the money equivalent of the wheat wages is deliberately kept just below the daily wage of 25 taka (5 pence) paid to agricultural labourers, so as not to entice them away from harvesting. For the same reason, the WFP insists that FFW projects do not begin until after harvests have finished. In fact, a very few schemes—like that at Kushtia—jumped the gun because the work was considered so urgent by the government and also because of the strict and meticulous timetable for completion insisted upon by the WFP. The Kushtia project had to find 5,000 labourers by November 11th and was due to finish on March 31st. So there was clear risk of labourers being taken from harvesting. But both the WFP and the government point out that they are strictly accountable to donors and must see that the food is properly used. So the rules and the timetable are always strict. And if they occasionally seem *too* strict, they can always point to the first traumatic years of independence, when large amounts of aid went astray. Corruption and pilfering are undoubtedly far less prevalent than three years ago. But each delay and each theft imperils the hard-working labourers. So the WFP holds workshops in each of the country's 19 districts to get the system running as smoothly as possible, and employs a team of 4 to visit projects and check on possible abuses.

It is easy to forget, faced with the sense of achievement engendered by FFW projects, that they are in fact meant ultimately to benefit the labourers themselves, who represent the poorest sector of the Bangladesh workforce. Their life on the projects is tough: they receive a survival wage which is based not on living costs or the value of their work, as a real wage should be, but the market price of wheat, which is low after harvest; they live in makeshift shelters away from their families; and they do an extraordinarily hard day's work for five months without a break.

World Food Programme officials emphasise that this situation is far from the ideal and certainly no alternative to proper rural employment and a proper rural wage. This was one of the points stressed in a recent meeting of a joint FAO/UNESCO/ILO Advisory Committee on Agricultural Education and Training held recently at ILO Headquarters.

[Iain Guest, a British journalist, recently visited Bangladesh. This article is based on his observations and on-the-spot interviews with local workmen and World Food Programme officials.]

ASEAN: THE NEW SOUTHEAST ASIA

by Justus M. van der Kroef

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which comprises Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia, has now entered the second decade of its existence. Slowly, quietly, yet with an ineluctable inevitability it has become a major matrix of economic and political developments in the Southeast Asian region, as well as a principal point of organisational reference for the most diverse phases of ordinary human activity, from growing orchids to philately. There is, these days, what might be called an 'Aseanisation' of Southeast Asia's public consciousness: at a meeting of the Ministers of Public Welfare of ASEAN in Djakarta, last July, it was agreed, for example, that 'an ASEAN prosperous and contented society' could only come into being if all political, economic and 'socio-cultural' elements 'in the region were mutually interacting to create harmonious overall growth.'

Few believed, in August, 1967, at ASEAN's founding conference in Bangkok that all this was likely ever to be so. After all, the very concept of Southeast Asia has been a Western artifice, like Vietnam's boundaries, Singapore's location, or the names 'Malaysia' and 'Indonesia',—all the product of alien imaginations and rule. Drawing lines or vaguely indicating geographic 'regions' on a map, ignoring tribal domain or ethnic identity, lumping together hundreds of languages, and the most divers religions, major and minor,—thus did English, French, Spanish, Dutch and American colonial powers impose their structures, and, in so doing, also ultimately provoke nationalist reactions. ASEAN at first seemed but a part of the same pattern: the organisation was born at the height of the American intervention in Vietnam, and critics professed to perceive a Johnson administration gambit to rally the rest of 'Southeast Asia', and, through a common U.S. encouraged organisational mould, to direct and control the region's future growth.

Whether or not there were such American initiatives, ideas of regional cooperation had been heard well before ASEAN's founding. In 1963, for example, at a conference in Manila, Indonesia's President Sukarno floated the concept of 'Mapilindo,' an acronym standing for policy unity among Malaya, the 'Pilipinas' (i.e. the Philippines), and Indonesia. Sukarno shortly wrecked his own creation by his opposition to the formation of Malaysia that same year. Earlier, in 1961, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines formed ASA, the Association of Southeast Asia, ostensibly as an informal, consultative organisation, though it has been alleged that it was formed as a possible check on Djakarta's regional ambitions. The very fact that ASA was too narrowly based, sharpened the need for a more comprehensive grouping. This became possible with the end of the Sukarno era in Indonesia in 1966-67 and Djakarta's abandonment of its hostility toward Kuala Lumpur and the creation of Malaysia.

Still, the Vietnam question had something to do with ASEAN, or rather

with its subsequent development, although perhaps not in the way that Washington had originally intended. The Nixon Administration's decision to begin disengaging the US from Vietnam, Nixon's 1969 'Guam Doctrine' which required US friends and allies in Asia to attend more directly to their own security instead of counting on American intervention, and the implications of détente and of Washington's new rapprochement with Peking, all underscored the appeal, indeed the necessity, for the nations of Southeast Asia to seek more support and coordination of their policies among their own regional neighbours. At the first and founding ASEAN conference in Bangkok the strongest, if more covert, sceptics were among the member delegates themselves, one of whom told this author that whatever America's rumoured desires in the matter, he and others were present because of the delights of the Thai capital and because there were no strong reasons to oppose forming another 'harmless talk club.'

The founding declaration of ASEAN (August 8, 1967) modestly speaks of accelerating economic growth and 'social progress' through unspecified 'joint endeavours', and of promoting 'regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law.' It also declares that membership in the association is open to all states in the region willing to subscribe to these principles—an earnest gesture in the direction of Hanoi which, over the years, was to be repeated and as often rebuffed. For as of ASEAN's founding, Hanoi and other Communist movements in Southeast Asia had nothing good to say of the organisation. Indeed, after the consolidation of Communist power throughout the Indochina states in 1974-75, Hanoi and Vientiane intensified their attacks on ASEAN, accusing it of being a continuation of the dying and now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The presence of US military bases in the Philippines, of American military advisers and US run electronic surveillance facilities in Thailand and Indonesia, as well as the relentless domestic anti-Communist and counter-insurgency policies of all the ASEAN states, and the steadily looming importance of allegedly 'imperialist' Japanese, British and US multi-nationals and capital in the economic development of the ASEAN region—all these provided the new Communist regimes in Indochina with ample grounds for suspicion and hostility.

As early as November 27, 1971, in an attempt to meet the doubts concerning the bona fides of the organisation, Malaysia persuaded her fellow ASEAN members to adopt the so-called 'Kuala Lumpur Declaration' at a foreign ministers' conference in the Malaysian capital. The document committed the signatories to 'exert initially necessary efforts' to win international recognition of Southeast Asia as a 'zone of peace, freedom and neutrality', free from any form of interference by outside powers. This commitment is the best known part of the document. But even the most sanguine observers of ASEAN, viewing such matters as the persistent, if lower-profile military presence of the US, the Soviet diplomatic and trade offensive, ASEAN's unresolved relationship with China, or Japan's burgeoning investments in the region, wondered if the 'neutrality zone' concept was more than a rhetorical conceit.

Still, as a policy ideal or as an indication of intent among nations which until recently had had little more in common than geographic contiguity, the neutrality concept was not insignificant: it appeared at least, to be signalling to the rest of the world, and particularly to the big powers and to Hanoi, that, whatever their present state of dependency, freedom from anyone's influence would be the ASEAN members' common objective. In this light the second, and much less known, commitment of the 'Kuala Lumpur Declaration' might be stressed. It requires members to make 'concerted efforts' to widen their mutual cooperation so as to contribute to 'their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.' This commitment was to reach a further crystallisation five years later in the ASEAN doctrine of 'regional resilience', to be described presently.

Undaunted by Hanoi's suspicions of ASEAN as an organisation, individual ASEAN members in recent years have attempted to mend their bilateral diplomatic fences with the new Communist regime of a unified Vietnam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam), periodically encouraged, in turn, by Vietnamese assurances that good relations are, after all, possible. However, Hanoi's continued open support of what its media call the 'people's democratic' or 'liberation movement' in Southeast Asia remains worrying to ASEAN, because such support is not just a matter of official media propaganda. For more than a decade Thai Communist guerrilla leaders, for example, have been trained in North Vietnam, and Hanoi dominated Laos serves as the Thai insurgents' main supply base today. In an obvious effort to undercut ASEAN, the SRV, in the middle of 1975, urged other Southeast Asian states to join it in forming an integrated regional economy, pooling resources, labour and production facilities. The Vietnamese suggestion, if anything, spurred ASEAN to review its own very limited progress up to that point toward economic cooperation, as well as toward further defining common security and development strategies.

Their common legacy of colonial economies which, in one-sided fashion, accentuated the extractive sphere of commodity production, has been a major factor in impeding regional economic cooperation. At the meeting of ASEAN Economics Ministers in Singapore, in June, 1977, Singapore premier Lee Kuan Yew emphasised again what other sceptical observers had been noting for some time: that ASEAN countries are at approximately the same level of development and, in the absence of diversified industrial economies, tend to compete with rather than supplement each other in their basic exports of agricultural, mineral and food products. Premier Lee, on the same occasion, pointed out that while ASEAN countries are now trading more among themselves than ever before, nevertheless the share of this intra-ASEAN trade in relation to the total trade of the ASEAN area is, in fact, declining (from 15.49% in 1970 to 12.63% in 1975). In 1975 only about one-tenth of ASEAN's global imports came from within the ASEAN bloc itself.

In Kuala Lumpur, in March, 1976, an ASEAN ministerial conference had agreed to a blueprint for coordinated regional industrial production. In subsequent months proposals were formulated by ASEAN business and

financial leaders determining the proportion of member nations' future output in basic industrial categories. At their June 1977 Singapore meeting, the ASEAN Economics Ministers took further significant steps toward creating a 'common market.' Tariff reductions of from ten to thirty per cent on a group of trade items ranging from ball-bearings to sawn timber, and from paraffin wax to chillies, were agreed to. It was further agreed not to impose tariffs on existing duty free items, and strong concern was officially voiced also over the 'increasingly protectionist trade policies' of certain developed countries. The latter was a slap at the European Economic Community (EEC), Japan, Australia and the US.

In the months following the June 1977 conference the ASEAN partners also began implementing a $1 billion regional development project, based on an anticipated new flow of Japanese and Asian Development Bank credits, which will see the construction of urea factories in Indonesia and Malaysia, of a diesel engine plant in Singapore, a soda ash factory in Thailand, and a phosphates plant in the Philippines. Increasingly, ASEAN economic thinking appears to be going in the direction of 'bloc' development arrangements with the economic 'super powers' (the US, Japan, and the EEC), under which ASEAN countries would gradually assume more responsibility for the semi-processing of their raw materials prior to their export to the 'super power' countries. Various inter-bloc tariff reduction agreements, e.g., between the EEC and ASEAN, are also being considered. Japan has been presented with an ASEAN request for the creation of a financial support system that would provide steady price levels through extra compensation for ASEAN raw materials exporters whose products are subjected to periodic drops in price on the world market. The EEC's agreement with African and some other Third World nations reached at the 1975 Lomé conference and designed to meet the need to stabilise incomes of the raw materials exporting nations, has been held up by ASEAN members as a prototype of the arrangement which they, in turn, seek with the EEC and Japan.

In February, 1976, at Denpasar, on the island of Bali, in Indonesia, the first ASEAN 'summit' attended by the organisation's heads of state was held, producing agreement on three basic documents which go far in giving structure and policy substance to the ASEAN's decision-making machinery and future strivings. The first document, a 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord', embodies a 'programme of action', the economic and major part of which specifies areas of cooperation in establishment of large scale industrial plants, in the production of food and energy, and in the making of intra-regional preferential trading arrangements. This 'Declaration' also binds members to the elimination of threats 'posed by subversion', and to the strengthening of 'national and ASEAN resilience.' The latter term, it might be noted, has begun to serve as a catch-all designation for various multi-facetted, essentially authoritarian government directed nation-building processes which, *inter alia*, emphasise the importance of maintaining a high national morale through propagation of a distinct national identity, national 'philosophy', and campaigns of public service. The term also includes

emphasis on a widening prosperity, the avoidance of any disruption in economic development or of debilitating partisan political conflicts, and, above all, the ruthless confrontation and elimination of 'subversive' (i.e., particularly Communist) movements or armed resistance. Through the achievement of 'resilience', its propagators assert, ASEAN will be able to counter any and all threats coming from outside its region, and also hold a steady course in implementing national and regional economic development.

Originating in the Indonesian doctrine of *ketahanan nasional* ('national resilience') promulgated by the Suharto regime, 'ASEAN resilience' is both a bundling of individual member country strengths and a regional cooperative policy, but it is conceived of as non-threatening to those outside the region. This means from ASEAN's point of view that the militant, domestic, anti-Communism of ASEAN members, and the existing pattern of *bilateral*, not collective, military agreements and joint manoeuvres among them, need not and should not stand in the way of friendly relations with the Communist governments, including those in Indochina. Such bilateral agreements and manoeuvres are specifically allowed under the brief, one sentence long 'Security' clause of the 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord' and they have e.g., included the joint Thai-Malaysian border agreement directed against Communist rebels, and periodic Thai-Indonesian and Indonesian-Philippine naval patrols and exercises. Seminars and symposia sponsored by ASEAN in recent years have brought together prominent public figures from the region in an effort to give further substance to the 'resilience' concept.

The second document adopted at the Denpasar conference was a 'Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.' Composed of 20 articles in 5 chapters, this document commits ASEAN states to a broad policy of mutual respect, historically dating back to the nineteen-fifties and the so-called *Pancheela* doctrine of Sino-Indian peaceful co-existence formulated by Nehru and Chou En-lai, and to the African-Asian Nations' Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Echoed further by the 1972 Sino-American 'Shanghai Communique' issued after Nixon's visit to Peking, and also by more recent Soviet policy statements on Asia, and by SRV spokesmen, the 'mutual respect' requirement pledges ASEAN states, among other things, not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs, to renounce the use of force, and to respect the territorial integrity of each other. 'Social justice' and a rising standard of living are also to be pursued, according to the 'Treaty of Amity', and—the ground theme of all ASEAN policy concepts—there is to be further collaboration in an 'accelerated' economic growth of the region.

The third document adopted at Denpasar was an agreement on the establishment of an 'ASEAN Secretariat', including provision for its housing in Djakarta, and descriptions of the responsibilities of an ASEAN Secretary-General and his staff. Three bureaus, for Economic, Scientific-Technological, and Social-Cultural affairs respectively will coordinated 'the activities of ASEAN Permanent Committees' and of various ad hoc committees 'insofar as they relate to the activities' of the bureaus—an indication that ASEAN increasingly intends to use one fact-gatherer and to speak with one

voice in the critical areas of national development. This decision to 'bureaucratise' ASEAN, whatever its negative long-term implications, was also a decision in favour of organisational solidity, due process, and considered policy judgment, and, in practice, may turn out to have been the most important step taken by the organisation since its founding. Further organisational streamlining and a 'simplification' of the operations of various existing ASEAN commissions, now considered to be 'too many' according to Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, is contemplated for the latter half of 1977. The trend toward more centralised ASEAN planning and policy-making now seems to be part and parcel of the parallel ASEAN decision to deal more and more on a unified bloc basis with the rest of the world, also in the United Nations.

How will such a more unified ASEAN speak for Southeast Asia in the future? And can it in fact do so?

There are too many imponderables to answer these questions with certainty, to be sure. But some of the more broadly accepted premises from which ASEAN policies are likely to proceed seem rather clear:

1. There is to be continued maximum emphasis on economic development, but in a context of domestic political stability that will be attractive to multi-nationals and Western orientated big power financial interests. From this policy premise flows the preoccupation with building 'national resilience', which, in turn, shapes official intolerance for any movement, party, or ideology that is considered to be disruptive. Control over the formation of public opinion, though not total by any means, and allowing for a measure of academic contention and dialogue and even for moderate criticism of government policies in the national media, is viewed as essential.

2. Efforts will be made to accustom the rest of the international community to think of Southeast Asia's needs and policies in 'bloc' terms and, concomitantly, to devise 'bloc' (i.e. integrated ASEAN) responses to global crises of food, energy, commodity prices and tariffs, and to persistent international political problems (the Middle East, residual white rule in Africa, arms limitation and control). The corollary of this is a growing sense of intra-bloc obligation among ASEAN members themselves. Thus, at ASEAN's tenth anniversary 'summit' meeting in Kuala Lumpur, on August 4, 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos announced to the pleasant surprise of his Malaysian host that the Philippines was now abandoning its troublesome claim on the Malaysian state of Sabah, in North Borneo. Marcos, to the applause of his fellow heads of state, declared he was taking the action in deference to 'ASEAN unity.'

3. There will be militant confrontation of domestic Communist movements and insurgents, not least because it can be used to legitimise authoritarian controls over public life which, in turn, are believed to be necessary in order to meet economic development needs. Magnifying the danger of Communist or other 'subversion' may thus become a matter of policy, although the threats posed by insurgency, as, e.g., in Thailand, can be real

enough. Yet, at the same time, ASEAN leaders insist that their organisation, as Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam recently put it, is now gradually moving towards 'cautious co-existence' with the Communist states in Indochina', replacing the initial posture of 'defensive confrontation.'

4. Officially, ASEAN states will seek or maintain, whether individually or collectively, a posture of friendship toward all nations, not least so as to continue to qualify them for membership in the 'non-aligned' community. Implicit in this position is the recognition that all nations should be permitted to acquire an economic stake in the future of a 'neutral' Southeast Asia and that the region should be hospitable to the trading and financial interests of all. Such relative 'internationalisation' of the region, if kept in bounds, is viewed, despite some risks, as a practical corollary of ASEAN's 'neutrality' ideal. In practice, however, each member of ASEAN will be permitted to work out such informal, low-key, special investment or even military relationships with others, including major powers, which it believes to be in its national interest. But this is permissible only so long as this relationship does not become so blatant as to endanger ASEAN's formal 'neutrality' commitment. It seems unnecessary to emphasise that constant juggling of big power interests and regional 'neutrality' claims will be one of ASEAN's major diplomatic concerns in the years ahead.

In implementing these policy premises formidable obstacles remain, notably within the Southeast Asian region itself. Burma, pursuing its own muddled quasi-isolationist economic course, remains outside ASEAN. At any moment ancient ethnic and frontier problems may threaten the organisation's still fragile unity. The hostility between the present Thai regime and the three Communist Indochina states as well as uncertainty over US policies remain barriers to further regional integration.

However, it is worth noting that in the middle of August, after discussions with the ASEAN leaders at the Heads of State conference in Kuala Lumpur, Japan's Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda, promised not only to extend a new 27.5 billion yen loan to the Philippines, but also formulated a new long range, so-called 'Fukuda Doctrine', committing Japan to extended financial support for ASEAN development. The historic significance of this Japanese decision, and, more important, the acceptance of the concept at the ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur in early August, can hardly be exaggerated. Thus, at ASEAN's tenth anniversary we are witnessing the birth of a long term, regional, integrative process, bringing together Northern and Southeast Asian economies, with far-reaching implications for the world.

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THE SEXUAL SIDE OF DISABILITY

by W. F. R. Stewart

THE last forty years have seen a growth of openness and candour in sexual matters to an extent unmatched in the last century and a half. Sexual tolerance (the toleration in others of practices in which we ourselves do not indulge) has increased at a lesser rate but, in certain sections of society at least, such increase is evident.

The Permissive Society does not yet, of course, exist. Professor Eysenck has written of our present mores that, 'when all is said and done, more is said than done', and a glance at the correspondence columns of our more staid journals indicates the strength of opposition even to saying it! An enormous amount of sexual ignorance and inhibition still exists, providing a hot-house for both the commercial exploitation of sex and panic-stricken resistance to it.

Nevertheless, taboos are breaking down, not only as regards sex but also in relation to other long-unmentioned subjects. Until comparatively recently physical disability and deformity, at all events in their more noticeable forms, were regarded by most people in this country as distasteful; while mental disorder or retardation were viewed with a kind of superstitious fear. One didn't mention them and if one's eyes fell upon evidence of them one looked the other way.

This attitude, too, is changing. Disability and the disabled are also tolerated—if, by many members of our population, little more. In the last few years the decay of inhibition around sex and about disability has opened the way to consideration of a topic which would at one time have been widely regarded as distasteful if not disgusting—the sexuality of the handicapped individual, his or her right to the enjoyment of a full sexual life, and the obstacles to this which are raised by disability.

Sexual problems are not the monopoly of the disabled. Probably as many as a quarter of adults in this country, at any one time, are subject to lesser or greater problems concerning sex and sexuality. Moreover, since many of them are married, problems must exist for their spouses also. The widely quoted estimate of forty per cent as the proportion of our population in sexual difficulty may not be far wrong.

The disabled man or woman can suffer from any of the difficulties which beset the able-bodied; but a moment's thought must indicate that, for many of them, sexual difficulty must arise from or be exacerbated by the nature or results of their disorder. Up to the last decade or so little attention was paid to these aspects of handicap, due no doubt to the double taboo discussed above. They formed no part of training in the medical, para-medical or social work professions. It was tacitly agreed that disabled people should be regarded, by the public and professional workers alike, as sexless or sexually inconsiderable. A brief burst of attention to the problems in this country after the last World War fizzled out, and it was left to other nations

to pioneer research and action in them.

Sweden, the Low Countries, Israel and the United States were first in the field and their work increasingly attracted the attention of some individuals in the United Kingdom. Then, five or six years ago, the National Fund for Research into Crippling Diseases set up a committee—the Committee on Sexual Problems of the Disabled—to study and advise upon sexual problems as these might be encountered by disabled people in this country.

The Committee consisted of specialists and experts in the areas of disability and sexual counselling, representatives of some voluntary organisations for the disabled, and disabled people themselves. Medical, surgical, psychological and psychiatric fields were represented. It is to the credit of members at that time that the Committee's first decision was that more research was needed before any pronouncement was possible.

Results of the research were surprising, even to the Committee. They indicated that the majority of disabled people, at all levels of disability, are at one time or another subject to sexual difficulty directly associated with their disability. In a survey which formed part of the study, 54% of respondents were found to have current, significant, personal sexual problems, practically all arising directly from or aggravated by their handicap; while a further 18% had experienced such problems but had managed to overcome them (occasionally by their own efforts, infrequently with outside advice or counsel, too often simply by usage and resignation over a period of many years).

Few had received effective advice or counsel, since sources of such assistance were few and scattered. Most had no realistic idea as to where they might turn for help. Existing advisory and counselling organisations in sexual problems paid attention only to the psycho-sexual problems of the able-bodied and were baffled by physical aspects. Medical and rehabilitative advisers in most cases ignored or skimmed over the sexual implications of disorder. Yet solutions to the problems existed in many cases, unknown to the people concerned.

It was evident that here was a gap in social provision. At this stage the Committee decided that it must have an ongoing function in a more active role. A grant was obtained from the National Fund to cover three years' existence as an organisation concerned with (a) the dissemination of information and training in both the problems and solutions to them, for workers among the disabled, and (b) the setting up of an advisory and counselling service for those disabled people who required such assistance in sexual problems arising from their handicap.

Two of the three years have now passed and developments have been rapid. Attention to the problems, among the caring professions, has spread throughout the country and for the first time in centuries the sexual aspects of disability are becoming seen as equally worthy of consideration with all other aspects. It is generally realised in the professional field that disabled people, like their able-bodied peers, are sexual people, with sexual needs, capabilities and rights. Even public attitudes are changing, albeit slowly.

The activities of SPOD (as the Committee has become known) in the counselling field increase steadily. Some sixty cases a month from disabled people themselves are dealt with in which factual information or advice are provided or in which longer-term counselling is arranged. Other enquiries are handled from professional workers involved in work with individual patients or clients. The peak of work in this respect has probably yet to be reached.

Developments in general continue and SPOD now approaches the time when it will cease to be a Committee of the National Fund and assume independent existence, with considerably increased membership and diversification of activities.

But what are the problems with which it deals? What, in any case, constitutes a 'sexual problem'? SPOD's initial research and its continuing outlook define a sexual problem as 'an obstacle to the satisfaction of sexual need'. Such need is present in all of us, partly as arising from innate instincts and urges, partly as developed or modified by upbringing, the socio-religious norms to which we subscribe and to some extent by general health. Thus, sexual need is variable in different persons and personalities. It is important to remember that low libido may reduce a sexual difficulty to insignificance for the person concerned, while a higher sexual drive may mean that a minor difficulty assumes immense proportions. A sexual problem is a problem for the person concerned, however others may see it. Moreover, every problem is unique, at least to the individual subject to it.

About a quarter of the cases with which SPOD deals are those in which the sexual system of the body is itself affected by disability. The components of this system are highly generalised throughout the body, but its essential parts are the forebrain, the endocrine system and the central nervous system. Disorder of any of these may raise difficulties. The problems are those of impotence or partial impotence, loss of sexual sensitivity and so on. Another quarter is concerned with the difficulties of sexual posture and motions associated with pain or stiffness in joints and muscles, or pain and tenderness in other parts of the body. The inhibitory effect upon sexual intercourse must be clear in relation to the not-infrequent case in which one or another form of disorder results in rigid adduction of a woman's thighs. It is less obvious in, for example, disorders involving tenderness or pain in a man's elbows, knees or toes: points of balance for the male in the usual position of coitus. Tenderness in the abdomen or groin can sometimes make bodily contact excruciatingly painful.

As distinct from stiffness, a flaccid paralysis can prevent sexual positions being voluntarily adopted and rule out the motions of sex.

For a small minority of disabled people, sexual intercourse or intense sexual excitement may carry actual danger. Blood pressure, for instance, increases at times of sexual excitation; for the person with hypertension or extremely high blood pressure, sexual activity may push it beyond the danger point. Severe heart disorder may also carry risk—but only severe disorder of this kind is dangerous; although no area of disability is sur-

rounded by as much fear of ill-effect from sexual activity, there is little or no risk in sex for most heart patients. (It *is* contra-indicated for a few months after a heart infarction or where the effect is generally crippling in its severity.) Brittle bones may snap under pressure of a human body or in the sudden jerky motions which can accompany sex.

These are all physical problems, but disability and sexual difficulty can each be surrounded by an aura of psychogenic difficulty. Such difficulty is even more widely variable in nature than the physical kind. Apart from the problems of neurosis which can arise, there are unfounded fears—as to the effect of mild heart disorder, perhaps, or as to hereditary implications of disability—relationship difficulties, problems of self-view and shyness, and a range of personality effects. These are the areas in which counselling—sometimes over a considerable period—as distinct from information and advice becomes necessary.

Yet there are solutions to most problems. Mention has been made of the extent of ignorance and inhibition in sexual matters which exist for many people in our society. This can militate against solution of one's own difficulties, either because one's sexual knowledge is insufficient to work it out or because, having conceived a remedy, one is inhibited over putting it into effect. The idea that the sexual practice to which one is not accustomed is in some way abnormal or wrong is very prevalent.

Perhaps surprisingly, it is not too difficult to reassure people in such matters. Ideas as to remedies for problems which have arisen are often readily accepted by the most bashful individual and it has been observed over and over again that approval or 'permission' by a third party seen as knowledgable and non-judgmental is enough to overcome qualms as to the 'naturalness' of an activity. This, of course, is a generalisation and does not apply in every case; yet it is true of the majority.

The remedy for difficulty of a physical nature may be based on the adoption of a hitherto unknown or untried position for intercourse, by a change of technique or the adoption of non-coital techniques for sexual activity which can provide satisfaction and relief, or by the use of some improvised or manufactured sexual aid. There is not space here to go into such solutions in detail, but they exist in most cases where physical problems arise.

Nothing has so far been said as to problems which are raised by attitudes within society at large and those of able-bodied people toward the disabled. These are the most intransigent and can only be altered with time. Of what use is sexual awareness and knowledge to the disabled person who cannot find a partner? or the one who is in a residential institution where the very idea of sexual relationship between residents is frowned on?

In the realm of mental handicap, indeed, it may be said that practically all problems which arise are those not of the handicapped individual but of society. The shibboleths and fears which exist among us concerning the sexual aspects of mental retardation are alone enough to ensure that most mentally handicapped persons have no opportunity for sexual pleasure or

relief except in hole-in-the-corner situations. Their problems do not lie as a rule in their own sexual capabilities but in their discouragement from using them.

Thanks in part to the changing outlooks within our society and in part, perhaps, to the efforts of SPOD, the 'sexless' view of disabled people by the able-bodied is altering. As a society we have yet to realise that the outward appearance and capabilities of the man and woman have little significance, that what matters in love and sex is the inner person and personality. Perhaps we may never fully realise it. But more and more disabled people are marrying or finding sexual partners.

The last point emphasises the necessity for adequate advice, counsel and sexual education for disabled folk (at present sexual education is virtually non-existent for the disabled youngster and in the autumn of this year SPOD and the Family Planning Association are combining in the first course in sex education of the physically disabled). It underlines the need for consideration of sexual aspects in diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and rehabilitation of disability. Such consideration is steadily increasing. Until it becomes standard, a gap exists which SPOD must fill.

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[William F. R. Stewart is Secretary and Development Officer of the Committee on Sexual Problems of the Disabled.]

It is hoped that the following information, issued by the European Communities Commission, the Department of the Environment, and the Department of Health and Social Security may be of interest.—*Editor.*

The Commission has just approved a grant of £100,000 towards a three-year programme in Britain aimed at removing difficulties in the way of disabled people in their homes. This is a new departure in the Commission's social policy in the field of housing.

The grant consumes almost half the financial allocation in this year's Community budget for pilot schemes aimed at the professional readaptation and social reintegration of handicapped workers; the policy recognises that

such readaption requires vigorous help to aid mobility in the home as well as outside.

The EEC funds will be paid to the Housing Development Directorate of the Department of the Environment, which will channel the money to the Crossroads Trust, Rugby.

The Director of the Trust, Mrs. Pat Osborne, will head a team working in cooperation with six selected local authorities in the United Kingdom. Mrs. Osborne's work in Rugby in setting up schemes which alleviate the stress on disabled people and their relatives, has been acclaimed by disablement organisations in Britain. She will now establish Crossroads agencies in the areas selected for study.

In each of the six participating local authorities, which have yet to be chosen, there will be an evaluation of housing programmes for disabled people. There will be special focus on people who are severely handicapped, who, with the benefits of convenient housing and improved domiciliary care services could remain in their local community instead of being moved to a residential home or long stay hospital unit.

About £30,000 of the Commission funds will be used to carry out structural adaptations to housing for people who can best be catered for by keeping their existing homes.

For each participating local authority the Department of Health and Social Security (or the Scottish and Welsh Offices) will boost the local Crossroads scheme by matching the funds put into each project by the local social services departments, up to £5,000 for each authority each year.

The programme is expected to begin this autumn and to be completed in June, 1980.

The EEC contribution is provided to cover additional and identifiable costs arising from the pilot nature of the study, such as finding individual solutions to the personal problems of the handicapped.

Apart from specific architectural modifications, these costs will include administration, research and evaluation, including salaries, office costs, insurances and travelling expenses, and other contingencies connected with local inquiries.

TOURISM—A BOOM INDUSTRY

by Sir Mark Henig

TOURISM in Britain, now worth more than £4,500 million a year, is big business by any standard. One of this country's growth industries, tourism is making a large and increasing contribution to our balance of payments. It provides employment for more than a million people directly, and another two million in related industries; and helps to sustain amenities and facilities for British people which otherwise would not exist.

It is easy to regard tourism merely as money through a till, guests at an hotel, children on the beach or queues at the Tower of London. What is rarely understood is that tourism is a social activity that affects us all, both as individuals and as members of communities, large and small. It can provide a structural, as well as an economical benefit to urban areas and can help to stabilise rural economies.

We in Britain were perhaps slower to recognise the great potential of tourism than many other countries. Indeed, our official tourism structure dates back only to the Development of Tourism Act, 1969, which established the English, Scottish and Wales Tourist Boards and the British Tourist Authority. Each is an independent statutory body financed mainly by grant-in-aid from Government and each is responsible direct to Parliament. The three national tourist boards are responsible for the development and promotion of tourism within their respective countries and the British Tourist Authority is primarily responsible for the marketing of British tourism overseas.

One of the English Tourist Board's first tasks was to set about administering in England, the Hotel Development Incentives Scheme, which was part of the Development of Tourism Act. This was an enlightened example of public funds being used on a large scale to encourage the building and improvement of hotels in Britain, and it was designed to fill a very real—and an urgent—need to increase serviced accommodation. It was a 'crash programme' to cope with the tourist boom. There is no doubt that it succeeded in that objective. At a cost to the public purse of some £43 million, the Scheme assisted the building of more than 1,300 new hotels and extensions in England. It helped to provide more than 50,000 new bedrooms (over 100,000 beds) in England, plus many other amenities and facilities. Largely because of the HDI Scheme, this country now has a greatly increased—and improved—stock of accommodation for visitors all over the country. We are in a much stronger position in relation to our overseas competitors. We have many more hotels of international standard than we had before the HDI Scheme.

Like almost all pieces of legislation, the HDI Scheme had its imperfections—for example, the English, Scottish and Wales Tourist Boards, which had the task of administering the scheme, had absolutely no discretion as to where new hotels should be sited. Also, the scheme took no account of

such factors as the distribution of capacity to encourage traffic dispersal—nor, indeed, of differing rates of expected tourism growth. Perhaps we should have had differing rates of grant to encourage greater dispersal of development throughout the country and to avoid overconcentration in city centres?

Critics of the scheme have said that it resulted in too many new hotels being built, too many new bedrooms being provided. Certainly in many places there were too many bedspaces for too few tourists. But who can say after this past summer that we have too many bedrooms, particularly in London? We still have, of course, a seasonal (and a geographical) imbalance in demand.

But hotels are not built in a day. It is no good starting to construct an hotel when masses of tourists are clamouring at your doorstep. Forecasts show that many more bedrooms will be needed in the next decade—and the timing of the next wave of development will be critical. We are somewhat concerned that we do not have the number of bedrooms at medium and low price levels that are required to meet the needs, not only of our own domestic tourists, but also of those from overseas, who, despite favourable exchange rates still have to adhere to modest holiday budgets. The recent 'Little Neddy' study pointed out the need for cheaper and alternative forms of accommodation to meet the demands of the 1980s. I think that all of us —including central government—should give very serious consideration to this.

The Tourist Projects Scheme came to an end in 1973, and the only public money the English Tourist Board now has available directly to assist tourist developments is under Section 4 of the Development of Tourism Act. This aid is restricted to the Development Areas of England, and since 1971 we have been able to assist more than 500 tourist projects, at a cost to public funds of some £5 million. This has attracted more than treble that amount of investment from other, mainly private, sources. Section 4 aid has enabled a wide variety of tourist projects to get off the ground, attracted tourists to parts of the country that need them, and created the equivalent of 2,223 (from 1971 to June 1977), jobs in areas of particularly high unemployment. It is estimated that the cost, out of public funds, of providing each job amounts to £3,100—less than half that needed in manufacturing industry. The English Tourist Board very much welcomes the Government's initiative in identifying three pilot 'tourism growth points' within the Development Areas as having particularly good tourism potential, and as possible candidates for concentrated Government aid.

These three areas are the High Pennines from Teesdale to the South Tyne Valley; Scarborough; and Bude to Wadebridge. Recently, together with Mr. Michael Meacher, M.P., Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Trade, I visited these areas for consultative meetings with a wide range of local authority, trade and other interests, to discuss the proposals. The response from the local authorities involved was most encouraging; and I am very confident for the future of these three new initiatives. However, the English Tourist Board has long favoured an alternative concept of

Tourism Development Areas, based on similar criteria of social need which would identify neglected areas of real tourism potential in or out of the statutory Development Areas.

There are some aspects of tourism which have a national dimension and must be dealt with on a national basis. As we at the English Tourist Board have recognised ever since our formation, there are others which are best dealt with at regional level. So when the English Tourist Board started to operate early in 1970, we set our minds against a structure operated only from London. Instead, we opted for a family of autonomous regional tourist boards, partly financed by ourselves, partly by local authorities, and partly by local trade interests. There are now twelve such regional tourist boards in England; and the close involvement of these boards in the planning, management and marketing of tourism provides a regional dimension which the English Tourist Board could not possibly hope to organise as effectively from London.

In the fields of publicity and promotion, the regional boards build on national schemes to get the greatest possible regional benefit from them. The national campaigns themselves follow consultation with the regional boards and reflect their needs as well as national ones.

The English Tourist Board's marketing operations — campaigns to encourage British people to take their holidays in England—have developed a great deal since our first main England Holiday brochure in 1970. In addition to our main holiday brochure we provide a wide variety of publications providing information on many different types of holidays and to many different types of location. Our highly successful 'Let's Go' campaign, for example, gives details of weekend breaks at bargain prices out of season. Our 'Activity Holidays' booklets give details of hundreds of special interest holidays ranging from potholing to ghost hunting! We mount a number of special promotions, including A Taste of England to encourage the provision of traditional English food, American Heritage Trails and Roman Heritage Trails.We also mount special campaigns aimed at encouraging tourists to visit beautiful but neglected parts of England, thus helping to spread the benefits of tourism more widely throughout the country.

Unlike many other European countries, Britain has no statutory registration of accommodation. For the past three years the English Tourist Board has been operating a voluntary registration scheme, and, as a result, our *Where to Stay* guides are a long way from being a comprehensive inventory—and we still consider that some form of statutory registration of accommodation is necessary if we are to have the right data on which to plan for the years ahead. Here I should like to put on record how much we at ETB welcome the new Code of Booking Practice announced by the Secretary of State for Trade in the House of Commons recently. Under this Code—which has been offered by many hotels, motels, inns, boarding and guest houses since the beginning of June this year—guests are told clearly and simply the total charge for the room and breakfast and whether any meal is included in the booking. In addition, the relevant Government

Departments are having discussions with local authority organisations about an Order in Council for the statutory display of maximum and minimum overnight charges, including VAT. The provision of good information services to visitors is also an important part of any successful tourist industry—and right from the start we recognised that Britain should offer a service as good as if not better than our other neighbouring European countries in provision of this welcome service. Since 1970 we have set up, with the cooperation of local authorities throughout the country, a network of nearly 400 TICs as one of our most successful enterprises. A number of these TICs also make hotel bookings on behalf of visitors and 60 of them operate a Holiday Planning Service. In addition to these manned TICs, we are encouraging the use, all over England, of unmanned Tourist Information Points, which are providing tourists with a variety of different kinds of information at low cost.

Important though tourism undoubtedly is to our country's economy, that is not the English Tourist Board's only concern. It is concerned with preservation of our environment natural and man-made, which is, after all, the indispensable basis of our tourism. It is also concerned with the interests of our local residents and of the tourists themselves, as well as with those of the tourism industry and the holiday needs of the young and the elderly, the disadvantaged and the disabled. In this context, *Holidays: the Social Need*, the first report of a Study Group set up jointly by the English Tourist Board and the TUC, revealed that there are eight million people in Britain who have not had a holiday for at least five years. The study group's aim was to find out who these people are, why they don't take a holiday and what can be done to help. It was found that those least likely to be able to take a holiday are the lower paid, and those disadvantaged through age, disability or family circumstances. The response by the holiday industry and public authorities to this need varied considerably throughout the country, and this formed the basis for the recommendations made by the Group. These included proposals relating to central and local government, the travel trade and the statutory tourist organisations, and emphasised the need for more thoughtful allocation of existing resources rather than large investment by the public or private sector.

Since the publication of this report, steps have been taken to increase awareness in the tourist industry of the physical requirements of elderly and disabled people; to inform local authorities of the holiday needs of the disadvantaged; and to make more information about low cost holidays available through the marketing effort of the English Tourist Board. Close links have been established with voluntary associations active in the field of holiday provision, emphasising the value of the report as a basis on which to plan future provision for the large potential of this part of the domestic tourism market.

Britain's domestic tourism market as a whole has, like everything else, been affected by our economic difficulties and has been unstable. However, British people spend more than £2,000 million a year taking holidays in their own country—and that's a large amount of money by any standard.

The average Briton still spends more on tourism than he does on tobacco and beer and domestic tourism is still worth more to the British economy than the IMF loan. And there's no doubt that as the state of Britain's economy improves, so the volume of domestic tourism will grow. An economy on the move is essential for developing domestic tourism.

Meanwhile, the number of overseas tourists coming to Britain has been growing by leaps and bounds. It is estimated that Britain will attract between 11-12 million overseas visitors this year—and our earnings from overseas tourism (including payments to British carriers) will total some £3,000 million. Together with the British Tourist Authority and other tourist boards, the English Tourist Board very much welcomes the increasing contribution these overseas tourists are making to our balance of payments.

So British tourism, judged by any standard, is a success story. Why do so many people choose Britain as a holiday destination. Well, we can offer a great variety of holidays to suit every conceivable taste and inclination. We have beautiful countryside and coastline (and for the past two years, at least, we have also had the sun—although we cannot guarantee that!). Our natives are friendly and welcoming to visitors and we do, of course, have a rich historic and cultural tradition, a wealth of stately homes, castles, ancient monuments and art treasures to prove it! The fall in the value of the pound, particularly against such hard European currencies as the German Mark and the Swiss Franc, has obviously made Britain a bargain buy for many overseas visitors. However, having said that, let us not forget that the overseas visitor to Britain is by no means a new phenomenon and people do not travel for cheapness alone. They seek value for money as well as enjoyment.

We must face the fact that the problems posed by the greatly increased volume of overseas visitors to London — their potential need for more accommodation of all types, transport facilities and other amenities — have to be tackled as a matter of some urgency. However, the tourism pressures on London are not typical of the country as a whole. In most other parts of England, which offer a great variety of attractions for tourists, there is plenty of spare hotel capacity and a wide range of facilities and amenities which are under-used, particularly out of the peak summer season.

An important part of the English Tourist Board's marketing policy—and that of the British Tourist Authority overseas—is to encourage as many tourists as possible to take their holidays out of London and out of season. Repeat demand is one of the keys to dispersal. Overseas visitors coming to this country on second and third visits can be encouraged to visit other parts of the country—but the alternative gateways of Manchester, Birmingham and Prestwick, for example, need more services and vigorous promotion across the Atlantic. The interdependence of all the various interests involved in tourism must be more widely recognised and greater cooperation achieved. The English Tourist Board is doing its best to encourage much greater investment by the private sector in tourism; for that, too, will be a vital element in our future success.

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

OPERA

MOZART. *Don Giovanni*. Philharmonia Orchestra/Giulini (3 records). HMV SLS 5083. £7.95.

MOZART. *Le Nozze di Figaro*. English Chamber Orchestra/Barenboim (4 records). HMV Angel SLS 995. £11.95.

HAYDN. *La Vera Costanza*. Lausanne Chamber Orchestra/Dorati (3 records). Philips 6703 077. £10.50.

VOCAL

BRITTEN. *Phaedra/Sacred and Profane* and other works. Baker/English Chamber Orchestra/Bedford. Wilbye Consort/Pears. Decca SXL 6847. £3.50.

ILEANA COTRUBAS. Operatic Arias. New Philharmonia/Pritchard. CBS Masterworks 76521. £3.49.

PRESENTING SYLVIA SASS. London Symphony Orchestra/Gardelli. Decca SXL 6841. £3.50.

MOZART SONGS. Jill Gomez/John Constable. Saga 5441. £1.50.

AMERICAN COLLECTION. Sandra Browne/Michael Isador. Enigma VAR 1029. £3.49.

CHAMBER MUSIC

STRAVINSKY. *The Soldier's Tale*. Jackson/Nureyev/MacLiammoir/Zalkowich. Argo ZNF 15. £3.75.

BACH. Sonatas and Partitas for Solo Violin. Salvatore Accardo (3 records). Philips 6703 076. £11.97.

IT was particularly heartening to hear recently that the great Italian conductor, Carlo Maria Giulini, intends to return to opera, at least in the recording studio, with a performance of Verdi's *Rigoletto* for Deutsche Grammophon. For in the post-war era there can be few conductors whose work in the operas of Mozart and Verdi has been more distinguished, painstaking, and more successful, and one awaits the forthcoming new recording with the utmost enthusiasm. To underline Giulini's mastery of Mozart opera, EMI have recently reissued his recording of *Don Giovanni* which originally appeared, on four records, on their Columbia label in 1961. To make an already outstanding issue yet more attractive, EMI have now compressed it onto three records with no discernible loss of quality, and are offering it at a highly competitive price. Giulini in fact took over this recording at short notice from the late Otto Klemperer, who had suffered a most serious accident just before recordings were due to start, and Klemperer in fact recorded his own *Don Giovanni* some five years later. To my mind, however, this Giulini version is the one to have, the one to which I can return again and again without any loss of freshness and delight. For, without using extraneous sound effects or 'staging', this performance has a theatricality and spontaneity which I find entirely unequalled. It also has an exceptionally strong and musical cast, with the ladies particularly in a class

of their own. To listen to the young Joan Sutherland soaring effortlessly through Donna Anna's two great arias, the distilled genius of Elisabeth Schwarzkopf as Donna Elvira, culminating in a superlative account of *Mi tradi*, and to the Italianate charm of Graziella Sciutti as Zerlina, at her best perhaps in *Vedrai carino*, is to experience unmitigated pleasure. The men, too, are good: as Giovanni Eberhard Wachter is sometimes rather abrasive in the recitatives, but is caressingly seductive in *Lá ci darem la mano*, and sings the 'Champagne aria' with great brilliance. Giuseppe Taddei is a witty, musical Leporello, Luigi Alva a most stylish Ottavio who sings an impeccable *Il mio tesoro*, and the young Piero Cappuccilli (who will be Giulini's Rigoletto on the new recording) contributes an outstandingly positive Masetto. But it is Giulini above all whom one notices: his shaping of the music, his response to every nuance of the score are unparalleled, and the Philharmonia at their vintage best respond to him to a man. A first-class recording added to all these other qualities makes this an offer one truly cannot refuse.

Daniel Barenboim's recording of *Le Nozze di Figaro* stems from the performances he gave at the Edinburgh Festival in 1975 and 1976, although, good as is Judith Blegen's Susanna, one misses the more delicate characterisation of Ileana Cotrubas who was in the Edinburgh casts. Barenboim's approach here is perhaps ideal for the gramophone, yet might well seem dull in the opera house. There is a measured tread and a contemplative quality which at times lack the effervescence that this opera requires. Nevertheless, this is a beautifully shaped account of the work, and the orchestral as much as the vocal line is exquisitely moulded, with the result that he draws eloquent playing from the English Chamber Orchestra, even if some dramatic points are missed. There is a strong cast with Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau a powerfully sung, multi-faceted Count, and Heather Harper a most beautiful Countess. Judith Blegen's Susanna is lively and well sung, but Sir Geraint Evans contributes a somewhat blustering, even mannered Figaro, and Teresa Berganza, well though she sings, rather lacks freshness as Cherubino. But taken overall this is a thoughtful and pleasing account of the opera, and one to which I shall return.

Philips's admirable series of Haydn operas under Antal Dorati has now reached its third issue. I have yet to hear *Orlando Paladino*, but can give the strongest possible recommendation to *La Vera Costanza*, the second opera to be released. Whereas nowadays the weakness and lack of dramatic motivation of the plots might tend to militate against performances in the opera house—though Glyndebourne will be giving *La Fedeltá Premiata* in 1979—the variety and beauty of the music gives every reason for recording the operas, particularly when they are performed as attractively as here. Dorati's handling of the score is totally assured and stylish, and so engaging is the music that one ceases to trouble about the absurdities of the plot involving a secretly married young couple, and simply sits back and enjoys the music. The cast is strong, with Jessye Norman delightful as the heroine, Rosina, and other fine contributions come from Kari Lovaas, Anthony Rolfe Johnson and Helen Donath. Dorati plays the harpsichord continuo

himself, and draws highly polished, affectionate playing from the Lausanne Chamber Orchestra. Philips have provided a clear, well-balanced recording to make this set an eminently desirable acquisition.

At last year's Aldeburgh Festival Dame Janet Baker gave the world première performance of Benjamin Britten's last great work for voice and orchestra, the dramatic cantata *Phaedra,* set to the late Robert Lowell's verse translation of Racine's *Phèdre.* As Stephen Walsh poignantly observes in his helpful sleeve-note: 'Whether Britten could have sustained such a concept for the full length of an opera is a matter for speculation. We may wish that he had been spared for the attempt.' Certainly this work, modelled, said the composer, on the Handelian Italian cantata, contains full-blooded, starkly dramatic music which, in a mere 15 minutes, develops a great tragic character. There are echoes of *The Rape of Lucretia* here, and the feeling, if not the form, of the music is more of the earlier operatic works. Janet Baker sings it magnificently and is most sensitively accompanied by Steuart Bedford and the English Chamber Orchestra. One listens with total absorption and is left at the end moved and exhausted by the sheer concentration and power of the music. The rest of this record is also devoted to Britten, the Prelude and Fugue, Op.29, for string orchestra, some early song settings, and the eight mediaeval lyrics, *Sacred and Profane,* written, like Phaedra, in 1975, the last full year of the composer's life, and beautifully performed by the Wilbye Consort directed by Peter Pears. This record is a worthy memorial to the work of a great composer.

Four solo records from gifted young singers have recently appeared, two of operatic excerpts and two of songs. Ileana Cotrubas has been singing regularly in this country for some years now, and invariably gives immense pleasure, not merely by her vocalisation, but also by committed characterisation. This first solo recital record, sympathetically accompanied by John Pritchard and the Philharmonia, divides between Mozart and Donizetti on the first side and between Verdi and Puccini on the second. If I say that I preferred the first selection, that is not to decry the second, simply that I find Miss Cotrubas's voice ideal for Mozart and superb as Norina in *Don Pasquale,* whereas neither the Puccini heroines, nor Leonora in *Forza del Destino* seem so precisely right for her. But one should not overlook a compelling account of Gilda's *Caro nome* from *Rigoletto.* Sylvia Sass made her Covent Garden debut last year in Verdi's *I Lombardi,* and returned this spring for a memorable performance of Violetta in *La Traviata.* This young Hungarian soprano has immense dramatic flair and a strong, beautiful voice, and her recital of Verdi and Puccini arias makes rewarding listening. Here it is the Puccini side which I prefer for the eloquent performances of *In questa reggia* from *Turandot,* a touching *Sola, perduta, abbandonata* from *Manon Lescaut,* and a performance of Tosca's *Vissi d'arte* which makes me long for her to take the role on stage. On the Verdi side Lady Macbeth's sleepwalking scene makes the strongest impression. Well accompanied by Lamberto Gardelli, this is a welcome opportunity to listen to an exciting new voice.

The other two solo recitals are further off-beat and given by two British-



based singers who both happen to be Trinidadian by birth. Jill Gomez, understandingly accompanied by John Constable, investigates perhaps the least known of Mozart's works, his songs, and makes most rewarding listening of them. Most of the songs, apart from the late *Kleine Deutsche Kantate*, written, with Masonic overtones, in 1791, are short, but Miss Gomez manages to convey a wide spectrum of mood and colouring. It is a pity that such an attractively selected and well performed issue should be so ill served by its recording, though perhaps the heavy pre-echo is the price to be paid for producing the record at such low cost. Sandra Browne's dramatic mezzo-soprano is devoted to American composers for her recording debut. Aaron Copland's settings of Twelve Poems by Emily Dickinson, though powerfully and sensitively performed by both singer and her excellent accompanist, Michael Isador, I find somewhat dreary music, and I much prefer Samuel Barber's Hermit Songs, written for Leontyne Price in 1953, which have the wit and range of colour which respond to Miss Browne's gifts. One gathers that a further record of Spanish songs will be appearing early in the New Year.

Stravinsky's *The Soldier's Tale*, with French libretto by C. F. Ramuz, who based this variation on the Faust legend on stories by the Russian Afanasiev, was first performed in Lausanne in 1918. For seven instrumentalists, narrator, and two characters, it is an early example of music theatre, as opposed to opera, and needs a convincingly theatrical performance. This it does not receive here, and much of the blame attaches to Nigel Lewis's new English translation which appears to 'send the work up'. Nor is the casting of Rudolf Nureyev, with his blatantly 'stage foreigner' accent, an asset, though Glenda Jackson narrates with dry humour and the Devil is splendidly taken by Michael MacLiammoir. The instrumentalists are eminent and give a polished performance, but one that seems to relate little to the action: almost as though it had been recorded separately. Doubtless the personnel involved will make the record sell, but I cannot conjure up any great enthusiasm for it myself.

Enthusiasm, however, is precisely what I feel for Salvatore Accardo's glowing and supremely musical performances of Bach's Sonatas and Partitas for solo violin. These were recorded in a church with Accardo playing his Guarnerius del Gesú violin, which produces a rich golden tone, with almost unbelievable accuracy of intonation. Not only that, but immense musicality too, so that one hears the music not as the dry exploration of the instrument's range, but as powerful, emotional music which, in the D Minor Partita, becomes very moving indeed. This is a superb set, and one which no lover of Bach's music should be without.

POEMS

LANDSCAPE

The low brow of the hill seemed to express
something I wanted to say,
the winding road, to the soft horizon.

Beyond, the sky, like a transparent film
of viscerous tissue: glistening, blue,
in the light.

Earth beneath my feet . . .

the slow bend, in time.

BLINDS

Closed in, on the arms of a tremendous valley,
an old shopping bridge stands stranded,
over a stretch of time,
as people collect along its cobbled by-way,
mingling with the bright displays of soft lights,
under illuminated heat.

The river pushes gently under its arches,
beneath the lazy swirl of people,
shimmering in silence, out . . .
into the sunlight of the valley.

Blinds drawn, along the Arno,
time's not seen fit to re-open.

N. S. THOMPSON

OLEANDER

Fountain of rose
From lean dark buds,
Suddenly in southern sun
A firespray of pink
A floral jet
Sparking the polished sky
With tribute.

Oleander
Harbinger
Of Nature's nonpareil.

Da Vinci's dream,
Archetype:
A lumbering
Soaring
Scythe-winged
Plump, pointed
Owl-faced aeroplane;
With thread-fine
Antennae.

Oleander
Harbinger
Of insect wonder.

Hawk-moth
Flushed velvet
Olive brown
Green marbled
Beauty.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK

NOVEMBER STILL LIFE

It's dizzying. The leaves turn, the sky,
the stream of day at seven ayem
becomes a later hour. Children on the way
to school, change, like little lizards molting,

from shorts and skinned knees to
woollen gloves and wind-painted cheeks.
On the lake, boats bob as they did in May,
but are introverted now, pulling into themselves

to fight the chill.
A car motor
in November has an urgency to its rev.
Contagion up and down the early avenues.

It's easy to get lost in the city.
After Halloween everyone wears a winter mask:
pale, sudden faces peer from doorways and
brightly coloured scarves at bus stops.

Cats abandon the midnight howl and scrap
for perches along the inside of frosty panes.
Who knows exactly when the change presents itself.
It comes as easily as if it had been prepared

in a steamy evening kitchen.
It is unseeming.
Nothing stays the same.
The Shock of burnt-blood against the gray-tan

of eucalyptus in the gutter, is as quick
as the school children scurrying
to catch the day before it slips.
At the stops and entrances

the faces are curious, ready, waiting,
and no one is ever sure for what.
But whatever it is must not elude the cat's wail,
the choppy skipping of the water, or the new

confused morning. Fear grows old and changes.
Like leaves. Like the joy of unfathomable certainty.

RACHEL HICKERSON COHEN

THE NIGHTFISHING: BY W. S. GRAHAM

by Elise Passavant

LIKE great music, *The Nightfishing* is timeless and dateless, states its own argument, exists in its own space and time, moving forward and ending only when its own fulfilment is reached, leaving the reader—listener—not quite the same.

Although the poem that I am discussing may at first present no similitude to music, I hope to be able, through this comparison, to open a way into the poem itself and to reveal some of its beauty and significance.

W. S. Graham, who was awarded a Civil List pension in 1974 for his services to Literature, has been bracketed with others whose work emerged from the prevailing twilight of the forties and fifties as being 'elaborate, formal and rhetorical', but this great poem does not have anything to acknowledge to period or influence, but stands alone, like a lighthouse. No convenient or pithy sentence can be found to describe it. It appears at first sight to be a voyage, but it is more than it seems. The voyage is a real voyage but at the same time it is a voyage from life through death, towards resurrection—an immediate and constant fusion of the seen and the unseen. We share a purgative experience akin to hearing a great work of music; but to specify any particular music would be to label the poem, which is far from being my intention, merely to consider it from a musical angle and by so doing hope that some of its difficulties may be resolved.

The music of Boulez has been described as 'organised delirium' and his preoccupation with the poetry of Mallarme, whose life was dedicated to preserving the mystery of language, can be considered in the context of *The Nightfishing*. Time and again one is made conscious of this mystery that is never completely revealed although the language itself is organised and apparently simple. The statements are often made in a five word sentence, but the words are seldom in their expected order. To quote musical examples from contemporary work would be to labour the point; but it is important to draw attention to the twin themes that, musically speaking, are contrapuntal. The metaphor, the meaning, the appearance of reality and the sweeping of the imagination, like the twin screws of the boat, drive the poem along and out into the experience.

It begins with a summons—the Bell—the start of the voyage but at once, as the bell strikes, the dead speak out. The bell has called them as it has called the poet by name. He goes out 'into the salt dark—befriended by the sea', and goes on board. The quay 'opens wide its arms and waves us loose'. We reach a period of suspension in the poem, when the poet goes back to his birth and is 'put forward into live water, clad in oil, burnt by salt'. Surely a baptismal metaphor?

The poet then becomes part of the business of fishing and six stanzas describe this, with 'a chill wind rising' and 'the cross tree lights swing wide over Orion'. We feel the dawn coming as the men hear the gulls 'uneasy'

and know that it is time to shoot the nets. With nets paid out, the boat is still, and as the light begins, so 'the words take place'. It is time for the poem to quit realities and move into the inner self. While the men wait, the engine cuts out. In the stillness the gulls wail and settle and the poet, resting, 'feels separate and stopped to trace all grace arriving' as if he, a fisherman with the rest, is apart and waiting not only for the dawn to break, but to embrace the words he waits for. It is as though when he was 'called by name' that it was to give himself to the sea and so to the poem it creates. It is as if the elements have prepared an initiation ceremony—a deep involvement that will result in the birth of the poem.

Time is the metaphor as it is also the signal for the arrival of 'the great morning' and here the poem breaks out with the light like a burst of harmony—a modulation leading to a new movement. The words 'it is time to haul', simple as they are, come like a trumpet call to action after the stanzas of stillness. The narrative takes over, but it is never narrative only, for it moves on two planes at once. The stage is set for the drama of the storm and as the storm gets up so the poem gathers momentum and with its long lines we are carried forwards and outwards 'high up in open arms of the towering sea'.

The boat 'drives down into the roar of the great doorways, each time almost to overstay'. The words are like an orchestral climax, with tympani thundering below the brass and strings. But even in the midst of the storm there comes a human cry. Out of the storm centre: 'Who is that poor sea scholar?' It is himself, the poet, struggling for words. There is always something strange and rare in what comes from the sea depths. The poet's memory seems to search for what lies below, in his own mind, as well as in 'the watched water'. The sea and the weather, the gulls' cries and the herring scales are the visible, the heard and seen. The nets become part of the man who is 'braced to the haul' . . . the 'hard slow haul of a net white with herring'.

Then comes a slow decrescendo, with 'the sea loosening and the screws spin steadier beneath us'. Then, in a slower tempo, 'the land lay just as we knew it well all along that shore. Akin to us with each of its dear seamarks, and lay like a mother'.

With so quiet and tender a simile the storm ends and we begin another movement—a slow movement, in a different key, a different rhythm. It is like a solo cello, speaking a personal message . . . 'Oh, my love, keep the day leaned at rest'. . . . We are home—'So this is the place. This is the place fastened still with movement. Movement as calligraphic and formal as a music burned on copper'.

A work of art today has been compared to 'a labyrinth of a thousand and one secret corridors'. It may be that these secret corridors are best left unexplored and their mystery preserved. The words (or the notes) are there on the page—deceptively simple, but their arrangement is fluid and open to differing interpretations. The phrase 'Blindfold with the bright hemisphere ancient overhead' is an example of the mystery of language. Shakes-

peare's Floor of Heaven—Yeats' Embroidered Cloths, Marvel's Heavens Vault. . . . And so the poem draws us towards the seventh and last stanza, with a reprise of the first movement; with the bell 'Far out and faintly rocked'. This becomes an epitaph; the poet writes his own, at his table that becomes 'the grave's table' and the room he writes in becomes his distance. Nothing, in fact, remains real.

Different instruments state the same theme and as the sound changes, so the theme itself has a different meaning; changing the pace of the same notes can alter the structure and the atmosphere. So the poet knows that his words 'contend within the ear they alter' and he uses a musical analogy when he writes that his words 'awoke their harmonies for ever'. There is also a reminder of the voyage . . . 'the keel walks its waters again'. It is as if the sea had become the Dark River and the poet himself Charon; but instead of darkness he is 'blindfold with the hemisphere unprised and bright . . . 'the sea itself would seem to have receded from the immediate and presented scene', and the crew, although regarded as dead, 'have mixed all the qualities' that he, the poet, has been (the great leveller was perhaps his reference?).

A final, major chord illuminates the minor key of the last verse:

So I spoke and died.
So within the dead
of night and the dead
of all my life these
words died and awoke.

The words live, perhaps for as long as we have eyes to read them. The poet still lives, still writes, but it is unlikely that he will ever write anything as significant as this long poem, *The Nightfishing*.

[Elise Passavant, formerly a professional violinist, has had many poems broadcast and published, including two collections from Outposts Publications. *The Nightfishing*, by W. S. Graham, is included in *Longer Contemporary Poems* (Penguin Poems, 1966).]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

COMPULSIVE COMMUNICATOR

The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Vol. 3. Secretary of State for Social Services 1968–1970. Richard Crossman. Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape. £12.50.

Were these diaries really worth conceiving and dictating? What light do they throw on Cabinet government? Will future politicians be able to learn something from the mistakes and muddle of 1964-1970, and in any case are they unique? I will try to answer some of these and other questions in the course of this review.

For those who enjoy Dick Crossman's candid exposure of people and events *as he saw them* week by week, for those who like to see a maverick romping among the mandarins of public life, this final volume written in a lively prose style may well be a solace for long winter evenings ahead. For others like myself this last volume is too long and repetitious—over 950 pages covering two years of a Cabinet Minister's life. But I am glad to see Dr. Janet Morgan's name appearing in an editorial note; she has obviously worked hard over several years to see these volumes through the press and was not allowed to make significant cuts in the text.

It is difficult to evaluate a diary of this length and coverage because the author is articulate about everything from Biafra to Israel, from agriculture to devolution, quite apart from his own Department and the personal clashes within the Cabinet. He is also articulate about everyone he meets, sparing neither colleagues nor civil servants, many of whom are still alive. I refrain from mentioning the latter by name. But his observations on Harold Wilson, Gerald Gardiner, Benn, Michael Stewart and the rest may be deserved, but are insulting and in the worst imaginable taste. One example will suffice and this is mild. After sitting next to the Master of an Oxford College he describes him as 'the most appallingly effete Head of a College.' This same man happens to be a friend of mine and was chairman of a Hospital Board when our diarist was Minister of Health and he described Crossman as the worst Minister he had ever encountered. So one might continue, without much light or clarification.

In fairness, I should add that Crossman indulges in constant bouts of self-depreciation and self-adulation. Psychologists tell me that this is not an unusual phenomenon, but it must make Crossman the most self-conscious and narcissistic personality in recent British politics. But let me add immediately that outside the Cabinet, outside Labour party politics, Crossman reveals himself as a highly civilised man, generous and human, a lover of the theatre and opera, widely read, a *bon viveur* in every sense of that phrase. Once he is with his wife Anne and the children at Prescote Manor, he is happy and loves to entertain friends like Nicholas and Olga Davenport and many others who share his tastes and style. When he is preparing the Godkin lectures on 'Bagehot revisited' for Harvard or the Granada lecture on 'Television and Politics' he holds my attention completely.

The moment he enters the world of real politics, he seems to be lost, either dropping bricks or trying to make bricks without straw. Witness his long and valiant labours on a complex pension scheme, on specialist committees, on reforming the House of Lords, on re-organising the Health Service—most of which failed in practice.

In my opinion, Crossman was a first-class teacher, a first-class journalist and

a compulsive communicator. During the years 1968-1970 he was a senior member of the Cabinet, but he behaved more like a shouting senior prefect. He felt that politics had no future for him, so he slid back into the *New Statesman* and then the *Times* and television. He made strenuous efforts to persuade Harold Wilson to change his style of devious, secretive and instant Cabinet decision-making—and failed. I doubt whether politicians or political scientists will learn very much about the machinery of government from these diaries. But consciously or unconsciously Crossman has revealed, as did the Greek tragedians of old, something about the arrogance that goes with power, about the role played by envy and jealousy in human relations and about the need for an enduring faith in the eternal verities. In this sense, Crossman's candour might indirectly help to restore public belief in democratic government.

KENNETH LINDSAY

A SOLDIER LOOKS AT THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

In Defence of the Public Liberty—Britain, America and the Struggle for Independence 1760–81. Samuel B. Griffith, Jnr. Jonathan Cape. £12.50.

At first glance, a book of 670 pages on the American War of Independence would seem to be a risky venture to tackle these days, for this has been a very well-tilled field. General Griffith, however, deserves congratulation for providing a survey that, though it covers familiar ground, yet does so in a vivid, lively and readable fashion. He brings a special military authority to the book, as a retired Marine Brigadier-General, a graduate of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis and of New College, Oxford, and an author of other military studies. His handling of the armies is thus especially balanced, shrewd and authoritative, and he has a sharp sense of the acute differences between the ways of officers and other ranks, both British and American. Although no kinder to the British generals than writers before him, and especially severe on Howe (who does not quite fully merit the repeated sneers *re* Mrs. Loring), he is acute on Germain and on Burgoyne—the last 'with his thirty carts loaded with furniture, champagne, china, linen, crystal and silver, his mistress and her maids and their trunks, bedding and boxes'. If war was then a game for amateurs and gentlemen, it was not so for other ranks; and it is perhaps to be preferred to total war?

A special strength of the book are the sharp descriptions of the individual personalities, so that North and Pitt, Fox and Burke, Washington and George III are seen as rounded and real personalities. By describing their quirks, he does much to bring out their qualities. For the most part, General Griffith uses their own words for his quotations, and this adds flavour to the book, although the scholarly reader would benefit from having more careful attribution of the sources used. The footnotes are useful, but not all quotations are traced to their sources.

For a description of the episodes that led up to the War, of the confused politics of the Court of Westminster and of the inconclusive battles, this book is hard to fault. General Griffith plays down the social aspects of the War, and the role of the Loyalists; much work has been done on them in recent years and little of it is reflected here. Again the role of the men in Whitehall mattered then as now, but we read little of it. We hear of William Knox, for example, but General Griffith confuses John Pownall, one of the Colonial Secretaries and

an influential figure, with his brother Thomas, the ex-Governor of Massachusetts and M.P. (page 98). He is perhaps kinder to Burke than all the facts warrant, and a trifle harsh on Conway and Dartmouth. Nor is it quite a fair comment on John Hancock to suggest that he had his 'mistress' with him at Lexington when the redcoats marched in April 1775. He had with him his cousin whom he did not want to marry but who did want to marry him (he was one of the wealthiest of Americans). He had with him too his formidable aunt Lydia, who wanted to ensure that he married no one else—and she got her way. Since they were packed in the house with Samuel Adams, the minister and his family of twelve, John Hancock could not have been left free for private indulgences. John Hancock, in any case, was not the great man he wanted to be, neither in private nor in public, and his contemporaries knew it. But these are small points and matters of opinion.

The book ends in 1781, with Yorktown. Washington did not know the war was won then, and in a sense it was not fully clear that it was over until Franklin secured the Treaty of Peace two years later. But for the war itself, this is a splendid and authoritative account, written with style and panache.

ESMOND WRIGHT

EMILE ZOLA

The Life and Times of Emile Zola. F. W. J. Hemmings. Paul Elek Ltd. £7.50.

First of all, one must pay tribute to Paul Elek for publishing Zola over the years. Others have reprinted the three or four well-known novels, *Germinal, L'Assommoir, Nana, La Bete Humaine,* but it is Paul Elek who has borne the burden of printing the larger part of Zola's immense cycle *Les Fortunes des Rougon-Marquart* over the last thirty years.

Zola is indisputably one of the four greater novelists of 19th Century French literature. It is arguable that he is one of the four great novelists of 19th Century European literature. He was born in relatively comfortable circumstances in 1840. His father, a former soldier turned inventor and engineer, was involved in various entrepreneurial schemes. He was consistently defeated in contract races and died in tragic circumstances in 1846. Zola's mother struggled bitterly against her husband's business trials more or less totally unsuccessfully. He had not done well in his life and certainly after his death any financial claims he had were simply extinguished. Zola was able to identify with both sides, as in *Germinal* where he draws a most sympathetic picture of the poorer mineowner and his daughters. He was, at the same time, able to identify with the poor workers of Paris, as in *L'Assommoir.* Zola's mother eventually moved to Paris from Aix-en-Provence and Zola struggled to earn money merely to subsist.

Professor Hemmings' study of Zola is the first in English for 25 years. Probably if there was a street survey in England very few would be able to say who Zola was and still less would be able to give any sort of accurate account of his work and of his one great political stand—his defence of the Officer Dreyfus. Clearly any study at all is welcome. We are most insular so far as novelists are concerned.

Zola's immediate English counterpart is, of course, Charles Dickens, who also railed heavily against the oppression of the poor. But his writing has always seemed to me to be far superior to Dickens. For a start, his immense conception of a twenty-novel series has greater vision than that of Dickens. Moreover, the novels lack the 'comic characters' of the English novelist. This has always

seemed to be a weakening of the novels. One must accept that Dickens was obliged to write his novels by instalments, whereas Zola's novels were serialised rather than being written specifically for a newspaper.

Zola's private life has been something of an enigma. After an initial relationship with a prostitute, Berthe, who was a model for Nana, he married Alexandrine-Gabrielle Meley. He seems to have been faithful to her for many years until he became obsessed in late middle-age with Jeanne Rozerot. She bore him two children and eventually Zola's wife became reconciled and looked after the children after her husband's death.

Professor Hemmings' book traces Zola's life from poverty to riches and fame with commendable economy, quoting extensively from contemporary material. Although relatively short, the book is only some 180 pages long, it encompasses Zola, his life, contemporaries and his work, with admirable control. It is a most useful adjunct to what we know of Zola. One can hope that Paul Elek will continue the series so that there is the complete series of *Rougon-Macquart* in English.

JAMES MORTON

THE GUILT OF RUTH ELLIS

Ruth Ellis: A Case of Diminished Responsibility? Laurence Marks and Tony Van Den Bergh. Macdonald and Jane's. £4.95.

In June 1977 there was transmitted on Thames Television a thoroughly remarkable documentary programme on the Ruth Ellis case. Two aspects were entirely new—interviews with John Bickford, Ruth Ellis' defence solicitor, and with Desmond Cussen, her supplementary lover at the time when she shot and killed the unlovable David Blakely. Arising as it were contemporaneously out of that startling programme, this new book contains that new material, and deepens it. As regards Mr. Bickford, who appeared, weeping, on television, and whose life has been ruined by regrets and self-searching about a case which he did not expect to end in a judicial hanging, the interest lies firstly in his revelations, after clearance from the Law Society, about the preparation of the case, and secondly about certain statements made to him (and later to another solicitor, Mr. Victor Mishcon) by Ruth Ellis in the condemned cell. It appears that he was somewhat over-awed by the distinguished cluster of counsel briefed by him for the defence, and when they arrived outside court at the Old Bailey too late to discuss with him a last-minute decision of theirs not to cross-examine prosecution witnesses rigorously, he felt unable to make a show of himself and oppose them.

All practising solicitors have encountered such a situation, but it certainly should not have been allowed to evolve in a capital case. Mr. Bickford blames himself, whether wrongly or not, for the conduct of the defence, and, of course, he would have been within his rights, even if his decision was unusual and unpopular, to withdraw his instructions from those briefed in what he considered to be the best interests of his client. The point of the cross-examination, as envisaged by him was to bring out the extreme and nauseating violence inflicted on Ruth Ellis by David Blakely in the hope that the jury would make a recommendation of mercy. There was little hope of presenting Ruth Ellis as McNaghten insane, and this case in 1955 predated and helped to introduce the Homicide Act 1957 which would have made available to her the defence of diminished responsibility, which reduces murder to manslaughter.

The defence is criticised, however, for producing in evidence only a psychia-

trist who had spent a mere two hours with Mrs. Ellis, rather than Dr. T. P. Rees, who had actually treated her for several months. Dr. William Sargant even stated on television that her behaviour at the time when her husband was being treated for alcoholism in Warlingham Park (Psychiatric) Hospital was 'paranoid'. The common law did not allow the defence of provocation to attach to the circumstances of this case. The trial judge himself, apparently, felt that if the defence had been allowed to show she was not responsible for her actions through a combination of drinks and drugs, that she had had a miscarriage caused by Blakely punching her in the stomach, and that the gun had been put into her hand and she had been driven to the site of the murder, the jury might well have shown compassion. However, as the late Mr. Justice Havers subsequently pointed out, 'A judge has no powers to suggest to a jury that they should do so.'

As for Ruth Ellis' death cell instructions to her solicitors, these are quite extraordinary and disturbing. Her insistence that she alone was responsible for the inception of the crime and for the obtaining of the gun had been widely disbelieved. When her reprieve was refused, she turned against John Bickford, accusing him of accepting a bribe from Cussen to protect that gentleman, and made a statement to Victor Mishcon, her second solicitor, saying that Cussen gave her a loaded gun and, having plied her with pernod, drove her to the scene of the crime. Thus the element of premeditation was greatly diluted. This information was certainly not been previously made public, and this book is quite outspoken in its criticism of Cussen's conduct. The last-minute attempts to persuade the bureaucracy to investigate these allegations and to stay the execution make very disturbing reading. The matter was not aided by Cussen's convenient absences from home, so that he was unavailable for further questioning. For good measure, we have as an appendix a record of a unique interview, as also shown on television, with Desmond Cussen, in which he denies those things said against him by Ruth Ellis.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

THE WOMAN BEHIND THE ACTRESS

Sybil Thorndike: A Life in the Theatre. Sheridan Morley. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £5.95.

A highlight of my younger years was seeing Sybil Thorndike as Shaw's *Saint Joan*. I have seen her, too, at a party of stage people, turn all heads at her entry and outshine women half her age—not just by looks, dress, brilliance, but by sheer personality. One was at once aware of the woman behind the actress, as Mr. Morley is, in this intimate biography. It was her innate simplicity, directness, Christian faith, that enabled her to portray the rustic spiritual Joan so memorably.

These attributes were evident in the Gainsborough vicar's young daughter who resolved to join Ben Greet's Academy with her brother Russell. 'Well', she said. 'We know he's a dear, don't we, because we followed him home once, about a year ago from Chatham Theatre . . . and he looked sweet. And he's awfully keen on church. . . . ' She could be as unaffected about herself, saying of the audition held by Frederick Topham in Greet's absence, 'Oh, I looked such a sight! I put on a veil, God knows why!' When he observed 'She looks as if she can act', Sybil exclaimed: 'Of course I can act, I've acted since I was four. Anybody can act, it's the easiest thing in the world.' But she found it wasn't so easy to act tragedy, at least when Greet duly cast her for Lady

Macbeth and she wrote to Russell: 'Don't laugh—I was too appalling. The critics that I read all said I was unsuited to tragedy. . . . Something's got to be done about it, and I mean to jolly well swot until they do think me suitable.' An interesting prelude to tragic rôles that were to include *Medea*.

Her simple directness was apparent when she toured and teamed at the Manchester Gaiety with Lewis Casson, who helped her master her parts, introduced her to the Pankhursts' Women's Suffrage, and finally proposed to her in a Kardomah café. 'I didn't fall flat on my face,' she wrote to Russell, 'but the whole room spun round and so did the houses outside. So I suppose it means I shall marry him, though everything doesn't look quite as Mother says it ought to when you're in love.' To author Enid Bagnold she was characteristically frank about this abiding marriage, admitting they were a violent couple who had raging arguments. She was jealous of his occasional involvements with other women, who generally became her good friends. Sometimes she got slightly involved herself, but Lewis wasn't possessive; they were too close for that. 'Infidelity depresses me terribly. But it wasn't really that with us. I suppose it was a sort of overflow of vitality.' A nice way of seeing it, certainly.

Mr. Morley records her relations with Shaw, Lilian Baylis, other notables and fellow players. In *Short Story*, Marie Tempest annoyed Sybil by knitting ostentatiously downstage during Sybil's big scene, so she began playing cards, also ostentatiously, during Marie's big scene. 'Clever little actress, aren't you, dear?' said Marie the next night in the wings. 'No', replied Sybil sweetly, 'but clever enough to act with you, dear.' His concern is with Dame Sybil off as well as on stage, the forthright woman behind the bright lights of stardom. Sir John Gielgud says in a Preface: 'She had goodness in its rarest and noblest sense—faith and loving kindness and no pious nonsense . . . ' There are 32 pages of photographs and a datal list of all her performances.

TREVOR ALLEN

THE HOUSE OF STUART

The Lion And The Lilies: The Stuarts and France. Eileen Cassavetti. Macdonald and Jane's.

There is already a voluminous and exuberant literature on the House of Stuart. It is right that this should be so. They are amongst the most colourful and romantic of all dynasties: they were always vivid, generally libidinous, often wayward and exasperating characters. Courage was their stock-in-trade; they found the politics of opportunism repellent, any form of compromise anathema. Their sense of informality was endearing; their natures held no streak of pomposity. Above all, they have come to project the fascination which follows the lodestar of failure.

Eileen Cassavetti's admirable book encompasses four centuries of history. It begins in 1419 when the rugged, unassuming, yet highly competent John Stuart of Darnley was summoned out of self-imposed retiral in Renfrewshire to aid the young Dauphin Charles, determined to maintain his inheritance and to avenge the *dégringolade* of Agincourt. After exposing the reader to a whirling kaleidoscope of family fortunes in Scotland, England, and France, the book ends in Rome in 1807 with the death of the self-styled Henry IX.

The 'Auld Alliance' between France and Scotland is, of course, pivotal to the text. The French emerge with little glory. They were adroit in exploiting the Stuarts in order to foster their own interests, both nationally and internationally

and in particular their traditional enmity towards England. To them the Stuarts were redolent of marionettes, mere puppets on a string, sometimes to be treated with kindness and deference, at other times to be ignored, humiliated or even pilloried. The Jacobite Cause had a fickle ally in Paris. The Old Pretender could not count on the unequivocal support of the French Court; only when the Young Pretender seemed to have some chance of success did the Quai D'Orsay execute a rapid *volte face* and announce its support for him.

To a Scot like myself, the 1745—'a wild and desperate thing'—will always have a sense of magic. Perhaps it was the sheer audacity of the enterprise inextricably interwoven with the magnetic character of Prince Charles Edward and the tantalising aura of might-have-been. Miss Cassavetti's chapters on the rebellion and its sequelæ are especially revealing and are amongst the best in the book.

We live in an era when Scottish nationalism is resurgent. The Stuarts are woven deeply into the fabric of Scottish history. For a broad, majestic and enthralling appraisal of the dynasty I know no better source than this book.

JOHN A. LORAINE

SHORTER REVIEWS

Mind-Reach: Scientists Look at Psychic Ability (Jonathan Cape. £4.95). Margaret Mead has contributed an Introduction to this work in the field of psychic research by Russell Targ and Harold E. Puthoff. This book's special claim to distinction lies in the venue of the experiments discussed and the status of the experimenters—viz. the joint authors are physicists researching at the Stanford Research Institute in California. Margaret Mead vouches for this 'perfectly regular and normal piece of work' (her words) which claims to demonstrate the existence of 'remote viewing'—that is, the ability of both experienced and inexperienced volunteers to view, by means of mental processes, randomly selected remote geographical or technical targets outside the range of normal perception. Some evidence of precognition is presented. A small portion of the experimentation concerned Uri Geller, and this caused much controversy when published in *Nature*, although in fact the experimenters were not able to establish his celebrated psychokinetic ability to their satisfaction. They were left in no doubt, however, as to his paranormal *perceptual* ability. The book is curious because although it describes rigorously controlled laboratory experiments, its format is that of a high quality magazine for popular consumption, and it includes a 'recipe' for a private, reader's experiment in remote viewing—'The indications are that this is a widespread human talent, and chances are that you will be amazed at your own psychic ability.' (R.W.E.)

Arcadia (Penguin Books. U.K. £2, U.S.A. $4.95). Professor Maurice Evans has edited the version of Sir Philip Sidney's classic known as the *Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*. The original *Old Arcadia* had been partly revised by Sidney before his death in 1586. In 1593 her sister, the Countess of Pembroke, brought out the revised version with the rest of the story, as in the *Old Arcadia*. In the fifth edition in 1621, Sir William Alexander 'wrote a bridging passage' between the end of the revised version and the start of the old which followed. This version followed in numerous editions until the romance fell into disfavour in the eighteenth century.

Professor Evans has modernised the text in a very limited way. 'I have made no attempt to modernise the vocabulary since Sidney himself used deliberately archaic language' appropriate to his theme. He has restored the chapters introduced in the 1590 quarto, but which the Countess of Pembroke eliminated. Professor Evans has contributed a substantial Introduction and Notes which add considerably to appreciation of the text and its background. This is a most welcome publication.

Writers of East Anglia (Secker & Warburg. £4.50). The Eastern Arts Association invited contributions in prose and poetry from residents in the six counties of East Anglia, and some two thousand entries were submitted. Out of these, Angus Wilson has selected about fifty pieces and added several contributions from more established writers including Hammond Innes, David Holbrook, Edward Blishen, Raymond Williams and Laurens van der Post who assesses the East Anglian artist, Edward Seago. John Holloway has advised on the selection of poetry. The range of subject matter is very wide, varying from descriptive pieces on East Anglian countryside to fiction and poetry with no local reference. 'The purpose of this book is to encourage literature in our area and to offer literature to its readers.' As such, it should succeed and also make a pleasant bedside book. On the whole the standard is encouragingly high.

Backdoor Britain (Andre Deutsch. £4.95). The newly awakened interest in Britain's waterways is well catered for in Anthony Burton's study of the canals. He has travelled nearly one thousand miles on the canals; navigating, exploring and researching as he goes. The result is a combination of practical advice for the uninitiated as well as a useful background of history to the largely neglected network constructed with such ingenuity and courage a century and a half ago.

Frederick William Frohawk (E. W. Classey Ltd. £1). 'F.W.F.' (1861-1946) was an etymologist of quite exceptional talent and ability about whom a full-length biography may one day be written. In this brief memoir his daughter, Valezina Bolingbroke, attempts no more than a personally slanted profile, interspersed with some useful information about the landmarks in Frederick Frohawk's professional career. Clearly, there is much to be learned about this pioneer naturalist.

Alone In The Wilderness (Macdonald and Jane's. £3.50). Familiarity with all aspects of wildlife through photography and TV have robbed the explorer's documentary of much of its interest; and the author of any new book on the subject will need something very new and dramatic to describe. In this volume, Mike Tomkies writes about his self-imposed exile in one of the wildest parts of Canada with a genuine sense of wonder at the strange, uncharted way of life in which he participates. Beautifully written, this book stands out above many nature and wildlife studies.

Uniforms and Weapons of the Crimean War (Batsford. £4.95). In this informative and erudite study, Robert Wilkinson-Latham describes and comments upon the uniforms and hand weapons of the five armies involved in the war, 1854-56, namely the British, French, Turkish, Sardinian and Russian forces. There is also a chapter on the winter of 1854 and its effect on the clothing worn by the troops. There are numerous illustrations.

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CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

by Peter Woodward

THOUGH the conflict in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia has proved difficult for journalists to report fully it is apparent that the fighting has been both widespread and fierce; indeed it has been suggested that it is easily the most ferocious conflict in Africa since World War II. In African terms the war appears to represent surprising developments: border confrontations in the continent have rarely erupted into the scale of fighting which has occurred between Ethiopia and the Somali-backed Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF); both sides appear to be fighting with greater determination than African troops have sometimes shown; while Somalia is widely regarded as seeking the annexation of Ethiopian territory contrary to the oft-repeated and widely recognised policy of the non-alteration of Africa's colonially-drawn borders adopted by the Organisation of African Unity. Yet so often in African affairs the continental generalisation appears inappropriate to the particular circumstances of a region, and this seems particularly the case in the Horn of Africa where the present conflict reflects a number of unique features.

The most outstanding feature lies in the character of the major protagonists, Ethiopia and Somalia. For the most part politics in post-independence Africa has seemed dominated by the heterogeneous character of the society (or perhaps societies) of the new states, a fact which has appeared of major significance in the most prominent civil wars in the Congo, Nigeria and the Sudan. Yet the one exception to this heterogeneous norm is that of Somalia. Though divided into numerous clans, amongst whom rivalry as much as cooperation has been evident, there remains a common cultural base which has contributed to the growth of Somali nationalism. Present-day Somalia, consisting of the former British Somaliland and the former Trust Territory of Somalia (once an Italian colony) has never disguised its interest in areas of neighbouring states in which Somali people live—the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and Djibouti. The virulence of Somali irridentism has varied at different times, but the present conflict represents the most severe outburst since independence. Though Somalia claims that the fighting is the work of the Western Somali Liberation Front, there is strong evidence of the involvement of Somali forces reinforced by eager volunteers from amongst the Somali population.

In contrast to Somalia, and to the rest of Africa's modern states, Ethiopia reflects an indigenous imperial history. The Emperor Menelik in the late nineteenth century developed a unified and stable empire, based on the dominance of the Shoa Amhars of the high plateau to the north of Addis Ababa, which incorporated a variety of peoples, including Somalis in the lowlands of the Ogaden. Menelik's military strength, illustrated by the defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1897, was accompanied by clever diplomacy which had other European powers, notably Britain and France, settling for an accommodation with rather than attempt at conquest of his empire. In more recent times his example was followed by Haile Selassie, who combined political skills with ruthlessness to maintain his domestic position, while shrewdly manoeuvring among the great powers. He was able to add substantially to the empire by incorporating the trust territory of Eritrea, also a former Italian colony, into the empire (initially on a federal basis) in 1952. Since the revolution began in Ethiopia in 1974 the concept of empire has appeared obsolete, not to say reactionary, but it has been replaced not by any form of self-determination for Ethiopia's heterogeneous peoples but by the assertion that they are all members of one pluralistic nation, however out of place this may sound amongst the new rulers' Marxist-Leninist pronouncements. Thus Ethiopia and Somalia are making claims to the loyalty of what both recognise as the Somali people of the Ogaden but by advancing nationalist arguments that are on the one hand pluralistic and on the other irridentist.

While the Ethiopian claim of the inviolability of borders has won some recognition, her claims with regard to Ethiopian nationhood have been open to doubt. In addition to resistance by the Western Somali Liberation Front, Ethiopia's attempt to swallow up Eritrea has met with ever-growing opposition. Since the early 1960s Eritreans have organised armed resistance and in recent years and months have been so successful that the Ethiopian government's presence in the region is virtually limited to the region's capital, Asmara, and the towns of the coastal strip—including Ethiopia's only ports at Massawa and Assab. At the same time there are other smaller resistance movements in the north and west of the country, which, though currently less successful than the Eritreans and Somalis, would be encouraged by the success of one or both of these movements.

Though Somali nationalism and the legacy of Ethiopian imperialism are starting points in the analysis of the present conflict, they are far from being the only ones. Developments in the Horn of Africa are of interest not only to African but to Middle Eastern countries. In addition to cultural and historical links with the latter, the Horn is of strategic significance in respect of both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and in consequence a number of Middle Eastern states have not only been watching but seeking to influence the course of events. Over several years Arab support for the Eritreans has increased, for the groups comprising the Eritrean resistance movements are predominantly Muslim while conservative Arab states view with alarm the emergence of a revolutionary regime in the largest country in the Horn of Africa. Support for the Eritreans, particularly from Syria,

Iraq and Sudan, has helped to weaken Ethiopia by draining her militarily, cutting supply lines, and encouraging other opposition movements, including the WSLF. In 1976 President Numeiry of Sudan, in part alarmed at the repercussions of support for the Eritreans on developments in his own country, attempted unsuccessfully to mediate between Eritreans and Ethiopians, but obtained no significant response from either side. Possibly his experience has discouraged others from making similar attempts in respect of the Ethiopians and Somalis. Unlike the Eritreans, Somalia receives only limited sympathy in the Arab world. Though a Muslim country, she appeared for some years isolated from them and in close alliance with the Soviet Union, and while these ties appear to have broken recently, conservative states dislike her aggressive posture. In any case, with the question of Israel once more particularly prominent, and while Arab states seek agreement amongst themselves, interest even in the Eritrean situation has diminished. However, there are reports that Israel has once more seen an opportunity to make some capital in the soft underbelly of the Arab world and has secretly supplied spares and ammunition for Ethiopia's American equipment which were denied by the U.S. after the break in relations earlier this year. (A surprising bedfellow for the Israelis is the capricious Arab leader President Qadaffi of Libya who has switched from supporting the Muslim Eritreans to the Dergue as a result of his open hostility to Egypt and Sudan.)

The African dimension of conflict in the Horn of Africa has been more longstanding than that of the Middle East and reactions are similar to those that have arisen before. In the 1960s as Somali-backed guerrillas in north-east Kenya clashed with Kenyan security forces, relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. However, in recent years, as Somali concern appeared to be directed more towards Ethiopia and Djibouti, and the situation on Kenya's frontier was contained, even if it was not fully pacified, it appeared that Kenya felt as threatened by the Ethiopian revolution as by Somalia: indeed it was reported earlier this year that Somali guerrillas in the Ogaden were being supplied via routes through the Kenyan border area to avoid Ethiopian patrols. But the apparent involvement of Somali troops in Ethiopia, and Kenya's fear that Somali successes in the Ogaden will be followed by renewed claims on Kenyan territory have led to a swift clarification of her position. Kenya is now offering aid, mainly in the form of medical and other non-military supplies, to the Ethiopians. While Kenya's is the most notable reaction to Somalia's involvement in the Ogaden, other African states are also worried at the blatant violation of the most longstanding principle of the O.A.U. and fearful of the consequences of Somali success. Small states with powerful neighbours will look with particular concern at the future of the continent's newest independent state, Djibouti, where a narrow majority of the inhabitants are Somalis.

With the exception of Kenya, whose role has been limited, Africa's sub-Saharan states can do little that will have a direct bearing on events in the Horn, but the great powers can, and their activities, especially those of

the Soviet Union, have been amongst the most startling of recent developments. During the 1960s the most influential power in the region, in military terms at least, was the United States. The conservative regime in Ethiopia seemed a firm bulwark in a sea of instability, and the Americans gave more military assistance to Ethiopia than to the rest of Black Africa put together. In spite of the Marxist-Leninist character of the Ethiopian revolution, it was not until April of this year that the government expelled the American military advisers and arms supplies were cut. At the same time the most extraordinary development occurred when the Soviet Union decided to back the Ethiopian regime. The attraction of assisting the Ethiopian revolution was apparent, but so too was the strong possibility that such a move would provoke the fury of Somalia, who during the 1970s had emerged as the Soviet Union's closest ally in Africa. It was suggested that the Soviet Union hoped that by providing aid to Ethiopia as well as Somalia, both of which are self-professed Marxist-Leninist regimes, it would be possible to bring about a rapprochement between the potential protagonists. Furthermore, the hope may have existed that the Marxist-orientated movements in Eritrea could have been persuaded to participate in a settlement as well, as a result of which the regime in Addis Ababa would be in a much stronger position to deal with the continuing pockets of reactionary opposition. If indeed this was Russia's aim, and there is evidence to support this view, then it appears to have failed. On the other hand she may simply have calculated that in spite of the possibility of losing Somali friendship the opportunity to develop her position in the larger and traditionally more powerful state of Ethiopia was irresistible. If this is the case then much of the calculation will depend on Russia's ability to ensure that Ethiopia's armed forces can reverse the apparent disintegration of the old empire without which the Soviet Union will be left with a seriously truncated and weakened ally.

The middle of a conflict is hardly the best moment to assess the likely outcome for there are far too many factors which are difficult to estimate. Nonetheless there are certain aspects of the present fighting on which comment of a tentative character seems possible. Somalia's encouragement of and support for the WSLF may owe much to her desire to act before Ethiopia can complete the change from American to Russian armaments and while the Ethiopians find themselves in a desperate position in Eritrea. If so, the Somalis will be looking for a swift success, which at first they seemed to achieve, for without it Russian help to Ethiopia will become more effective. Furthermore, if the war drags on Somalia may feel the consequences of having exposed lines of communication, and the loss of Russian support. The Somalis' heavily mechanised armed forces were very dependent on Russian supplies and it may prove difficult to maintain the necessary mobility to fight deep in the territory of the Ogaden. Possibly the present attack has put these in doubt. Furthermore, Russian military advisers seemed to be important to the operations of all levels of the Somali forces and the effect of their expected departure may prove an important factor in the performance of the troops. A question also exists concerning

the human loss the Somalis can sustain in a war which has already cost more than eight thousand men (and women) on both sides. The Somali forces, which at the start of the conflict numbered approximately twenty-three thousand men, are only about half the size of Ethiopia's; and although many civilians are being recruited the population of less than three million is only a fraction of that of Ethiopia's, even allowing for secessionist sentiments amongst the latter's peoples. The maintenance of a sustained war effort on such a small and poor country will be an enormous strain, though at present all the evidence suggests that feeling in support of the conflict is very high and that people are prepared to make great sacrifices.

At first sight Ethiopia appears to have time on her side, providing she can slow the Somali advance. It will clearly take a while to adjust to Soviet military supplies and learn the lessons taught by the new military advisers, who include a small group of Cubans. In particular the People's Militia will enter the fight in increasing numbers and eventually add three hundred thousand more men to Ethiopia's original fifty thousand-man armed forces. But the People's Militia is itself an uncertain force. Though the existence of a territorial force has long tradition in Ethiopia the peasants' army raised in 1976 was notably unsuccessful in Eritrea, and it remains to be seen if a force hurriedly trained in the ways of modern warfare, however warlike and determined it may be, can be significant on the battlefield. Even if the armed forces are successful a further deterioration elsewhere in Ethiopia may affect the capacity to fight the Somalis, for if Eritrea is lost, Ethiopian troops will still be needed to guard the border and other secessionists may be encouraged to renew their efforts, while the loss of the ports, coupled with the breakdown of the rail link from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, will prove a severe blow.

The Soviet Union may have profoundly altered the situation in the Horn of Africa by establishing her support for Ethiopia and losing her friendship with Somali, but her action is not necessarily decisive. Whatever military assistance she provides may not be sufficient to decide the outcome not only of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict but the various secessionist struggles in Ethiopia, while a question-mark still hangs over the rulers of Ethiopia themselves, for in the past the behaviour of the Dergue has resembled cannibalism. Meanwhile in Somalia, the loss of Soviet support may still be offset, not least by the spirit of the people which appears to resemble that of a *jihad*. It seems a far cry from the appeal to the brotherhood of Marxist-Leninism with which Fidel Castro addressed the Ethiopian and Somali governments, as well as the Eritrean secessionists, on his visit to the Horn earlier this year.

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THE ARMY AS 'SOCIAL ENGINEERS' IN NIGERIA

by Arnold Hughes

WESTERN news media coverage of Third World events are notoriously incomplete and frequently slanted towards the violent, pathetic, scandalous or picturesque. This has certainly been the case with Nigeria, black Africa's wealthiest and most populous country. News coverage was high during the violence and turbulence of the mid-sixties and for the more harrowing episodes of the protracted civil war but since then interest has flagged. It is true that the economic boom generated by vast oil earnings has periodically received attention in the West though with the inescapable accounts of massive official incompetence (as in the Lagos port congestion of 1975) and high living on the part of the country's *nouveau riche* (the recent ban on champagne imports or the traffic offences of Nigerian diplomats in London). Events regarded by Nigerians as worthy of international coverage do not fare so well; neither the Pan-African Games nor the Pan-African Cultural Festival (FESTAC) obtained more than passing coverage and, more recently, national elections to the recently convened Constituent Assembly received no mention whereas the inconsequential 'general' elections in Rhodesia, which were held around the same time, were given considerable prominence. This is doubly regrettable; it tends to confirm African suspicions of Western news bias and fails to take account of a momentous process of social and political change taking place in Nigeria during the last few years.

The army has been in power in Nigeria for the last twelve years and for much of this period has been engaged in an ambitious programme of 'social engineering' which has as its objective the transformation of an economically underdeveloped and politically divided society into a democratic industrial state. Of course, every country in Africa claims to be attempting the same thing but the Nigerian endeavour is important in several respects. In subscribing to the ideals of parliamentary democracy and a mixed economy Nigeria's military leadership may appear out of tune with more 'progressive' tendencies in Africa so that its success would question the assumed inevitable drift towards authoritarian planned economies on that continent. The long-standing public commitment of the Nigerian army to withdraw from political life is also unusual in a continent where military intervention rather than disengagement has been the practice since independence. If the army can extricate itself out of politics here why not elsewhere in Africa? Perhaps it is the combination of these two factors which makes what is happening in Nigeria so important. Not only is the army prepared to return to the barracks in 1979, it is also seeking, through its programme of 'social engineering', to create the conditions which will keep it out of politics permanently. Clearly this is an audacious experiment and success is in no way guaranteed. Yet several aspects of the programme have been implemented and the convening of the Constituent Assembly shows that the various stages of the time-table for military withdrawal are

being fulfilled.

The Nigerian army is a creature of colonialism and for most of its existence it has served the British well, both in maintaining law and order within Nigeria itself and in serving the imperial cause in two world wars and numerous small colonial conflicts. But in recent years it has undergone significant changes. It has grown enormously since the start of the civil war, from about 10,000 to an estimated 250,000, and has acquired a range of skills and weapons unknown to earlier colonial levies. Today, there is a small navy and a burgeoning air force in addition to the ground forces of the past and the combined defence forces, with education, make the biggest claim on the national budget. It is not simply in its establishment that the army has changed; its leadership is no longer a small body of British-trained, Anglophile and politically unsophisticated officers. The British attachment is still there but Nigerian military personnel, when not trained at home, now receive instruction in a number of countries, and military purchases are made across the globe. Anglophilia can no longer be assumed, indeed relations with the former colonial power have grown more distant of late. British policy towards southern Africa; the refusal to hand back for trial the former head of state, Yakubu Gowon, and the future of British investment in Nigeria have all caused periods of strain. Theories of the inevitable dependence of Africa's soldier-rulers on their ex-colonial pay-masters are difficult to square with the nationalist philosophy now adhered to by Nigeria's military leaders.

The cornerstones of military thinking in Nigeria would appear to be economic modernisation of a largely poor and agrarian society; the creation of a unified nation; and the adoption of a social-democratic political system. The success of such aspirations would achieve a measure of social justice and political harmony not previously known and greatly enhance the country's international stature. A stable and prosperous Nigeria would more effectively play a part in world affairs, deploying its new strength to the cause of African unity and the defence of the Third World in its confrontation with the industrial world. A flattering and unattainable position perhaps, yet in several respects the country has moved towards this goal.

Perhaps the central theme of military thinking is the need for national unity; not surprising in view of the country's past history. A sense of Nigerian nationhood is something to be fashioned not assumed; in the words of the old civil war slogan 'To Keep Nigeria One is a Task that Must be Done.' Not only to keep the country unified in the face of separatist demands but to generate a patriotic sentiment stronger than any attachment to the 400 linguistic groups that make up the population or to any regional or religious loyalties. The army, more than any other institution in the land, suffered the effects of fratricidal conflict. Two of its three leaders, numerous officers and countless ordinary soldiers have suffered violent deaths following the instrusion of sectional politics into the military domain. The second effect of the civil war on the political thinking of the army was a realisation of the country's vulnerability to external pressure.

Both the federal and rebel forces could only wage war with the assistance of outside powers. The pressing need for military supplies obliged the federal government to accept the humiliating presence of foreign observers to accompany and report on the conduct of its troops, a situation virtually unheard of elsewhere. The army leaders' sense of military and national self-esteem was indelibly scarred by this slight and the subsequent concern to be masters in their own house and brook no further criticism from outsiders is undoubtedly related to this experience.

The army has adopted a number of measures to generate a sense of nationhood. Some have been of a symbolic nature, particularly in the area of foreign relations where snubs to western countries and the establishment of closer ties with anti-colonial states have been somewhat ostentatiously contrived to emphasise a national dignity. The search for a new national anthem and the deliberate eradication of state names with geographically divisive connotations (Mid West to Bendel or South East to Cross River) reflect a similar concern for patriotic symbols. Of greater importance are the institutional changes brought about by the army. The replacement of the old regions with a system of nineteen states is a major accomplishment for the former were long regarded as divisive and unfair in that too much political power was given the north at the federal level while minority tribes were subjected to the hegemony of the three major nationalities—Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo—at the regional level. It was not merely ethnic minorities who were suppressed at the regional level; the de facto one party states which controlled the former regions repressed opponents belonging to the dominant ethnic groups as well. As a result, attachment to national institutions atrophied and regional-ethnic loyalties became foremost. Unconstitutional action was seen as the only means of escape and, among the Ibo, secession seemed to offer the best hope of redress. It took a military government to resolve the 'states issue' and the present arrangement of a greater number of more-equally endowed states has abated southern fears of northern domination and given a number of smaller ethnic groups their own states. The core-areas of the three largest nationalities are now divided into a number of smaller states. At the same time the power of the central government has been increased, particularly in revenue allocation where federal assistance is needed to balance state budgets. The growth of central power is to be seen also in the decision to take over universities, radio and television stations, and newspapers previously under regional and state control. In the past these had often acted as the mouthpieces of virulent tribalism and regionalism. It is unfortunately true in Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa, that educated elements in society have championed rather than opposed communalism; the government's establishment of a National Youth Service Corps is intended to combat such an attitude among students by obliging graduates to spend a year in government employ away from their home areas. Trade unionists have also been encouraged to join a new government-backed central body so as to reduce internal squabblings and free themselves from dependence on outside funds and ideologies. The launching of a universal primary education (UPE) pro-

gramme in 1976 ranks as one of the most significant innovations of military rule. It will be some years before its effects will be felt but there is no denying its contribution to the objective of social equality. At present much of the north lags a long way behind the south and this enormous disparity has played a considerable part in creating a defensive regionalism on the part of northerners, sensitive to southern jibes at their backwardness and fearful of domination by their better-educated neighbours in the south. So real was this fear in the past that government posts were given to expatriates rather than to southerners. The educational backwardness of the north also encouraged social and political servility to traditional authority on the part of the northern peasantry. A secondary function of UPE is to help produce a future generation of managerial and technical cadres capable of running a modern economy.

The economic policies of the military government are also intended to contribute to its nationalist aims. A number of key themes may be singled out from the two major policy initiatives—the Third National Development Plan (1975-80) and the Indigenisation Decree of 1972. The former seeks to use the vast, but finite, oil revenues to transform the economy from a largely agricultural country with a high dependence on imported goods and services to one with an efficient and modernised agrarian sector, a large and export-orientated industrial facility, and a minimal need for imports of any kind. To achieve this, massive sums of money are being injected into all sections of the economy to increase and diversify agricultural output, expand industrial capacity and increase Nigerian participation, both state and private. The Indigenisation Decree is intended to regulate foreign participation in the economy so as to maintain over-all control by the federal government and encourage the growth of an indigenous entrepreneurial class. In addition to promoting these changes the army sees its role as harmonising, in the interests of national solidarity, the competing demands of different sections of society. If successful it would bring about prosperity and economic modernity without the need for divisive class antagonism, leaving the government free to take up a leading part in the affairs of Africa and the world beyond. Nigeria is already using its economic muscle in diplomacy; financial assistance to poorer African countries and the threat of cutting off trade with Western states trading with South Africa are recent examples.

The military's thinking on the political future of Nigeria may be gleaned from its guidelines accompanying the preparation of the draft civilian constitution submitted last year by panels of experts. It seems that the army is particularly anxious to avoid the political abuses of the past, notably rampant communalism, the use of political office for personal gain, and the suppression of personal liberties. Although the Constituent Assembly has a free hand in debating the draft constitution, the Supreme Military Council reserving its own position until it has received the Assembly's recommendation, the army seems anxious to foster a multi-party political system with a presidential rather than a prime ministerial government, and the rigorous application of checks and balances to keep branches of govern-

ment separate and effective. Political parties will have to be national in their policies and territorial in their organisation. The details of such a national, democratic and honest form of political representation is left to the 223 members of the Constituent Assembly. Theirs is an awesome assignment, in the light of the country's recent history and the pressure of time on their deliberations. It is not clear whether the revised constitution will need to be approved by a national referendum as well as by the military authorities but the registration of electors will commence shortly. Local government elections were held last year and the elected councillors formed themselves into electoral colleges to choose the majority of the membership of the Assembly. The absence of wide-scale controversy surrounding these two sets of elections must be regarded as encouraging for the staging of full scale elections at national and state level in 1979. Barring any major reversal it seems likely that the new constitution will be adopted next year and so enable the people of Nigeria to participate fully in the governance of their country and for the armed forces to make a discreet withdrawal to their barracks (the cement for the construction of which created such massive congestion at Lagos harbour two years ago!)

That, at least, is how the armed forces would wish things to be but the prospects for parliamentary democracy in Nigeria are somewhat more problematic. It seems appropriate to end on a cautionary note given the uncertain outcome of experiments in social engineering elsewhere in the world. To what extent does the populace at large, and its political leadership, subscribe to the ideals of the military authorities? While it is true that much of the army's programme has been applauded by the Press and public and it is civilians, rather than soldiers, who will be drawing-up the new constitution, is there an element of caution or opportunism present? With communal loyalties so strong and many former politicians likely to make a return to political life can we expect truly 'national' parties to emerge or will they pose as such in order to avoid proscription as communal organisations? Can the constitutional safeguards envisaged, and those who apply them, prevent future abuse of political office? One of the army's promises which it has not been able to fulfil is the eradication of corruption. Indeed, under the Gowon administration official corruption reached new heights and necessitated a cleansing of the armed forces themselves by the Mohammed-Obasanjo governments. There is little to counter the pessimist's view that communalism and corruption are endemic and ineradicable in Nigeria but these may be kept in check in future. Again, can class antagonism be avoided as industrialisation proceeds and the self-awareness and power of organised labour increases? Will UPE produce a generation of unemployed or unemployable, flocking to the over-crowded cities in search of a better life they cannot find while agriculture stagnates? Is the army's policy of encouraging the growth of Nigerian capitalism likely to turn sour, producing a class of exploiters rather than of innovators? Can the power of international capital be tamed through state controls and the policy of partnership, or will it reappear in concealed forms?

There is no means of answering these and kindred questions; the survival

of parliamentary democracy in Nigeria may not lie so much with those responsible for drafting the new constitution, or even those who will have to implement it, but with the army. Prospects for democracy seem brightest if the army maintains its corporate unity and its commitment to the ideals of national unity and parliamentary democracy. In this case its role will be that of guardian, eschewing any improper part in civilian politics but reserving the right to intervene when the constitution is broken. Such a benevolent interventionism is to be preferred to either of two alternative roles. Should the armed forces maintain internal cohesion but fail to live up to their ideals then an economically-damaging and politically-unstabling corporatism would emerge whereby the soldiers would seek to protect their privileges at the expense of society. Today, defence accounts for over a quarter of the national budget and, while there is understandable reluctance to shed manpower too rapidly, the real and fancied need of soldiers for increasingly complex and expensive weapons and equipment makes the Nigerian military establishment a costly asset. A continuingly large and demanding army would deny resources to other sections of society and jeopardise long term development plans. Democratic politics would become a sham if political leaders dared not adopt policies damaging to military interests, however constitutionally correct such policies might be. In such a praetorian state parliamentary institutions and procedures would be no more than a facade concealing military manipulations. The second alternative is that of military disintegration of the kind experienced in 1966; such a debacle would prove disastrous to army and state and would undo the patient efforts of the last decade. Sectional tendencies do occur within the post-civil war army as the toppling of Gowon and murder of Mohammed prove but, unlike 1966, they did not lead to the break-up of the army. There was no open opposition to the removal of Gowon and very little support for Mohammed's assassins. Perhaps the army, if not the country, has learnt the lessons of the civil war. Whatever role the army adopts in future—guardian, corporatist or communalist—the army out of politics is the army in politics and parliamentary democracy must learn to accept this reality.

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THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND AFTER

by Roberto Ducci

AS in a well-known play by Eugene Ionesco, we have in our living quarters in Western Europe a body (variously called Community, Common Market, European Integration), which in thirty years has grown big and occupies a lot of political and intellectual space. Some of us are perfectly happy with it; others would like to eject it from the house but when they try they lack the strength; more and more people are beginning to think that, whatever its usefulness in the past, it now does not seem to have a sensible scope. The body in any case will not die by itself, even if it has been in coma three or four times; and now and then, on the contrary, it produces some substance (mostly paper). The time is perhaps approaching when one should start wondering what to do with it.

I shall call this Body, throughout the article, *Unification of Europe*, an expression which one finds in several variants during the last thirty years; from the United Europe Movement which was presided over in 1947 by Winston Churchill, to the Committee for the United States of Europe which was Jean Monnet's brainchild, to the preamble of the Rome Treaty which speaks of the union of the European peoples, the communiqué of the Six Heads of Government in 1969 requesting a blueprint for political unification, and the Manifesto of the Nine Heads of Government in 1972 setting the date of 1980 for a European Union. Unifying Europe, step by step or in a big leap, over most of the Western part of the continent or a small part of it, starting with coal and steel or with nuclear energy or military integration, or with a customs union, has loomed large between 1947 and the present time, in the political debate within each of our countries—a debate in which sometimes the United States and the USSR were also involved.

Looking back, it is easy to judge that the progress of European Unification was regulated by an irregular series of impulses. The Strasbourg Council of Europe of 1949 and its Consultative Assembly were hailed as a springboard for quick advancement; a year later nobody believed it any longer. Placing the political management of the coal and steel industries of six advanced countries under a supranational Authority had apparently nothing which could inflame people's hearts: instead, the initiative became very popular as a symbol that the way to reconciliation between Germany and its victims-victors could be opened by calling all of them to a common endeavour. The terror of a Soviet Blitzkrieg against a weak and disarmed Europe justified some *fuites en avant*, like the European Army and the European political authority from which the former would have taken orders; both of them collapsed, and everything came to a standstill. (In reality American strategic superiority in 1950-55 gave breathing time for recruiting and arming a German *Bundeswehr*. Footnote for the futurologists: the majority of the French people did not want a German national army. They also did not want a European Army. So finally they

got a German national army.)

So stupendous had been the ruin that the unification of Europe was considered by nearly everybody a dead cause. Only three years later, however, the Economic Community was born, which consisted of a general customs union, plus a set of principles for achieving an economic union, starting with a common agricultural policy. For the subsequent ten years any real progress was stopped because of the quarrel about UK accession, which among others did not permit an agreement on the 1961 French project of a political union. Progress was resumed at The Hague Summit of December 1969 where the Six, while accepting Britain as a member, set to the Community the new goal of a monetary union. In the following years a completely new machinery for concerting the action of the Nine in the foreign policy field was invented, built and tested. In October 1972 it did not look unrealistic to practical politicians like Heath, Pompidou, Brandt, Andreotti and their partners that a European Union might be established in 1980. An initial and timid operational plan drafted by the Belgian Prime Minister was on the contrary buried without flowers four years later. Stagnation and immobilism, strongly helped by the oil crisis and the world economic recession, prevailed, and continue to do so.

This brief reminder of things past contains nothing that is not known to most people. But it indicates that every past progress in European Unification was obtained by a new initiative, opening up new prospects and pointing to new goals. At no time did the Promised Land seem at hand's reach; but moving towards it maintained or restored the faith. Can we realistically expect something of this kind to happen again? And if so who or what should be the driving force?

In the last twelve years the unifying capacity of the various Community institutions has been gradually eroded. It was rather foolish, even in the salad days of the Community, to pretend, as Hallstein did, that the Commission was the cocoon out of which a European Government would emerge. The Commission was surely intended to be (before it was gelded during the sixties) the guardian of the Treaty, the depositary of the *esprit communautaire*, the *porteparole* of the *volonté générale* and—perhaps most important—the natural defender of the Small against the hegemonic tricks of the Big. Notwithstanding its right and duty to submit proposals to the Council, and though composed of highly respected people, the Commission was and is in no condition to give a decisive push to European Unification. The reason is that its morale was broken years ago; and not even Roy Jenkins will be able to restore it.

Alas, the shifting of its powers to the Council is mostly eyewash. The Council pretends to be the main governing body of the Community; but, since de Gaulle in 1965 destroyed its birth-right to take decisions (in relatively few cases) by a two-thirds qualified majority, the Council has become a *liberum* veto assembly, and cannot even govern itself. There were halcyon days in which it considered itself an institution acting as the collective organ of a Community, and not as a forum where individual nations prompted their own interests. Its transformation into a sort of Polish Diet was however inevitable; one cannot consequently expect that a coacervation

of egoisms possesses a unifying capacity.

If no further impulse towards European unification can be expected from the Council, what of the most august of the institutions, the thrice-yearly meetings of the nine Heads of Government (including one Head of State), christened with a lot of phantasy the European Council? Was it not created, on French suggestion, because a maximum of authority and influence was vested into it, making it therefore capable of reaching the consensus necessary to propel the Community in its forward march? Alas, one of the first things the European Council had to do was to pass judgment on the proposals made, at its own request, by its Belgian member (Prime Minister Tindemans) on ways and means that would lead, sooner or later, to a European Union. The trouble is not that the Prime Ministers buried, as noted earlier, the Tindemans' report under a few hypocritical words. The trouble is that the nine Great Men put the matter at rest: even the usual face-saving formula of asking a committee of officials to ruminate over the report was disregarded. Yes, it was a realistic and matter-of-fact decision, what with inflation, unemployment, floating exchanges, terrorism, troubles in the Middle East and Africa, eurocommunism, changes of Administration in America and may be in France and Britain. But what next?

We have seen that the Unification of Europe tends to fall in catalepsy if not in coma unless it is pushed forward by some new initiative. Its institutional system being what it is, i.e. something more than an old-fashioned international organization but infinitely less than a Confederation (let alone a Federal Union), the Community contains no in-built unifying force. The impulse must recurrently come from the outside, or the operation will fold up sooner or later.

This will however be concealed for a number of years by two factors. Certain EEC activities will continue apparently unimpaired. The Customs Union will not be abolished or wither away: perhaps because it has relatively little importance in our days. Contrarywise, it will be more and more difficult (it is so already) to establish and to maintain a common commercial policy. Did we not claim in a not too distant past that the Community is the largest foreign-trade entity in the world? It is, but only if it is a real Community. The European Investment Bank is not going to be liquidated, nor the Social Fund, nor the machinery for regional aid. But in the name of what should some of the more favoured countries go on transferring resources to the less favoured ones, if the myth of a Community (that is, of a standing obligation of the whole towards the parts) is on the wane? While the 'snake' disappears in the wilderness, what will prevent—if things get worse in the economic field—a return to the competitive devaluation of the currencies? We have spared ourselves the recurrence of a 'beggar-my-neighbour policy'. So far so good, because in the small European subcontinent we are our own neighbours: the largest and more distant neighbours, the US, the USSR and Japan, would not be hurt as much as ourselves by our taking refuge, as in 1932-39, in trade and monetary barriers of all sorts.

The second factor concealing the gravity of the situation, even if a new phase of European Unification does not start pretty soon, is the residual capacity which the institutions of the Community have of giving a certain amount of coordination to the several national policies. In the field, for instance, of foreign policy it is clear that no common activity (except exhortation, deploration and flagellation) can exist with the present rules. Action, which is the substance of foreign policy, cannot be originated by the European political cooperation system: action, I mean, of the type of the French military aid to Zair through Morocco; but even of the type of British diplomatic action trying to solve the tragic problems of Rhodesia today and of South Africa tomorrow. It can and will therefore be theorized that a kind of European foreign policy might take shape by a concurrence of national policies, carried out by the countries able to do certain things which the Parliaments of other countries might not swallow. Some of us would keep close contacts with, say, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, while contacts equally intense and beneficial would be kept with Israel by some others. The Holy Ghost will certainly help us in this acrobatic operation: but what is happening to the 'Europe speaking with one voice' which was hallowed only a few years ago as a desirable and achievable aim? And even if a certain amount of coordination of defence policies will continue (largely within NATO) can we be sure that the example of French strategic thinking will stop at the borders of the Hexagone?

Indeed, if we want certain things to continue (even the minimum: a market which will remain common, a reformed C.A.P. giving equal price support to farmers, certain mutual obligations in the monetary and currency fields, a sort of coordinated commercial and diplomatic activity abroad, and so on), we need to reformulate, and assent to, what the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Herr Walther Scheel, has called *Gesamtkonzeption*: a global concept of the Community's future, changes and developments.

It is manifest, I believe, that neither the national Governments nor the present Community institutions are capable of formulating such a *Gesamtkonzeption*: because they lack the capacity to rise above the national selfishness. (How could it be otherwise, since they embody the so-called national interests, and are established and maintained for the purpose of defending them?). But there is one institution of the Community which may—it is prudent to say it *may*, instead of saying it will—undergo a fundamental variation. If by direct polling in each and every Community country a European Parliament is elected, an institution will see the light whose legitimacy will not be drawn directly or indirectly from the national Parliaments or Governments. In the new Parliament, though it will function mostly on the basis of intereuropean parties, the defence of national interests will be legitimate and even frequent: but it will *not* be its primary task nor its mission. The European Parliament will not legislate for Europe, a function which will remain a responsibility of the Councils. But it will *speak for Europe*, just as a national Parliament speaks for the country on matters of principle,

according to the wishes of the majority of its members (which, by convention, equals the majority of the citizens).

Here then is the possibility of a *Gesamtkonzeption* being formulated, permitting a better coordination and a less egotistic application of national policies. A European Parliament directly elected will have no direct control on the nine (or more) Governments; it will not regiment the lives of men and women. It will have little or no power; but it will have great influence, because with the years it will become the permanent popular Assembly of the European people, speaking in its name by the normal parliamentary procedure which the British invented and the Continent assimilated: applying the system of Western democracy according to which the voice of the majority, even if obtained with transient alliances or coalitions of interests, defines the rule of the land unless and until it is reversed.

A European Parliament directly elected will not be a revolutionary step; but it may, at least at the beginning, impinge on certain loyalties, disturb certain habits and, in a few cases, damage some vested interests. That is why certain forces in each of the countries of the Community will try to prevent or delay the holding of the elections. Even when a European Parliament is elected, it cannot be wholly excluded that tribal instincts might prevail, reducing it to impotence and frustration.

If either one or the other of these two pessimistic assumptions should become true, then the twilight would rapidly descend upon the dream of what Winston Churchill used to call a United Europe. The decaying body of European Unification, encumbering our living quarters with its amorphous mass, would start to suppurate. It would then be high time to throw it out of the house by bits and pieces; even better if one could eliminate it, perhaps with some outside help, in one blow. Finally we would be free to live in our small quarters, each one on his own, turning untiringly like polar bears within walls which would grow higher and higher.

[Roberto Ducci, who has contributed the above article at the request of *Contemporary Review*, is an expert on European Community affairs. He was Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Rome Treaties, Chief of the Italian Delegation for the UK-EEC negotiation in 1961-1963, a member of the Board of the European Investment Bank from 1958-1968. He has contributed several articles to Italian and other magazines on European matters and is the joint author of a book published in 1973: *Roberto Ducci e Bino Olivi 'l'Europa Incompiuta'*.]

SALUTATION FROM A DISTANT ISLE

by Terry Tucker

IF you were visiting these far-flung Bermuda Islands, whose total area is a mere twenty square miles, you might be surprised to find, on a road that climbs sharply round Scaur Hill Fort, a milestone facing eastward across the Great Sound towards England with the clearly-engraven words: LONDON 3076 miles. This is always referred to as The London Milestone.

It was the English who, in 1609, came by chance to an uninhabited Bermuda, and it has remained populated ever since by peoples of English and, slightly later, of Negro and then those of Portuguese descent. Since 1620, the islanders have made their own laws; but by choice they still remain a self-governing colony of the British Commonwealth, and proudly boast that their Parliament is the oldest in the British Commonwealth countries overseas.

Throughout these 368 years, the close of each reign in the Mother Country and the commencement of another have been observed in the islands with due form and ceremony. Only the pace of learning of events has changed—a death, an accession, an abdication reach us now with the immediacy of light, and we have become accustomed, over the radio, to the very tones of the voices of our Sovereigns. But even the visits to our shores of various members of our Royal Family faded into insignificance with the visit of Queen Elizabeth II in November of 1953. Not only was that her coronation year, not only was Bermuda the first stop-over for the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh on their tour of the Commonwealth, but for Bermuda itself it was an epoch-making event—the first visit of a crowned British monarch to our shores.

The very words she used here are unforgettable, unforgotten:

> 'Nor is it British Parliamentary Institutions alone which have grown and flourished in Bermuda, for our British outlook and customs have taken firm root, and in the Old Country they may be proud of this plant which has sprung from British seed. . . . I am sensible that the loyalty you have expressed to me in words has in the past found expression in deeds. This colony has played a long part in the struggles which have built up the British Commonwealth overseas and have fought side by side with their fellows for its preservation. From these years of strife wider organisations to ensure world peace are emerging, in which I am confident that Bermuda will play an honourable part while retaining to the full the distinguished position she occupies in the British Commonwealth. That position will, I know, remain unshaken by the storms through which the world is passing.'

My work being what it is, it was inevitable that Her Majesty's words sent my mind far-ranging into our recorded past; I suddenly recalled the time, 200 years ago, during the American Revolutionary War, when Bermudians were vacillating between loyalty to the crown and the views of the revolting American colonists, and the words spoken then by Governor George Bruere flashed into my consciousness: 'Let us not deceive ourselves, liberty is nowhere to be found as pure . . . as under our limited monarchy. . . . Stray not after it to rebel states and new-fangled systems. In Britain and under

British Government you will find it.' And I thought, ah, yes! and if that was true in the context of its time, it is even more true today.

So great an impression was made by that and two subsequent visits to our shores, that by the time the Silver Jubilee occurred in 1977, Bermudians entered wholeheartedly into celebrations that they no longer felt were merely correct professions of loyalty and homage to a distant monarch on a far-away throne—no, indeed, everything that took place here was a vivid renewal of allegiance and love towards a familiar royal figure whom they could always visualise even when distant. Sporting events, a gymkhana, acrobatics, boat parades of some 200 craft, military tattoos, mock assaults by the U.S. Marines, massed bands and Beating the Retreat ceremonies—all culminated in a Thanksgiving Service expressing gratitude to God for the Queen's '25 years of devoted service to all her peoples throughout the Commonwealth' as the Acting Governor, Mr. Peter Lloyd, expressed it ere the public holiday ended with an explosion of fireworks over Hamilton Harbour against the June night-skies.

Inevitably, local publications beseiged some of us to divulge our most vivid recollections of Her Majesty. Over the years, many Bermudians have been singled out for New Year's or Queen's Birthday honours and receive their insignia in investitures either locally at Government House or by journeying to London to receive them at the hands of the Queen herself. The high-spot of my own recollections was at Buckingham Palace, eleven years after that Coronation-Year-visit to Bermuda—and fourteen long years ago. My award was an extremely modest one, and my adventure was spiced—as are even memorable occasions—with the usual small human absurdities and comedy of errors that prick most of us at times. But perhaps it is noteworthy for the indelible imprint it has left on the mind of one distant little-islander who had never expected to invade Buckingham Palace. The fabled 'myth of monarchy' contains an essential truth.

Once the arrangements were made, I went about my daily tasks with—blissfully and idiotically—an old Nursery Rhyme ringing through my head:

> Pussy cat, pussy cat, where have you been?
> I've been up to London to look at the Queen.

And the absurdities began with the arrival of the impressive engraved document itself, bearing the bold signature Elizabeth R. in the top right-hand corner, and signed by the Grand Master at the foot 'By the Sovereign's Command'. Alas! 'our trusty and well beloved' had her name thereon spelled 'There*as*' Tucker. I should have stuck to my usual simple *nom de guerre* I decided laughingly, instead of treating this occasion with such formality; I felt obliged to correct the error to the officials to prevent being announced so quaintly to Her Majesty—but declined their generous offer to have the whole MS. reinscribed.

When at last the allotted day in a hot mid-July arrived, my friends and I —each honours-recipient is allowed two guests—reached the gates of Buckingham Palace just as they were due to open at 10 a.m. We circled the Mall to get into one of the car-queues, and drove into the Inner Quadrangle. I reminded myself fleetingly that King George III had bought the

mansion standing on this site from John Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham, that it became a Royal Residence at the start of Queen Victoria's reign—and that the Portland stone front we faced now was ordered by King George V. Delighted with the rapidity of the reconstruction—it was completed while the Royal family was away for the summer—he invited all the workmen in to dinner!

Already, crowds of people were sticking their noses through the railings in idle curiosity to watch the two streams of visitors entering over red carpets. Now separated from my friends, I was directed onwards through various long rooms to pass at last through a glass door into a sky-lighted picture-gallery. The more than one hundred recipients gathered here—of whom eight or so were women—were chatting quietly, almost reverentially, together, or resting on the settees down the sides. I was to spend the next two hours looking at the pictures, sitting now and then for a little while to fan myself against the intolerable heat, and talking briefly, in subdued tones, with one or two of my fellow-guests.

Various officials began quietly calling lists of names, and lining their owners up in file before shepherding them, one by one, into the Presence. Batches of Lieutenant-Generals, Generals, Flight Officers, airmen, in their various uniforms, and elderly statesmen, professors, scientists in cutaway coats and morning dress were being arranged according to the status of their award. Then they were given the most exact directions as to facing the Queen when each found himself ushered in separately before her, the formal bow, the manner in which to answer if she spoke to him, the withdrawing bow, where and how to exit while still facing towards Her Majesty.

And now it was our turn, the modest M.B.E.s, the final recipient being a magnificently decorated Beefeater, already sporting a row of decorations. The official who now addressed us remarked facetiously he would not show the ladies how deeply they should curtsey! We could remove both gloves—or neither. We must not speak to the Queen unless she first addressed us; in replying, we must address her as 'Your Majesty'—followed by 'Ma'am' if conversation continued.

For two hours, while watching and listening, I had been wondering how much of this extreme protocol really belonged in our modern age. The idea of the Divine Right of Kings crumbled centuries ago; surely governments can function without this brilliant façade, the elevation of one human being on to an almost superhuman level, I was thinking critically. I even reminded myself that my journey of over 6,000 miles was to fetch a decoration worth, in terms of hard cash, a very few pounds at the outside—but I owned, even at that moment, that no one can evaluate honours in such a mundane manner. For me, this would remain a great and unique experience. . . . Most countries have the honours system—even the Soviet Union boasts some sixteen Orders. And Britain has over two dozen types of titles, orders, stars and ribbons, ranging up to the ancient Order of the Garter. And the Queen herself has become an expert on uniforms, badges, medals, infusing an almost reverential awe into her entourage towards a

ceremony which, without the observance (both by the Queen herself and by her subjects) of a code of diplomatic etiquette, would degenerate into a mere charade.

At last we were filing towards the Throne Room, packed, towards the back, since 10 a.m. by the crowd of invited guests of whom we were quite oblivious. For us, there was merely a door ahead through which in a moment one would have to step and face the Queen separately and alone. As far as I was concerned, the little imps which dog human activities had even invaded the palace,—for as I strained to glimpse what the next few moments would bring, I was dismayed to note that the slight figure on the dais, flanked by Beefeaters immobile as carved stone, wore a short white dress and coatee with silver threads that gave a beautiful glittering effect. Alas! I myself was wearing a short white dress and coatee with golden threads, and for one irrepressible moment wondered if I were guilty of lèse-majesté! . . . Even more absurdly, the confusion of my name still pursued me; the official, in announcing me, glanced surprisedly at the corrected paper in his hand, hesitated, then said unnaturally loudly: 'Th*ere's* a Tucker!"

By now I was smiling with happiness as I stepped forward, wheeled to the left to face the Queen, and curtsied. She looked pale and a little tired. Her hair seemed darker under the brilliant candelabra than I remembered it under the Bermuda sun in Government House grounds eleven years earlier. Against the scarlet and gold of the Royal Arms, the two thrones, the solid Beefeaters, she gave an overwhelming impression of fragility, dignity, beauty.

Curtseying, I stepped closer to her, and in a moment she had slipped the crimson decoration into place on my lapel. 'What is your work?' she asked, in so low and quiet a tone that no one else could have overheard it. Ah! here was my chance to mention my island home. I stammered in my eagerness: 'Oh—I-I write *Bermuda* history', and added, in a rush, 'Your Majesty'. A short pause gave me an opportunity, so I added rapidly: 'And may I say, Ma'am, we've never forgotten your wonderful visit to our island in 1953.' She raised her head. Her smile was radiant as she returned with fervent pride: 'And *we* shall always remember it.'

Unexpectedly, perhaps ridiculously, my history-orientated mind reverted suddenly four hundred years to the time when courtiers around the first Elizabeth were wont to say 'that they could not look full upon her because her face was as the sun'. Suddenly, today, I felt as if the Queen's whole presence diffused an aura, an emanation far from physical, that overwhelmed me with the realisation that this symbolic being personified the essence of all the long centuries of British history, tradition, ceremonial, continuity—as if the past and present were one. . . . Recovering myself, I backed a few paces, curtsied once more, wheeled again to the right and passed through the further door. It was over. . . . A few minutes later, the playing of 'The Queen', accompanied by the great wave of people rising to their feet in the Throne Room, signalised the stately withdrawal of the Monarch and her entourage.

The unforgettable scene recurs to me many times as one considers the pros and cons of ceremony. Societies have to elevate some human beings among them to positions of authority, symbolical or actual; those thus accepted are, in point of fact, our prisoners, sometimes our scapegoats, both deserving and needing the support of protocol and diplomatic etiquette. On the face of it, the idea of an hereditary right in any mortal to govern others seems absurd, yet, even in our democratic age it is admitted by many that an inherited, but reasonably restricted, monarchy eliminates the contest for top position, means that each ruler is trained for his future, gives an element of continuity and recognition of the historical past, and the recognition that, carefully limited though the royal powers be, they are an ultimate voice above politics and acrimonious party struggles. A unifying figurehead in times of stress is of inestimable worth, binding together the remaining countries of the Commonwealth without impinging on their freedom.

As for the idea in this battered age of abolishing functions and ceremonies, countries that have attempted this equation of their leaders with the fabled 'man in the street', soon realise that they are depriving not only the State but their own lives of what remains of myth, and poetry, and beauty, and reducing life to a drab level where violence and crime become the only colourful outlets.

Perhaps the ultimate irony is that often, when this fabled man of the people attains high office in any country, his immediate reaction—or that of his followers—is to attempt to prove that after all he does descend from the circles of the aristocracy—or even of the Divine! . . . And, more absurdly still, those very people who affect to despise titles and other indications of rank, often appropriate one of them as a nickname—or even christen their children 'Earl', 'Duke', 'LeRoy' and so forth!

As far as we are concerned, 'May the Queen Live for Ever'—as an ancient National Anthem expressed it long ago.

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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ARCHITECTURAL DEVELOPMENT

by Sir Hugh Casson

SOME years ago I was a member of a committee set up by an ancient university to decide whether architecture was a discipline of sufficient intellectual rigour to warrant a 'chair'. A pushover, I thought, but I was mistaken. I had underestimated the old academic prejudice which favours thinkers and talkers above makers and do-ers . . . a prejudice which for at least 150 years has permeated the educational system of this country from the top and is hardly challenged till it reaches nursery school level. In the end the chair was established, but the experience re-emphasised for me the dispiriting fact that the visual arts in general and architecture in particular are unfamiliar territory, except in a historical sense, to the academic mind brought up from the first to respect the written word rather than the perceived object, and thus are nationally undernourished. (Even at the trivial level of social intercourse or TV punditry the names of minor poets or minimum novelists are better known than those of, say, this country's two most internationally distinguished architects.)

This general cloud of ignorance, into which the more informed occasionally and timidly grope their way, has in recent years been illumined by shafts—not to say explosions—of public criticism, virtually all of it adverse. Indeed, national disenchantment with our physical surroundings verges today on paranoia. We, as consumers, demand and happily use supermarkets and airports, open-plan schools, motorways and holiday hotels. When we are given them we find them intrusive, vulgar, inhuman and unalluring. The architect, rightly, must take some of the blame for this situation, but not (as he is usually asked to do), all of it. It is a truism, after all, that architecture is always an accurate mirror of national values, and thus much of this criticism of our environment should more justly be directed to the life-style it so mercilessly expresses. The symptoms, in other words, are being attacked, not the causes.

Before discussing this further it is as well to remember that even the symptoms are not always as bad as the critics make out. We forget too easily and too quickly how appallingly ugly, inconvenient and unhealthy for most people—clerks and factory workers, servants, shop assistants and schoolteachers—was the typical Victorian city. Those richly modelled façades we all admire today concealed so often working conditions that today would make even a Balkan factory inspector blench.

We forget too that buildings cannot avoid looking different and disturbingly unfamiliar because they are being asked to do different and unfamiliar things. Developing technology has made these new functions and forms possible, e.g., air conditioning has made climate irrelevant, windows dispensable. Industrial and commercial activities tend to be repetitive and monotonous. What goes on in an office block or factory in Bristol is much

the same as goes on in Lincoln or Middlesbrough. Modern industrial society —capital or communist—demands centralisation and mass production, large sites, large buildings, mechanised systems, standard finishes. Mass needs and mass economics in fact demand mass architecture, too big for the victim-consumer to understand, too impersonal to love.

We forget finally that most buildings of this scale—anonymous, shiny-faced and hard edged—are built by people who will not personally live or work in them—insurance companies, government departments, speculators —and thus will not as a rule put much personal affection or thought into their creation.

Yet when all the reasons for all this—plus money-mania and the hysterical speed of cultural change—have been identified and all the criticisms countered, we all know—just look around us—that the quality of our environment is not commensurate with the well-meant effort that is put into it, and that somehow and for some reason what is being built is not what we wanted. Do we know what we want? Yes . . . shelter, stability, evidence of affection and skill, human scale, a sense of place. (Above all, this . . . for a sense of place reinforces identity and because it dignifies the individual helps indirectly to cherish personal liberty. Without it we escape into fantasy or sink into alienation.)

This gap between human needs and their expression in buildings is comparatively recent. Mediaeval man and his builder believed in the value of the human soul. Eighteenth Century man and his builder believed in harmony and intellect. Not surprisingly, the buildings expressing these agreed beliefs were acceptable to or cherished by those who used them. Even in Victorian times the combination of technical ingenuity, romanticism and self-confidence of structures like Tower Bridge or St. Pancras Station accurately and recognisably responded to Victorian aspirations.

Today, no longer. Ingenuity, of course, remains and indeed develops, but romanticism is siphoned off into Merrie England Grill Rooms, fibre-glass Georgian porches, Art Deco boutiques or personal attire. Confidence has vanished. No wonder the experts seem to flounder. The architect—he is not after all a Martian—is well aware of this. He is a prisoner of his period and thus a victim of that growing gap between expert and consumer that is slowly cutting our western society in half. To his credit he realises this with more passion and perception than some of his colleagues in other professions. We architects seem to thrive on self-criticism and crying 'Mea Culpa' in the streets. We admit the occasional pursuit of false gods—the dogma of functionalism and the chimera of artificial cosiness and contrived chaos that has replaced it. We realise that to the conservationist we are vandals, to the radical a prop to the status quo ('Tyrants,' said Auden, 'have no fears of Geologists or Engineers'). We recognise our dilemmas—that we wish to speak for the common man yet too often find ourselves pushing the common man about—that we, uniquely among artists, cannot create without first destroying . . . either a piece of countryside or another building. (What painter or poet, I wonder, would not hesitate to start if told that his work could not be begun without the destruction of somebody else's?)

Have the last twenty-five years, then, been nothing but a record of falling environmental standards, a flourishing of the ugly and the banal, a saga of professional self-questioning or incompetence? Certainly and unequivocally not. Look at the record. Britain emerged from the war exhausted, impoverished but optimistic. Most of the principal towns and cities had been damaged by air attack, the railway and road systems were on the brink of breakdown. Two million houses had been damaged or destroyed. Quick decisive action was needed . . . and was taken. The recipe for victory in war—apart from personal and patient courage—seemed to have been good organisation, the minimum of debate, a clear chain of command, understood ungrudgingly at all levels, a refusal to make perfection the enemy of the possible. This formula, warmed and inspired by a national belief that things could and must be better, was applied with energy and success to our peacetime problems.

By 1946, 200,000 families had been re-housed and 40,000 prefabs built—a remarkable technical achievement by the building industry at a time of desperate shortage of materials.

By 1948, coal, steel, the railways and the Bank of England had been nationalised and we had new Education Acts, a National Health Service, and a mass of new and adventurous planning housing legislation—(Bevan's target, almost reached, was 200,000 houses a year)—The New Town Programme. Fourteen of these were launched.

For architects it was an exciting and inspiring time. All our pent-up pre-war hopes, dreams, our school-fed faith in radical thinking and rationalised building as the gateways of Utopia, seemed to be on the verge of proving themselves . . . the technical hiccups or consumer resistance sometimes experienced being put down to conservatism or teething troubles. Such optimism proved within ten years to be pathetically misplaced, but four unquestioned successes can be chalked up to this period at the beginning of the Queen's reign. Two of them 'professional' in the sense that their virtues were recognised more easily by 'pros', and two of them in every sense of the word 'popular'.

First of the 'pro' successes was the Hertfordshire School programme. In 1946 the country needed 100 new schools . . . and quickly. By 1954 the target was met. The method chosen by the architects was first to study, quickly, but in great detail, the physical demands of the new Education Act and secondly to go into partnership with industry, and to build the schools from a range of standard components to a standard grid.

These pre-fab schools were, and still are, a triumph of modest, friendly and efficient design, and won international acclaim.

The second success was the New Towns programmes, a conscious attempt to build from scratch a series of new communities; what Raymond Unwin, a pioneer of the Garden City movement, had called 'a full life and an honest place'. Now, experimental new towns had, of course, been tried before, in particular the model towns like Bournville and Port Sunlight, built for their workers by enlightened industrialists, but Ebenezer Howard's garden city concept first tried at Letchworth in 1903 and Hampstead in 1906 are

the true forerunners of Stevenage and Harlow . . . low density . . . plenty of space . . . careful landscaping, a logical organisation of roads, schools and shops. Criticised by the avant garde as cosy and Toy-Townish, and derided by intellectuals as fortresses of small-minded prejudice, they in fact continued the unbroken run of the nation's most successful architectural image . . . The Englishman's Home, small, semi-rural, practical and reassuring. As so often—I nearly wrote 'as usual'—the intellectuals were proved wrong. The pedigree of suburbia is strong and healthy. Its appropriateness, compact and convenient within, scenic and varied without, is self-fulfilling and self-identifying, its symbolism instantly recognisable. It could not be said that they were a 'popular' success except in the negative—and to my mind crucially important sense—that they were 'accepted', like a pillar box, but not 'noticed' by those who lived and worked there. When architecture is not called upon to ennoble or uplift, such modesty and suitability is, to my mind, a virtue.

The two great popular successes of the early fifties were Coventry Cathedral—a competition winner by the late Sir Basil Spence—and The Festival of Britain. Coventry, criticised by some as exhibitionist and lacking in 'gravitas', caught, and has subsequently held the public imagination with its sparkle and bravado. The South Bank Exhibition, centrepiece of the Festival of Britain, did the same. Launched at a time of great privation, universally derided during its building period—(the Conservatives suspected a Socialist Trojan horse, the radicals deplored its alleged elitism)—it was a resounding success. For six months, it was been said, it was the most exciting place to be in England . . . a place where a glimpse was given of what our rebuilt cities might be like . . . full of colour and trees and water . . . places to walk about in and enjoy. Although stylistically no revolution, many of the ideas shown here with such liveliness and zest in fact passed into more permanent—if diluted—form.

Meanwhile Europe, far more war-damaged than ourselves, was picking itself up again, putting most of its housing efforts into its traditional form of high-rise flats but using new, ingenious prefabricated systems.

These systems—French, Danish, Dutch, German—caught the eye and enthusiasm of housing committees and their architects all over England. Here, it seemed, were quick off-the-peg solutions to our problems, not greedy of expensive land, standardised (so no arguments in committee) and carrying the image of 'The Future', lofty white towers set in green spaces. The hair-raising costs, the structural defects to be expected in all new technology, above all the heavy social price of high-rise family living were under-estimated or ignored. It was the gas-explosion of Ronan Point—a trivial if tragic accident—that concentrated the slowly mounting criticism of tower blocks into a sudden almost panic reversal of policy. (By the seventies hardly a single housing authority in the country was building tower blocks.)

The sixties, of course, had other things than housing on its mind. Package holidays and Kings Road boutiques, television and the teenage industry, supermarkets, motorways and fantasy hotels. And most dramatically of all

the speculative property boom diverted the attention, the skills and the money of the building industry into a frenzy of activities which, when it had petered out in bankruptcy, bequeathed us a legacy not so much of architecture as of three-dimensional real estate. Of this period Centre Point —as it happens not by any means the most banal of new office blocks— became a symbol—a building which made more money in a year when empty than British Leyland could do by making cars. It was not a time of which architects can in retrospect feel proud, despite a handful of excellent buildings like the *Economist* in St. James's Street and Gatwick Airport.

The pace was too hot, the programme too money-manic for good architecture. It was the universities new and old who made belated amends for generations of apathy in patronage. Many fine new buildings, laboratories, libraries, sports centres, hostels, designed by this country's most distinguished architects, appeared in quick succession in the older universities and in a final spurt of public patronage the Government launched a programme of seven entirely new universities. Not all of them were as adventurous in their educational policy as in their architecture and virtually all of them were compelled by convenience or economic sense to build in outer suburbia rather than in city centres—with all the pros and cons such a solution implies. But each of them expressed clearly and with great skill architectural attitudes—warm and picturesque as at Brighton, logical and cold as at Warwick, rational and severe as at Colchester—which illumined the theoretical disarray of the profession.

To the thoughtful professionals once again something seemed somehow to have gone wrong. The recipes for Utopia . . . comprehensive redevelopment, zoning, the careful analysis of needs, leading to logical solutions precisely expressed in the technology of our times, had turned out, again despite a score of distinguished buildings, to be clumsy or ineffective, or visually dispiriting. Once more architects wearily put on their hair-shirts. Some retreated into the world of small-is-beautiful, do-it-yourself. Others jumped—with genuine enthusiasms—onto the conservationist band-wagon which was, now it seemed, carrying all before it. Pitched roofs were hurriedly dusted off. Brick sales soared. Planners lost their nerve and building control officers fussed endlessly over minor details. For Jubilee Year the slump delivered its final blow. Now, this apparent *volte face* was not as whimsical or architecturally unproductive as it sounds. It is true that architects are often volatile in their loyalties and clients—particularly public ones—sensitive to public criticism. It is true also that this is a period (not surprisingly in view of their record) of distrust in experts of all kinds. Yet the lessons learned—if financially, visually and socially expensive—had to be learned and were worth learning. The purely 'rational' approach to so complex an organisation as a city is obviously naïve. To wish to preserve and re-use what we have got is surely sensible. (The converted old Maltings at Snape must be one of the finest concert halls in Europe.) Experts should be more humble and open minded, architects be better at what we do. It is right to recognise the public wish not to be pushed around and to have more say in the look of their surroundings.

We must beware, of course, of the real dangers of the situation—paralysis of cultural will, cowardice in the face of the monumental, the quirky, the passionate or the experimental, a soppy susceptibility to the architectural baby talk of Toy Town, a longing for the mental deep freeze.

It has, in retrospect, been a revolutionary twenty-five years. Not many great buildings perhaps—but then the British shrink from elegant gestures and stray statements in their architecture as in everything else.

A few visual disaster areas must be accepted, but nothing surely so awful as, say, the suburbs of Paris or the coastline of Spain. A handful of masterpieces recognised abroad if not always here, and several hundred modest design achievements. The real revolution has been in values and attitudes . . . a rediscovery of the truth that architecture is democracy's true art, that can only flourish when it is warmed by a sense of shared decisions and a respect for the individual. To cultivate an eye for architecture—which means places and light and weather as well as buildings—is to cultivate a concern for humanity. 'A full life', to paraphrase Unwin, needs an honest place!

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PLUSIEURS DE PAYS UNE AME

by John Garway-Whitehead

EIGHT years ago an account was given of an old ring engraved *Six pays une ame*; it was summed up as a voice from the past telling that in the 14th century a spirit had been in motion, trying to generate a sense of unity in Western Europe.[1] Since then more has come to light about the reality of that spirit; and as the need for unity is now even more evident, there seems reason for continuing the subject. First, though, the cause for the disunity calls for recognition: we have no common aim. National *ways* will differ necessarily, yet so long as they are directed to a common *aim* the differences can be co-ordinated; but without a single aim divergent ways are bound to occur. Nor is such an aim really hard to find; the trouble is that our old inherited wisdom is being ignored, we are so absorbed in material progress that the old intellectual common sense has been forgotten. This ancient wisdom ran: Happiness will come when three faculties are regained, which the soul once possessed but lost (when the not wholly legendary Golden Age broke up). These are: Memory of the past Goodness from which today has been evolved, Strength of Will to preserve that goodness through present difficulties, and Wisdom to build upon it a better future. Goodness, Strength, Wisdom; they are a familiar trio, which mediaevally used to be denoted heraldically by Three Crowns, and which still remain as a symbol for national endeavour in many countries.[2] They are the royal arms of Sweden, they were worn by royal heralds in England and France, they once represented Eire and still do the province of Munster, and as a triple crown were the symbol of the Holy Roman Empire; in Germany they are prominent as 'The Three Kings of Cologne', with which there is much parallel usage in England; in Poland they are the bishopric of Cracow, and they can be inferred in Portugal. Their spirit of Goodness-Strength-Wisdom was once a common Aim throughout Western Europe, although the use of the sword for enforcing that aim, instead of for defending it, evidences misdirected zeal.

Remarkably they appear also on Bellini's portrait of the Sultan Mehmet in the National Gallery who, after his capture of Constantinople in 1453, sought to bring all the creeds in his empire under a single philosophy and chose this extremely ancient one of 'Harmony through Reason'.[3] As its features are best preserved in Britain, their identity will be focussed upon this country. Mixed motives though have constantly operated, and the lessons from the resultant failures have unfortunately not been heeded. History demonstrates that material interests are bound to conflict, until the millenium comes; and the way to that ideal is through the mind. All human enterprise starts from the mind, even though it be an empty stomach which stirs it to move; so, if we are to draw a useful conclusion from the 14th century embryonic attempt, it must begin with a modern realisation that the basic aim must be non-material, with conflicting material motives reconciled by a common philosophy; a common market will then follow as a

rational corollary; but any attempt to put the cart before the horse is unlikely to make it forge ahead quickly. A leaf may be taken from the Tibetan *Milarepa*:

> The horse of Mind . . . this horse doth course along the wide spread plain of Happiness, its goal the attainment of the state of all the wise.

Accordingly we are taken to the romance of *The Seven Champions of Christendom*, mentioned in the 1969 article. The theme it opens up is that although Europe may seem to be a hotch-potch of different racial stocks, the differences are rather parochial, and for those who care to look there can be seen running throughout a common strain of a very ubiquitous people; it is one which had carried its culture with it, known figuratively as that of the 'Seven Sages' or in a more warlike character the 'Seven Champions'. Visually and poetically for them were the Seven Stars of the Great Bear, known in India as the Seven Sages, a night-time reminder for sailors and travellers taking their bearings from the Pole Star; those Seven Stars were looked upon as the paradise of immortality, whither went the souls of warriors who fell in battle.[4] More prosaically and yet profoundly, the allegory meant that the pure Wisdom of the seven principles of their culture, upheld by the warriors, would produce the clarity of thought voiced by Solomon—'In kinship unto Wisdom is immortality'.[5]

England's omission from the *Six pays* spirit was probably on account of the ill-conceived Anglo-Saxon acquisitiveness having caused the Gaelic strain to look to France to head its unity. But in retrospect the acquisitiveness should not be judged too harshly, even though its better aspect was too often callously ignored; because, just as in the 19th century English 'colonialism', dual motives can be seen operating—one commercial (though not in itself necessarily wrong), the other a generous desire to bring law and order to peoples behindhand in it themselves—so too it is possible that a not wholly selfish aim to bring law and order to Eire and to French feudal fission may partly have underlain the heavy-handed methods. The evil that men do lives after them, and no claim is being made that the English were saints; none the less in both the 19th century and mediaeval 'colonizations' the English did show themselves capable of leaving a record of justice and peace, while the 1415 Military Law instances admirable humanity towards the civil population of Northern France.[6] Consequently cynicism can be bridled, and a glance given to see whether some better motive may not also have been operating.

That motive actually discloses itself in the 14th century English royal circle. In York Minster is to be seen a sculptured head, crowned with a triple diadem, which John Harvey has shown likely to represent Richard II when expected to become Holy Roman Emperor;[7] as Richard's grandfather, Edward III, had shown himself strongly sympathetic to the English 3-crowns tradition, and as Richard introduced it noticeably to feudal Eire, there is justification for believing that the device's implication was much in his heart. Moreover, at this period the architecture called 'Gothic' was spreading over Western Europe, developing a beauty peculiar to itself in England, 'Perpendicular'.[8] It is clear that a fresh spirit was flowing in Western Europe. And as that coincides with the popular spread of the 3-crowns

device heraldically, there is reason to think the two ideals may have been similar, and the English sought to foster this aim. Sceptics may argue whether their purpose was altruism or commerce or power, but the fact is undeniable that the symbol was an ideal. And in that era, before the days of literacy, men understood the meanings of symbols just as plainly as they do advertisement posters today; the sign of 'The Three Crowns' meant more than just an alehouse, it carried a story with it. There is too the evidence of King Alfred's and Queen Elizabeth's translations of *Boethius*: his 'Happiness and goodness are one', and her 'We were not guided by the pride of any mortal glory, but wish a ground in our affairs by which virtue should not grow old silently',[9] both suggest a tradition of idealism running in the royal house.

The Goodness-Strength-Wisdom of the 3-Crowns, as the way to Happiness, will be repeated; they imply remembering the past Goodness from which has evolved whatever we value today, maintaining Strength of Will to preserve that goodness through present difficulties, and cultivating Wisdom to build upon it a better future. The three were one, the development of Goodness; and they were always concurrent—learning more about it, maintaining it, and fulfilling it further. The term 'Goodness' therefore needs specification. It was memorised by the number '5', on the fingers of the hand and by other mnemonics: progress in intellect (whence all behaviour springs); progress in morality, without which intellect will be distorted; physical progress; material progress; and social progress, in justice and goodwill. These had all to be co-ordinated in proper proportion, with none neglected, 'Goodness' being the growth of Culture.

For this purpose seven principles were formulated, the Wisdom for attaining greater Happiness; they were in reality eight, though condensed into seven for memorising by the seven days of the week:

1. The first requisite is a proper Aim, necessarily seen in two aspects: the ultimate aim, and the immediate steps towards it. The ultimate is Perfection —of 'mind, body, and estate'—to which a fourth must be added, 'social surroundings', since no one's contentment can be complete unless people around him also are contented. The immediate aims in the four vary, because the ideal has to be tempered to the practical; hence the immediate can be generalised as Practical Idealism, the reminder for which was Sunday.

2. As every action in life stems from the mind, the next requisite is Knowledge. The reminder for this was Monday, its child in the nursery rhyme being 'fair of face', alluding to the Moon, the earliest symbol for scientific knowledge in the form of astronomy.

3. Knowledge by itself being of uncertain benefit, as it can be used wrongly, the next requisite is Wise Judgement for using it aright. This entails an absence of any personal bias, and a selfless outlook. The reminder for Wise Judgement was Tuesday, whose child is 'grace', a word with a compound meaning of Wisdom and Strength of Will.

4. Will accordingly was the fourth principle, representing the strength of mind to turn good ideas into practical action. This too is brought to mind

by Tuesday.

These four—Aim, Knowledge, Wisdom, Will—were the four principles of Reasoning. They used to be memorised in many other ways, such as the sun's daily course through the four quarters of the heavens—North, East, South, West (north being night-time), or the four seasons of the year—Winter, Spring, Summer, Autumn (harvest). The four quarters of the horizon are well instanced in a heraldic work of 1666: 'If these lines cross at right-angles, making quarterly, then it hath reference to the four cardinal points of North, East, South, and West; these lines signifying Reason not at all prevaricated' (i.e. perfect reasoning).[10] The next four principles covered the main subjects to which Reason must be applied in everyday life, all to be cultivated in due proportion if true happiness is to be achieved.

5. The physical element, Health and Strength, colloquially called 'Youth'; it was remembered by Saturday, whose Youth had 'far to go' through life.

6. The material element, Livelihood, was represented by Thursday, whose child 'has to work for a living'. The principle was coupled with the rule that sufficiency only should be sought, not luxury. Thor's hammer was that of the artificer.

7. The social element, Goodwill, was represented by Wednesday, 'loving and giving'. This included generosity over matters of opinion. Justice, however, belonged to the principle of Wise Judgement, though Goodwill contributed to it in the form of a blend with mercy.

8. Lastly came the Unknown Element, sometimes called Luck, sometimes Providence, an allowance for which has to be included in reasoning on any subject. It constitutes the portion of Knowledge which is always lacking, and corresponds to the engineer's 'factor of safety'. In Wise Judgement it is the element of intuition, which has to be assessed as impartially as possible, lest it cause the unwitting intrusion of some personal bias. With the need for impartiality, this principle became one of Selflessness.

Its converse, 'trusting in Luck', is the danger against which Friday's 'woe' was a warning; inversely that is a reminder for the positive principle of Prevision and Provision, provision by Providence being governed by the saying that 'God helps those who help themselves'.

9. The outcome of the whole eight principles, when properly applied, is Harmony of Mind. It denotes the accomplishment of the Aim, Perfection of Mind, and so represents also the Aim itself; hence it was recollected by Sunday 'happy and gay'.[11]

Such was the spirit beginning to animate Europe in the 14th century; but it became smothered, through the enterprise stirred by the Renaissance being diverted towards material ambitions. Veneration for the seven principles continued under the misleading designation the Seven Sciences, but their meaning was forgotten. 'Sciences' was the corruption of *sanths*, truths; they were the Seven Truths; but their metaphorical names, Astronomy, Geometry, and so on, were only indirect and abstruse allusions to what the principles enjoined. For some inexplicable reason the ancient Wisdom was passed down by word of mouth only, and hallowed in secrecy. Providentially

however, a monk of Bury St. Edmunds (a home of the 3-crowns tradition) taught the Wisdom to a man who became one of Henry VIII's Court, Stephen Hawes; and he, in 1509, published an exposition of them in a long allegory, *The Pass-time of Pleasure,* or more explicitly:

> Time passed with virtue must enter the gate of joy and bliss, without time for to be everlasting. (*Lines 5785-7*)

This aim was signified by 3-crowns, worn as a diadem by the figure of Eternity, whom John Lydgate himself calls Doctrine. A similar allegory is told by Gerard Legh in his *Accedens of Armory* (1562) under 'The Herald's Story', which ends:

> There came Eternity, apparelled in white vesture with a triple imperial diadem, and said to him: first the high God made heaven his own dwelling place (although his power is everywhere), and there in that place is Eternity, where time may not abide. And as my maker had no beginning, so shall I never have ending. All other things perish and lose their memory, I alone Eternity am invincible. And he that loveth God, doth his will, as a knight vanquishing the world and the flesh, his virtue shall live with me, Eternity, in sight of the Highest.

The Aim was 'Goodness', to be applied with Strength of Will and with Wisdom, in the concluding words of Legh's story:

> The lover of Wisdom, leader of Fortune, victor to wavering Chance, which Patience directeth with ruled Law. Till prevailing Policy, set on by Courage, giveth the overthrow to tyranny, placing Wisdom to subdue Chance and govern all in all.

There would appear good scope for reviving that old 'Policy' today, since it has the attraction of being traditional to Western Europe. The old stumbling block, though, needs to be noticed—Friday's abandoned child, Selflessness. Instead, clinging to self-interest has caused the almost invariable outcome, failure to see ahead clearly. Structures have been built to serve present welfare only, so that in Biblical phrase they have become weakened by rust, eaten by moth, and attracted thieves to break in, with resultant continual turmoil. Perhaps it is not too much to say that there are still grasping hands abroad in the world; consequently, if in compliance with the first of the 3-crowns precepts we recall past history, then we see the second two precepts needing to be effected: unity for strength is calling for accomplishment, to preserve what we value; and wisdom is calling for education, to build for the future. A symbol often expresses a spirit better than do words, since in a single outline a whole page of thought can be brought to mind; but its essence is the function 'remind'; the understanding must be conveyed from the outset, else fabrication will set in like a blight. Mehmet II, like Sir Thomas Malory,[12] remembered the Three Crowns legend as going back to the Tree of Eden, thereby giving East and West a common purpose. It is memories such as this, coupled with strength of will to preserve them, that can produce the single spirit wanted. Here, an attempt has been made to sketch what it is that we value in our Culture; and if what has been written be judged reasonable (E and OE), then does not this device of Three Crowns display a good and practical Aim, to lead towards our goal—peace, prosperity, and Happiness?

NOTES

[1] *Contemporary Review,* July 1969.
[2] Fiona Macleod, *Winged Destiny* 'A Triad', and *Coat of Arms* nos. 89, 90 (New Series).
[3] See *Family History* (Institute of Heraldic Studies), vol.X, no.64.
[4] Lucan, Pharsalia, i: 'Happy the folk on whom the Bear looks down'.
[5] *Wisdom of Solomon,* viii. 17.
[6] In Petyl's *Collecteana,* reproduced by S. Hooper, 1784.
[7] In his Essay among Du Boulay and Barron's *Essays (for) May McKisack,* 1971.
[8] See J. H. Harvey, *Henry Yevele,* 1944.
[9] 'silent' has here been amended to 'silently' to conform with the original sense.
[10] Silvanus Morgan, *Armilogia,* p.27.
[11] Quoted from *Faith & Freedom,* Autumn 1972, 'The Celtic Way of Life'.
[12] *Morte d'Arthur,* XVII, v.

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The January issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Morality in Foreign Policy: An Expression of American Idealism* by Thomas Hills, *Labour and the Constitution* by Norman P. Barry, *Belize is in the News* by Sybil Armstrong and *The Ice Break by Sir Michael Tippett* by David Fingleton.

DELINQUENCY—A NEW APPROACH

by Mia Kellmer Pringle

IN recent years disenchantment with residential provision has become widespread. Long-stay hospitals for the mentally or physically handicapped; boarding schools for maladjusted children; residential nurseries and children's homes for those needing substitute family care; all of these have come to be regarded as being less desirable, less viable and less constructive alternatives to living within a family and community setting.

In addition to the danger of institutions 'institutionalising' both inmates and staff, residential settings are now seen to have other disadvantages and shortcomings. For one thing, they are ever more costly to run. Next, it is difficult to staff them because in a relatively affluent society, which no longer has a surplus of single women willing to devote themselves to this kind of work, residential life has little appeal. Also it is now recognised that such work needs not only dedication but highly skilled trained staff if it is to play its proper role of treatment, rehabilitation and restoration to the community wherever possible; yet the proportion of trained workers is dismally low.

In relation to juvenile delinquents, the disenchantment with residential provision has been further increased by the apparently falling 'success rate'. From an unsatisfactory level of about 50 per cent twenty years ago, it had dropped still further by the mid-1960s to about 38 per cent. The definition of success is itself far from positive—merely that the delinquent has not been found guilty of an offence within three years of discharge. So it was perhaps inevitable that new hopes should be pinned on non-institutional forms of intervention for those 'in trouble'. A further factor was the recognition of the positive power of parental as well as of community involvement.

Though 'community care' has become a popular and appealing slogan, it has remained an empty catch-phrase because the necessary supportive, rehabilitative and treatment services have not been provided. Yet the more disadvantaged the child and his family, and the more deprived the locality, the more essential such services are. Without them, the concept of community care is in danger of being rejected as having failed when in truth it has not been given a proper chance to succeed. If additional resources are not provided or are made available on too limited a scale, or for too short a period, then the inevitably disappointing results lead to a condemnation of what could have been a viable concept. This applies as much to community care of the handicapped or the old as it does to intermediate treatment of delinquents.

What then is intermediate treatment? The term was coined relatively recently. It appeared first in the 1968 White Paper 'Children in Trouble'[1] and was then built into the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act.[2] The roots of the concept grew from more realistic and research-based child care policies which increasingly emphasised the need for early preventive

measures and for relinquishing the sharp distinction between deprived, disadvantaged and delinquent children. Compensation for inimical personal, family and environmental circumstances came to be seen as more appropriate than punishment.

Intermediate treatment was conceived as a form of intervention, half-way between removing a delinquent child from his family and neighbourhood on the one hand; and on the other hand, letting him remain at home under supervision. It was also intended to be a preventive measure for those 'at risk' of becoming delinquent. In fact an integral component of intermediate treatment is to avoid segregating young offenders and to allow them to participate in programmes which include children in their own neighbourhood who have not come before the courts.

The most recent definition has been put forward by a study group set up by the Personal Social Services Council under my chairmanship.[3] 'Intermediate treatment is action, through a range of already existing or new community-based programmes, planned to meet identified needs of children and young persons who are at risk of appearing or who have appeared before the courts.' Thus it is seen as encompassing a preventive role for disadvantaged young people; as a provision for those at risk of coming before the courts as well as those who have already been before the courts and placed on a supervision order; and for those in care, whether living in a community or foster home.

The Bureau's own report on Intermediate Treatment[4] saw its aims as providing new interests and experiences which can counteract delinquent or other undesirable influences and involvements. Also it seeks to prevent those segregating and labelling processes which are in themselves causal factors in the emergence and perpetuation of delinquent sub-cultures. Specific provision may have to be made for individuals with special needs and problems.

At its simplest, intermediate treatment provides challenging or exciting activities to counter the boredom which afflicts the life of many inner city youngsters with little to do (legitimately, that is) and nowhere to go (without infringing someone else's privacy or property). Also, many disadvantaged children and young people have a poor self-image compounded by educational failure and lack of opportunity to try their hand at new types of activities. Intermediate treatment programmes endeavour to provide such opportunities in the fields of sport, games, crafts, the arts—whether acting, painting or learning to play an instrument—and hobbies of various kinds; in every case the emphasis is on active participation with the aim of fostering the individual's skills and self-confidence.

Community participation both in the planning and running of a wide range of activities is an integral aspect of this approach. The active involvement of parents as well as of other adults must be enlisted while simultaneously fostering the involvement of the youngsters themselves in the life of their community. Activities may include establishing playgroups, adventure playgrounds, arts centres, sports programmes, discotheques and the like; to do so requires the mobilisation of a wide range of community resources

aided by the skills and knowledge of professional workers. Through being based on Family Advice Centres, it becomes possible to interlink these activities and services. For example, a mother may seek advice or assistance for a personal problem; she then becomes active in organising a mothers-and-babies group; this group in turn decides to provide a recreational programme for old-age pensioners of the neighbourhood; the senior citizens on their part then help to raise funds for a school holiday programme for local youngsters; some of these young people then start a window cleaning and decorating service for the old people while others take part in building a playground for the younger children.

In addition to such programmes, which are primarily activity-based, intermediate treatment must also provide the opportunity for those who have been emotionally and socially deprived to make supportive and dependable personal relationships. This is possible through sharing interests and activities with like-minded groups led by experienced youth workers. Some young people, however, require a one-to-one relationship, in some cases because having lacked this experience, they are too demanding or too withdrawn in group situations; while in the case of others, disruptive behaviour can be dealt with more effectively when individual attention is available.

Providing such close personal attachments presents difficulties in terms of professional staff but volunteers could play a much bigger part than they do at present. How effectively this can be done and on how large a scale has been shown by the successful recruitment of lay people, i.e. those who are not trained teachers, in the Adult Literacy Scheme. Of course, adequate support and guidance must be provided; professional resources are also essential for the recruitment and allocation of volunteers to individual children and young people, so that the latter's needs can be matched by the former's interests, skills and personality.

There are two further components of intermediate treatment which have remained so far underdeveloped. These are community service and restitution for damage done. Again much can be learnt from the success in the adult field of Community Service Orders for offenders as an alternative to prison sentences. Though only introduced as recently as 1972, they have already become a widely accepted measure. In contrast, work in the service of the community and repayment, as it were, for damage inflicted on the community, have not at present established themselves as part of community-based care for children and young people.

Yet there are several reasons why their widespread introduction could make an additional contribution to the range of available options. Both would enhance the credibility, and hence the acceptance, of the intermediate treatment concept. They would defuse the jibe that it is 'merely treats not treatment'. Also it would make intermediate treatment more acceptable to magistrates, many of whom so far remain sceptical of its value. The adolescent would be offered a significant change of role; instead of having things done to, for and with him, he would himself contribute his time, energy and skill for the benefit of others, thus making him feel needed and

wanted. Furthermore, having the opportunity to make restitution would relieve the burden of rejection and guilt felt by many young offenders while at the same time assuaging feelings of anger and revenge on the community's part.

Clearly none of the distinguishing features of intermediate treatment programmes are new or unique in themselves. Rather it is their flexibility, variety, comprehensiveness and, at best, multi-disciplinary, co-operative nature, which is or should be their main characteristic. It could be argued with some justification that it is largely what caring parents provide for their growing children: broadening their horizons; widening their range of new experiences so as to stimulate their intellectual curiosity about the world; deepening their ability to make relationships with an ever-increasing range of people; and promoting reasonable standards of behaviour which eventually will lead to self-discipline and consideration for others.

It is a reflection of how demanding, skilled and challenging the job of good parenting is that when it has to be complemented or supplemented by professionals, no single discipline or service is capable of providing all that is required. For intermediate treatment to be effective, social workers, probation officers, youth workers, teachers, instructors, artists, magistrates and the police all need to be involved; both statutory services and voluntary organisations have a vital part to play; and a substantial contribution can be made by volunteers. Yet none of these should completely usurp the parental role. For this reason and also because the parents' attitude to the adolescent inevitably remains a major influence, their agreement to, and wherever possible active involvement in, intermediate treatment programmes must be sought. Indeed, it could be argued that their inability or refusal to give support and to participate, might be seen as contra-indications to the suitability of community-based, intermediate treatment.

To assess children's needs without the availability of the resources necessary to meet them is frustrating to all concerned. Conversely, to allocate children and young people to existing facilities simply because they exist is also unlikely to meet their needs except in a rather hit-or-miss fashion. Faced with this choice of evils, it seems nevertheless wiser to assess the needs of each individual because the findings can be used as ammunition to argue the case for developing those facilities and methods which are lacking. To allocate haphazardly not only reduces the chance of successfully meeting an individual's needs but also risks bringing the whole concept of intermediate treatment into disrepute.

But where are the resources to come from for developing new facilities and programmes? Since at a time of financial stringency it is all the more important to make the most effective use of existing resources, should there not be a re-evaluation of those which are the most costly, namely residential provision? In a Circular issued by the Department of Health and Social Security at the beginning of this year,[5] the case for doing so was persuasively argued.

> A modest switch of resources from residential to intermediate treatment would represent a very substantial increase in resources for intermediate treatment. Any new initiatives in the development of intermediate treatment, involv-

> ing very little capital expenditure in many cases, would be an investment for the future. . . . A successful intermediate treatment programme should considerably reduce the need for residential care providing in many cases a more suitable form of treatment at potentially less cost.

Most schemes and projects are still in an early stage of development. Monitoring and on-going evaluation would help to clarify the most effective approaches and methods, as well as to provide participating staff with the stimulation and critical awareness which collaboration with practice-orientated researchers can—at its best—produce.

If the necessary resources, support and impetus remain lacking and if the belief in the potential efficacy of this approach remains half-hearted, then intermediate treatment may come to share the fate of other innovative and forward-looking ideas: to be condemned as ineffective, not because of any inherent shortcomings but because of a failure of imagination and nerve.

A crossroad may well have been reached. Given a real commitment to the concept; adequate resources; staff willing to become involved with a wide range of other professions; community and youth workers able to provide for the differing needs of young people and their families within the community in which they live; and a real partnership between statutory services, voluntary agencies and volunteers, then, and only then, can intermediate treatment really get off the ground to become an imaginative and viable alternative to custodial care.

NOTES

[1] *Children in Trouble* (1968) Cmnd 3601, HMSO.
[2] *Children and Young Persons Act*, 1969. HMSO.
[3] Personal Social Services Council Study Group (1977). *A Future for Intermediate Treatment*, PSSC.
[4] Leissner, A., Powley, T. and Evans, D. (1977) *Intermediate Treatment: A Community-based Action-research Study*, National Children's Bureau.
[5] *Circular on Intermediate Treatment* (1977) Department of Health and Social Security, LAC (77)1.

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QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW

by James Morton

AGAIN quite by chance two films turn up in London with exactly the same theme—that of a failure of communication—but there the similarity ends. The first is Woody Allen's *Annie Hall* and the second is Claude Goretta's *La Dentellière.*

Woody Allen was a former stand up night club comic in the best American Jewish tradition of Mort Sahl and Lennie Bruce. His films have all been an extension of his act, a mixture of Jewish humour and the psychiatrist's couch. The best loved is *Play it Again Sam,* possibly because it allows the audience to participate once again in the obsession it has for the late Humphrey Bogart. *Annie Hall* features most of his stock players, such as Diane Keaton, in the title role. The story is part fact part fiction of their life together in New York, He plays a night club comic, she a small time singer who meet whilst playing tennis. They live together and break up when she goes to California to make a long playing record. Allen visits her but she is hopelessly out of sympathy with the West Coast and out of his Brooklyn milieu. Annie Hall drifts from *affaire* to *affaire.* Allen sits and remembers the good times they had together.

Allen's films suffer primarily from their lack of structure and secondly from the fact that they lack an audience. I recall some years ago going to see the Crazy Gang on the first house on a Monday night. It was awful. They went through their act as the tired old men they were. By some chance a few months later I saw the self-same show, but this time the house was full of coach parties who were actively spurring Flanagan & Co. into greater excesses.

The same really applies to Allen. The jokes flow at the rate of two a minute or more but they tend to wash over the audience. One sequence in the film shows him in his old role of stand up comedian and it shows what a stunning command of timing he has. This never manifests itself in the film—one is always out of breath reaching for the new joke. It seems a funny thing to say but he would be better making programmes for television where he has an audience to control and who—to a certain extent—can control him. That said, the film really is funny with more one-line jokes and sight gags than I can recall in any other film. It is also more disciplined than his earlier films and ultimately it is really rather touching.

Whether it is in the class of *La Dentellière* is another matter. Certainly Diane Keaton is nowhere near as an accomplished an actress as Isabelle Huppart, who plays Pomme in the French film. Many would say that you can't compare the two and that one is purely a comedy, but to label Allen's film as that is to both underestimate and misunderstand his work. *La Dentellière* is Goretta's second film. (The first was about a group of workers invited to a *chateau* for an afternoon and was briefly shown in London). Pomme is an assistant in a Paris beauty salon and is essentially a simple minded but a cute eighteen year old.

She is under the tutelage of Marylene, an old employee in the salon who at the beginning of the film breaks up her *affaire* with a married man. She and Pomme go to Cabourg for an out of season holiday. Marylene soon picks up an American and moves out of the hotel bedroom leaving Pomme in sole possession and very much alone.

She meets a young law student and goes to bed with him at the end of the holiday. Back in Paris, for no very clear reason, she sets up home with him. From then on it is a very slow deterioration of the relationship. He is of good bourgeois stock and she does not understand his friends and is not accepted by his parents. For her part she is infuriatingly silent, asking little except to be patted as a puppy and eating the ubiquitous apple. Eventually he forces a break and then she degenerates into insanity and a mental hospital.

It could have been so easy for Goretta to have depicted the law student (Yves Beneyton) as a cruel seducer of an innocent victim of the class war but nothing is further from the case. He finds he cannot live with her and does what he thinks is best for both of them. Judging by the end of the film he does not seem to have done what is best for himself, let alone Pomme who has retreated into a world of total fantasy.

The film is a masterpiece of subtle statement with a truly riveting performance by Isabelle Huppart. I cannot recall when I have been so entranced by the sheer acting ability of a player. Perhaps this is the trouble with the film. I never found myself actually involved with any of the principals. I was, of course, mildly sorry for both of them but it did not affect me. All I was concerned with was thinking how brilliant was Isabelle Huppart. When it comes to it I was more involved with Woody Allen and Diane Keaton.

It is impossible not to be involved with the Spanish film *Las Largas Vacationes del 1936*, now showing a year after its appearance at the 1976 London Film Festival. Jaime Camino is the director of the story of a handful of middle class holiday makers 'trapped' in a small village in the hills outside Barcelona at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. It is a fine Sunday morning and two of the women are on the way to Church when one stumbles and is taken to the local doctor for an injection. Whilst she is there the Republicans open fire on the Church and force the surrender of the priest. For some days everything is chaotic but later as the days pass into weeks, the weeks into months and these in turn into years one sees a pattern of their life. At first there are still picnics and paellas but later there are food shortages, bombings and extortion by the peasants who have smallholdings. Quique, one of the boys, falls in love with Alice as they grow older and he goes off to the war on the republican side. Everything until the eventual evacuation follows a logical progress.

Although Camino has made the film from the republican side it is not really a political story but one showing basically decent people caught in a conflict they never completely understand.

This is one of many fine Spanish films made in recent years and the degree of freedom with which it has been made shows the lessening of

censorship restrictions in Spain. One can only hope *Crias Cuevas*, another triumph of the 1976 London Film Festival, will be shown.

Francesca Rossi first burst into prominence on the Continent some twelve or so years ago with his semi-documentary picture of a bullfighter, *Momenta di Verdad*. This was a simplistic study of the rise of a Spanish peasant played by the real life *tremendista* Miguel Migelin. Even then it established his style and left wing reputation with its attacks on the usual fashionable targets such as wealth which he equated with decadence and corruption.

The excellent Gate cinema which is the reincarnation of the Notting Hill Classic has had a seeming monopoly to show his work in London and the latest, *Lucky Luciano*, has just finished its run there and is starting to pop up in various parts of the country. Rossi's style is still that of the documentary with pieces of straight reportage footing slipped in between the sequences. The film is the story of Luciano, the American gangster, after his release from prison and deportation to Italy in 1946. Gian-Maria Volonte is in the title role and Rod Steiger plays the small time crook who is sent to infiltrate his web. For some reason—no doubt wholly promotional—Steiger has had top billing but Volonte, who has been a master of his craft for many years, now acts him off the scene. Had *The Godfather* been an Italian film then surely Volonte would have had the Brando role. He is excellent as he wheels and deals, lies, cheats and throughout maintains a feline grace and charm even when finally arrested and interviewed over a drug consignment.

There is one scene which deserves particular mention. It is the sequence where some Italian girls are invited (after the war) to a party in a GI mess in the South of Italy. The contempt he manages to convey both for the Americans whom he depicts as simple fools and the girls who prostitute themselves for sandwiches is devastating. Alexander Walker of the Evening Standard described this as 'The most important film in London'. Certainly I could not agree with that but it is an important film and one which should not be missed.

Christmas is coming soon and so one must look out for amusement for the children. There is a new Walt Disney film *The Rescuers* which seems to look over its shoulder to *101 Dalmatians* and is none the worse for that. The new James Bond *The Spy who Loved Me* bears no resemblance to the book whatsoever, which is rather sad. It was Fleming's one effort at writing a love story and it gave a true picture of a young Canadian girl loose in London in the late 50s. The film is the usual round of exploding cars, chases, falling buildings and a lunatic scientist out for world domination. There is a very good villain and poor acting from everyone else. The children in the audience loved it.

They were also very keen on *The Island of Doctor Moreau*. This is a rather jokey remake of the excellent Warner film *Island of Lost Souls* from the novel by H. G. Wells. Burt Lancaster is the well meaning scientist outcast for his experiments and he plays the part with a great deal of weariness in contrast to Charles Laughton's colonial sadist in the original.

This is a film which does not benefit from colour. The masks worn by the human animals are not convincing and their acting suggests the wider extremes of the muppet show. Nevertheless the children were properly respectful during the thinking bits and cheered loudly when Michael York —who like Jeff Bridges never seems to age—begins to get the upper hand.

March or Die, a 'stirring' tale of the Foreign Legion, should suit them as well. It is directed by Richard Lester who made the latest version of *The Three Musketeers* and *Royal Flash*. Again he treats the subject quite lightly but tongues initially wedged firmly in cheeks loosen as the film gathers pace and it is clear that by the end Terence Stamp as the hero has actually attained that status.

Finally a very short tribute to the BBC. It continually shows good films in sequences. This summer we had not only a series of old Karloff Lugosi films on Saturday nights but also a long tribute to the Ealing Studios. This latter showed many films such as *Halfway House* which will never get another commercial screening and one should be grateful for the opportunity to see them. At present there is a series of musicals most of which have disappeared and the showing of foreign films which will never appear. We should be grateful to them.

VIA MEDIA

by Andrew Liddell

THE world is divided between two economic theories, capitalism and communism; economic freedom versus economic egalitarianism. The rivalry between these systems is the main conflict in the latter part of the 20th century, although there are many other subsidiary quarrels at the same time. In history, this is a familiar pattern: many squabbles over frontiers, dynasties, trade, economics, but a dominant theme. In Western Europe over the last thousand years the main themes followed a related sequence.

After the Western provinces of the Roman Empire were abandoned in the fifth century AD, as being indefensible, the Christian church was left to the mercies of the barbarian infiltrations. Against the odds, the result was that the church absorbed the barbarians into a modified system, in which, in addition to spiritual authority, the Pope acquired temporal, or secular, authority.

From the 11th century, the main issue was between the Pope and the Emperor to whom he had delegated secular powers: the result was the weakening of the cohesion of Christendom.

During the 16th and 17th centuries the frontier became that of religious innovation against traditionalism. The resulting religious wars led to a weakening of moral sanctions and the accretion of power to the nation states.

For the last two hundred years the issue has broadened. The philosophy of political freedom, born in the West, became an international ideology against which were ranged the proponents of order or authoritarian rule. The resultant world wars weakened the credibility of the nation states in favour of the super-powers.

The struggle is currently expressed in economic terms: economic equality, as conceived by the socialist philosophers, versus economic liberalism. From earlier examples, it seems unlikely that either will 'win', but that the conflict will end in some unexpected outcome.

Communism has many appealing ideals. Its thesis is, briefly, that the concept of equality before the law and political freedom conceived in the 18th century and achieved in the 'democratic' nation states to some extent, was not enough. A just society would require that the product of society be shared equally to achieve true 'democracy'. The goal should be economic rather than political equality. This ideal was epitomised in the phrase 'to each according to his needs, from each according to his abilities'—a more basic expression of idealism, than the 'liberté, égalité, fraternité' of an earlier generation of revolutionaries. The theses of Karl Marx are not cold and authoritarian, but rather warm-hearted and practical. Faced with the exploitation of the working classes which was particularly obnoxious in his time, Marx developed his philosophy: the economic reasoning may have been arguable, but the ideals were humane.

The trouble arises with the application of communist principles to a real society. If 'market forces' are not to be allowed to determine demand and 'profit' is not to provide the incentive to production, some other motor is to be found. The chosen motor is the plan. The plan establishes detailed production quotas for every economic unit, whether it be a farm, a chemical plant or a taxi driver. The plan is all encompassing, is established by officials, based upon the census of resources, employment and productivity and in accordance with the economic and political objectives of the government. The social product, the product of all output quotas, is allocated in detail to investment, defence, government, utilities, communal consumption, balance of payments needs and, lastly, private consumption. Within the COMECON, in the spirit of socialist division of labour, the national plans of member states are to be co-ordinated.

The plan is an inflexible matrix for every aspect of economic activity. Its quotas are set in terms of 'quantities' not of 'qualities'. Rewards are related to accomplishment of the 'plan' and failure to meet the production quantities incurs sanctions, so that the rhythm of each stage of the productive chain is: obtain the allocated resources from the previous stage by hook or crook; convert them into the product quota, regardless of the quality or efficacy of the product; and pass it down the line to the next production unit: a sort of game of musical cushions.

Robert Kaiser in his book *Russia* cites the Bolsheviska tailoring factory, which produces suits, shunned in the shops by consumers, because they shrink. This is not really Bolsheviska's fault. It cannot pre-shrink its material because it would lose 10% of production in a manner inexplicable to the planners. Technical achievements of Russian science and industry are a tribute to the ingenuity of individuals in beating the constrictions of such a system.

It seemed that the application of advanced cybernetics to planning might overcome the difficulties, that computers would really be able to assess resources and allocate them with such infallibility as to make the planned economy work. In some of the smaller socialist countries, notably Bulgaria, this has proved true, but not on the large scale of the major industrial economies nor of Comecon.

The infinite variety of human behaviour means, as it always has meant, that dirigisme cannot work, whether it be religious, political, or economic.

There is a quirk in human nature which makes it believe either in an ordered, disciplined past (the Golden Age) or in an ordered and disciplined future (the Brave New World). Neither view has any semblance of likelihood. The past has always been a chaotic interplay of personalities, ideologies and economics and there is no reason to suppose that the future will not continue so to be. These two misconceptions divide those who believe in an innately good human nature which has been perverted and if left alone will return to natural goodness (the liberals) from those who believe in original sin, which, if curbed and disciplined, can, perhaps, be redeemed (the authoritarians).

The frustration of those who believe in the innately good characteristic

is just as great as that of the dirigiste. In the current contest, economic freedom has proved as unworkable as economic authoritarianism.

The thesis of capitalism is that the social product should be determined 'democratically' by the preference expressed in the form of free individual expenditure: competition for the flow of consumer expenditure will ensure that the social product reflects as closely as possible consumers' choice as to goods, services or savings (a preference for deferred consumption).

The mechanics of the system are that a successful product will attract money in excess of its cost of production, a profit, which will enable the producer to harness more production resources (capital) and increase output, until demand is satisfied. The way this happens is that the profit enables the producer to attract the new savings (capital funds) of the community and invest them in acquiring new production resources. The producer rewards the new capital funds which he has acquired by payment of a share of his profits, a dividend. The profit also enables the producer to pay more interest on borrowed funds, whether from individuals, institutions, or banks, but the volume of borrowed funds is a function of the permanent capital funds of the producer, because of the necessity to preserve prudent ratios. The key, then, is that new capital funds should be allocated to production by the attraction of the income which it can generate in the form of distributed profits, dividends. So long as producers are constrained to distribute earnings to the maximum extent, in order to woo new capital, production resources will be allocated roughly according to the preferences expressed by consumers' expenditure, at least so far as the private sector of the economy is concerned. The determining factor in allocation of savings to investment should therefore be dividends per share, only modified by the assessment of the relative risk involved in the production concerned, fickleness of market, obsolescence and the various elasticities of demand and price.

The share of government in the total product is determined by the share taken from private disposable incomes through taxation and by the ability to attract savings by paying competitive rates of interest. Expenditure by government in excess of the products of these sources amounts to the creation of new money and opens up a whole new perspective—the money supply and inflation. But government expenditure does not offend the capitalist principle that the social product should be determined democratically, provided that the government is responsible to democratic election.

Of course, consumer expenditure is not equally attributed to each individual, because some have more money at their disposal than others. A greater weight is therefore attached to the consumer preference of the 'rich' than the poor, but there is an element of justice in this, because the 'rich' have saved money by deferring consumption in the past, which gives them a prior claim on current production; besides the distortion is not of great significance provided that the inequality of wealth distribution is within socially acceptable bounds; and taxation can level inequalities.

The trouble in the capitalist system arises from the difference between practice and theory.

The first distortion that comes to mind is the ability of producers to invoice their capital needs instead of bidding for new capital funds in the market. The technique is to establish a 'monopoly' for the product and then to promote sales regardless of price. Modern advertising methods can create the idea that a product is 'unique' and has no substitute. This, combined with modern techniques of sales promotion, can reduce the effects of competition and sensitivity to price; indeed, competitors have an interest in differentiating their own product and maintaining price. Producers are therefore enabled to add to their sales price an element for the acquisition of new plant and equipment, not just depreciation or amortisation of existing plant, but additional cash to meet expansion requirements: autofinancement.

The reason that the providers of capital funds (shareholders) accept the phenomenon of autofinancement is that, in most advanced capitalist countries, the tax on distributed profits is so high that shareholders are willing to forego the prospect of income in exchange for the prospect of growth of their capital funds (equity). Such capital profits are much less highly taxed, if taxed at all. Consequently, earnings per share, in place of dividends per share, becomes the key determinant in attracting capital funds.

Earnings per share and autofinancement led to a further distortion, the polyvalent corporation. The ability to mobilise capital funds internally gave producers the means of taking over the role of investors and therefore of diversifying their activities into related, or unrelated fields. This development leads to the determination of an increasing share of the social product by professional managers, remote from responsibility to consumer or other social constraints.

Finally, neither earnings per share, nor dividends per share take account of non-financial factors such as number of employees, rewards to employees, contribution to the society nor indeed of the cost to the community in damage to the environment: ecological, social and philosophical factors are excluded per se. On reflection it is unlikely that the social product resulting from the reflection of free consumer expenditure will in fact be either what the community as a whole wants or what is good for it, because consumers use a significant part of their disposable income irresponsibly.

For the communist system to produce the Bolsheviska factory is bad; but for the capitalist system to produce Las Vegas is worse! It would not be regrettable if both the economic theories now in conflict were to be discarded in favour of something else; and historical perspective implies that this is a likely outcome. A plague on both houses!

The occlusion of the confrontation between the communist and capitalist system is going to result in new methods of determination and distribution of the social product. Already, in the marches between the two economic areas can be discerned new systems and institutions, which may be the forerunners.

An interesting example, in the shadow of communist Europe, is Yugoslavia. The variation from the orthodox communist doctrine is that power

has been delegated to the 'enterprises' which make up the production units of the country. The enterprises themselves are responsible to their shareholders, comprising employees and customers. State ownership is thus from the bottom upwards. Management is left with responsibility for determining the commercial policy and profit is used as one of the yardsticks of success.

In the sphere of the capitalist world is the amorphous European Economic Community, some of the members of which have moved quite far from capitalist practice. Most European countries have adopted a mixed economy, in which a high percentage of production is state controlled, with varying degrees of central planning.

In France, the major banks and insurance companies, the steel industry, coal, railways, a major sector of the motor industry and tobacco are all state owned, representing a significant percentage of the social product. The French state corporations are encouraged to follow their own commercial policies and to compete, where necessary, against each other. France was the most successful of the European countries to adopt central planning of its economy. It was a vital instrument in promoting recovery from the wartime and pre-war economic decline. However, unlike the communist planning practice, the concept of the French plan is not that of a matrix, but rather an inventory of the resources available to each sector of the economy, targets for independent managements, and an assessment of the aid, financial or regulatory, needed from government to achieve the objectives.

Basic industries and utilities have also been nationalised in Britain, but planning has not proved effective. Mutations in the British economic system are becoming apparent in the institutionalisation of sectoral interests, notably the labour organisations, employers' federation, and regional communities. It is at present not possible for the British government to implement a policy without prior consultation with the Trades Unions, so that they have become a de facto constituent of government: a fourth estate. There are other claimants to similar privilege.

An interesting phenomenon is the growth of joint ventures in communist countries between local state enterprises and foreign capitalist enterprises; and the *modus vivendi* worked out between the two philosophies.

At the other end of the frontier between the two systems is the curious home grown capitalism of Japan. Japan has adopted the philosophy of American capitalism with spectacular success internationally, but its institutions have many special features. Production is dominated by corporations linked through interlocking shareholdings into families of companies. Such groups respect a social responsibility to their work force and are governed by a hierarchical structure based on seniority, not on competitive merit. Government is conducted in consultation with the groups and policy is sometimes implemented not be regulation, but by an invisible code of conduct. Incidentally, the Japanese are endeavouring to use similar techniques in their international trade relationships, sensibly preferring to adopt self-restraint, rather than to be excluded from markets by legislation,

more difficult to dismantle once in place. In effect, the Japanese are coming towards the corporate state by a different route from that of the Europeans.

Apart from deliberate nationalisation as a result of socialist inspired policy, there are economic reasons why certain industries are better organised by the state. Basic industries, which were the forefront of the first stages of the industrial revolution, are cyclical in nature. As the base of the economy they are most sensitive to changes in the level of economic activity. They are also labour intensive, consequently variations in the rhythm of the economy have an important effect on employment. A socially conscious government cannot look with equanimity at the resulting social friction. It is better to take control, to endeavour to ensure a consistent level of employment and investment, at a cost to the whole community. In another sphere, urban concentration is necessary for efficient economic organisation, but the capital cost of commuter transportation cannot be rewarded properly without distortion of the earnings of the commuters. Consequently passenger transportation services decay. The government cannot stand back and let its cities be throttled. Even in the heartland of capitalism, the United States of America, the state has had to step into some sectors. Corporatism is manifesting itself in creeping state intervention. The organisation of 'business' in the United States is working in the same direction. Through the effects of autofinance, certain individual US companies have succeeded in dominating several sectors of the economy. International Business Machines is the computer industry. A narrow group of companies dominate steel, chemicals, the aircraft, space, banking and many other industries. The difference between a US corporation and a Russian state enterprise is becoming less clearly defined.

In other words, the conflict between the capitalist and communist economic theories will result in the growth of corporatism as a system of economic organisation. This will imply that the various partners in the economy, government, labour, management, savers, consumers, production units and representatives of regional interests will co-operate one way or another in establishing the resources available, the targets for sectors and the allocation of the social product. Neither the economic liberal nor the economic authoritarian will approve of the compromise, but it may work better.

Meanwhile, no doubt, disorder will continue in human affairs in other quarters. From the philosophy of economic organisation the fight is likely to move into the inequality of the geographic distribution of resources. The next stage of confrontation looks as if it will be North/South, the 'have' nations against the 'have-nots'.

[Before taking up an appointment in Hong Kong, Andrew Liddell was responsible for developing Eastern Europe business on behalf of First International Bancshares Ltd.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THE INFLUENCE OF LIDDELL HART

Liddell Hart, A Study of His Military Thought. Brian Bond. Cassell. £7.95.

Liddell Hart was arguably a genius as a military writer. Certainly he had no rival in Britain in this century as a combination of commentator, theorist, propagandist and historian. He started young and kept it up for half a century (1920-1970). As Brian Bond, his admirable expositer points out, he was profoundly affected for the rest of his life by his experience on the Western Front during the First World War, short though it was through no fault of his own. A vital part of his subsequent thinking was governed by his inflexible determination that the frontal assault of the Somme and Passchendaele should never be repeated.

He made his name as a pioneer in the field of infantry tactics but by 1921, to use his own words, his 'conversion to mechanisation was complete'. It was a sad irony that his doctrines of armoured warfare were made far more use of by the Germans than by his own countrymen. German Generals like Guderian did not hesitate to express their gratitude to Liddell Hart for setting them on the road to the triumphant Blitzkrieg. The British attitude makes painful reading. Brian Bond leans over backwards to defend our military rulers during that period, but his task is more or less impossible.

The unfortunate irony did not end there. By the time the 1930s were reached, Liddell Hart had become the recognised exponent of the defensive as being stronger than the offensive unless the latter was given overwhelming superiority of force and numbers. No one can doubt that the general effect of this emphasis was damaging and nearly fatal. This is not to deny the rightness of Liddell Hart in many particular and specialised controversies. He made the grave error of becoming attached, as special adviser, to Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War. Belisha, guided by Liddell Hart, made an excellent democratic approach to army reform but managed to antagonise everyone who mattered. By 1939, Liddell Hart had reached a nadir. His military prestige had sunk with the failure of what was thought to be his policies. He had suffered a heart attack; his first marriage had broken up. The beauty of his second marriage was still in the future.

During the war, he was more or less out of things, officially discredited. Even so, his warnings, for example about the effects of unconditional surrender, began to look very sensible soon afterwards. After the war, his attitude to the defeated Germans in general and to the German Generals in particular does him nothing but credit. Before he died, he was, in a broad sense, rehabilitated. His 'History of the Second World War' will surely be accepted as the best account in a single volume. Some of his famous ideas, like the indirect approach, will figure more largely as essay subjects for students than as guidance to future commanders. But when the dust of the pre-war controversies settled, and Churchill, himself, was seen in perspective, Liddell Hart emerged as an authority to whom even the greatest experts, in this and other countries, did well to listen. Increasingly he became a kind of Mecca for old and young to visit. No one, as I know from personal experience, was ever more generous in placing his extraordinary supplies of knowledge at the disposal of seekers after military truth.

FRANK LONGFORD

ORIGINS OF THE LAST WAR

The Making of the Second World War. Edited by Anthony P. Adamthwaite. George Allen & Unwin. £6.95 (paperback £3.50).

Mr. Adamthwaite's collection of documents relating to the coming of the last war is the twenty-eighth in the series of Historical Problems: Studies and Documents, whose general editor is G. R. Elton. Mr. Adamthwaite has contributed a 110-page introduction to the 116 pages of documents.

The author has provided both the student and the general reader with a timely collection of extracts from documents which range from government published official correspondence, to Cabinet papers and personal correspondence. Here, however, we shall be more concerned with the introduction, which acts as a useful survey of the writing so far devoted to the war's origins. This is in turn supported by a short but useful bibliography of the more important works (in English) about the inter-war years.

Mr. Adamthwaite also presents his own view. He has much more to say for the Versailles Settlement than many still versed in the views of Keynes and his followers. The settlement was 'a brave attempt to deal with intractable, perhaps insoluble, problems'. The politicians in 1919, he argues, faced problems on a scale not known before: the collapse of the Ottoman, Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and the emergence of the United States with whose power came a frightening degree of international irresponsibility. Especially important was the destruction of the Austrian Empire, from which tragedy we, and those who once lived under the benign rule of the Hapsburgs, still suffer. Likewise, the failure to act over the Italian attack on Ethiopia laid the foundation for much which was to follow.

Mr. Adamthwaite returns to a more traditional view of the coming of the war then held by historians like Maurice Cowling. Whilst he agrees that British party politics during the 1930s did matter, he insists, and rightly so, that a country which shies away from the use of force is necessarily at the mercy of one whose government does not, whether it be headed by Hitler or Amin. There would, in short, have been no war without Hitler. The author's concern with 'class' as a factor in British political life is perhaps somewhat naïve and misleading, in that it underestimates the popularity of the Conservative policy of detente or appeasement. The introduction is nevertheless a useful guide to the work being done as well as to the extracts which follow.

J. E. B. MUNSON

THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

Jerusalem Perspectives. Edited by Canon Peter Schneider and Dr. Geoffrey Wigoder; maps by Martin Gilbert, 1976; 50 pages.

Jerusalem Illustrated History Atlas. Drawn, annotated and published by Martin Gilbert, Oxford, 1977; 128 pages; £2.50 (£1.50 in soft cover).

These two slender volumes deal with one of the most difficult problems that must be solved before any agreement can be reached between the Arab States and Israel—the City of Jerusalem. I have a deep personal interest in this conflict as I live there, and have done so for most of the past sixty years.

The trouble is that the city contains a great many holy places sacred to each of the three major religions—(in historical order) Judaism, Christianity and Islam. As far as Jews and Christians are concerned, *Jerusalem Perspectives* is an attempt to establish a theological dialogue about the city. In 1976, the London Rainbow Group met in the ancient—and appropriately named—Jerusalem

Chamber at Westminster Abbey. The papers read there have now been published and are edited by the Christian and Jewish joint chairmen of the Group with forewords by the Dean of Westminster and the Senior Rabbi of the West London Synagogue.

The papers deal with:

The Jewish presence in Jerusalem, 1880-81: Jerusalem before Zionism; by Dr. Tudor Parfitt.

Jerusalem in recent history: 1882 to the present; by Martin Gilbert.

The Christian Communities in the context of the larger religious framework of the Holy City; by Canon Peter Schneider.

The present problems and future perspectives; by Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem.

These papers are followed by three appendices:

A Jerusalem chronology.

A Jerusalem bibliography (of works in English).

Jerusalem between 1922 and today in seven maps, by Martin Gilbert.

These maps are all taken from *Jerusalem: Illustrated History Atlas* that appeared in July, 1977. It contains sixty-six maps showing the development of the city over the 4,000 years of its recorded history—its frequent destructions and constant rebirths, together with its demographic situation today. The first half of the atlas shows the development of the city up to World War I; the next sixteen maps trace the conflicts and riots in which the city was involved, showing the various political boundaries proposed from time to time. The last fifteen maps depict the development of Jerusalem under the State of Israel. Some of these maps break entirely new ground: for example (map 50), the development work of the Jerusalem Foundation (organised by Teddy Kollek) and the following map showing the constant spread of Jerusalem's parks and gardens in the last ten years financed largely by the Foundation. In consequence, the city grows lovelier all the time, to the delight of the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims and tourists who visit it each year and to the joy of its lucky inhabitants.

EDWIN SAMUEL

JANE AUSTEN'S DOMESTIC LIFE

A Jane Austen Household Book: With Martha Lloyd's Recipés. Peggy Hickman. David and Charles. £3.95.

Peggy Hickman has shown considerable enterprise and ingenuity in basing her short study of Jane Austen's domestic life on a book of recipés gathered by a close friend of the Austen family, Martha Lloyd. The small, faded volume was recently acquired by the Jane Austen Trust, thus providing an opportunity for research into Jane Austen's attitude to food and cooking generally. As Peggy Hickman points out, published cookery books were a rarity and so most families recorded their own favourite 'receipts'.

As is constantly confirmed by memoirs and letters written during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, meals were elaborate and subject to the 'removes' eventually discarded by Mrs. Beeton's more practical approach to feeding the family or guests. And yet, on the whole, mainly due to primitive ovens and boiling plates, the methods of cooking remained basically roasting and boiling. Hence, the value of the subtly flavoured soup or sauce by means of a surprising variety of unusual ingredients.

The impression given is one of thoughtful, intelligent housekeeping and a readiness to give time and trouble to the preparation of food, taking advantage

of an unexpected bonus such as fresh fish from the sea, or Hampshire lakes and rivers, or game shot in the nearby woods. Wherever possible, the average family expected to grow their own fruit and vegetables and to make preserves.

Throughout this cheerful involvement with the pleasures of the table, Jane Austen's own personal comments, and those of her fictional characters, run like a bright thread. The problem is to equate the most caustic and penetrating social commentator in our Literature with the girl who writes enthusiastically to her sister that she looks forward to enjoying a haricot mutton 'next week'!

ROSALIND WADE

A LITERARY LANDMARK

Rebecca West: A Celebration Selected from her Writings. Macmillan. £8.50.

It is difficult to write coolly of this prodigious harvest of a rare talent's life-work, selected with her co-operation, her minor readjustments where necessary. Novellas and shorter fiction entire, excerpts from longer novels; the *St. Augustin* biography; critical essays and reviews; political and crime reportage including the Nuremberg Trials, the Setty-Hume murder, 'Lord Haw-Haw', the Profumo case; a 200-page extraction from *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon,* an account of a Balkan safari which Mr. Samuel Hynes, in his critical introduction, rightly calls 'a supreme effort, by a mind at the height of its powers'; 780 pages, a gift at the price.

It includes also a preview of opening chapters of a novel in progress, *The Real Night,* a sequel to *The Fountain Overflows.* This sketches, with sure characterisation, the social interactions of two families set in the luxurious country home of a Jewish art voluptuary and collector, Mr. Morpurgo, and his recalcitrant wife who scoffs at his classic tastes. 'I tell my husband,' she says of her daughter, 'that my Marie Louise can paint a better picture than all his Florentines and Sienese.' She prefers Chardin, Greuze, le Brun to 'stupid-looking stiff Madonnas' and 'ugly little Christs.' On leaving, the mother of the visiting family tells her brood: '. . . you had to learn that there are husbands and wives who do not get on together.' This adroit comedy of manners has delicious touches. The butler and footman 'suddenly looked as remote as if they had taken a drug.' The butler 'opened a door at a blank verse pace.'

In style and content it is incomparably better than her 1918 first novel, *The Return of the Soldier* (complete), about a shell-shocked officer's return home with loss of memory, except for his idyllic love of a Bray innkeeper's young daughter fifteen years ago. She is now dowdy, drably married, but he is obsessed by the memory, knowing his wife only 'as one knows a woman staying at the same hotel.' The situation seems strangely unreal, the style half-amateur at times, though vivid on scenic background. One hardly accepts that his young love, confronting him again so changed, 'has gathered the soul of the man into her soul and is keeping it warm in love and peace. . . .' It is too far-fetched. Her other fiction is represented by extracts from *The Modern "Rake's Progress", The Thinking Reed, The Birds Fall Down; The Salt of the Earth* and *Parthenope* entire.

Having known Macedonia as a young soldier, I can react strongly to Dame Rebecca's genius in presenting scene and people in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon.* Her descriptions of the fecundity peasant rites of St. George, with altar sacrifice of live cock and lamb, are unforgettable and incite deep speculation into mystic psychology and Christianity. Her liberal-minded approach to all forms of cruelty and barbarism is based, she admits, on the love of honour, freedom, harmony, of Herbert Fisher, Lord Cecil and Gilbert Murray. As in all

her serious work, she probes in depth.

Admirers of her *Sunday Telegraph* reviews, marked by the brilliant uncommonsense of a writer in her mid-eighties, will enjoy her critical essays now reproduced. She heartily defends D. H. Lawrence, regarding his life as 'a spiritual victory.' Of Kipling she says: 'Some of his work was gold; and the rest was faery gold.' While not swallowing him whole, she perceives what made his work 'just the nourishment the English-speaking world required for the period surrounding the Jubilee and Diamond Jubilee' and recalls her own childhood memories of the time. Her other subjects include Charlotte Brontë, Henry James, Joyce, Kafka, Margaret Drabble.

What irony if the work of her lover of long ago, H. G. Wells, so eminently of his time, should prove less enduring than her own at its best, which is for all time, or at least a long time yet. One reservation about this cornucopian book: it is so bulky to hold that I would have preferred it in two volumes, even at higher cost.

TREVOR ALLEN

A NEW ANTHOLOGY OF SHORT STORIES

My Favourite Story. Edited by Denys Val Baker. William Kimber. £3.25.

Once again Denys Val Baker has assembled a most attractive and reasonably priced anthology of short stories, the schema this time being that the authors were invited to select their own favourite story for inclusion. This means that without a unifying theme, such as the supernatural or the countryside, the stories are, inevitably, more heterogenous than in the previous volumes. However, the conscious effort with which, in a continuous rather than a sporadic reading of the stories, one transfers one's loyalty to a completely new atmosphere with each succeeding story, is well rewarded by the sheer stimulation of the variety. Interestingly, the editor reveals that the authors vehemently rejected his first plan for self-selection of their 'best' stories. In brief introductory remarks, each writer explains his preference: it may be that the story is associated with a special period in his life, or that it is a response to a particularly strongly perceived incident, as in James Hanley's fine study of isolated old age, *Mr. Ponge*. It may be that the story illustrates a psychological or philosophical idea of particular interest to the writer, as in Rosalind Wade's thoughtful story, *The Gold Medallion*, which illustrates the effect of experience on personality and development. Indeed, it is those writers who 'prefer' a story with a serious theme, such as William Sansom's tragi-comedy of middle age and modern plastic manners, expressed wryly through the psychiatrists' 'narcissistic injury' of tooth extraction and substitution of the first denture, in *A Visit to the Dentist*, who contribute the most memorable stories to this collection.

MOLLY TIBBS

TOM DRIBERG'S MEMOIRS

Ruling Passions. The Autobiography of Tom Driberg. Jonathan Cape. £5.95.

In the middle '50s, a mild, rather moral book, *The Philanderer* by Stanley Kaufman was prosecuted for obscenity. Its acquittal opened the floodgates for the tide of pornography of which Tom Driberg's autobiography, with luck, will be the climax—to use a word of which the author would have been proud. There can be no doubt that had this book been prosecuted ten years ago a conviction would have been certain. Now, with the carnival which attends such prosecutions, it would no doubt be shown to have strong remedial qualities.

Tom Driberg is best remembered as a back bench Labour M.P. for some twenty years before his elevation to the peerage as Lord Bradwell. He was also

a well-known journalist. He was for many years William Hickey on the *Daily Express* and later wrote a weekly column for *Reynolds News*. He was also a practising homosexual—and according to his autobiography took pains to use his position as a journalist in particular to promote his proclivities and to smooth his path when he was caught in the act.

It is difficult to know which are the least unpleasant parts of the book. For those with a turn of mind Driberg lists innumerable acts of homosexual passions mainly with the lower classes—he had a passion for the armed forces. Even when writing supposed reportage—much of the book is taken from old articles of his—the gloat of the seducer gleams through, as when he looks on the faces of sleeping men in a troopship.

Driberg was born in 1905, the son of middle-aged parents. His elder brothers were at that time in their twenties. He grew up amidst good middle-class comfort. He was bored by his background. Even the activities of his brothers disenchanted him. Lancing and Oxford brought him out and brought out the snobbishness in him. He seems to have been a second division Evelyn Waugh. The stories of his brothers make up the most entertaining pages of the book, although he manages to infer homosexuality and paedophilia in one of them, Jack. Jim, a doctor, fell into hard times, drink and divorce sent him into exile in South America from which he returned to live with Driberg. This by no means pleased the compassionate younger brother.

'He . . . had had a severe bout of DTs and had defecated all over his bedroom floor. This was unbearable, and dangerous (he was in the sixteenth century timber-framed part of the house); to put it cynically, it was difficult to get and keep good servants.' This from the devoted socialist peer.

Quite apart from anything else, Driberg has not actually been too frank in his writing. In fairness, it may be that death clipped a few thousand words from the book, but it gives the impression that he steadfastly flaunted his homosexuality in defiance of convention. There is one passage where he sneers at prospective M.P.s who put down 'married with family' on their application forms. The implication is that he would not demean himself by marriage. Do we hear a word of Mrs. Driberg/Lady Bradwell? We do not. Again like Evelyn Waugh's first wife she seems to have been excised from memory.

With the fashion for reading lives of the second rate, Driberg will surely soon have a number of biographers. No doubt they will give further examples of how power and cynicism can and do corrupt but whether they will serve any useful or edifying purpose is doubtful. This book does not.

JAMES MORTON

SHORTER REVIEWS

Devolution: the End of Britain (Jonathan Cape. £4.95 hardback; £2.95 paperback). This is a powerful attack upon the whole conception of devolution for Scotland and Wales by Tam Dalyell, Labour M.P. for West Lothian since May 1962 at a by-election when the Scottish Nationalist leader William Wolfe came second. Mr. Dalyell is naturally mainly concerned with Scotland, although many of his arguments are equally well applied to Wales. He gives his account of the reluctant conversion, finally in 1974, of the Labour Party to devolution on electoral grounds. It is fair to add that the Conservative Party also gave way with equal reluctance to the policy of devolution. Inevitably this book is concerned with the two devolution Bills destroyed in the last Parliamentary session by the defeat of the guillotine motion. The new proposals, which would give more powers

particularly to the Scottish Assembly, do nothing to weaken the author's arguments. The Assembly will lead to bitter frustration and the demand for more authority and more control. The division of powers between Westminster and Edinburgh will lead to administrative and political chaos. There will be overgovernment with more bureaucracy, and no economic advantages. There will be the inevitable slide to independence, which is precisely why the S.N.P. support the proposals. 'There is not, and never can be, a tenable half-way house between remaining an integral part of the United Kingdom and opting for a Scottish state. . . . The great danger is that Scotland may well stumble into independence simply because not enough people understand where devolution—which sounds so harmless and unexceptional—will lead them'. The SNP has not majority support among Scots. At the last election it had about a third of the votes cast: no doubt a considerable proportion were protest votes and not votes for independence. Nonetheless, the SNP 'has been extraordinarily successful in conveying . . . that it alone is the "party of Scotland".' To a smaller degree this applies to the Welsh nationalists. This is a striking book which needs to be read and re-read as the campaigns proceed in Parliament and ultimately at the promised referendums. It would be an advantage to have an edition incorporating the new legislative proposals.

Poets In School (Harrap. £2.95). The Poetry Society's Poets in School project, founded in 1969, has at last borne fruit to the general public in the shape of this little gem of a book edited by Alasdair Aston. In the early sixties, when Head of English at Alleyn's School, Dulwich, Alasdair Aston invited the whole school to write a poem, the best of which would be published in a magazine produced by him and a few boys in their spare time. The result astounded him. The magazine, *Abstract*, became a regular publication and must now be regarded as the embryo of this volume of poetry written by schoolchildren. The Poets in School project brought poets like Adrian Mitchell, David Harsent, Patricia Bear, George MacBeth and many others into the classrooms of British schools and brought to the pupils a form of self-expression many of them would never have considered. The eighty-eight poems here are unfettered by the complexities of form that many established poets seem to consider more important than content. Most of the poems are simply a joy to read and one cannot ask more than that. In his Preface, Stephen Spender expresses his hope that this volume will cause the emergence of future poets in strength. One must also hope it will be only the first of a series of equally refreshing publications of poetry by young people. (J.M.)

The Ship's Cat (Jonathan Cape. £2.95). Hot on the heels of *The Plague Dogs*, Richard Adams' latest story of animal life, comes this delightful tale in verse of a ship's cat who is captured by the Spanish, thrown into Chagres gaol, only to escape and return to England laden with booty for Good Queen Bess. He is suitably rewarded with a knighthood and spends the rest of his days with his family in Berkshire. Written in the style of such verses as 'Sir Patrick Spens', it is richly illustrated by Alan Aldridge, who spares the reader nothing in his portrayals of the grotesque crew and conditions in a Spanish gaol. The book is a real old-fashioned adventure with the cat as a clearly defined hero for which the author rightly makes no apologies. It will make good bed-time reading for children from six to sixty. (J.M.)

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